JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of learned counsel appearing for rival parties. 2. The petitioner has challenged order dated 24/07/2014, passed by the respondent No.1 i.e. District Deputy Registrar (Co-operative Societies), whereby the Executive Committee of respondent No.2 – Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Khamgaon, stood superseded by exercise of power under Section 45 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 1963. 3. The petitioner was the elected Chairman of the Executive Council of the said Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Khamgaon (APMC) and according to him, impugned order dated 24/07/2014, passed by the respondent No.1 was illegal, unsustainable and that it was passed in a high handed manner. Although, initially interim order was not granted in the present writ petition, subsequently, order of status quo was granted. 4. The brief facts leading up to filing of the present writ petition are that certain complaints were received by the respondent No.1 in January 2017, alleging that the Secretary of Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Khamgaon, had indulged in misappropriation and corruption while purchasing weighing machines for the said APMC. On the basis of such complaints, the respondent No.1 directed the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies to enquire into the matter. Pursuant to the said directions given by respondent No.1, the Assistant Registrar submitted a report dated 21/04/2017, giving findings to the effect that there was substance in the complaints made against the Secretary of APMC, Khamgaon and that the material that came to light in the said enquiry demonstrated that there was indeed misappropriation and corruption on the part of the said Secretary. Upon receipt of said report on 05/05/2017, the respondent No.1 directed that the enquiry under Section 40(b) of the aforesaid Act be undertaken and a report be immediately submitted within 10 days, with a further direction that the requirements of Rule 117 of the Rules framed under the said Act be complied with, while conducting such enquiry. A further direction was given to the Assistant Registrar to cause an First Information Report (FIR) to be registered against the Secretary of the APMC, Khamgaon, on the basis of material that had come on record. On 06/5/2017, the respondent No.1 passed a detailed order regarding enquiry to be conducted under Section 40(b) of the said Act. 5. A further direction was given to the Assistant Registrar to cause an First Information Report (FIR) to be registered against the Secretary of the APMC, Khamgaon, on the basis of material that had come on record. On 06/5/2017, the respondent No.1 passed a detailed order regarding enquiry to be conducted under Section 40(b) of the said Act. 5. An FIR was registered in pursuance of the said directions given by respondent No.1. The secretary of the APMC was arrested and later on he was released after four days of custody. Thereafter, on 22/11/2018, the respondent No.1 issued an order giving two specific directions to the APMC. The first direction was to immediately suspend the said Secretary of the APMC and second direction was to appoint the senior most person in the list maintained by the APMC for appointment of qualified persons in the post of Secretary. It was directed that the said directions be complied with and report be submitted within 15 days to the office of respondent No.1. 6. According to the respondent No.1, the said directions were specifically given under Section 40(e) of the aforesaid Act. Since there was non-compliance of the same on the part of the APMC, a notice was issued on 22/1/2019 under Section 45 of the said Act to show cause as to why the Executive Committee of the APMC ought not to be superseded for non-compliance of the specific directions given by the respondent No.1. The APMC submitted its reply to the said notice and by impugned order dated 24/07/2019, the Executive Committee of the APMC was superseded and it was directed that the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies would take over as Administrator. The said order has been challenged in the present writ petition. 7. Mr. A.M. Ghare, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, who was Chairman of the Executive Committee of APMC, submitted that the impugned order passed by the respondent No.1 was wholly unsustainable and that it was in the teeth of the provisions of the aforesaid Act and Rules. It was submitted that the directions given by the respondent no.1 by order dated 22/11/2018, could not have been issued under Section 40(e) of the said Act and that, therefore, the very basis of the proceedings against the APMC under Section 45 of the said Act was fallacious. It was submitted that the directions given by the respondent no.1 by order dated 22/11/2018, could not have been issued under Section 40(e) of the said Act and that, therefore, the very basis of the proceedings against the APMC under Section 45 of the said Act was fallacious. It was submitted that directions under Section 40(e) of the said Act could have been issued only during pendency of an enquiry under Section 40(b) of the said Act. It