JUDGMENT Ashok S. Kinagi, J. - The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition seeking the following reliefs: a. Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other Order or Direction, directing to quash or set aside the Rejection Order dated 26.10.2013 passed by 4th Respondent Deputy Director bearing No.Ga BhuE/UNiHo/Ka.Ga.Sha/50/2013-14/9330 and Revision Order dated 09.07.2014 passed by 7th Respondent Joint Director at No.GaBhuE:JamNiBa:MaPaA:219.2013-14:354 produced at ANNEXURE-E & F respectively, in respect of Quary Lease No.HPT-395/08-09 to extract Ordinary Building Stones in Govt. Land at Sy.No.1 of Mallapur Village, Sandur Taluk, Bellary Dist., over an area of 03.00 Acres produced at ANNEXURE-B; and/or; b. Consequentlially issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other order or Direction directing 4th Respondent Deputy Director and Competent Authority to Renew and/or Extend validity period of Quarry Lease at QL HPT- 395/08-09 till 17.11.2013 to extract Ordinary Building Stones, over an area of 03.00 Acres, in Govt. Land at Sy.No.1 of Mallaapur village, Sandur Taluka, Bellary District, alternatively exercising the Deeming Powers as per newly inserted Rule 8-A(2) & (4) effective from 12.08.2016; and/or 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was granted a quarrying lease to extract ordinary building stones which is a non-specified minor mineral covered under the provisions of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1994 (for short the said Rules of 1994 ) and the said lease was valid for a period of five years with effect from 18th November 2008 to 17th November 2013. 3. The petitioner filed an application for renewal of quarrying lease in the prescribed Form-R on 16th August 2013 along with the statutory fees, well within the prescribed period. The fourth respondent-Authority has not disposed of the said application within 90 days as provided under Rule 22 of the said Rules of 1994. The said Rule 22 was in force till 12th August 2016. The fourth respondent vide order dated 26th October 2013 rejected the application for renewal stating that quarrying lease area is now included in Safer Zone Notification dated 25th October 2012. 4. The petitioner aggrieved by the order of rejection of application for renewal dated 26th October 2013, preferred a Revision Petition No.219/13/2014-15 before the seventh respondent. The seventh respondent after perusing the material on record, dismissed the revision petition by order dated 9th July 2014, vide Annexure F . 5. 4. The petitioner aggrieved by the order of rejection of application for renewal dated 26th October 2013, preferred a Revision Petition No.219/13/2014-15 before the seventh respondent. The seventh respondent after perusing the material on record, dismissed the revision petition by order dated 9th July 2014, vide Annexure F . 5. The petitioner aggrieved by the order of rejection of renewal application and order of Revisional Authority, filed this writ petition. 6. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the renewal application is filed well within 90 days as provided under the erstwhile Rule 22 of the said Rules of 1994, which was in force till 12th August 2016 and the fourth respondent has wrongly rejected the renewal application, which is highly illegal and impermissible under law. He further submitted that there is no hard-and-fast rule by way of period of limitation for filing a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. He has relied upon the judgment reported in the case of SMT. SUDAMA DEVI VS. COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS, (1983) 2 SCC 1 and further submits that the Revisional Authority i.e., seventh respondent, without considering the material on record, has dismissed the revision without applying their mind. Hence, he prays to allow the writ petition. 8. We have perused the records. 9. The grievance agitated by the petitioner did not deserve to be addressed on merits, as the writ petition is filed at a belated stage. Hence, we are considering the writ petition only on the ground of delay and latches. 10. The petitioner was granted quarrying lease to extract ordinary building stones vide Q.L.No.HPT-395/08-09 for a period of five years with effect from 18th November 2008 to 17th November 2013. The petitioner filed an application for renewal of quarrying lease in the prescribed Form-R on 16th August 2013 within ninety days as provided under the erstwhile Rule 22 which was in force till 12th August 2016. The fourth respondent, vide order dated 26th October 2013 rejected the application on the ground that the applied area comes under the notified Safer Zone area for stone crushers. The petitioner aggrieved by the order passed by the fourth respondent, filed a revision petition before the seventh respondent. The fourth respondent, vide order dated 26th October 2013 rejected the application on the ground that the applied area comes under the notified Safer Zone area for stone crushers. The petitioner aggrieved by the order passed by the fourth respondent, filed a revision petition before the seventh respondent. The seventh respondent after considering the material on record, has affirmed the order passed by the fourth respondent and consequently dismissed the revision vide order dated 9th July 2014. 11. The petitioner is challenging the order dated 9th July 2014 passed by the Revisional Authority, in the year 2019 by way of the instant writ petition on 14th February 2019 from the perusal of the contents of the memorandum of the writ petition, the petitioner has not explained the satisfactory reasons for approaching this court at a belated stage. In fact there is no explanation at all for the delay of four and half years. The petitioner is not a layman. He was granted a quarrying licence in the year 2008. We do not entertain the grievance agitated by the petitioner to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and latches. We would like to place reliance on the judgment of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE BOARD & OTHERS VS. T.T. MURALI BABU, (2014) 4 SCC 108 wherein it has been ruled thus: 23. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ Court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional Court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, procrastination is the greatest thief of time and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis . 12. From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is manifest that a writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice. The present case, needless to emphasize, did not justify adjudication. It deserves to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order passed by the fourth respondent and also the order passed by the seventh respondent for more than four and half years and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of SMT. SUDAMA DEVI (SUPRA) wherein Hon ble Supreme Court has held that there is no hard-and-fast rule that can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of latches. Though there is no limitation prescribed for filing a writ petition, but the party who approaches the writ court must approach within a reasonable time. The words reasonable time as explained in VEERAYEEAMMAL VS. SEENIAMMAL, (2002) 1 SCC 134 , at paragraph 13 is as under: 13. The word reasonable has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word reasonable . The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word reasonable . The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the reasonable time is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P.Ramanatha Aiyar s The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean: A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than directly ; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea. Further, in the present case, the petitioner has not explained the satisfactory reason for approaching the writ court at a belated stage and further not pleaded about the injustice that would be caused to the petitioner. 14. As observed above, the writ court while deciding the writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. The doctrine of delay and latches should not be lightly brushed aside. A litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, procrastination is the greatest thief of time and law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. Thus there is inordinate delay of more than four and half years in approaching this court. Hence, on the ground of inordinate delay and latches, we decline to entertain the writ petition. 15. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.