JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This Court has passed order dated 14.1.2020 as under : "Heard Sri Mahendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ran Vijay Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. The case set-forth by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner applied for the child care leave for three months with effect from 11.07.2019 as application dated 10.07.2019 to that effect has been preferred by the petitioner to her Appointing Authority i.e. the District Homeopathy Medical Officer, Sultanpur. On earlier occasion, the petitioner had proceeded for maternity leave with effect from 07.05.2018 to 13.12.2018 and the said leave has not been sanctioned. The District Homeopathy Medical Officer, Sultanpur has called an explanation from the petitioner that was duly replied vide explanation dated 20.11.2019. In the said explanation, the petitioner has cited the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in re: Dr. Rachna Chaurasiya vs. State of U.P. & others reported in [ 2017 (11) ADJ 399 (DB)], which categorically provides that the maternity leave and child care leave are admissible to all the lady employees irrespective of her nature of appointment whether it be permanent, temporary and contractual. After receiving the aforesaid explanation of the petitioner dated 20.11.2019, the Appointing Authority has issued two letters, one letter dated 22.11.2019 to the petitioner and second one to the Mission Director, Uttar Pradesh Rajya Ayush Society, Lucknow. Letter dated 22.11.2019, which was addressed to the petitioner, says that her entire issue including her explanation has been forwarded to the Mission Director for necessary orders. By means of the impugned order dated 17.12.2019, the Mission Director, Uttar Pradesh Rajya Ayush Society, Lucknow has directed the District Homeopathy Medical Officer, Sultanpur to terminate the services of the petitioner for the reason that she has absented again and again without permission and the leave i.e. the maternity and the child care leave are not admissible to the contract employees, therefore, the said leave may not be exceeded to the petitioner. The maternity leave as well as the child care leave is admissible to the contract employees also in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in re: Dr. Rachna Chaurasiya vs. State of U.P. & others (supra), therefore, recital to that effect in the impugned order is prima facie unwarranted. The maternity leave as well as the child care leave is admissible to the contract employees also in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in re: Dr. Rachna Chaurasiya vs. State of U.P. & others (supra), therefore, recital to that effect in the impugned order is prima facie unwarranted. So far as recital to the effect that the petitioner has absented again and again without permission is concerned, the question would be as to whether the petitioner has absented without informing the Competent Authority by preferring an application and as to whether she has sought such relief which can not be granted to her. If any employee has sought such relief which may be granted strictly in accordance with law and the circumstances at that point of time compels the employee to proceed on leave otherwise she shall suffer irreparable loss, whether that conduct of an employee may be treated as misconduct. Not only the above, whether in a given circumstances the services of an employee may be dispensed with without following the principles of natural justice inasmuch as in the present case the services of the petitioner have been dispensed with without affording an opportunity of hearing. One more question crops up i.e. as to whether any punishment order against an employee can be passed at the behest of the Superior Authority inasmuch as in the present case admittedly Appointing Authority of the petitioner is District Homeopathy Medical Officer but the services of the petitioner have been dispensed with pursuant to the direction being issued by the Mission Director, Uttar Pradesh Rajya Ayush Society, Lucknow, however, the termination order has been passed by the Appointing Authority. The law is settled on this point that the punishment order can only be passed by the Disciplinary Authority applying his judicious mind independently appreciating the legal provisions to that effect. Therefore, the matter requires consideration. List/ put up this case on 18.01.2020 in the additional cause list to enable the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel to seek instructions in the matter. Till the next date of listing, no third party interest shall be created." 3. In compliance of the aforesaid order Sri Ran Vijay Singh, learned Addl. Therefore, the matter requires consideration. List/ put up this case on 18.01.2020 in the additional cause list to enable the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel to seek instructions in the matter. Till the next date of listing, no third party interest shall be created." 3. In compliance of the aforesaid order Sri Ran Vijay Singh, learned Addl. C.S.C. has produced the copy of the instruction letter dated 17.1.2020 preferred by the Director, Homeopathy, U.P. addressing the C.S.C., High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow enclosing therewith some correspondences and letters. Along with the instruction letter one letter dated 17.1.2020 has been enclosed which has been preferred by the District Medical Officer, Homeopathy, Sultanpur addressing to Director, Homeopathy, U.P. The perusal of the aforesaid letter dated 17.1.2020 of the District Medical Officer, Homeopathy, Sultanpur reveals that initially the petitioner absented for three days w.e.f. 7.5.2018 to 10.5.2018 without preferring any application to that effect and she further proceeded on leave in continuation of earlier authorized leave by preferring an application seeking maternity leave. It has further been indicated that after the aforesaid maternity leave which was not sanctioned by the competent authority till date the petitioner again proceeded on leave on 10.7.2019 for care of her child as Child Care Leave for three months i.e. w.e.f. 11.7.2019 to 10.10.2019. Admittedly, the petitioner has submitted her joining on 1.11.2019 but her joining was subject to the necessary orders being passed by the Mission Director, U.P. As per Sri Ran Vijay Singh the Mission Director considering the entire facts and circumstances relating to the petitioner directed the District Medical Officer, Homeopathy, Sultanpur to dispense with the services of the petitioner as she is habitual absentee and the leave sought by the petitioner are not admissible for the contract employees. 4. Besides, Sri Ran Vijay Singh has placed reliance on the judgment dated 20.11.2018 of Division Bench of this Court in re: Rajesh Bhardwaj vs. Union of India (Writ-A No. 5484/2013 along with one connected writ petition) by submitting that since the petitioner was appointed on the post 'Yog Assistant' on contract basis, therefore, being a contract employee her writ petition may not be maintained before this Court. 5. 5. It would be apt to indicate here that the petitioner is taking recourse of the various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court which provides that if the order of termination is stigmatic, irrespective of nature of appointment, be it ad-hoc, contractual or regular, a full fledged inquiry would be required to be conducted, therefore, in view of the fact that the facts and circumstances of in re: Rajesh Bhardwaj (supra) would not be applicable in the present case as the facts and circumstances of the present case are different. Further, the petitioner has also challenged the impugned order on the ground that the punishment order has not been passed by the appointing authority but the same has been passed at the dictate of superior authority, therefore, in view of the settled propositions of law by the Hon'ble Apex Court in re: (1991) 3 SCC 219 , Nagraj Shivarao Karjagi vs. Syndicate Bank, Head Office, Manipal and another, (1995) 5 SCC 302 , Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja and another and (2009) 7 SCC 69 , Commissioner of Income Tax, Shimla vs. Greenworld Corporation Parwanoo the punishment order is liable to be set aside. Therefore, the judgment in re: Rajesh Bhardwaj (supra) shall not be applicable in the present case inasmuch as the facts and circumstances of both the cases are different. 6. So far as the leave of the petitioner is concerned be that authorized or unauthorized the instructions have been received but so far as the two other questions framed in the order dated 14.1.2020 have not been received as those questions are as to whether the services of an employee can be dispensed with without following the due procedure of law or in violation of principles of natural justice and as to whether the punishment order can be passed other than the appointing authority. The law is trite on the point that if any punishment order is stigmatic or based on some allegations, the services of an employee may not be dispensed with without following the due procedure of law. Had the order impugned been simplicitor, such type of protection could have been avoided but in the present case the Mission Director vide order dated 17.12.2019 has levelled allegations against the petitioner that she is habitual absentee and the leave sought by her is not admissible, therefore, her services should be dispensed with. 7. Had the order impugned been simplicitor, such type of protection could have been avoided but in the present case the Mission Director vide order dated 17.12.2019 has levelled allegations against the petitioner that she is habitual absentee and the leave sought by her is not admissible, therefore, her services should be dispensed with. 7. Considering the tone and tenor of the letter dated 17.12.2019, I feel that an ample opportunity should have been provided to the petitioner, particularly for the reason that in her explanation dated 20.11.2019 the petitioner has cited the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in re: Dr. Rachna Chaurasiya (supra) wherein this Court has categorically provided that the maternity leave is admissible to all the employees irrespective of her nature of appointment, therefore, before passing the order dated 17.12.2019 the Mission Director must have considered such legal point as the explanation of the petitioner to that effect has been sent to him by the District Homoeopathy Medical Officer. 8. The Division Bench of this Court in re: Dr. Rachna Chaurasiya (supra) vide para 25 & 27 has held as under : "25. Maternity benefit is a social insurance and the Maternity Leave is given for maternal and child health and family support. On a perusal of different provisions of the Act, 1961 as well as the policy of the Central Government to grant Child Care Leave and the Government Orders issued by the State of U.P. adopting the same for its female employees, we do not find anything contained therein which may entitle only to women employees appointed on regular basis to the benefit of Maternity Leave or Child Care Leave and not those, who are engaged on casual basis or on muster roll on daily wage basis." "27. We are of the considered opinion that the benefit under the Act as well as the Rules of the Government Orders providing for grant of Maternity benefits and Child Care leave are applicable to all female employees, irrespective of their nature of employment whether permanent, temporary or contractual." 9. So far as the second question regarding the competence of the authority to pass punishment order is concerned, the law is settled on this point that the punishment order can only be passed by the disciplinary authority applying its judicious and independent mind appreciating the facts of the issue and the legal provisions to that effect. So far as the second question regarding the competence of the authority to pass punishment order is concerned, the law is settled on this point that the punishment order can only be passed by the disciplinary authority applying its judicious and independent mind appreciating the facts of the issue and the legal provisions to that effect. In the present case the punishment order has, however, been passed by the appointing authority but the appointing authority has not applied his own judicious mind independently as he followed the direction being issued by the Mission Director vide letter dated 17.12.2019, therefore, in that count the punishment order dated 26.12.2019 is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in re: Nagraj Shivarao Karjagi (supra), Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja and another (supra) and Commissioner of Income Tax, Shimla (supra) it has been held that if the statutory authority has been vested with the jurisdiction, the authority has to exercise it according to its own discretion. If the discretion is exercised under the direction or in compliance with some higher authority's instruction, then it will be case of failure to exercise discretion altogether. 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in re: Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India reported in 1958 AIR 36, 1958 SCR 828 has held the stigmatic termination order may not be passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to an employee if the order entails civil consequences could not have been passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to an employee. Apex Court in the case of High Court of Gujarat Vs. Jayshree Chamanlal Budhhabhatt, 2013 (16) SCC 59, has taken the view that once any allegations are made against the incumbent concerned, which results in stigma, the minimum requirement is to inform the concern person, the charge against him, and to give him reasonable opportunity of being heard. Apex Court in the case of SBI Vs. Palak Modi, 2013 (3) SCC 607 , has considered the issue of termination simplicitor or punitive termination. Mention has been made that if misconduct/misdemeanor constitutes the basis of final decision taken by competent authority to dispense with the services of an incumbent albeit by a non-stigmatic order, the Court can lift the veil and declare that in the garb of termination simplicitor, the employer has punished the employee for misconduct. 12. Mention has been made that if misconduct/misdemeanor constitutes the basis of final decision taken by competent authority to dispense with the services of an incumbent albeit by a non-stigmatic order, the Court can lift the veil and declare that in the garb of termination simplicitor, the employer has punished the employee for misconduct. 12. This Court in re: Faraz Hameed Ansari vs. Life Insurance Corporation Of India Thru Chairmann & Others reported in 2018 (36) LCD 2062 has held in para 15, while considering various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, para 15 is as under : "15. Thus, even if the impugned action terminating the services of the petitioners is in the realm of a contract, the same would not be precluded from scrutiny in exercise of its powers of judicial review by this Court available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I am of the considered opinion that every action of the Corporation, whether statutory or non-statutory or administrative in nature, has to be necessarily in consonance with the constitutional mandate and the impugned order, thus, can be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In case, the impugned action is found to be unreasonable, irrational, illegal, perverse or unfair, the same can be interfered with in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of GRIDCO, [GRIDCO Ltd. And another v. Sadananda Doloi and others, (2011) 15 SCC 16 ] Ltd. (supra). 13. If on account of the fact that the petitioner was habitual absentee and the leave sought by the petitioner was not admissible to her, the full-fledged departmental inquiry should have been conducted against the petitioner seeking her explanation to that effect and after providing her opportunity of hearing any appropriate order could have been passed by the disciplinary authority. It might be possible that the petitioner could have defended herself placing on record, some relevant case laws of this Court and Hon'ble Apex Court justifying her conduct and if she fails to justify her conduct the appropriate order could have been passed, but such exercise has not been carried out in the present case. If the Division Bench of this Court in re: Dr. If the Division Bench of this Court in re: Dr. Rachna Chaurasiya (supra) has observed that the maternity leave shall be available to all female employees irrespective of her nature of appointment, be it temporary, permanent, casual, contractual etc., then how the competent authority i.e. Mission Director has indicated in his order that such leave is not admissible to the petitioner, therefore, it appears that such observation is in derogation of the direction being issued by the Division Bench of this Court in re: Dr. Rachna Chaurasiya (supra). It might be possible that the authority concerned i.e. Mission Director was having some judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court or having some relevant material that may authorise him to disagree with the direction of the Division Bench in re: Dr. Rachana Chaurasiya (supra) but such material must have been indicated in the order dated 17.12.2019 otherwise that order shall suffer from vice of perversity. 14. Be that as it may, since the appointing authority are not satisfied with the conduct of the petitioner as being reflected in the impugned orders and the instruction letter and the recital to that effect has also been given in the impugned order, therefore, a proper departmental inquiry strictly in accordance with law should have been conducted and concluded against the petitioner to that effect if it is so warranted and after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner any appropriate order can be passed. Any appropriate order can be passed only by the disciplinary authority independently and such order may not be passed pursuant to the direction being passed by the superior authority. 15. In any case if the departmental inquiry is conducted against the petitioner, the same can be conducted and concluded with promptness preferably within a period of three months and any appropriate order can be passed strictly in accordance with law within one month thereafter. It is needless to say that the petitioner shall cooperate with the departmental proceedings, if the same is initiated inasmuch as this is sole prerogative of the disciplinary authority to initiate the departmental inquiry against the petitioner. It is being clarified that this Court is not directing to conduct the departmental inquiry against the petitioner. 16. It is needless to say that the petitioner shall cooperate with the departmental proceedings, if the same is initiated inasmuch as this is sole prerogative of the disciplinary authority to initiate the departmental inquiry against the petitioner. It is being clarified that this Court is not directing to conduct the departmental inquiry against the petitioner. 16. In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 17.12.2019 and 26.12.2019 are not sustainable in the eyes of law, therefore, both the orders are hereby quashed. 17. The disciplinary authority is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service and pay her regular salary and other emoluments as and when the same falls due. 18. It is also directed that the appropriate orders regarding earlier leave of the petitioner may be passed strictly in accordance with law. 19. In view of above, writ petition is allowed.