was submitted that in the present case, although a direction was given on 05/05/2017 and a specific order was passed on 06/05/2017, by the respondent No.1 directing the Assistant Registrar to initiate such enquiry under Section 40(b) of the Act, no such enquiry was initiated and in any case no notice was ever issued to the APMC under such an enquiry. On this basis, it was submitted that when such an enquiry was not initiated, directions under Section 40(e) of the said Act could not have been issued, because under the said provision directions can be issued pending consideration of reply during the course of enquiry. On this basis, it was submitted that the action of the respondent No.1 was unsustainable. It was further submitted that enquiry under Section 40(b) of the said Act has to be conducted in consonance with Rule 117 of the Rules framed under the said Act and there was absolutely no material that such an enquiry was ever undertaken, by adhering to the requirements of Rule 117 of the said Rules. 8. On merits of the matter, it was submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that there were two fold directions given in order dated 22/11/2018, purportedly issued by the respondent No.1 under Section 40(e) of the said Act. The first direction was to immediately suspend the then Secretary of APMC and second direction was to appoint the senior most person from the seniority list available with the APMC on the post of Secretary and to submit a report of compliance within fifteen days. It was submitted that the then Secretary was immediately suspended and therefore, the first direction was complied with. It was submitted that the then Secretary was immediately suspended and therefore, the first direction was complied with. As regards second direction, since enquiry was pending against the senior most person from the seniority list of the APMC, the APMC sought to appoint a person, who was next senior in the seniority list, in respect of which controversy erupted, as the senior most person challenged the said action of the APMC. It was further submitted that the dispute raised by the senior most person in the list travelled up to this Court and it was only after a writ petition filed by the said person was disposed of on 24/07/2019, that he was appointed as Secretary of the APMC. Due to the dispute and litigation, the senior most person could not be immediately appointed. Yet, the respondent No.1 did not consider the sequence of events while passing orders. There was substantial compliance of the directions and in any case drastic action of supersession of the APMC by exercising power under Section 45 of the said Act was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that action of respondent No.1 was high handed and that elected persons were deprived of their legitimate term due to such high handed action. On this basis, it was submitted that the writ petition deserved to be allowed and a further direction was required to be given that the petitioner and other members of the Executive Committee should be permitted extra period for completing the entire five year term of the Committee. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh and others Vs. Sanjay Nagayach and others (2013) 7 SCC 25 and Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. District Collector, Raigad and others (2012) 4 SCC 407 . 10. On the other hand, Mrs. Mrunal Naik, learned AGP appearing on behalf of respondents No.1 and 3 submitted that the impugned order passed by the respondent No.1 was fully justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. District Collector, Raigad and others (2012) 4 SCC 407 . 10. On the other hand, Mrs. Mrunal Naik, learned AGP appearing on behalf of respondents No.1 and 3 submitted that the impugned order passed by the respondent No.1 was fully justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It was submitted that large scale misappropriation of funds by the APMC was noticed and in that backdrop, during pendency of enquiry under section 40(e) of the said Act, directions dated 22/11/2018 were correctly issued under Section 40(e) of the said Act. Non-compliance of such directions was an admitted position, because even if the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner were to be accepted, the appointment of the Secretary was finally made on 24/07/2019, which was much after 15 days period stipulated in order dated 22/11/2018, had expired. It was submitted that the authorities had taken immediate action on the complaint of corruption and misappropriation of funds made against the APMC and that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the writ petition deserved to be dismissed. As per directions given by this Court, the learned AGP produced the original record for perusal. 11. Mr. S.D. Chande, learned counsel appeared for respondent No.8, who was also a member of the Executive Committee of the said APMC. He supported the submissions raised by the learned AGP. Although it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent No.8 could not be heard by this Court, as he had been disqualified as per an order of the Executive Committee, this Court has heard the learned counsel on the merits of the matter. 