Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 205 (KER)

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Philomina

2020-02-18

ANIL K.NARENDRAN

body2020
JUDGMENT : ANIL K. NARENDRAN, J. 1. The appellant is the 3rd respondent insurer in O.P. (MV) No. 170 of 2012 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakkuda, a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by respondents 1 to 4, claiming compensation on account of the death of one Linju son of the 1st respondent and brother of respondents 2 to 4, in a motor accident which occurred on 07.09.2011, while he was walking along the side of a public road. At the place of accident, he was knocked down by a motorcycle bearing registration No. KL-4/X-6542, owned by the 5th respondent and ridden by the 6th respondent herein and insured with the appellant insurer. In the accident, he sustained fatal injuries, who succumbed to the injuries on the very next day, while undergoing inpatient treatment. Alleging that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent riding of motorcycle by its rider, claim petition was filed before the Tribunal, claiming a total compensation of Rs. 7,00,000/- under various heads. 2. Before the Tribunal, the owner and rider of the motorcycle remained absent and they were set ex-parte. The insurer filed written statement admitting the policy coverage of the motorcycle; however, denying its involvement in the accident. The insurer contended that the compensation claimed under various heads is on the higher side. 3. Before the Tribunal, Exts.A1 to A11 were marked on the side of the claimants. The police officer, who submitted Ext.A2 final report in Crime No. 637/11 of Haripad Police Station, was examined as RW-1. The case diary of the said crime was marked as Ext.X1. 4. After considering the pleadings and materials on record, the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the deceased sustained fatal injuries in a motor accident involving motorcycle bearing registration No. KL-4/X-6542 and that accident occurred due to the rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by its rider. Since insurance coverage of the said vehicle was not in dispute, the appellant insurer was held liable to indemnify the insured. Under various heads, the Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs. 15,55,550/- together with interest at the rate 9% per annum, from 06.03.2012 till the date of realisation, with proportionate cost, and directed the insurer to satisfy the award. Since insurance coverage of the said vehicle was not in dispute, the appellant insurer was held liable to indemnify the insured. Under various heads, the Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs. 15,55,550/- together with interest at the rate 9% per annum, from 06.03.2012 till the date of realisation, with proportionate cost, and directed the insurer to satisfy the award. The 1st respondent/1st claimant, who was the mother of the deceased, was found entitled for the entire amount of compensation. 5. Challenging the findings of the Tribunal that the deceased sustained fatal injuries in a motor accident involving motorcycle bearing registration No. KL-4/X-6542 and that accident occurred due to the rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by its rider, the appellant insurer is before this Court in this appeal. The insurer has also challenged the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads. 6. On 04.12.2019, when this appeal came up for consideration, this Court admitted the matter on file. In I.A. No. 2816 of 2017, this Court granted an interim order of stay, which reads thus: “There will be an interim stay, as prayed for, for a period of two months, on condition that the appellant/insurer satisfies 50% of the total compensation awarded by the Tribunal with proportionate interest, within three weeks. It would be open to the 1s respondent/claimant to move the Tribunal for disbursement of the said amount, in which event, the Tribunal shall consider that request taking note of the law on the point and also the directives issued by this Court in Circular No. 3 of 2019 dated 06.09.2019 and clarified further in Official Memorandum No. D1-62475/2016 dated 07.11.2019.” 7. Seeking review of the above interim order of stay dated 04.12.2019, the appellant insurer has filed R.P. No. 15 of 2020, which ended in dismissal by a separate order dated this day. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant insurer and also the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/1st claimant. 9. Seeking review of the above interim order of stay dated 04.12.2019, the appellant insurer has filed R.P. No. 15 of 2020, which ended in dismissal by a separate order dated this day. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant insurer and also the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/1st claimant. 9. The issues that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the findings of the Tribunal that the deceased sustained fatal injuries in a motor accident involving motorcycle bearing registration No. KL-4/X-6542 and that accident occurred due to the rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by its rider can be sustained in law; and whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads represents just and reasonable compensation. 10. The document marked as Ext.A2 is a true copy of the charge-sheet filed in Crime No. 667/2011 of Haripad Police Station, registered in connection with the motor accident in question. The police, after investigation, charge-sheeted the 6th respondent herein, the rider of the motorcycle, for an offence punishable under Section 279 and Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 11. In New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Pazhaniammal, 2011 (3) KHC 595 a Division Bench of this Court held that, as a general rule it can safely be accepted that production of the police charge-sheet is prima facie sufficient evidence of negligence for the purpose of a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. If any one of the parties do not accept such charge-sheet, the burden must be on such party to adduce oral evidence. If oral evidence is adduced by any party, in a case where charge-sheet is filed, the Tribunal should give further opportunity to others also to adduce oral evidence and in such a case the charge-sheet will pale into insignificance and the dispute will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence. In all other cases such charge-sheet can be reckoned as sufficient evidence of negligence in a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Wherever, on the facts of a given case, the Tribunal feels that the police charge sheet does not satisfy its judicial conscience, the Tribunal can record that the charge sheet cannot be accepted and can call upon the parties, at any stage, to adduce oral evidence of the accident and the alleged negligence. Wherever, on the facts of a given case, the Tribunal feels that the police charge sheet does not satisfy its judicial conscience, the Tribunal can record that the charge sheet cannot be accepted and can call upon the parties, at any stage, to adduce oral evidence of the accident and the alleged negligence. In such a case, the issue of negligence must be decided on the other evidence, ignoring the charge sheet. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said decision read thus: “7. In this context we feel it appropriate to refer to the practice adopted by many Tribunals in the State. Wherever a crime has been registered in respect of the accident and the investigation has culminated in the filing of a charge sheet by the police, such charge sheet is filed and the same is reckoned as sufficient to establish negligence on the part of the indictee. The practice has not received formal judicial approval and hence some Tribunals insist on oral evidence in support of negligence invariably. This consumes a lot of judicial time and the heavily over worked Tribunal spends its time on unnecessary oral evidence of negligence. We would certainly not want the Tribunals to be prisoners of the conclusions of police officers. If the Tribunal finds it suspicious, it can insist for better evidence. But as a general rule it can safely be accepted that production of the police charge sheet is prima facie sufficient evidence of negligence for the purpose of a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. A system cannot feed itself on a regular diet of distrust of the police. Prima facie, charge sheet filed by a police officer after due investigation can be accepted as evidence of negligence against the indicted. If any one of the parties do not accept such charge sheet, the burden must be on such party to adduce oral evidence. If oral evidence is adduced by any party, in a case where charge sheet is filed, the Tribunals should give further opportunity to others also to adduce oral evidence and in such a case the charge sheet will pale into insignificance and the dispute will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence. In all other cases such charge sheet can be reckoned as sufficient evidence of negligence in a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In all other cases such charge sheet can be reckoned as sufficient evidence of negligence in a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. We mean to say that on production of such charge sheet the shifting of burden must take place. It is not as though we are not conscious of the dangers and pit falls involved in such an approach. But we feel that adoption and recognition of such practice would help to reduce the length of the long queue for justice before the Tribunals. The judicial recognition of the practice will help the Tribunals to ensure the optimum use of judicial time at their disposal for productive ventures. 8. We do not intend to say that collusive charge sheets need be accepted. Wherever on the facts of a given case the Tribunals feel that the police charge-sheet does not satisfy their judicial conscience, the Tribunals can record that the charge-sheet cannot be accepted and can call upon the parties, at any stage, to adduce oral evidence of the accident and the alleged negligence. In such a case, the issue of negligence must be decided on the other evidence, ignoring the charge-sheet.” 12. In view of the law laid down in Pazhaniammal, the production of Ext.A2 charge sheet filed in Crime No. 667/2011 of Haripad Police Station, registered in connection with the motor accident in question, in which the 6th respondent rider of the motorcycle was charge sheeted for an offence punishable under Section 279 and Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, is prima facie sufficient evidence of negligence on his part, for the purpose of a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 13. The case dairy in Crime No. 667/2011 was marked as Ext.X1, through RW-1, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, who conducted investigation in that crime. The accident occurred around midnight. Nobody has witnessed the accident and the charge was laid on the basis of circumstantial evidence. CW-7 and CW-8 in Ext.A2 charge sheet are the persons who pointed out the scene of occurrence to RW-1. During cross examination by the learned counsel for the claimants, RW1 has admitted that, as per the statement made by CW-8, motorcycle bearing registration No. KL-4/X-6542 was found parked near the place of accident. CW-7 and CW-8 in Ext.A2 charge sheet are the persons who pointed out the scene of occurrence to RW-1. During cross examination by the learned counsel for the claimants, RW1 has admitted that, as per the statement made by CW-8, motorcycle bearing registration No. KL-4/X-6542 was found parked near the place of accident. The owner of the motorcycle produced the said vehicle and the police seized that vehicle after preparing a seizure mahazar. At the time of seizure, the number plate and handlebar of the motorcycle were found dented; the front mirror was found broken; and there were scratches on its body. RW1 has admitted that, in Ext.A6 AMVI Report, extensive damages were noted on the motorcycle. 14. In N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. vs. Karumai Ammal, (1980) (3) SCC 457 the Apex Court held that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The Tribunals should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. 15. In Kusum Lata vs. Satbir, (2011) 3 SCC 646 the Apex Court held that, in a case relating to motor accident claims, the claimants are not required to prove the case as it is required to be done in a criminal trial. The Court must keep this distinction in mind. 16. In Parameshwari vs. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 the Apex Court reiterated that, in a road accident claim, the strict principles of proof in a criminal case are not attracted. In Parameshwari, the Apex Court had taken note of the observation made in its earlier decision in Bimla Devi vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, (2009) 13 SCC 530 that, the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and that standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. 17. In Sherin J. Thankom vs. Thankom and Others, 2014 (3) KLT 44 a Division Bench of this Court held that, in deciding matters arising out of accident cases the Tribunal should bear in mind the caution struck by the Apex Court that a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is neither a criminal case nor a civil case. 17. In Sherin J. Thankom vs. Thankom and Others, 2014 (3) KLT 44 a Division Bench of this Court held that, in deciding matters arising out of accident cases the Tribunal should bear in mind the caution struck by the Apex Court that a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is neither a criminal case nor a civil case. In a claim before the Tribunal the standard of proof is much below than what is required in a criminal case as well as in a civil case. No doubt before the Tribunal, there must be some material on the basis of which the Tribunal can arrive at or decide things necessary to be decided for awarding compensation. 18. In the instant case, since the accident occurred around midnight, nobody has witnessed the accident. Therefore, after investigation, RW-1 laid Ext.A2 charge on the basis of circumstantial evidence. As per the statement made by CW-8, the motorcycle was found parked near the place of accident. In Ext.A6 AMVI Report, extensive damages were noted on the motorcycle. Neither the owner nor the rider of the motorcycle offered any explanation for the extensive damages found on that vehicle (which was parked near the place of accident) and they remained absent. When the standard of proof in a claim before the Tribunal is much below than what is required in a criminal case as well as in a civil case, Ext.A6 AMVI Report showing extensive damages on the motorcycle and the statement of CW-8 that, the motorcycle was found parked near the place of accident, are sufficient materials for the Tribunal to arrive at a conclusion as to the involvement of that vehicle in the motor accident in question. As already noticed, in Ext.A2 charge sheet the 6th respondent rider of the motorcycle was charge sheeted for an offence punishable under Section 279 and Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, which is prima facie sufficient evidence of negligence on his part, for the purpose of a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, the findings of the Tribunal that the deceased sustained fatal injuries in a motor accident involving motorcycle bearing registration No. KL-4/X-6542 and that accident occurred due to the rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by its rider, are perfectly legal, which warrant no interference in this appeal. 