JUDGMENT 1. The Court : The appeal is directed against an order dated March 20, 2019 passed on an application taken out in a disposed of petition under the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920. There are additional prayers for leave being granted to the appellant to prefer the appeal and for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. The proposed appellant is the appropriate authority of the State to determine the stamp duty payable on documents and, as such, leave is given to the appellant to prefer the appeal. 2. In view of the good grounds shown, the delay of about 233 days in preferring the appeal is condoned and the appeal is taken on record. 3. The respondents herein applied by way of ACR 7 of 2013, inter alia, under the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920 and the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 . Sections 3, 7, 10 and 11 of the 1920 Act were indicated in the cause-title to the petition and Sections 32 and 36 of the Act of 1882 were also mentioned. It is fairly submitted on behalf of the respondents that the relevant petition ought to be regarded as one under the Act of 1920 since the trust was a public charitable trust. Accordingly, the 1882 Act would have no manner of application. 4. In course of dealing with ACR 7 of 2013, this Court deemed it fit to provide for one or more of the trust properties to be vested in another set of trustees by requiring one of the original trustees of the public charitable trust to be the settlor in respect of the relevant transfer. The petition was disposed of by an order dated October 15, 2015 as corrected by an order of September 8, 2017. In terms of the relevant order, the transfer of the property or properties was attempted and a deed of transfer prepared. However, a problem arose at the time of registration of the deed of transfer since, according to the respondents, the State demanded that the transfer should be regarded as an ordinary conveyance covered by Article 23 of the Schedule to the Stamp Act as applicable in this State and not by Article 62(e) thereof that pertains to transfer of properties by a trustee to another trustee without consideration. Instead of challenging the States action or the demand, in whatever form it may have been made, before any other forum or even by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution , the trustees returned to this Court and made an application in the disposed of ACR 7 of 2013 whereupon, upon notice to the State, the order impugned was passed. Such order, in effect, holds that Article 63(e) of the Schedule to the Stamp Act as applicable in this State would apply to the transfer and it could not be regarded as an ordinary conveyance. The appellant is prejudiced since the order impugned would result in a considerable loss to the Revenue. 5. The preliminary ground that is urged on behalf of the appellant is that the single Bench in this case completely lacked the jurisdiction to address the issue, particularly, since the trust petition had already stood disposed of. The appellant refers to Section 34 of the 1882 Act and the much more constricted Section 3 of the 1920 Act to suggest that any court in exercise of the authority under Section 3 of the 1920 Act could only deal with the matters specifically referred to in the provision and could not travel beyond such matters. 6. In such context, paragraph 16 of the celebrated judgment reported at AIR 1969 SC 823 (Official Trustee, WB vs. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee) has been placed. The provision in that case was Section 34 of the Act of 1882 and the Supreme Court observed that the jurisdiction conferred by the provision was of limited nature and the extent of the authority wielded by the Court travelled beyond the limited power conferred by Section 34 of the Act. 7. The respondents say that the ground of lack of jurisdiction was not urged before the court of the first instance despite the State being put on notice and being heard before the impugned order was passed. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that once the ground of jurisdiction is abandoned or not taken, it cannot be resurrected in any appeal. 8. The principle embodied in Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 covers territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and, objections on such ground are capable of being waived. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that once the ground of jurisdiction is abandoned or not taken, it cannot be resurrected in any appeal. 8. The principle embodied in Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 covers territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and, objections on such ground are capable of being waived. However, just as it is elementary that parties by agreement cannot confer jurisdiction on a court when the subject-matter of the courts authority to receive the matter is in dispute, whether or not the objection is canvassed before the court of the first instance is a material. It goes to the very root of the courts power to pronounce on a matter. If the authority was absent, whether or not any party pointed it out to the court - it was incumbent on the court to assess whether it possessed the authority before it proceeded to the merits of the matter. 9. In the present case, nothing in Section 3, or Sections 7 or 10 or 11 of the Act of 1920 for that matter, empowered the court to adjudicate on the character of the deed of transfer or the extent of the stamp duty payable thereon. This is more so, since the trust petition was already disposed of. It may have been possible to make an observation while disposing of the trust petition - though it is doubtful whether the same would have been binding on the State - but the court could not have entertained the subsequent application to adjudicate on a matter that did not fall within its purview under any of the provisions of the Act of 1920. 10. The respondents say that since the matter pertained to a public charitable trust which is short on funds, it was perceived that an opinion of the court which passed the order in the nature of settlement could be obtained for giving effect to such courts order. It is true that even the State was given notice and the issue was addressed after hearing the State; but that cannot override the fundamental problem that the court did not have any authority to adjudicate on the matter in the first place. 11. It is true that even the State was given notice and the issue was addressed after hearing the State; but that cannot override the fundamental problem that the court did not have any authority to adjudicate on the matter in the first place. 11. Since it is evident that the deed of transfer, a copy whereof appears at page 124 of the appeal papers, is being attempted to be registered and such registration may not be effected without the tender of appropriate stamp duty, the State is directed to raise a demand on the respondents herein as to the extent of stamp duty payable on the document. Such demand should be raised within four weeks from date. Upon receipt of such demand, it will be open to the respondents to take appropriate action in accordance with law, including approaching any forum entitled to adjudicate on the matter. APO No.179 of 2019 is allowed. GA No.2786 of 2019 and GA No.2787 of 2019 are disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.