ORDER : U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J. The jurisprudential significance of this C.R.P. can be summed up in the form of following points: (i) When an execution Court closes the Execution Petition due to the pendency of Insolvency Petition filed by JDR and giving liberty to DHR to seek for issuance of warrant of arrest in future basing on the result of I.P., whether DHR needs to file a fresh Execution Petition or can continue the same E.P. to seek arrest of JDR? (ii) In either case of continuing the same E.P. or filing a fresh E.P., whether the DHR is required to again establish the means of JDR and his wilful failure to discharge the decree? 2. The factual matrix of the case is thus: The respondent/DHR obtained money decree against the petitioner/JDR in O.S.No.12/2013 and filed E.P.No.36/2013 under Order XXI Rule 37 CPC to arrest the JDR and commit him to civil prison for realisation of the decree amount. The JDR filed counter and opposed the E.P. The executing Court conducted enquiry and passed an order dated 03.02.2015 and held thus: “From this evidence, it is clear that though the D.Hr could not secure any documentary proof for the properties owned by J.Dr, it is proved that J.Dr is leading luxurious life. He maintains the car. He maintains the motor bike. He is providing costly education for his two children in famous and costly engineering colleges. The person with the income of Rs.5,000/- per month cannot maintain this standard of life. As submitted in the written arguments of J.Dr, it is not possible to maintain the family with this standard with the mercy of relatives. Hence it is proved that JDr has got sufficient means to discharge the debt, but he is not discharging debt wilfully. Hence in the circumstances, petition is allowed. In the result, the petition is allowed and the J.Dr be sent to civil prison for a period of one month. Arrest the J.Dr by 03.03.2015.” 3. Thereafter the JDR was arrested and produced in Court on 03.03.2015. Hence in the circumstances, petition is allowed. In the result, the petition is allowed and the J.Dr be sent to civil prison for a period of one month. Arrest the J.Dr by 03.03.2015.” 3. Thereafter the JDR was arrested and produced in Court on 03.03.2015. Since he informed that he already filed I.P.No.1/2015 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Kothapeta (the executing Court itself), he was released under Section 55 CPC and E.P. was closed giving liberty to the DHR to seek for issuance of warrant for the arrest of JDR if he does not comply with the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act. 4. Thereafter I.P.No.1/2015 filed by JDR was dismissed on 04.11.2016. Therefore the DHR filed E.A.No.22/2018 in E.P.No.36/2013 under Order XX1 Rule 38 r/w Section 151 CPC seeking to issue arrest warrant against JDR to commit him to civil prison. The JDR appeared and filed counter opposing the petition. The executing Court in its order dated 14.03.2019 allowed the said petition in view of the dismissal of I.P.No.1/2015 filed by the JDR. Challenging the said order the instant CRP is filed under Section 115 CPC by the JDR. 5. Heard Sri P.Rajesh Babu, learned counsel for petitioner, and Sri S.Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent. 6. The main flank of argument of learned counsel for petitioner is dipronged. Firstly, he would argue that since E.P.No.36/2013 was dismissed by the executing Court in view of the pendency of Insolvency Petition, the DHR is not entitled to file E.A.No.22/2018 seeking arrest warrant in the same E.P.No.36/2013 which was already dismissed. He would strenuously argue that the DHR should have filed a fresh E.P. and therefore, the order in E.A.No.22/2018 is not legally sustainable. He placed reliance on Pentapati Chinna Venkanna v. Pentapati Bengararaju 1964 AIR 1454 = 1964 SCR (6) 251. Secondly, he would vehemently argue that since the enquiry relating to the means of JDR to discharge the decree was conducted long back in E.P.No.36/2013, the DHR is required to file a fresh E.P. and again prove the means of JDR and his wilful failure to discharge the debt. Without undertaking such an exercise, he cannot simply file an application in the closed E.P. to seek for arrest of JDR. Without undertaking such an exercise, he cannot simply file an application in the closed E.P. to seek for arrest of JDR. He would submit that the past financial capacity of the JDR cannot be a basis to commit him to the civil prison now, which is against the principle laid under Section 51 CPC. He thus prayed to set aside the order in E.A.No.22/2018. He relied on Jolly George Verghese v. The Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470 = 1980 SCR (2) 913. 7. Traversing the above arguments, learned counsel for respondent strenuously argued that E.P.No.36/2013 was only closed in view of pendency of Insolvency Petition, but not dismissed on merits. It was only a tentative closure for statistical purpose as no further proceedings could be taken up due to pending I.P. He would argue that in substance the said E.P. shall be deemed to be pending though ostensibly it was closed. Therefore, the DHR was perfectly justified in filing E.A.No.22/2018 in the very same E.P. seeking arrest warrant after dismissal of Insolvency Petition. He relied upon Mutha Pukhraj Ratanjee v. Ganesh Mull Adaji, (1983) 1 MLJ 443 . He would further argue that since means enquiry was already conducted and held that JDR in spite of having means wilfully failed to discharge the decree debt, and said finding was not challenged and on the other hand as his Insolvency Petition was also dismissed, there is no need of DHR again establishing the means of JDR by filing a fresh execution petition. 