19. Therefore, the findings of the Tribunal that the deceased sustained fatal injuries in a motor accident involving motorcycle bearing registration No. KL-4/X-6542 and that accident occurred due to the rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by its rider, are perfectly legal, which warrant no interference in this appeal. 19. The next question that has to be considered is as to whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads represents just and reasonable compensation. 20. In Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation, (2009) 6 SCC 121 the Apex Court laid down the principles governing determination of quantum of compensation in the case of death in a motor accident. The Apex Court held that, the compensation awarded does not become "just compensation" merely because the Tribunal considers it to be just. Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well settled principles relating to award of compensation. It is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit. To have uniformity and consistency, Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by following the well settled steps, namely, ascertaining the multiplicand (annual contribution to the family), the multiplier and calculation of loss of dependency by multiplying the multiplicand by such multiplier. 21. In National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the concept of "just compensation" and the same has to be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an individual case. The conception of "just compensation" has to be viewed through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non-violation of the principle of equitability. In a case of death, the legal heirs of the claimants cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted cannot be an apology for compensation. It cannot be a pittance. The conception of "just compensation" has to be viewed through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non-violation of the principle of equitability. In a case of death, the legal heirs of the claimants cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted cannot be an apology for compensation. It cannot be a pittance. Though the discretion vested in the Tribunal is quite wide, yet it is obligatory on the part of the Tribunal to be guided by the expression, i.e. just compensation. 22. In the instant case, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads reads thus:- S. No. Head of claim Amount claimed (Rs.) Amount awarded (Rs.) Basis-vital details in a nutshell 1 Transport to hospital and to bring dead body to residence 5,000/- 10,000/- 2 Damage to clothing 5,000/- -- 3 Medical expenses 50,000/- -- 4 Funeral expenses 20,000/- 25,000/- 5 Pain and suffering 15,000/- 20,000/- 6 Loss of dependency 6,00,000/- 14,30,550/- (14,025 x 12 x 17/2) 7 Loss of estate -- 20,000/- 8 Loss of love and affection 30,000/- 50,000/- Total 7,25,000/- Limited to Rs. 7,00,000/- 15,55,550/- Rs. 15,55,550/- along with interest @ 9% p.a. from 6.3.2012 till realisation 23. The accident occurred on 07.09.2011. At the time of accident, the deceased was aged 30 years. In the claim petition it was claimed that at the time of accident, the deceased was an Optical Fitter earning a monthly income of Rs. 12,500/- at Vasan Eye Care Hospital, Mangalapuram. Before the Tribunal, the appellants produced Ext.A9 salary certificate issued from Vasan Eye Care Hospital, in which it is certified that the deceased was working as Optical Fitter in their hospital for a period of one year and one month, who died in a motor accident which occurred on 07.09.2011. In Ext.A9, it is certified that the salary of the deceased was Rs. 9,350/- per month. Though Ext.A9 salary certificate was not proved by examining the employer concerned, the Tribunal took the monthly income of the deceased as Rs. 9,350/-. 24. In Ramachandrappa vs. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited, (2011) 13 SCC 236 the Apex Court reckoned the monthly income of a coolie (manual labourer), who met with a road accident in the year 2004, at the age of 35 years, notionally as Rs. 4,500/-. 9,350/-. 24. In Ramachandrappa vs. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited, (2011) 13 SCC 236 the Apex Court reckoned the monthly income of a coolie (manual labourer), who met with a road accident in the year 2004, at the age of 35 years, notionally as Rs. 4,500/-. The Apex Court held that, the claimant who was working as a coolie cannot be expected to produce any documentary evidence to substantiate his claim. In the absence of any other evidence contrary to the claim made by the claimant, in the facts of the said case, the Tribunal should have accepted the claim of the claimant. The Apex Court made it clear that, in all cases and in all circumstances, the Tribunal need not accept the claim of the claimant, in the absence of supporting material. It depends on the facts of each case. In a given case, if the claim made is so exorbitant or if the claim made is contrary to ground realities, the Tribunal may not accept the claim and may proceed to determine the possible income by resorting to some guess work, which may include the ground realities prevailing at the relevant point of time. 25. In Syed Sadiq vs. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2014) 2 SCC 735 , taking note of the earlier decision in Ramachandrappa's case (supra), the Apex Court reckoned the monthly income of a vegetable vendor, who met with a road accident in the year 2008, at the age of 24 years, notionally as Rs. 6,500/-. In the said decision, the Apex Court held that, a labourer in an unorganised sector doing his own business cannot be expected to produce documents to prove his monthly income. Therefore, there was no reason for the Tribunal and the High Court to ask for evidence to prove his monthly income. Going by the state of economy prevailing at that time and the rising prices in agricultural products, the Apex Court accepted his case that a vegetable vendor is reasonably capable of earning Rs. 6,500/- per month. 26. Therefore, there was no reason for the Tribunal and the High Court to ask for evidence to prove his monthly income. Going by the state of economy prevailing at that time and the rising prices in agricultural products, the Apex Court accepted his case that a vegetable vendor is reasonably capable of earning Rs. 6,500/- per month. 