12. Mr. K.P. Mahalle, learned counsel appeared on behalf of respondent No.4, who was appointed as Administrator, as per the impugned order. He made no submissions on merits of the matter. 13. Mr. J.B. Gandhi, learned counsel appeared for respondent No.2 - APMC, Khamgaon. 14. Mr. Amit Bhate, learned counsel appeared for respondent No.17 and supported the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. 15. Heard learned counsel for rival parties and perused the material on record. He made no submissions on merits of the matter. 13. Mr. J.B. Gandhi, learned counsel appeared for respondent No.2 - APMC, Khamgaon. 14. Mr. Amit Bhate, learned counsel appeared for respondent No.17 and supported the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. 15. Heard learned counsel for rival parties and perused the material on record. The first submission made on behalf of the petitioner is a pure legal submission and it needs to be dealt with first, because if such contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is accepted, the subsequent action taken by the respondent No.1 under Section 45 of the aforesaid Act is rendered still born. The thrust of the submissions made in this regard by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner was that a perusal of Section 40 of the aforesaid Act would show that power under Section 40(e) of the said Act could be exercised only during pendency of the enquiry under Section 40(b) thereof. Much emphasis was placed on the words used in Section 40(e) of the said Act, which reads as follows: “direct that anything which is about to be done or is being done should not be done, pending consideration of the reply and anything which should be done but is not being done within such times as he may direct.” 16. It is an undisputed position that enquiry contemplated under Section 40(b) of the said Act has to be conducted in consonance with the requirements of Rule 117 of the aforesaid Rules, which provides for manner of enquiry and inspection. The said Rule stipulates the requirements, which demonstrates that the principles of natural justice are expected to be followed during the course of said enquiry. 17. It is necessary to examine as to whether in the present case when order dated 22/11/2018, was issued by the respondent No.1, purportedly under Section 40(e) of the said Act, whether an enquiry under Section 40(e) thereof was pending. This is because pendency of such an enquiry is a sine qua non for issuing directions by exercising power under Section 40(e) of the said Act. 18. In the present case, the sequence of events leading to supersession of APMC by the impugned order was triggered by complaints received by the respondent No. 1 in January 2017, regarding misappropriation and corruption on the part of Secretary of the APMC, while purchasing weighing machines. 18. In the present case, the sequence of events leading to supersession of APMC by the impugned order was triggered by complaints received by the respondent No. 1 in January 2017, regarding misappropriation and corruption on the part of Secretary of the APMC, while purchasing weighing machines. The record shows that on the directions given by the respondent No.1 on 06/01/2017, the Assistant Registrar had conducted an enquiry. A report pursuant to the said enquiry was submitted on 21/04/2017, before the respondent No.1. In this enquiry, findings were rendered adverse to the Secretary of the APMC. On the basis of the said report, on 05/05/2017, the respondent gave three specific directions. Firstly, to conduct enquiry under Section 40(b), to be completed within 10 days. Secondly, to adhere to the requirements of Rule 117 of the Rules, while conducting such enquiry and thirdly, to cause an FIR to be registered against the Secretary of the APMC, on the basis of such report. Thus, even as per the record, enquiry under Section 40(b) was first directed to be initiated on 05/05/2017 and thereafter when a detailed order regarding the same was passed by the respondent No.1 on 06/05/2017. It is at this stage that the Assistant Registrar was expected to comply with the requirements of Rule 117 of the said Rules to undertake the process of enquiry under Section 40(b) of the said Act. 19. There is nothing on record to show that the Assistant Registrar indeed issued notices to the APMC, starting the process of enquiry as per Rule 117 of the said Rules and that the APMC was to file reply in response to initiation of such an enquiry under Section 40(b) of the said Act. A perusal of the original record, which was tendered by the learned AGP, shows that other than directions given on 05/05/2017 by the respondent No.1 to the Assistant Registrar to initiate enquiry under Section 40(b) of the said Act, no further steps were taken in that regard. 20. It is after the said directions were issued on 05/05/2017 and 06/05/2017 that on 22/11/2018 i.e. after more than one year and six months, the respondent No.1 issued order dated 22/11/2018, purportedly under Section 40(e) of the said Act, giving the aforesaid two directions to the respondent No.1. 20. It is after the said directions were issued on 05/05/2017 and 06/05/2017 that on 22/11/2018 i.e. after more than one year and six months, the respondent No.1 issued order dated 22/11/2018, purportedly under Section 40(e) of the said Act, giving the aforesaid two directions to the respondent No.1. The material on record does not show that such an enquiry under Section 40(b) of the Act, in consonance with requirements of Rule 117 of the said Rules, was initiated pursuant to the directions given by the respondent No.1. There is nothing to show that the enquiry was at the stage pending reply from the APMC. In such a situation, it is difficult to understand how the respondent No.1 claimed that directions given by order dated 22/11/2018, were issued to the APMC under Section 40(e) of the said Act. An alternative submission was made by the learned AGP, that the record demonstrated that a communication dated 22/05/2017, was sent by the Auditor of the Co-operative Societies to the respondent No.1, with reference to the order dated 06/05/2017, passed by the said authority for initiation of enquiry under Section 40(b) of the said Act, stating that since detailed enquiry was already conducted and report dated 21/04/2017 had been submitted by the Assistant Registrar, there was no necessity for undertaking a fresh enquiry. On this basis, it was submitted by the learned AGP that the enquiry which resulted in report dated 21/04/2017, could be said to be an enquiry under Section 40(b) of the said Act and that, therefore, order dated 22/11/2018, passed by the respondent No.1 was as per Section 40(e) of the said Act. But, even if the said contention is accepted, for testing the arguments raised by the learned AGP, it is evident that if enquiry undertaken by the Assistant Registrar, pursuant to the directions given by the respondent No.1 due to complaints in January 2017, was to be treated as an enquiry under Section 40(b) of the said Act, it culminated in report dated 21/04/2017, forwarded by the Assistant Registrar to the respondent No.1. Thus, the enquiry having been completed, power under Section 40(e) of the said Act could not have been exercised by the respondent No.1, as the said provision specifically provides that directions can be given pending consideration of reply, meaning thereby that such directions can be given only when an enquiry is still alive. Thus, the enquiry having been completed, power under Section 40(e) of the said Act could not have been exercised by the respondent No.1, as the said provision specifically provides that directions can be given pending consideration of reply, meaning thereby that such directions can be given only when an enquiry is still alive. But, if the said earlier enquiry was to be treated as enquiry under Section 40(b) of the said Act, it had already culminated into report dated 21/04/2017 and, therefore, the said contention raised on behalf of the learned AGP cannot be accepted. 21. The only conclusion that this Court can draw on the basis of above discussion is that, order dated 22/11/2018, giving directions to the APMC, could not have been an order passed in exercise of power under Section 40(e) of the said Act. As a consequence, the said order cannot be sustained and since noncompliance of directions given in the said order was the basis for the respondent No.1 to proceed against the APMC under Section 45 of the said Act, the entire action undertaken by the respondent No.1 by exercise of power under Section 45 of the said Act was rendered still born and wholly unsustainable. On this very ground, the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the present petition deserves to be allowed. 22. But, since this Court had heard the learned counsel for rival parties at length and original record was also perused, it is evident that the APMC had immediately suspended the then Secretary of APMC, upon receiving the order dated 22/11/2018. Therefore, first direction was complied within the stipulated period of time. But, as regards the second direction whereby the APMC was expected to appoint a senior most person in the list maintained for appointment of persons as Secretary of the APMC, there is material on record to show that a dispute had arisen due to the fact that the APMC was of the opinion that senior most person could not be appointed due to enquiry pending against him. The said person had raised grievance regarding the same, resulting in litigation, which ultimately travelled up to this Court and culminated into an order passed by this Court in a writ petition filed by the said person. The said person had raised grievance regarding the same, resulting in litigation, which ultimately travelled up to this Court and culminated into an order passed by this Court in a writ petition filed by the said person. This process consumed considerable time and ultimately, after the writ petition was disposed of by this Court, the APMC appointed the said senior most person as Secretary by order dated 24/07/2019. Incidentally, the impugned order in the present case directing supersession of the Executive Committee of the APMC was also passed on the very same day i.e. 24/07/2019. 