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2020 DIGILAW 199 (AP)

Padira Vidyavathi, Guntur Dist v. P. P. , Hyd

2020-03-05

CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY

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JUDGMENT : This criminal revision case is directed against the order dated 11-4-2014 passed in Crl.M.P. No.2018 of 2013 in C.C.No.608 of 2012 whereby the petition filed under Section 239 of Cr.P.C by accused 3 to 5 seeking discharge from the case was allowed. 2. Facts germane to dispose of the criminal revision case may be stated as follows: (a) The petitioners are accused 3 to 5 in C.C.No.608 of 2012 on the file of the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Chilakaluripet, Guntur District. They are being prosecuted for the offences punishable under Section 498-A of IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. (b) On the report lodged by the de facto complainant that accused No.1, who is her husband and the petitioners herein, who are her mother-in-law and brother-in-law and his wife, have all subjected her to cruelty and harassed her, a case in Crime No.325/2012 was registered against them under Section 498-A of IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. After completion of the investigation, Police filed charge-sheet against accused 1 to 5 in the said case. (c) When the said case is pending trial before the trial Court, accused 3 to 5, who are the mother-in-law and brother-in-law of the de facto complainant and the wife of the brother-in-law of the de facto complainant, filed a petition under Section 239 of Cr.P.C seeking discharge from the case on the ground that there is no material against them to frame charge against them and to try them for the said offences and also on the ground that the Chilakaluripet Police, who registered the said case and investigated the same and filed the charge-sheet, have no jurisdiction to register the said case and investigate the same and the Court at Chilakaluripet also has no jurisdiction to try the case, since as per the allegations made in the FIR, the entire offence took place in Guntur, which is the place of accused No.1 and his parents. (d) After hearing both the parties, the trial Court allowed the said petition and discharged the petitioners on the ground that there is no evidence against accused 3 to 5 to show that they have harassed the de facto complainant and that the ingredients contemplated under Section 498-A of IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are not existing against accused 3 to 5 and as such there is no material to proceed against them. (e) Aggrieved thereby, the de facto complainant filed this revision case assailing the legality and validity of the impugned order. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners; the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the 1st respondent/State and the learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 4. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the trial Court erred in holding that there are no eyewitnesses to prove the allegations made against accused 3 to 5 and that there is no material to proceed against them and in discharging them on the said ground. He would submit that the trial Court, at the stage of framing charge or considering the petition to discharge the accused, cannot undertake the exercise of appreciating the evidence on record and all that the trial Court has to see is whether the allegations mentioned in the FIR prima facie constitute any offence against them and whether there is sufficient evidence to try them for the said offence or not. If the Court finds that there are allegations made against them constituting the said offences and there is sufficient evidence to try them for the said offence, the Court has to frame a charge and try them for the said case and decide the truth or otherwise of the said allegations only in the final adjudication of the case. Therefore, he would submit that the impugned order of the trial Court is legally unsustainable and thereby prayed to set aside the same. 5. Therefore, he would submit that the impugned order of the trial Court is legally unsustainable and thereby prayed to set aside the same. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused 3 to 5 would submit that the contents of the FIR do not disclose any offence against accused No.3, who is the mother-in-law of the de facto complainant, that there are no specific allegations against her stating that she harassed the de facto complainant by making any unlawful demand for additional dowry and the vague allegations made against her in the FIR do not constitute any offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC or under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. He would further submit that even as per the allegations in the FIR, the offences took place in Guntur in the house of accused No.1 and no part of the offence took place in Chilakaluripet at the house of the parents of the de facto complainant. However, the de facto complainant lodged a report with the Chilakaluripet Police and they have erroneously registered the case and investigated the same and filed charge-sheet in the Court of Chilakaluripet. Therefore, both the Police at Chilakaluripet and also the Court at Chilakaluripet have no jurisdiction to entertain the present case. So, he would pray to dismiss the revision case. 6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that the allegations in the FIR show that the incidents of harassment took place both at Guntur and Chilakaluripet also. Therefore, when the offences took place in more than one place, Police at any one of those places will have jurisdiction to register a case and investigate the same and the Courts at any one of the said places will also have jurisdiction to try the said case. He would also submit that when the harassment was caused to a woman at one place and if she suffered the consequences of the said harassment at another place, the Courts at both the places will have jurisdiction to try the said case. Therefore, even though the de facto complainant was harassed at Guntur as per the submission made by the learned counsel for accused 3 to 5, as she suffered the consequences at her parents’ house in Chilakaluripet, on that ground the Court at Chilakaluripet got jurisdiction to try the case. 7. Perused the record. 8. Therefore, even though the de facto complainant was harassed at Guntur as per the submission made by the learned counsel for accused 3 to 5, as she suffered the consequences at her parents’ house in Chilakaluripet, on that ground the Court at Chilakaluripet got jurisdiction to try the case. 7. Perused the record. 8. In the light of the rival submissions made by both the counsel as detailed supra, this Court has meticulously gone through the allegations made in the FIR. The first ground on which the accused 3 to 5 sought discharge from the case is that there are no specific allegations made against them in the FIR or in the statements of the witnesses which constitute an offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC against them. A perusal of the FIR shows that the de facto complainant clearly stated that when she went to her parents’-in-law house that her brother-in-law i.e. accused No.4 and his wife accused No.5 questioned her as to what she did regarding the demand made by accused No.1 and asked her whether she made the money demanded by them ready or not and whether she informed about the said demand to her parents or not and thereby harassed her. Therefore, in view of the said specific allegation made in the FIR, it cannot be said that there is no material against accused 4 and 5 to hold that any offence under Section 498-A of IPC is constituted against them or not. Similarly, as regards accused No.3 is concerned, it is stated in the FIR in the last lines of the penultimate para that both accused No.3 and her husband, who are the parents-in-law of the de facto complainant, demanded for additional dowry to allow her to join accused No.1. Therefore, prima facie there is an allegation made in the FIR against accused 3 to 5 regarding the alleged illegal demands made by them regarding additional dowry. The contents of the FIR as a whole is to be considered to ascertain whether there is any such mala fide intention on the part of the accused in harassing the de facto complainant with any such illegal demands or not. Considering the entire allegations made in the FIR as a whole, it is evident that there are certain allegations made against accused 3 to 5 also regarding the illegal demands made by them for additional dowry. Considering the entire allegations made in the FIR as a whole, it is evident that there are certain allegations made against accused 3 to 5 also regarding the illegal demands made by them for additional dowry. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no prima facie material against them to frame a charge against them to try them for the said offences. 9. Therefore, the trial Court erred in holding that there are no eyewitnesses to prove the allegations made against accused 3 to 5 and that there is no material to proceed against them. The trial Court lost sight of the fact that even the sole testimony of the de facto complainant is sufficient if it is ultimately found to be trustworthy and inspires confidence in the mind of the Court regarding the accusation made against her against the accused. Corroboration is only a rule of law which is required by the Courts as an abundant caution to the testimony of the victim. So, the trial Court did not consider the said legal position regarding the appreciation of evidence of the sole testimony of the victim. At any rate, it is a matter which pertains to appreciation of evidence on record in final adjudication of the case. 10. At the stage of framing charge or considering the petition for discharge, the Court has to only see whether there is prima facie evidence or material to frame a charge against the accused and to try them for the said offence leaving the proof of the said allegations to be decided in the final adjudication of the case after the trial is concluded. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the trial Court grossly erred in allowing the petition for discharge of the accused ignoring the specific allegations made in the FIR and ignoring the fact that even the sole testimony of the de facto complainant, which if believed in the final adjudication of the case, would be sufficient to establish the guilt against the accused. 11. 