26. Considering the economic conditions prevailing at the time of accident, i.e. during the year 2011, and taking note of the fixation of notional monthly income by the Apex Court in Ramachandrappa and Syed Sadiq, the monthly income of a manual labourer or a labourer in an unorganised sector doing his own business as vegetable vendor, fruit vendor, etc. who met with a motor accident in the year 2011, could be reasonably taken as Rs. 8,000/-. As borne out from Ext.A9 salary certificate, at the time of accident, the deceased was working as Optical Fitter at Vasan Eye Care Hospital, Mangalapuram. At no stretch of imagination, the monthly income of Rs. 9,350/- fixed by the Tribunal cannot be said to be on the higher side, since it is only Rs. 1,350/- above the notional monthly income that could be reasonably taken for a manual labourer or a labourer in an unorganised sector doing his own business as vegetable vendor, fruit vendor, etc. who met with a motor accident in the year 2011. 27. In Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, the determination of "just compensation" has to be on the foundation of evidence brought on record as regards the age and income of the deceased and thereafter the apposite multiplier to be applied. The formula relating to multiplier has been clearly stated in Sarla Verma (2009) 6 SCC 121 and it has been approved in Reshma Kumari vs. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 . The age and income, as stated earlier, have to be established by adducing evidence. The Tribunal and the Courts have to bear in mind that the basic principle lies in pragmatic computation which is in proximity to reality. It is a well accepted norm that money cannot substitute a life lost but an effort has to be made for grant of just compensation having uniformity of approach. The Tribunal and the Courts have to bear in mind that the basic principle lies in pragmatic computation which is in proximity to reality. It is a well accepted norm that money cannot substitute a life lost but an effort has to be made for grant of just compensation having uniformity of approach. There has to be a balance between the two extremes, that is, a windfall and the pittance, a bonanza and the modicum. In such an adjudication, the duty of the Tribunal and the Courts is difficult and hence, an endeavour has been made by this Court for standardization which in its ambit includes addition of future prospects on the proven income at present. As far as future prospects are concerned, there has been standardization keeping in view the principle of certainty, stability and consistency. In Pranay Sethi the Apex Court approved the principle of "standardization" so that a specific and certain multiplicand is determined for applying the multiplier on the basis of age. 28. In Rajesh vs. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 , a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, in case of self-employed persons also, if the deceased victim is below 40 years, there must be addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. In Munna Lal Jain vs. Vipin Kumar Sharma, (2015) 6 SCC 347 another Three-Judge Bench followed the principle stated in Rajesh. In Pranay Sethi, after expressing the opinion that the dicta laid down in Reshma Kumari being earlier in point of time would be a binding precedent and not the decision in Rajesh, the Constitution Bench observed that, in Munna Lal Jain, the Three-Judge Bench should have been guided by the principle stated in Reshma Kumari which has concurred with the view expressed in Sarla Devi or in case of disagreement, it should have been well advised to refer the case to a Larger Bench. 29. In Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 the Constitution Bench held that, while determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. The Apex Court held further that, in case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component. 30. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 30 years. It was claimed that, at the time of accident, the deceased was earning monthly income as Optical Fitter. The Tribunal fixed the monthly income of the deceased as Rs. 9,350/-. In the impugned award, the Tribunal added 50% of the monthly income of the deceased towards future prospects. 31. As borne out from Ext.A9 salary certificate, at the time of accident, the deceased was working as Optical Fitter at Vasan Eye Care Hospital, Mangalapuram. The appellants have not chosen to prove Ext.A9 by examining the employer concerned. Therefore, the deceased can be treated as on a fixed salary. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi, an addition of 40% of the monthly income of the deceased as fixed by the Tribunal, can be made towards future prospects, since the deceased was aged below 40 years. The addition of 50% of the monthly income of the deceased towards future prospects, made by the Tribunal in the impugned award, cannot be sustained, in view of the law laid down in Pranay Sethi. 32. Therefore, for the purpose of re-fixing the compensation under the head loss of dependency, 40% of the monthly income of the deceased, i.e. a sum of Rs. 3,740/- (9,350 x 40/100) has to be added towards future prospects. In the result, the monthly income of the deceased, for the purpose of re-fixing the compensation under the head loss of dependency, is reckoned as Rs. 13,090/- (9,350 + 3,740). 33. 3,740/- (9,350 x 40/100) has to be added towards future prospects. In the result, the monthly income of the deceased, for the purpose of re-fixing the compensation under the head loss of dependency, is reckoned as Rs. 13,090/- (9,350 + 3,740). 33. In Sarla Verma (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the Apex Court, after referring to its earlier decisions in Kerala State Road Transport Corporation vs. Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176 , U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Charlie, (2005) 10 SCC 720 held that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table in paragraph 40 of the said decision [prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie], which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 [for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years], reduced by one unit for every five years, i.e. multiplier of 17 for 26 to 30 years, multiplier of 16 for 31 to 35 years, multiplier of 15 for 36 to 40 years, multiplier of 14 for 41 to 45 years, and multiplier of 13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, i.e. multiplier of 11 for 51 to 55 years, multiplier of 9 for 56 to 60 years, multiplier of 7 for 61 to 65 years and multiplier of 5 for 66 to 70 years. 34. In Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, as far as the multiplier is concerned, the Claims Tribunal and the Courts shall be guided by Step 2 that finds a place in paragraph 19 of Sarla Verma, read with paragraph 42 of the said judgment. 35. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 30 years (30 years and 4 months). Therefore, in the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case and Pranay Sethi's case referred to supra, the multiplier of 17 applied by the Tribunal is correct and proper. 36. 35. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 30 years (30 years and 4 months). Therefore, in the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case and Pranay Sethi's case referred to supra, the multiplier of 17 applied by the Tribunal is correct and proper. 36. In Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation, (2009) 6 SCC 121 the Apex Court, on the question of deduction towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased held that, the personal and living expenses of the deceased should be deducted from his monthly income, to arrive at the contribution to the dependants. Where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be one-third where the number of dependant family members is 2 to 3; one-fourth where the number of dependant family members is 4 to 6 and one-fifth where the number of dependant family members exceeds 6. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parents and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependant on the father. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where family of the bachelor is large and dependant on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two-third. 37. However, where family of the bachelor is large and dependant on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two-third. 37. In Reshma Kumari (2013) 9 SCC 65 a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court reproduced paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of Sarla Verma and approved the same, in paragraph 38 of the decision, by stating that, the standards fixed in Sarla Verma provide guidance for the appropriate deduction for personal and living expenses. One must bear in mind that the proportion of a man's net earnings that he saves or spends exclusively for the maintenance of others does not form part of his living expenses but what he spends exclusively on himself does. The percentage of deduction on account of personal and living expenses may vary with reference to the number of dependant members in the family and the personal living expenses of the deceased need not exactly correspond to the number of dependants. Therefore, the standards fixed in Sarla Verma on the aspect of deduction for personal living expenses in paras 30, 31 and 32 must ordinarily be followed unless a case for departure in the circumstances noted in the preceding paragraph is made out. In paragraph 43.6 the Apex Court directed that, insofar as deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the Tribunals shall ordinarily follow the standards prescribed in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment in Sarla Verma, subject to the observations made in para 38 of Reshma Kumari. 38. In Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, after considering the analysis made in Sarla Verma, which was reconsidered in Reshma Kumari, approved the method provided therein by stating that, as far as the guidance provided for appropriate deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the Tribunals and Courts should be guided by the conclusion in paragraph 43.6 of Reshma Kumari. 39. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was a bachelor aged 30 years. 39. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was a bachelor aged 30 years. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma, Reshma Kumari and Pranay Sethi referred to supra, deduction of 50% of the monthly income of the deceased towards his personal and living expenses is perfectly legal. 40. Towards loss of dependency, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 14,30,550/- (14,025 x 12 x 17 x 1/2). The Tribunal took the monthly income of the deceased as Rs. 9,350/-. Adding 40% of the monthly income of the deceased towards future prospects (9,350 + 3,740 = 13,090); deducting 50% towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased; and applying the multiplier of 17, the compensation under the head loss of dependency is re-fixed as Rs. 13,35,180/- (13,090 x 12 x 17 x 1/2), resulting an excess payment of Rs. 95,370/- (14,30,550 – 13,35,180). 41. In the impugned award, towards funeral expenses, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 25,000/-. Towards loss of love and affection, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs .50,000/- and a further sum of Rs. 20,000/- under the head loss of estate. 42. In Rajesh (2013) 9 SCC 54 a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. 43. In Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the head relating to loss of care and guidance for minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh refers to Santosh Devi vs. National Insurance Company Limited, (2012) 6 SCC 421 , it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the Tribunals and Courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, the reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be factcentric or quantum-centric. The Apex Court observed that, it would be condign that the amounts that have quantified as above should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years, which will bring in consistency in respect of those heads. 44. In Santosh Devi vs. Mahaveer Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 146 a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted compensation on conventional heads, in terms of the figures standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in Pranay Sethi, to the wife and children of one Puran Chand, who died in a motor accident, which occurred on 30.12.1992. 45. In Sureshchandra Bagmal Doshi vs. New India Assurance Company Limited, (2018) 15 SCC 649 the Apex Court granted the figures on conventional heads standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in Pranay Sethi, i.e. Rs. 15,000/- as loss of estate; Rs. 40,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs. 15,000/- as funeral expenses to the parents [appellants before the Apex Court], who lost their only daughter in a motor accident which occurred on 16.08.1998. In the said decision, Rs. 40,000/- granted in Pranay Sethi towards loss of consortium was granted to the appellants, who are the parents of the deceased, towards loss of love and affection. Paragraphs 1 and 14 of the said decision read thus: “1. Fate can be cruel. In the said decision, Rs. 40,000/- granted in Pranay Sethi towards loss of consortium was granted to the appellants, who are the parents of the deceased, towards loss of love and affection. Paragraphs 1 and 14 of the said decision read thus: “1. Fate can be cruel. This is a tragic case where the only daughter of a lawyer husband and a doctor wife, who got married early and unfortunately became a widow also at a young age, died in a vehicular accident, which took place on 16.8.1998. The claim of the parents (appellants herein) in respect of this unfortunate demise forms the subject matter of the present appeal. xxx xxx xxx 14. Now coming to the last aspect, i.e. the conventional heads, in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 , it has been standardised at Rs. 15,000 for loss of estate; Rs. 40,000 towards loss of consortium (in the present case loss of love and affection) and Rs. 15,000 towards funeral expenses. The total amount, thus, would be Rs. 70,000, which as per the said judgment is capable of being enhanced @ 10 percent in the span of every three years. However, we are still within the window of three years.” (Underline supplied) 46. In Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130, after referring to the decision in Pranay Sethi, the Apex Court held that in legal parlance, consortium is a compendious term which encompasses spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of company, society, cooperation, affection and aid of the other in every conjugal relation. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of 'parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training'. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. 