8. Point No.1: I gave my anxious consideration to the above arguments. As stated supra, after enquiry in E.P.No.36/2013, the Court held that the JDR got sufficient means but wilfully failed to discharge the debt and issued arrest warrant and the JDR was arrested and produced in Court on 03.03.2015. Thereupon the executing Court passed the following order: “The sole J.Dr. is brought under arrest. The J.Dr. informed to the court that he had already filed I.P. and it is coming for deposit of administrative charges and hence he may be released. Heard the learned counsel for D.Hr. In the facts of the case since J.Dr. already filed I.P. he is entitled to be released as provided U/s.55 of Code of Civil Procedure. Hence the execution petition at present is closed. The D.Hr. is at liberty to ask for issuance of a warrant for the arrest of J.Dr. Heard the learned counsel for D.Hr. In the facts of the case since J.Dr. already filed I.P. he is entitled to be released as provided U/s.55 of Code of Civil Procedure. Hence the execution petition at present is closed. The D.Hr. is at liberty to ask for issuance of a warrant for the arrest of J.Dr. if the J.Dr. does not comply with the provisions of Provincial Insolvency Act. Release the J.Dr.” 9. As can be seen I have no scintilla of doubt that the Court closed the E.P. only tentatively without deciding the same on merits because of pendency of Insolvency Petition. However, technically speaking the E.P. was pending and further proceedings therein could be taken up at the opportune time. Therefore, the executing Court was legally justified in entertaining E.A.No.22/2018 in E.P.No.36/2013 without driving the DHR to file afresh E.P. In fact, the judgment in Pentapati Chinna Venkanna’s case (supra) relied upon by the petitioner reiterates the same principle. In that case, the DHRs initially filed E.P.No.13/1939 in O.S.No.3/1928. However, since the JDRs therein filed CMA.No.127/1948 and obtained interim stay of execution, the executing Court closed the E.P. After sometime CMA.No.127/1948 was dismissed. Hence, DHRs filed E.A.No.142/1952 in E.P.No.13/1939 for reopening the Execution Petition and for proceeding with the execution. The executing Court observed that since the E.P. was merely closed, the decree holder could file a regular E.P. Hence, the DHRs filed a fresh E.P.No.58/1953. It was contended by JDRs that the E.P. was time barred because it was filed more than 12 years after the decree. The executing Court dismissed the E.P. The High Court of A.P. took a different view and held that E.P.No.13/1939 was merely closed for statistical purpose and therefore, the Execution Petition filed in 1939 was still pending and DHRs were entitled to proceed with that petition and the said position was not contested by the JDRs which means the Execution Petition was not dismissed but was only closed for statistical purposes and hence, DHRs were entitled to proceed with that petition. The High Court of A.P. remanded the matter to executing Court for disposal according to law. The matter was taken to Hon’ble Apex Court. The High Court of A.P. remanded the matter to executing Court for disposal according to law. The matter was taken to Hon’ble Apex Court. Agreeing with the view of the High Court, the Apex Court observed that it is true that the Courts condemned the practice of executing Courts using expressions like “closed”, “closed for statistical purposes”, “struck off”, “recorded” etc. as there was no provision in the CPC for making such orders. However, even assuming so the passing of such an order cannot tantamount to an order of dismissal, for the intention of the Court in making an order “closed for statistical purposes” is manifest. It is intended not to finally dispose of the application but keep it pending. Whether the order was without jurisdiction or whether it was valid, the legal position would be the same as in one case it would be ignored and in the other it would mean what is stated. In either case the Execution Petition would be pending on the file of Court. 10. Following the above decision and other citations, the Madras High Court has expressed similar view in Mutha Pukhraj Ratanjee’s case (supra). 11. Therefore, it is preposterous for the petitioner/JDR to contend that the DHR should have filed a fresh Execution Petition. This point is accordingly answered against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent. 12. Point No.2: In view of the finding in Point No.1, it is clear that E.P.No.36/2013 was pending and the finding given by the executing Court regarding the means of the JDR to discharge the debts and his wilful failure shall hold good even now also since he has not challenged the said finding. In that view, the question of the DHR filing a fresh Execution Petition and proving the means of JDR once again does not arise. The decision in Jolly George Verghese’s case (supra) do not come to his rescue. In the said case, the Apex Court was enquiring as to whether Section 51 CPC militating against the spirit of Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (for short, ‘ICCP rights”) on one hand and Article 21 of the Constitution on the other. The sum and substance of the above judgment was explained in Rajeti Prabhakara Rao v. Mosa Satyavathi (C.R.P.No.7107/2018 dt. 03.06.2019) by this Court as follows: “8. The sum and substance of the above judgment was explained in Rajeti Prabhakara Rao v. Mosa Satyavathi (C.R.P.No.7107/2018 dt. 03.06.2019) by this Court as follows: “8. Thus, the sum and substance of above quoted judgments is that Section 51(C) CPC though provides for committing the judgment debtor to civil prison, still such a mode of execution is not violative of Article 11 of the ICCP Rights for it provides procedural safeguards in the proviso of very same section. Thus, a mere non-payment of decretal amount by J.Dr will not land him in civil prison without conducting enquiry and Court satisfying that one of the conditions mentioned in the proviso is satisfied to transmit him to the civil prison. In the context of Section 51 proviso (b), it was observed in those judgments that quondam affluence and current indigence or having sufficient means at present by the J.Dr alone is not sufficient unless there is a proof of minimal fairness of his wilful failure to pay inspite of his sufficient means and absence of more terribly pressing claims on his means such as medical bills to treat cancer or other grave illness. Therefore, there can be no scintilla of doubt that when an execution petition on the basis of money decree is filed for arrest of judgment debtor, the Court shall afford an opportunity to judgment debtor and conduct enquiry as to whether since the decree, the judgment debtor has, or has had the means to pay the amount of the decree or some substantial part thereof and still refuses or neglects or has refused or neglected to pay the same and then pass the reasoned order.” It must be noted that in the instant case such an enquiry was already conducted and held that despite having sufficient means and leading luxurious life, the JDR wilfully failed to pay the decree debt. The said finding is still in force. Therefore, there is no need of again proving the same fact. This point is answered accordingly. 13. In the result, there are no merits in the C.R.P. and accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.