ORDER : The present petitioner, since deceased, being represented by his legal representatives, as a plaintiff, had instituted a suit in O.S.No.644/1989, in the Court of Prl.Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) & Prl.J.M.F.C., Dharwad, (hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘trial Court’), against the original defendants by name Smt.Sunanda, daughter of Shankar Rao Pandit (respondent No.1 herein) and Sri Shankar Rao, son of Venkatesh Pandit (respondent No.2 herein), for specific performance of an Agreement to Sell dated 24.4.1981, with respect to an immovable property. The suit came to be decreed by the judgment and decree of the trial Court on 20.2.1998. The respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein filed RA.No.41/1998 before the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Dharwad, and later the same came to be transferred to learned II Addl.District Judge, Dharwad and renumbered as R.A.No.129/2003, which appeal came to be dismissed. Against which, they preferred an appeal in R.S.A.No.968/2004, which also came to be dismissed. The decree holder filed an Execution Petition in E.P.No.84/2006 on 3.11.2006. An application was filed for appointment of a Court Commissioner on 31.3.2008. In the meantime, the respondents 1 and 2 filed an application i.e., IA.No.III in O.S.No.644/1989 under Section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking to rescind the contract dated 24.4.1981, inter alia contending that the decree holder has not paid the purchase money (remaining balance sale consideration of a sum of Rs10,000/-) within the time allowed by the Court. The decree holder denied the allegations made in the said application contending that there was no specific time limit fixed for the payment of the balance sale consideration and that the Execution Petition was filed within the limitation period. However, the trial Court after hearing both side, by its order dated 21.10.2009, allowed I.A.No.III filed by the applicants and ordered that the Agreement to Sell dated 24.4.1981 has stood rescinded due to the fault of the plaintiff and thereby the judgment and decree dated 20.2.1998 has stood annulled. It also directed the judgment debtors 1 and 2 to return the earnest money of Rs5,000/-with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of decree. The defendants 1 and 2 were directed to deposit the said amount in the Court within one month from the date of the order. It also directed the judgment debtors 1 and 2 to return the earnest money of Rs5,000/-with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of decree. The defendants 1 and 2 were directed to deposit the said amount in the Court within one month from the date of the order. It is challenging the said order of the trial Court allowing IA.No.III, which was filed by present respondents 1 and 2, the decree holder/plaintiff has preferred this Revision Petition. 2. The respondents are being represented by their respective learned counsels. The notice against respondent Nos.3 to 6 is dispensed with vide Court order dated 8.11.2010. 3. Heard the arguments of learned counsel from both side. 4. The only point that arise for my consideration is: “Whether the impugned order passed by the trial Court deserves any interference at the hands of this Court?” 5. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner in his argument vehemently submitted that when the decree under consideration did not specifically mention that the plaintiff ought to have deposited the amount irrespective of the respondents’/decree holder’s performing their part of the promise, the act of the trial Court in allowing IA.No.III filed under Section 28(1) of Specific Relief Act was uncalled for. 6. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 in his argument submitted that a reading of the operative portion of the decree makes it very clear that the decree holder ought to have paid or deposited the balance sale consideration, however, he for no valid reason had filed the Execution Petition after more than eight years, as such, the trial Court has rightly allowed the application. 7. The operative portion of the judgment passed in O.S.No.644/1989 reads as below : “The suit of the plaintiff is decreed. It is further ordered and decreed that the plaintiff is entitled to a relief of specific performance and also possession of the suit property from the defendants. It is further ordered and decreed that the defendants 1 and 2 are directed to obtain permission from the Urban Ceiling Authority and execute a registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff within 3 months and also hand over the possession of the suit property as on the date of sale deed after receipt of remaining balance consideration of Rs10,000/-. It is further ordered and decreed that the defendants 1 and 2 are directed to obtain permission from the Urban Ceiling Authority and execute a registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff within 3 months and also hand over the possession of the suit property as on the date of sale deed after receipt of remaining balance consideration of Rs10,000/-. It is further ordered and decreed that if the defendants 1 and 2 failed to execute the registered sale deed, then the plaintiff is at liberty to get registered the sale deed by appointment of Court Commissioner at the costs of the defendants 1 and 2. Under the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.” Learned counsel for the petitioners drawing the attention of this Court to the second paragraph of the above extracted operative portion of the order submitted that the person at fault are the judgment debtors, but, not the decree holder. He submitted that the judgment debtors themselves did not obtain Urban Land Ceiling Certificate from the competent authority, as such, he did not proceed to enforce the execution of the agreement immediately thereafter. He relied upon the two judgments of Co-ordinate Benches of this Court. The first judgment is in the case of Smt.Y.M.Shailaja –vs-C.Ramanjaneya, reported in 2010 4 AIR (KAR) 742, wherein a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court with respect to a decree for specific performance where the judgment debtor/vendor had filed an application for recession of the agreement at the time of the execution of the decree on the ground of alleged default on the part of the decree holder in depositing the full amount of sale consideration before the date fixed by the trial Court and causing three days delay in making the deposit, was pleased to observe that, where the direction given in decree was to the judgment debtor to receive the balance amount of sale consideration and execute the Sale Deed, he is not justified, when he has not complied with direction, in seeking rescission of contract one year after the decree was passed without explaining his own default in seeking the relief immediately. The second judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in his support is in the case of Mariyamma and others –vs-Distinappa, reported in 2015 4 AIR (KAR) 481, wherein a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court with respect to Section 28 of Specific Relief Act and rescinding the contract, was pleased to observe that, non-deposit of balance sale consideration by the purchaser during the period of pendency of Regular First Appeal or Regular Second Appeal, would not depict lack of bona fides and would not disentitle the purchaser to seek extension of time. It observed that, refusal to rescind the contract by the trial Court was not illegal. 