47. In Magma General Insurance the Apex Court held that consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognised that the value of a child’s consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions, therefore, permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In a case where parents have lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental Consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Apex Court held further that, the amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under 'loss of consortium' as laid down in Pranay Sethi. 48. In Magma General Insurance, the deceased was aged 24 years, who was engaged in the business of manufacturing namkeen products, who died in a motor accident which occurred on 01.12.2013. The father, brother and sister of the deceased filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Claims Tribunal did not award any compensation to the brother of the deceased, as he could not be considered to be a dependant. Compensation was awarded to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, who were held to be dependants. The father and sister of the deceased filed appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal. Compensation was awarded to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, who were held to be dependants. The father and sister of the deceased filed appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal. The High Court found that the Claims Tribunal used the wrong principle for application of multiplier. The multiplier ought to have been taken on the basis of the age of the deceased and not that of his father. The High Court, while re-assessing the compensation granted a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rs. 50,000/- x 2) towards loss of love and affection to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased. The insurer filed S.L.P. before the Apex Court contending, inter-alia, that the father and sister of the deceased could not be considered as dependants, and were not entitled to compensation. In case of death of bachelor, only the mother could be considered to be a dependant. The grant of Rs. 1,00,000/- on account of loss of love and affection, and Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses is erroneous. It was contended that only Rs. 30,000/- could have been awarded as per the judgment in Pranay Sethi. [i.e. loss of estate - Rs. 15,000/- and funeral expenses - Rs. 15,000/-] The Apex Court held that, considering that the deceased was living in a village, where he was residing with his aged father, who was about 65 years old, and an unmarried sister, the High Court correctly considered them to be dependants of the deceased, and made a deduction of 1/3rd towards personal expenses of the deceased. The Apex Court found that the deceased was a bachelor, whose mother had predeceased him. The father of the deceased was about 65 years old and his sister was unmarried. The deceased was contributing a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the father and unmarried sister of the deceased would be entitled to compensation under his dependants. Dealing with the contention of the insurer that the High Court had wrongly awarded Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of love and affection, and Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses, the Apex Court, after quoting Para-52 of the decision in Pranay Sethi, decreased the compensation under the head funeral expenses from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 15,000/-. Dealing with the contention of the insurer that the High Court had wrongly awarded Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of love and affection, and Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses, the Apex Court, after quoting Para-52 of the decision in Pranay Sethi, decreased the compensation under the head funeral expenses from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 15,000/-. However, the amount awarded under the head loss of love and affection was maintained. After explaining the concept of spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium, the Apex Court deem it appropriate to award the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, an amount of Rs. 40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium. 49. In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi, which was followed in Santhosh Devi and Suresh Chandra Bagmaldoshi referred to supra, the compensation payable under the conventional heads of loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid figures quantified by the Apex Court should be enhanced on percentage basis, at the rate of 10% in a span of every three years. 50. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. after referring to the decision in Pranay Sethi, the surviving spouse is entitled for spousal consortium; children of the deceased are entitled for parental consortium; and parents of a deceased child, who died in a motor accident, are entitled for filial consortium. The amount of compensation that has to be awarded will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under the head loss of consortium, as laid down in Pranay Sethi. 51. In Indian Bank vs. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. (2006) 5 SCC 72 one of the contentions raised was that, any direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the reasons, if any, given for exercising such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by that Court under Article 141. It was also pointed out that, other Courts do not have the power similar to that conferred on the Apex Court under Article 142 and any attempt to follow the exercise of such power will lead to incongruous and disastrous results. It was also pointed out that, other Courts do not have the power similar to that conferred on the Apex Court under Article 142 and any attempt to follow the exercise of such power will lead to incongruous and disastrous results. The Apex Court left open that question, observing as follows: “Though there appears to be some merit in the first respondent's submission, we do not propose to examine that aspect.” Though the said question was left open, the Apex Court observed as follows in Para-26 of the judgment: “26........Many a time, after declaring the law, this Court in the operative part of the judgment, gives some directions which may either relax the application of law or exempt the case on hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts or in view of the uncertainty of law till then, to do complete justice. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article 142. It is not uncommon to find that Courts have followed not the law declared, but the exemption/relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. When the High Courts repeatedly follow a direction issued under Article 142, by treating it as the law declared by this Court, incongruously the exemption/ relaxation granted under Article 142 becomes the law, though at variance with the law declared by this Court. The Courts should therefore be careful to ascertain and follow the ratio decidendi, and not the relief given on the special facts, exercising power under Article 142......” 52. In State of Punjab vs. Rafiq Masih, (2014) 8 SCC 883 a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court affirmed the view taken in ABS Marine Products' case (supra) holding that, the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court held further that, the directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. Paras-11 to 13 of the judgment read thus: “11. Article 136 of the Constitution of India was legislatively intended to be exercised by the Highest Court of the Land, with scrupulous adherence to the settled judicial principle well established by precedents in our jurisprudence. Article 136 of the Constitution is a corrective jurisdiction that vests a discretion in the Supreme Court to settle the law clearly and make the law operational to make it a binding precedent for the future instead of keeping it vague. In short, it declares the law, as under Article 141 of the Constitution. 12. Article 142 of the Constitution is supplementary in nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the Statute. It is a power that gives preference to equity over law. It is a justice oriented approach as against the strict rigors of the law. The directions issued by the Court can normally be categorised into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the declaration of law. "Declaration of Law" as contemplated in Article 141 of the Constitution: is the speech express or necessarily implied by the Highest Court of the land. This Court in the case of Indian Bank vs. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. (2006) 5 SCC 72 , Ram Pravesh Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 381 and in State of U.P. vs. Neeraj Awasthi, (2006) 1 SCC 667 , has expounded the principle and extolled the power of Article 142 of the Constitution of India to new heights by laying down that the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Court has compartmentalised and differentiated the relief in the operative portion of the judgment by exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution as against the law declared. The directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction of the Court that changes its complexion with the peculiarity in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. Therefore, in our opinion, the decisions of the Court based on different scales of Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution of India cannot be best weighed on the same grounds of reasoning and thus in view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no conflict in the views expressed in the first two judgments and the latter judgment.” 53. In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd., the Apex Court maintained the compensation awarded by the High Court at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased towards loss of love and affection. However, the compensation under the head funeral expenses was decreased from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 15,000/- after quoting Para-52 of the decision in Pranay Sethi. After explaining the concept of spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium, the Apex Court awarded the father and unmarried sister of the deceased an amount of Rs. 40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium. 54. As already noticed, the compensation that has to be awarded to the surviving spouse towards spousal consortium; to the children of the deceased towards parental consortium; or to the parents of the deceased child towards filial consortium, is for loss of love and affection and such other matters. 40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium. 54. As already noticed, the compensation that has to be awarded to the surviving spouse towards spousal consortium; to the children of the deceased towards parental consortium; or to the parents of the deceased child towards filial consortium, is for loss of love and affection and such other matters. In such circumstances, once the surviving spouse is awarded compensation towards spousal consortium; or the children of the deceased are awarded compensation towards parental consortium; or the parents of the deceased child are awarded compensation towards filial consortium, they are not entitled for award of further compensation under the head loss love and affection, as it would result in duplication or overlapping of compensation under the relevant heads. 55. The concept of spousal consortium to the surviving spouse; parental consortium to the children of the deceased; and filial consortium to the parents of the deceased child laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. does not speak anything as to the right of siblings to get compensated under the head loss of consortium. In Magma, after noticing the fact that the mother of the deceased had predeceased him, his father was aged 65 years old, his sister was unmarried, and the deceased was contributing a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival, the Apex Court granted a sum of Rs. 40,000/- as compensation to unmarried sister of the deceased under the head filial consortium, after maintaining the compensation (Rs. 50,000/- x 2) awarded by the High Court towards loss of love and affection, which can only be treated as a direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the exercise of such power cannot be considered as law laid down by the Apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 56. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. referred to supra, Rs. 25,000/- awarded by the Tribunal in the impugned award towards funeral expenses is scaled down to Rs. 15,000/- resulting an excess payment of Rs. 10,000/- (25,000 – 15,000); Rs. 50,000/- awarded towards love and affection is scaled down as Rs. 25,000/- awarded by the Tribunal in the impugned award towards funeral expenses is scaled down to Rs. 15,000/- resulting an excess payment of Rs. 10,000/- (25,000 – 15,000); Rs. 50,000/- awarded towards love and affection is scaled down as Rs. 40,000/- and the same is granted under the head filial consortium to the 1st appellant, who is the mother of the deceased, resulting an excess payment of Rs. 10,000/- (50,000 – 40,000). 57. As already noticed, the concept of spousal consortium to the surviving spouse; parental consortium to the children of the deceased and filial consortium to the parents of the deceased child laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. does not speak anything as to the right of siblings to get compensated under the head loss of consortium. Therefore, appellants 2 to 4, who are the siblings of the deceased are not entitled for payment of any compensation under the head loss of consortium or loss of love and affection. 58. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 20,000/- as compensation towards loss of estate. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 only an amount Rs. 15,000/- can be granted under the head loss of estate. In the result, the compensation awarded under the head loss of estate is scaled down to Rs. 15,000/- resulting an excess payment of Rs. 5,000/- (20,000 – 15,000). 59. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 20,000/- as compensation towards pain and suffering of the deceased. 60. In Jyni and Others vs. Raphel P.T. and Others, 2016 (2) KHC 870 a Division Bench of this Court held that, death in an accident is generally the result of violent impact on the body resulting in serious injuries causing severe pain. The magnitude of the ordeal may vary from case to case depending upon the nature of injuries sustained. In cases of instantaneous deaths also pain and suffering is invariably present, as in the case of survival for hours or days. In cases of instantaneous death as well as cases where the deceased was unconscious between the time of accident and the time of his death, some notional amount is payable under the head pain and suffering. A slightly higher amount can be awarded under this head, if the death is not instantaneous. Therefore, a conventional amount in the range of Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. A slightly higher amount can be awarded under this head, if the death is not instantaneous. Therefore, a conventional amount in the range of Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 15,000/- could be awarded under the head pain and suffering in such cases. 61. In the instant case, the accident occurred on 07.09.2011, around midnight, and deceased succumbed to the injuries on 08.09.2011. Considering the said fact, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal towards pain and suffering of the deceased is scaled down to Rs. 5,000/- resulting an excess payment of Rs. 15,000/- (20,000 – 15,000). 62. Towards transportation expenses, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000/-. The accident occurred at Haripad in Alappuzha district and the deceased was a resident of Poyya in Thrissur district. Considering the transportation expenses to the hospital and that after the death of the deceased to his native place, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under this head cannot be said to be on the higher side, which requires no interference in this appeal. 63. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 1,34,537/- to the 1st respondent/1st claimant towards proportionate cost, out of which Rs. 85,177/- is towards Senior Advocate Fee and Rs. 42,588/- is towards Junior Advocate Fee. 64. In ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company vs. M.D. Davasia @ Jose and Another, 2019 (4) KHC 157 a Full Bench of this Court held that, it is under Rule 195 and Rule 196 of the Civil Rules of Practice, Kerala that provision is made for claiming costs, including advocate's fee. Rule 6 and Rule 16 of the Rules Regarding Fee Payable to Advocates give the rates at which such fees has to be claimed. There are no specific rules in the Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, analogous to the Rules for payment of costs prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Civil Rules of Practice, Kerala and the Rules Regarding Fee Payable to Advocates and therefore, there is nothing wrong in drawing the analogy while following the mandates of Rule 195 and Rule 196 of the Civil Rules of Practice, Kerala as well as Rule 6 and Rule 16 of the Rules Regarding Fee Payable to Advocates, in the light of sub-rule (2) of Rule 381 of the Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, to claim proportionate costs in proceedings before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals. 65. 65. As per Rule 9 of the Rules Regarding Fee Payable to Advocates, when the amount or value of the claim in a suit or appeal exceeds Rs. 1,000 an additional fee calculated at one half [substituted for "one third" as per Notification No. D1-76211/2008 dated 31.05.2012, published in Kerala Gazette No. 25 dated 19.06.2012] of the fee prescribed under Rules 6 and 7 shall be payable to a junior practitioner engaged with a senior practitioner, provided that the junior was on record at least from the date of settlement of issues in a suit or from the date fixed for the appearance of the respondent in an appeal. 66. Rule 195 of the Civil Rules of Practice, Kerala deals with taxable items. In the tabulation of costs, the matters enumerated in clauses (i) to (xvii) of Rule 195 shall be included. The matter enumerated in clause (ix) is pleader's fee as allowed by the Rules. 67. Rule 196 of the Civil Rules of Practice, Kerala deals with statement of costs. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 196, each party shall, within 7 days from the date of judgment or order, or such further period as may be allowed by the court, file in court: (a) a statement signed by him or his pleader, of the costs and expenses incurred by him as in Form No. 35. (b) a certificate signed by the pleader that he has received the fee in the case save where he is exempted from producing such certificate by the rules relating to pleaders fees. He may include in the statement the items mentioned in the preceding Rule and shall give credit for any costs allowed to his opponent and shall state the total amount claimed by him. Such statement shall be checked by the officer of the court, who shall note thereon the sums, if any, disallowed and the total amount allowed, and shall sign the same. If any party makes default in filing the statement, the officer of the court shall prepare a statement of the amount of the institution fee, if any and the pleader's fee allowable to the said party, if duly certified. Every party shall be entitled to inspect and take a copy of the said statement. If any party makes default in filing the statement, the officer of the court shall prepare a statement of the amount of the institution fee, if any and the pleader's fee allowable to the said party, if duly certified. Every party shall be entitled to inspect and take a copy of the said statement. As per sub-rule (2), such statement shall be passed by the Judge and shall form part of the record of the case; and the total amount of costs allowed to the party to whom costs have been awarded shall be inserted in the decree or order. 68. Though the name of Adv. K.V. Ramarajan alone is shown as the counsel for the claimants in the head note of the impugned award, on a perusal of the records in O.P. (MV) No. 170 of 2012, this Court finds that the said counsel filed vakalath for the claimants, on 06.03.2012, along with the junior counsel Adv. Mini Madhu. After the award, Adv. K.V. Ramarajan filed statement of cost on 01.12.2016, which contains certificates signed by the senior practitioner and the junior practitioner, in terms of clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 196 of the Civil Rules of Practice, Kerala. Since the provisions under Rule 9 of the Rules Regarding Fee Payable to Advocates will be attracted only in claim petitions in which the junior practitioner engaged with the senior practitioner was on record at least from the date of settlement of issues, the Tribunals shall verify the said fact before allowing cost. The Tribunal shall ensure that the name of the junior practitioner is also shown in the head note of the award. 69. In the result, this appeal is disposed of by scaling down the total compensation awarded by the Tribunal in O.P. (MV) No. 170 of 2012 as Rs. 14,20,180/- (Rupees fourteen lakhs twenty thousand hundred and eighty only) [15,55,550 – (95,370 + 10,000 + 10,000 + 5,000 + 15,000)]. The appellant insurer shall satisfy the said amount, together with interest at the rate 9% per annum (as ordered by the Tribunal), from the date of petition till the date of realisation, with proportionate cost, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, after deducting the liability, if any, of the appellants/claimants towards Balance Court Fee and Legal Benefit Fund. The disbursement of the said amount to the 1st respondent/1st claimant shall be made taking note of the law on the point and in terms of the directives issued by this Court in Circular No. 3 of 2019 dated 06.09.2019 and clarified further in Official Memorandum No. D1-62475/2016 dated 07.11.2019. The 1st respondent/1st claimant shall provide her Bank account details (attested copy of the relevant page of the Bank Passbook having details of the Bank Account Number and IFSC Code of the branch) before the Tribunal, with copy to the learned Standing Counsel for the insurer, within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. No order as to costs.