JUDGMENT : The petitioner is the widow of late K.Gopal Mohan, who died on 24.10.2012 while working as an Assistant Manager of the State Bank of India. Late Gopal Mohan was placed under suspension as per Ext.P1 order on 29.06.1993 while he was working as Assistant Manager on the allegation that he committed misconduct in violation of Rule 32(4) of SBI Supervising Staff Service Rules read with rule 50(4) of S.B.I.Officers' Service Rules, in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. 2. Ext.P3 memo of charge was issued to him on 14.12.1995 alleging commission of misconduct in sanctioning agricultural loan. Though late Gopal Mohan submitted his explanation, enquiry was conducted in which out of 7 charges, charge No.1(a) and charge No.2(b) were found proved and Charge no. 2(a) was found partly proved. Accepting the findings in the enquiry, he was awarded a punishment of reduction in basic pay by two stages with cumulative effect and the period of suspension was treated as suspension itself. Though an appeal was filed, the same was rejected. 3. While so, he was convicted in the criminal case for offences under section 120B, read with sections 420, 466, 468 and 471 IPC along with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment, as per the judgment dated 30.12.2002 in CC.No.5/1998 and connected cases. On the basis of the conviction, the General Manager issued Ext.P8 order on 06.02.2003 discharging him from service under rule 68(7)(i) of the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules. Against the conviction the petitioner's husband had filed Criminal Appeal No.90/2003 which was allowed by Ext.P9 judgment dated 25.03.2011. On the basis of the acquittal, late K.Gopal Mohan submitted a representation requesting for back wages. He had also filed WP(C).No.1189/2005 before this Court which was withdrawn as per judgment dated 21.11.2012. Subsequent to the rejection of his claim for back wages as per Ext.P11 dated 26.09.2012, the Chief General Manager rejected his claim on the ground that he was convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude. It was stated that after his acquittal he was eligible for reinstatement, but not for back wages. But by the time he was acquitted he was already attained the age of superannuation and therefore he was not liable to be reinstated and was not eligible for back wages. It was stated that after his acquittal he was eligible for reinstatement, but not for back wages. But by the time he was acquitted he was already attained the age of superannuation and therefore he was not liable to be reinstated and was not eligible for back wages. While so, Sri.Gopal Mohan expired and therefore, his wife, the petitioner herein, has filed this Writ Petition challenging the orders Ext.P6 by which reduction of pay was imposed on him, Ext.P7 by which his appeal was rejected, Ext.P8 by which he was discharged from service consequent to conviction and Ext.P11 by which his claim for backwages was rejected. The petitioner claims that on acquittal from criminal case, her husband was entitled to backwages; her husband had already suffered a punishment in the Departmental proceedings and he cannot be subjected to another punishment on the basis of the conviction in the criminal proceedings and, at any rate, when the conviction was set aside in the appeal he would be entitled to backwages. 4. According to the respondents, under the provisions contained in Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 an employee who is convicted for moral turpitude is prohibited from continuing in employment. Rule 68(7)(1) of the SBI Officers Service Rules also provides for the same. 5. The respondents have filed a counter affidavit stating that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner's husband following the order of suspension. On the basis of the findings in the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority had awarded him the punishment of reduction in wages by two stages for one year with cumulative effect. The appeal filed by him was rejected. According to them, since the petitioner's husband had filed W.P(c).No.1190/2015 for backwages without challenging the order of punishment awarded in the disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner does not have any right to challenge the same, as it was a relief which should have been sought in his W.P(c).No.1190 of 2015 and on disposal of that Writ Petition those orders have become final. It is also pointed out that the punishment awarded as per Ext.P6 and the appellate order Ext.P7 are challenged in this Writ Petition after a lapse of 18 years. It is also pointed out that the punishment awarded as per Ext.P6 and the appellate order Ext.P7 are challenged in this Writ Petition after a lapse of 18 years. It is further stated that the petitioner's husband was discharged from service consequent to his conviction by the criminal court for offences under Section 120B r/w Sections 420, 466, 468 and 471 IPC and 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act,1988. Those proceedings are issued in accordance with Rule 68(7) of the Rules, which provides that the disciplinary authority or the appointing authority may impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 67 in the event of conviction of an officer of a criminal charge. The respondents have also relied on the provisions contained in Section 10(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, according to which, no banking company shall employ or continue the employment of any person who is convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude. Therefore, it is stated that when the petitioner's husband was convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, the bank was statutorily bound to discharge him from service and Ext.P8 order was issued on 6.2.2003 accordingly. It is stated that his acquittal as per Ext.P9 judgment was giving him reasonable benefit of doubt and therefore petitioner's husband is not entitled to get backwages. It is stated that the petitioner had already claimed backwages in W.P(c).No.1189 of 2005. 