11. As regards the jurisdiction of the Police to register the case and investigate the same is concerned and also as regards the jurisdiction of the Court to try the said case at Chilakaluripet is concerned, it is convenient and appropriate to discuss the issue separately regarding the jurisdiction of the Police to register and investigate the case and regarding the jurisdiction of the Court to try the said case. 12. As regards the jurisdiction of the Police to register the case and investigate the case is concerned, now the law is well settled that even when the Police at a particular place has no jurisdiction to register the case on the ground that the offence took place in the jurisdiction of another police station, the Police cannot refuse to register a case or investigate the same. According to settled law, the Police has to first register the case and investigate the same when the allegations made before the Police disclose a commission of a cognizable offence. Thereafter, the Police has to transfer the said case to the police station which got jurisdiction. So, in view of the said settled legal position, on the ground that the Chilakaluripet Police has no jurisdiction to register a case and investigate the same, the accused cannot seek discharge of the case. 13. Similarly, even if the Court at Chilakaluripet has no jurisdiction to try the said case on the ground that no offence took place within the jurisdiction of the said Court as the contents of the FIR disclosed that the entire offence took place in Guntur, the Court at Chilakaluripet cannot acquit the accused. At best, if the said Court finds at any stage of the case that it has no jurisdiction to try the case, under Section 322 of Cr.P.C, the Court has to stay the proceedings and submit the case with a brief report explaining its nature to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or to such Magistrate having jurisdiction as the Chief Judicial Magistrate directs. Therefore, as per law, even when the trial Court finds in any criminal trial that it has no territorial jurisdiction to try the said case, it cannot either discharge the accused on that ground or acquit the accused on that ground. At best, it can only order for transfer of the said case to the competent Court which has jurisdiction to try the same. At best, it can only order for transfer of the said case to the competent Court which has jurisdiction to try the same. Therefore, on the said ground, the petitioners cannot seek discharge from the case. 14. The Apex Court in the case of Sarvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 held at para-15 as follows: “15. Hence, in the present case, the High Court committed a grave error in accepting the contention of the respondent that the investigating officer had no jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged ground that no part of the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station at Delhi. The appreciation of the evidence is the function of the courts when seized of the matter. At the stage of investigation, the material collected by an investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion that the police station officer of a particular police station would not have territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be stated that in view of Section 178(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of the several local areas an offence was committed, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, the said offence can be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of investigation that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction, is on the face of it, illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo that no proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court has completely overlooked the said embargo when it entertained the petition of Respondent 2 on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.” 15. Even otherwise, the contents of the FIR show that the offence complained against the accused in the case was committed both at Guntur and Chilakaluripet. When the offence took place at two places, the Courts at any one of the said places got jurisdiction to try the said case. Even otherwise, the contents of the FIR show that the offence complained against the accused in the case was committed both at Guntur and Chilakaluripet. When the offence took place at two places, the Courts at any one of the said places got jurisdiction to try the said case. Even when the offences are continuing offences or when the victim suffered the consequences at another place on account of the offence committed against the victim at another place, the Courts at both the places would have jurisdiction to try the offences as contemplated under Section 179 of Cr.P.C. 16. At any rate, the trial Court has to come to the conclusion after considering the evidence on record adduced by the prosecution as to whether any part of the offence took place as mentioned in the FIR both at Guntur and Chilakaluripet and whether the Court at Chilakaluripet has got jurisdiction to try the said case or not. If the trial Court finds that part of the offence is committed at Chilakaluripet, it has to hold that it has got jurisdiction to try the said case. Even the trial Court finds that no part of the offence took place within its jurisdiction, it cannot discharge the accused or acquit them and the trial Court has to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 322 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, viewed from any angle, no case is made out by the accused 3 to 5 herein to discharge them from the case. 17. In view of the above discussion, the criminal revision case is allowed and the impugned order of the trial Court is set aside. However, it is left open to the trial Court to decide regarding the jurisdiction of the trial Court to try the case in view of the contentions raised by the accused that no part of offence was committed within the jurisdiction of Chilakaluripet. The said issue of jurisdiction has to be decided as per law by the trial Court. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.