8. Citing these two cases in his support, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that, in the instant case also, the unsuccessful respondents 3 and 4 had preferred a Regular Appeal and Regular Second Appeal and thus, he did not deposit the balance amount within the period of three months, as such, the same cannot be entertained against him and IA.No.III ought not to have been allowed by the trial Court. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 submitted that when the order passed is a composite order imposing certain obligations both on the decree holder, as well the judgment debtors to comply their part of the promise, the decree holders ought to have performed his part of the promise without waiting the judgment debtors to comply their part of the promise, because, the same was not a conditional one (contingent). In his support, he relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Chanda (Dead) through LRs. –vs-Rattni, reported in LAWS (SC) 2007 358, wherein after considering that the decree holder had failed to deposit the balance sale consideration within two months from the date of decree as required under the decree, the Hon’ble Apex Court had confirmed the rescission of contract ordered by both the trial Court and its confirmation in the Revision by the High Court. 9. 9. In the instant case, a careful reading of the operative portion of the judgment, which is extracted above, would go to show that the defendants 1 and 2 who are said to be the respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein were directed to obtain permission from the Urban Ceiling Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, (hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘Urban Land Ceiling Act’) and execute a registered Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff within three months. They were also directed to handover the possession of the suit property as on the date of the Sale Deed. Simultaneously, the decree holder was also required to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs10,000/-. 10. Admittedly, the Execution Petition was filed eight years after the said decree. Till then, the decree holder has not either deposited the said balance sale consideration of Rs10,000/-or offered to pay the said amount to the vendors/judgment debtors in any manner. Though he contends that Regular Appeal and Regular Second Appeal were filed challenging the decree, which has prevented him in preferring the Execution Petition at the earliest, but, the fact remains that the alleged Regular Appeal bearing No.RA.129/2003 and RSA.No.968/2004 were filed by the respondents 1 and 2 and that there was no interim order of stay in the Execution Petition of the decree under question. Thus, in the absence of any interim order of stay for the execution of the decree, merely because the other two respondents have filed a Regular Appeal and a Regular Second Appeal subsequently, would not act as a cause for the decree holder to seek the enforcement of the decree in his favour. It is important to note that the applicants in IA.No.III filed in the trial Court were not the appellants in either of those two appeals. Secondly, Smt.Y.M.Shailaja’s case (supra), was not a case where the decree holder did not deposit the balance sale consideration till filing of the Execution Petition. In the said case, there was only three days delay in depositing of the balance sale consideration, whereas, in the instant case, admittedly for several years, the decree holder neither offered to pay the balance sale consideration nor deposited the same. As already observed above, nothing had prevented him from depositing the said balance sale consideration in the Court and demanding the judgment debtors to perform their part of the promise. As already observed above, nothing had prevented him from depositing the said balance sale consideration in the Court and demanding the judgment debtors to perform their part of the promise. It was so, because, the petitioner herein was the decree holder who was eligible to reap the benefits under the decree. Even after he depositing the said amount of Rs10,000/-, if the judgment debtors were still not willing to execute the Sale Deed, then, he could have sought for appointment of the Court Commissioner to execute the Sale Deed. But, in the instant case, as observed above, for several years, the decree holder did not evince any interest to get the decree executed in his support though the trial Court in the decree has prescribed a period of three months. 11. No doubt, for enforcement of a decree, he has got a limitation period of twelve years, but, it does not mean that, for such a long period i.e., till the expiry of the limitation period, he need not offer the judgment debtors the balance payment of the amount so that they can perform their part of the promise which was simultaneous under the decree. Admittedly, the same has not been done. Furthermore, even according to both the parties, obtaining of the certificate from Urban Land Ceiling authority also came to be frustrated, because, pertinently, the Urban Land Ceiling Act ceased to be in operation from 22.3.1999. In such a situation, the decree holder was not expected or required to sleep on his decree for a long period anticipating that the defendants would furnish him the Certificate and it is only thereafter he is expected or required to pay them the balance amount of Rs10,000/-or deposit in the Court. The decree holder even after knowing that the Urban Land Ceiling Act was ceased to be in operation in the year 1999 itself, kept quite and did not take any action till the year 2006, when he filed the Execution Petition. So that it made the judgment debtors not to hand over the possession of the suit property since the operative portion of the judgment/decree says that for handing over the possession, the decree holder shall have to pay the remaining balance sale consideration of Rs10,000/-. 12. Thus, when the condition for performing certain acts was applicable to both the parties, it has to be exercised simultaneously. 12. Thus, when the condition for performing certain acts was applicable to both the parties, it has to be exercised simultaneously. The decree holder without discharging his part of the obligation under the decreetal terms cannot expect the other side alone to perform their promise. Thus, since the trial Court has rightly appreciating these facts, allowed the application i.e., IA.No.III filed by the respondents 1 and 2 (defendant Nos.1 and 2) and ordered for rescinding the contract, I do not find any reason to interfere in it. 13. Accordingly I proceed to pass the following order: ORDER The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. In view of dismissal of the main petition, IA.No.1/2014, filed by the respondents 1 and 2 does not survive for consideration.