6. Sr.i Rajeevan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on the judgments in Aboobacker S. v. Greater Cochin Development Authority [ILR 2016 (2) Kerala 1138], Joseph C.K v. Kerala State Electricity Board [ILR 2015 (4) Kerala 770] and Unnikrishna Pillai v. Commodore, Chief Staff Officer [ 2013 (4) KLT 902 ], etc. argued that the petitioner's husband was entitled to backwages, on his acquittal. It was argued that the provisions contained in the Banking Regulation Act or in the officers service Rules do not provide for action against a person who is already imposed a penalty after conducting a departmental enquiry and therefore he was not liable to be discharged consequent to conviction, which amounted to double jeopardy. 7. On the other hand, Sri. P.Gopal, the learned Standing Counsel for the Bank, relying on the judgments in SBI v. Mohd. 7. On the other hand, Sri. P.Gopal, the learned Standing Counsel for the Bank, relying on the judgments in SBI v. Mohd. Abdul Rahim [ (2013) 11 SCC 67 ] argued that there is nothing illegal in denying backwages for the period when the petitioner has not worked and was out of service. 8. Having considered the pleadings and contentions on both sides, I find it necessary to have a look at the provisions invoked by the respondents in discharging the deceased officer, i.e Section 10 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and Rule 68(7)(ii) of the SBI Officers Service Rules, relevant portion of which read as follows: 10. Prohibition of employment of managing agents and restrictions on certain forms of employment.— (1) No banking company— (a) shall employ or be managed by a managing agent; or (b) shall employ or continue the employment of any person— (i) who is, or at any time has been, adjudicated insolvent, or has suspended payment or has compounded with his creditors, or who is, or has been, convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude; or xxxxxx Rule 68(7)(ii) reads as follows: “68. (7)(ii): Without prejudice to what is stated in clause (I) above and notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rules (2), (3) and (4), the Disciplinary Authority or the Appointing Authority, as the case may be, may impose any of the penalties specified in rule 67, if the officer has been convicted of a criminal charge or on the strength of facts or conclusions arrived at by a judicial trial. Provided that before a penalty is imposed in terms of this clause, the officer employee may be given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty to be imposed, before any order is made.” It is seen that there is a specific prohibition against continuing an employee in a Bank, once he is convicted of moral turpitude. Under Rule 68(7)(ii), the Bank can impose any penalty on the employee after giving him an opportunity to show cause. Even without invoking Rule 68(7)(ii), the petitioner's husband was liable to be kept out of service by virtue of Section 10(1)(2)(b) of the Act. 9. Under Rule 68(7)(ii), the Bank can impose any penalty on the employee after giving him an opportunity to show cause. Even without invoking Rule 68(7)(ii), the petitioner's husband was liable to be kept out of service by virtue of Section 10(1)(2)(b) of the Act. 9. In the present case, it is seen that though the deceased officer was discharged from service consequent to his conviction, on his acquittal in appeal, he was granted all the benefits for the period during which he was kept out of service except for the pay and allowances. Pay and allowances can be directed for the period of ouster due to discharge, only if there is a provision for the same or in a case where the discharge ordered is found to be illegal or without authority. In this case, the Bank has only invoked the prohibition as envisaged under the provisions contained in Section 10(1) (b)(i) of the Act, 1949 in continuing a convicted employees in service. It is not a case where the bank can be said to have acted with any ulterior motive to keep him out of service. In the absence of any provision that on acquittal in a criminal case the employees would be entitled to be reinstated with backwages or that they would be entitled to pay and allowances for the period during which they were kept out of service on account of termination consequent to conviction, the petitioner cannot raise any valid claim for backwages. 10. In the judgments in Aboobacker's case or Joseph's case(supra), relied on by Sri.Rajeevan, the service rules governing the employees therein [KCS (CC&A Rules, KSR, etc], provided for re-instatement of the employees whose services were terminated consequent to conviction, in the event of their acquittal. Therefore, those judgments will not apply in the case of the petitioner. 11. There is no provision either in Section 10 or in other provisions of the Banking Regulation Act or in the SBI Officers Service Rules, which provides for backwages or even re-instatement on acquittal of the employees whose employment is to be discontinued on conviction. Those provisions only prohibit continuance and permit imposing of penalty, consequent to conviction of the employee. 