23. The question is whether the material available on record shows flagrant violation of directions given by respondent No.1 to APMC, Khamgaon, warranting drastic action of supersession of the Executive Committee. Regarding removal of a person who occupies an elected office, the authorities as well as the Court have to be circumspect and they have to come to a considered conclusion that the allegations against elected persons are of such a serious nature that removal of such democratically elected persons can be justified. The power of removal from office or to supersede such elected body has to be exercised sparingly and only after all the requirements of law are fully satisfied. The said position of law has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh and others Vs. Sanjay Nagayach and others and Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. District Collector, Raigad and others (supra). 24. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has correctly placed reliance on the same. This Court is of the opinion that the facts and circumstances of the present case, on the basis of perusal of original record do not make out such a case that the drastic action of supersession of the Executive Committee of the APMC could have been undertaken by the respondent No.1. Therefore, even on the merits of the matter, it cannot be said that the Executive Committee of APMC had committed such wrongs that would justify their supersession. It is found that substantial compliance was demonstrated by the petitioner and that in any event the facts and circumstances of the present case do not justify the drastic action taken by the respondent No.1. 25. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed much reliance upon the judgment of State of Madhya Pradesh and others Vs. It is found that substantial compliance was demonstrated by the petitioner and that in any event the facts and circumstances of the present case do not justify the drastic action taken by the respondent No.1. 25. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed much reliance upon the judgment of State of Madhya Pradesh and others Vs. Sanjay Nagayach and others (supra), claiming that since the action of the respondent No.1 was high handed and the Executive Committee of the APMC had been illegally superseded, a direction was required to be given to permit the Executive Committee to continue in office beyond the period of five years for the period during which they were deprived of their elected office. A perusal of the said judgment and order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court shows that the Board of Directors had been superseded on an innocuous allegation of failure on their part to conduct meetings periodically and that in the facts and circumstances of the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered such contentions raised on behalf of the superseded Board of Directors. But, in the present case, although this Court has accepted the contentions on law and on facts raised on behalf of the petitioner, but, the facts and circumstances can be distinguished, in the sense that in the present case, serious allegations of misappropriation of funds and corruption were made against the then Secretary of the APMC, which led to registration of FIR. 26. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the said specific contention raised on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 27. But, in view of the fact that the contentions on law as well as facts raised on behalf of the petitioner are accepted, it is found that the impugned order is wholly unsustainable. 28. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed and set aside. 29. Rule is made absolute in above terms. 30. Original record and proceedings produced by the learned AGP are returned. CAW No. 123/2020 This is an application filed on behalf of APMC, Buldhana, for intervention. It is claimed that the order passed by this Court in the writ petition would affect the intervenor and that, therefore, it deserves to be heard. Rule is made absolute in above terms. 30. Original record and proceedings produced by the learned AGP are returned. CAW No. 123/2020 This is an application filed on behalf of APMC, Buldhana, for intervention. It is claimed that the order passed by this Court in the writ petition would affect the intervenor and that, therefore, it deserves to be heard. Reliance was placed on Section 13(1)(A) of the said Act, which provides that the Bombay Agricultural Produce Market Committee, wherein 12 representatives of agriculturist elected by the APMC members and other Agricultural Produce Market Committees in the State are to be elected from each Revenue Division. 2. According to the intervenor, if the writ petition is allowed, it would adversely affect the intervenor on the question of election of representatives to the Bombay Agricultural Produce Market Committee, which is to be held in near future. 3. Mr. P.C. Madkholkar, learned counsel appeared for the intervenor. Having heard the learned Counsel, this Court is of the opinion that the grievance sought to be raised by intervenor while seeking intervention in the said application, pertains to separate and independent cause of action, if any, that may arise in future. Therefore, this Court finds that there is no substance in the present application and accordingly, it is dismissed.