12. In Mohmed Abdul Rahim's case (supra), relied on by Sri. Gopal, the Apex Court was considering the claim for backwages raised by an employee in a similar set of facts. Those provisions only prohibit continuance and permit imposing of penalty, consequent to conviction of the employee. 12. In Mohmed Abdul Rahim's case (supra), relied on by Sri. Gopal, the Apex Court was considering the claim for backwages raised by an employee in a similar set of facts. Following the judgment in Banshi Dhar v. State of Rajasthan [ (2007) 1 SCC 324 ], the Apex Court held that backwages is not automatic on acquittal. It was held that in view of the prohibition against the Bank in employing a convicted person under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during the said period. It was held that his subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act and the entitlement of the respondent to backwages has to be judged accordingly. In the present case, by the time the petitioner's husband was acquitted he had already attained the age of superannuation. Except for that factual difference and also relating to the offence under which they were charged, there is no difference with reference to the legal provisions in the present case. 13. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the offence involved in Mohmed Abdul Rahim's case (supra), was 498A and therefore the same parameters cannot be applied, the learned Standing Counsel for the bank, relying on the judgments in Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank [ 2010 (4) KLT 10 (SC)] and State Bank of India v. Soupramaniane [ 2019 (3) KHC 74 (SC)] argued that all offences involving corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act, would come under the purview of moral turpitude. 14. In Sushil Kumar Singhal's case (supra) the appellant was a Peon in a Bank. The charge against him was that he did not remit the amount entrusted to him to remit towards telephone bill. The criminal court convicted him. Consequent to that, he was dismissed from service. While the ID raised against the dismissal was pending, the criminal court released him under Probation of Offenders Act, while maintaining the conviction. Thereupon he claimed backwages. The issue before the Apex Court was that whether he was entitled to re-instatement on release under Probation of Offenders Act. Consequent to that, he was dismissed from service. While the ID raised against the dismissal was pending, the criminal court released him under Probation of Offenders Act, while maintaining the conviction. Thereupon he claimed backwages. The issue before the Apex Court was that whether he was entitled to re-instatement on release under Probation of Offenders Act. After analysing various judgments, and Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, the Apex Court held that in view of the aforesaid provision, the Management is under obligation to discontinue the services of an employee convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude. Discussing the dictionary meaning of moral turpitude, as well as the judgment in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr. [1997 (1) KLT SN 6 (C.No.7) SC] it was held that moral turpitude means anything contrary to honesty, modesty or good morals and that conviction of a person in a crime involving moral turpitude impeaches his credibility. 15. In the judgment in State Bank of India v. Soupramaniane [ 2019 (3) KHC 74 (SC)], the Apex Court while considering a case where the conviction was for an offence under Section 324 after considering the impact of the punishment and as to whether he can be kept out of service on account of an action involving moral turpitude it was held as follows in paragraph 9: “There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences which can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the respondent to cause the death of the victims. The Criminal Courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the respondent to cause the death of the victims. The Criminal Courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude he is not liable to be discharged from service.” 16. In the present case, the charges are for offences under Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore, even without going into the provisions contained in the SBI Officers Service Rules, the respondents were duty bound to keep the petitioner's husband away from service in the light of Section 10 (1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act. 17. The petitioner has challenged the orders Exts.P6 and P7 by which the punishment of reduction in pay was awarded to her husband as early as on 11.5.1999 which was confirmed in the appeal as per Ext.P7 order on 3.9.1999. When the deceased employee did not have any complaint against Exts.P5 and P6 orders, the widow cannot be permitted to challenge it after the lapse of about 20 years. Even otherwise the punishment in Ext.P6 was awarded only after conducting an enquiry in which at least 3 of the charges were found proved. The question regarding the nature of punishment awarded or proportionality of the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority cannot be a matter for judicial review unless it is shocking to the conscience of the Court as held by a catena of judgments of the Apex Court. There is no such circumstance. 18. In the result, the challenge against Exts.P6 and P7 fails. In the above circumstances of the case, I find that the claim of the petitioner for backwages is unsustainable. The orders Exts.P8 and P9 are issued in tune with the statutory provisions. Hence no direction can be issued to the respondents to disburse backwages as claimed by the petitioner. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed.