JUDGMENT John Michael Cunha, J. - The petitioner in this batch of petitions was the Deputy Conservator of Ports at Belekeri Port. By order dated 1.1.2008, he was placed incharge of the Post of Conservator of Ports at Belekeri Port. 2. The allegations against the petitioner in the charge sheet is that, during his tenure as the Incharge Conservator of Ports, he was entrusted with the seized iron ore approximately 5 lakh metric tons and he permitted the other accused persons to lift and export the entrusted ore from the Belekeri port area. 3. The contention of the petitioner is that he was no way involved in the alleged transaction. He has been made a scapegoat by the forest officials to save themselves from legal action for the illegalities committed by them in seizing the forest produce in violation of Forest Rules. According to the petitioner, alleged goods were seized by the forest officials on their own on 20.03.2010 in FOC/17/2019. Petitioner was not aware of the registration of the said case or seizure of properties therein. Referring to Annexure- E namely the report of seizure submitted by the Range Forest Officer, Ankola to the learned JMFC, Ankola, dated 20.3.2010, learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that there is nothing in the said document to show that the seized iron-ore was taken possession by the petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner himself has been shown as accused therein and therefore, it cannot be believed that the seized ironore was handed over to the accused himself. Further he pointed out that as per the order passed by the learned Magistrate, on 20.03.2010, the RFO was permitted to retain the seized iron-ore. This document therefore should not have been held against the petitioner to hold that the petitioner was entrusted with the seized iron-ore. In the absence of prima facie material to show the entrustment of the seized iron ore to the petitioner, the prosecution of the petitioner is wholly illegal and amounts to abuse of the process of Court. 4. Further referring to the documents produced along with the charge sheet, learned counsel highlighted that between 26.03.2010 and 29.03.2010, the RFO and the concerned forest officials inspected the area leased to Stevedores and conducted panchanama and marked 24 heaps out of 60 heaps. 4. Further referring to the documents produced along with the charge sheet, learned counsel highlighted that between 26.03.2010 and 29.03.2010, the RFO and the concerned forest officials inspected the area leased to Stevedores and conducted panchanama and marked 24 heaps out of 60 heaps. These documents also do not disclose the presence of the petitioner during the inspection from 15.03.2010 till 29.03.2010. No port official was asked to attend the proceedings conducted by the forest officials, as such, there is no prima facie material to show that the petitioner herein had the knowledge of alleged seizure of iron-ore. 5. Dilating on this point, learned counsel for petitioner pointed out that M/s.Greentex Mining Industries Limited, Bengaluru, had approached this Court in W.P.10349/2010 seeking for release of the seized iron-ore. This court by its order dated 31.3.2010 permitted the petitioner therein, namely M/s Greentex Mining Industries Limited to export the iron-ore regarding which clearance has been obtained from the forest authorities and in respect of which the customs duty was collected by the authorities. Based on this observation, it is argued that the iron-ore was lifted and removed from the port area only after obtaining clearance from the Forest Department and on payment of customs duty and under the said circumstances, there was absolutely no basis to accuse the petitioner that the property entrusted to him was allowed to be exported by the petitioner. 6. Further referring to the clearance granted by the RFO, learned counsel emphasized that even this document goes to show that the petitioner had no role to play in granting clearance for export of seized material. Learned counsel has referred to Annexure- F , copy of the letter written by the petitioner to the Superintendent of Customs, Belekeri Port, Belekeri, which reads as under:- Sub: Belekeri Port Issue of clearance in respect of M.V.Alias, Reg. Ref: Your Application dated 07.04.2010 M/s. Cochin Shipping Company have paid ship related charges in respect of MV ALIAS. The clearance certificate is enclosed herewith in respect of above ship for your further needful action. 7. Based on this document, it is argued that the petitioner had issued clearance certificate only to the ship. It was not meant to be a clearance for export of the material as sought to be contended by the prosecution. The clearance certificate is enclosed herewith in respect of above ship for your further needful action. 7. Based on this document, it is argued that the petitioner had issued clearance certificate only to the ship. It was not meant to be a clearance for export of the material as sought to be contended by the prosecution. Referring to section 51 of the Customs Act, learned Counsel submitted that as per this provision, Proper Officer of the Customs Department if satisfied that any goods entered for export are not prohibited goods and the exporters have paid the duty, he may make an order permitting clearance and loading of the goods for exportation i.e., Let Export . Thus, it is contended that the observation made by learned Special Judge in the impugned orders that the petitioner had given clearance for export of material is contrary to the records and has resulted in failure of justice. 8. With regard to the shipping bill (Annexure- F1 ) and export application (Annexure- F2 ), learned counsel pointed out that the shipping bill was signed by the Superintendent of Customs and not by the petitioner and therefore, even this document did not connect the petitioner to the alleged transaction. Further he contended that, as Deputy Conservator of Forests, he was a mere Class-III employee. He had no independent decision making power in the affairs of the Ports. Referring to section 7(2)(a) of the Indian Ports Act, 1908, learned counsel emphasized that, as per the said provision, the Port Officer alone shall be the Conservator of Ports and therefore, the petitioner could not have been treated as the Conservator of Ports so as to render him liable for the alleged transactions. Further referring to the provisions of the Forest Act i.e., sections 62 and 80, learned counsel would submit that the seized property being a forest produce , it was presumed to be property of the State Government until contrary was proved. FIR in FOC.17/2009-2010 was registered in respect of the alleged forest offence. Under the said circumstances, there was no basis for the prosecution to contend that the seized property was entrusted to the custody of the petitioner and the same has been allowed to be exported by the petitioner contrary to the permission granted by learned Magistrate. FIR in FOC.17/2009-2010 was registered in respect of the alleged forest offence. Under the said circumstances, there was no basis for the prosecution to contend that the seized property was entrusted to the custody of the petitioner and the same has been allowed to be exported by the petitioner contrary to the permission granted by learned Magistrate. In support of this submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of M.MARIDEV (M.MARIYAPPA) vs. STATE OF MYSORE, (1968) 1 MYSLJ 325 , wherein it is held that, Placing a subordinate officer, in independent charge of the current duties of a vacant post in a higher appointment does not amount to his promotion to the higher post. A subordinate officer charged with the performance of the duty of a superior for a limited time and under special and temporary conditions, is not thereby transformed into the superior and permanent official. Officiating appointments, and in charge arrangements are well understood terms in civil service. When an officer is appointed to officiate in a higher appointment, he is invested with the powers of the higher post, but when he is placed in charge of the current duties of a vacant post in a higher appointment, whether in addition to his own duties or independently, he cannot exercise any of the statutory powers of the office; he can merely perform the day to day office duties only. 9. Further learned counsel submitted that, eventhough there were allegations against the petitioner that in connection with the alleged incident, petitioner herein had received a bribe, yet the petitioner has been honorably exonerated of the said charge. In proof thereof, learned counsel has produced copy of the order passed by the Under Secretary to Public Works, Ports and Inland Water Transport Department in Karnataka (Ports) dated 27.11.2017. Thus, the learned counsel would submit that the entire material, even if accepted as true, does not disclose the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged transaction. The material produced along with the charge sheet does not show that the seized iron-ore was entrusted to the custody of the petitioner. None of the documents produced by the petitioner disclose that the petitioner was instrumental in allowing the export of the seized iron-ore, as such, the very basis of the charges foisted against the petitioner cannot stand scrutiny at the trial. 10. None of the documents produced by the petitioner disclose that the petitioner was instrumental in allowing the export of the seized iron-ore, as such, the very basis of the charges foisted against the petitioner cannot stand scrutiny at the trial. 10. Further, referring to the statements of CW.25, learned counsel has pointed out that in his statement, CW.25 the Section Forester who visited the Belekeri Port on 15.03.2010 and 20.03.2010 and registered FOC.No.17/2009-10, when questioned as to why the officials of the Port and the Stevedores Company were not made party to the seizure proceedings? has unequivocally stated, I did not know the procedure followed for seizure of any item in a criminal case neither the RFO or any Senior Officer guided me properly in this matter. Based on this statement, it is argued that the forest officials having seized the forest produce without following the procedure and without knowing how to deal with them ingeniously implicated the petitioner showing the seized properties as entrusted to the custody of the petitioner eventhough the physical custody was not given to him. 11. Further, referring to the statement of CW.24 Sri.R.Gokul, IFS who was working as Deputy Conservator of Forests, Karwar at the relevant time from September 2009 to July 2011, learned counsel pointed out that, when this witness was questioned as to why marking was done by Forest Department on 26.03.2010 and 29.03.2010 after a gap of so many days and how he could make sure that the iron ore heaps marked on 26.03.2010 and 29.03.2010 were the same as found on 23.02.2010, the witness has replied thus: A. On 20.03.2010, the RFO, Ankola, seized the iron ore present in the port Premises which was measured as 5 lakhs MT (approximately) from visual observation and DD. DMG, Karwar, was requested by me to depute his staff to inspect and technically measure the exact quantity, grade and nature of iron ore which was seized. Same day, i.e. 20.03.2010, I also wrote to the Superintendent of Police, Karwar and Deputy Commissioner, Karwar, to arrange security to protect the seized iron ore at Belekeri Port. But no action was taken by them on my request. Same day, i.e. 20.03.2010, I also wrote to the Superintendent of Police, Karwar and Deputy Commissioner, Karwar, to arrange security to protect the seized iron ore at Belekeri Port. But no action was taken by them on my request. On 24.03.2010, I received letter from LND/CR 03/2008-09 from the Port Officer, Karwar, requesting to furnish the details of the iron ore seized by us with location, name of the exporter, name of the handler, quantity of iron ore lying at Karwar and Belekeri Port so as to take action as shipment was going on. I then instructed Sri. C.G. Naik, IO of the case to mark the iron ore heaps, immediately. They got 24 heaps marked on 26.03.2010 and 29.03.2010 for an approximately 5 lakh MT in the presence of the officials of the Port Office, Belekeri. (on both dates admittedly, none of the officials of the Port was called or consulted) Q. Did you find out who were the owners/exports of the iron ore heaps seized in Belekeri Port and informed them about seizure of Cargo in Belekeri Port? A. No. After I handed over the case to ACF, Ankola, he collected information from the Port conservator, Belekeri. I have not informed the exporters about the seizure of material. Later, the Port Conservator, Belekeri, informed that the actual quantity of iron ore seized on 20.03.2010 was 8,05,991.083 Mts as against the initial estimation of approximately 5.00 lakhs Mts belonging to various exporters/parties as disclosed in the stock statement furnished by 4 licenced stevedores. Further, learned counsel has also referred to the portion of the statement of CW.24 wherein he was questioned as under: Q1. Please tell whether the action taken by Sri. C.G. Naik, RFO, Ankola/IO of the forest case No.17/2009-10 was correct by giving clearance to the Port Officer, Karwar, for release of seized iron ore to the tune of 32,936 Mts in heap No.18? A: . Sri. C.G. Naik should have asked for these documents and cancelled the same under Rule 162 of Karnataka Forest Rules, 1969 before giving clearance to the Port Officer, Karwar, for release of the seized iron ore. Hence, his action in this regard is not correct. 12. A: . Sri. C.G. Naik should have asked for these documents and cancelled the same under Rule 162 of Karnataka Forest Rules, 1969 before giving clearance to the Port Officer, Karwar, for release of the seized iron ore. Hence, his action in this regard is not correct. 12. Based on the answers of the witnesses examined by the prosecution, it is contended that, eventhough the witnesses had failed to aver anything about the role of the petitioner in the alleged transaction, yet the learned Special Judge, without considering any of these statements has passed the impugned orders and therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be setaside for non-consideration of the material evidence. Further, he argued that in both these statements, the witnesses have admitted that either on the date of seizure or on the date of marking the seized iron ore, none of the port officials were summoned or were present and therefore, there was absolutely no basis for the prosecution to hold the petitioner responsible for the alleged offences. 13. With regard to the sanction obtained by the prosecution, learned counsel submitted that the said sanction has been issued without application of mind and without considering the above facts and therefore even the sanction accorded for prosecution of the petitioner is not in accordance with law and on that score also, the impugned orders are liable to be set-aside. 14. Refuting the above contentions, learned Special Public Prosecutor representing the respondent, with reference to the documents produced along with the charge sheet, argued that the documents produced by the prosecution prima facie indicate that the petitioner had not only the knowledge of the seizure of the iron ore, but he was also actively involved in the export of the seized material. In this regard, learned Special Public Prosecutor referred to the letter dated 16.04.2010 addressed by the petitioner, under his seal and signature, to the Investigation Officer, wherein he has stated thus: Further to this office letter, the information received from the Company / lessee regarding the name of the Exporters and Quantity of cargo seized, stacked in the respective plot are enclosed herewith for your kind perusal. The lessee has also informed to submit the grade of the cargo as soon as received the above information same will be submitted in due course. 15. The lessee has also informed to submit the grade of the cargo as soon as received the above information same will be submitted in due course. 15. Learned Special Public Prosecutor pointed out that along with the said letter, the details of the seized iron ore has been mentioned which clearly manifest that, as on 16.04.2010, the petitioner was not only aware of the seizure, but also knew the details of the quantities seized and the location of the seizure. 16. Further, learned Special Public Prosecutor referred to another letter dated 24.03.2010 issued by the petitioner under his seal and signature to (1) M/s. Adani Enterprises Ltd., (2) M/s. Salgaoncar Mining Pvt. Ltd., (3) M/s. Shree Mallikarjun Shipping Pvt. Ltd., (4) M/s. Rajmahal Silks, All of Belekeri Port, District Karwar, directing them to follow the order of the Court in toto, failing to comply, they will be wholly held responsible. In the said letter, petitioner has referred to seizure report of the Karnataka Forest Department dated 20.03.2010, and the permission endorsed by the Hon ble JMFC, Ankola, Civil Judge, Jr. Division, JMFC, Ankola, which again shows that he was aware of the alleged seizure as well as endorsement made by the learned Magistrate and in this regard, learned counsel also drew my attention to the order passed by the learned Magistrate permitting retention of the seized property. The said order at Annexure- R7 clearly states that, The seized iron ore has been handed over to Port Conservator, Belekeri Port on as is where is basis for safe custody , indicating that even the custody was given to the petitioner and not to any other person as contended by learned counsel for petitioner. 17. Learned Special Public Prosecutor referred to another letter dated 27.03.2010 (Annexure- R11 ) sent by the Port Officer, Karwar, addressed to the aforesaid four Companies namely, (1) M/s. Adani Enterprises Ltd., (2) M/s. Salgaoncar Mining Pvt. Ltd., (3) M/s. Shree Mallikarjun Shipping Pvt. Ltd., (4) M/s. Rajmahal Silks, All of Belekeri Port, District Karwar, which reads as under: Further to the Port Conservator, letter cited above, this is to inform you that the Range Forest Officer, Ankola telephonically reported that he has marked the Iron Ore stock lying inside the Belekeri Port Premises on 26th March, 2010 as is where is basis. Therefore, you are directed not to load the stack lying in the Port premises. Therefore, you are directed not to load the stack lying in the Port premises. This letter is seem to have been received by the petitioner under his seal and signature. Therefore, the argument of learned counsel for petitioner that petitioner had no knowledge of the alleged seizure and marking of the iron ore stock lying inside Belekeri Port premises falls to the ground. 18. In this context, learned Special Public Prosecutor has also referred to another letter dated 29.03.2010 (Annexure- R12 ) addressed by the Port Officer, Karwar, the copy of which is marked to the petitioner herein, directing him not to allow loading of iron ore cargo from the above stock until further order. It is the submission of the learned Special Public Prosecutor that as against the documents which are relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner which are neither part of the charge sheet nor of unimpeachable character, the documents referred above being the part of the charge sheet which are maintained in the ordinary course of business in the official transaction of the Port as well as the above Companies have to be presumed to be true as per section 114(f) of the Evidence Act and therefore, learned Magistrate was justified in placing reliance on the above documents while rejecting the contentions urged by the petitioner. 19. With regard to the statements of the witnesses referred to by the learned counsel for petitioner and the alleged irregularity in conducting the proceedings by the forest officials is concerned, learned Special Public Prosecutor pointed out that the alleged irregularity may not assume any significance at this stage as the investigation in the instant case was conducted pursuant to the orders of the Hon ble Supreme Court. Under the said circumstances, even if there was any irregularity in the seizure of the forest produce or subjecting them to property form, the same is required to be considered only at the stage of trial and cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings as sought for by the petitioner. 20. Under the said circumstances, even if there was any irregularity in the seizure of the forest produce or subjecting them to property form, the same is required to be considered only at the stage of trial and cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings as sought for by the petitioner. 20. With regard to the allegation pertaining to nonconsideration of the material by the learned Special Judge, learned Special Public Prosecutor referred to para Nos.33 to 35 of the impugned orders and emphasized that, all the documents referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as statements of the witnesses have been taken note by the learned Special Judge and even an observation has been made therein about the receipt of the bribe by the petitioner and therefore, there is no substance in the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that the impugned orders have been passed without application of mind and without considering the material produced before the Court. 21. Insofar as the exoneration of the petitioner of the charge of bribery is concerned, learned Special Public Prosecutor pointed out that the above order has been passed by the Government on accepting the submission of the petitioner and not by conducting any enquiry as per rules and therefore even the said order cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner to uphold his contentions. 22. Further with reference to the orders passed by this Court in W.P.No.10349/2010, learned Special Public Prosecutor pointed out that the said order related to the export of iron ore other than what was seized by the forest authorities and therefore even this document does not support the plea canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 23. Regarding the export bills not bearing the signature of the petitioner is concerned, learned Special Public Prosecutor would submit that there is no requirement under law for the Conservator of Ports himself to sign the bills and therefore, even this submission does not merit acceptance. 24. Finally, learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the petitioner having neither pleaded nor pointed out any error of jurisdiction or patent error warranting interference of this Court under section 482 Cr.P.C., in view of the law laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. 24. Finally, learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the petitioner having neither pleaded nor pointed out any error of jurisdiction or patent error warranting interference of this Court under section 482 Cr.P.C., in view of the law laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. & Another vs. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (2018) 16 SCC 299 , the petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the petition. 25. I have bestowed my anxious thought to the submissions made at the Bar and have carefully scrutinized the material on record. 26. It is trite law that at the stage of framing of charge, the Trial Court has to apply its mind to the entire records and documents to find out whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. As held in STATE through CBI vs. Dr.ANUP KUMAR SRIVATSAVA, (2017) 15 SCC 560 , 25. Framing of charge is the first major step in a criminal trial where the court is expected to apply its mind to the entire record and documents placed therewith before the court. Taking cognizance of an offence has been stated to necessitate an application of mind by the court but framing of charge is a major event where the court considers the possibility of discharging the accused of the offence with which he is charged or requiring the accused to face trial. There are different categories of cases where the court may not proceed with the trial and may discharge the accused or pass such other orders as may be necessary keeping in view the facts of a given case. In a case where, upon considering the record of the case and documents submitted before it, the court finds that no offence is made out or there is a legal bar to such prosecution under the provisions of the Code or any other law for the time being in force and there exists no ground to proceed against the accused, the court may discharge the accused. There can be cases where such record reveals the matter to be so predominantly of a civil nature that it neither leaves any scope for an element of criminality nor does it satisfy the ingredients of a criminal offence with which the accused is charged. There can be cases where such record reveals the matter to be so predominantly of a civil nature that it neither leaves any scope for an element of criminality nor does it satisfy the ingredients of a criminal offence with which the accused is charged. In such cases, the court may discharge him or quash the proceedings in exercise of its powers under the provisions. 27. Section 239 of Cr.P.C. lays down the circumstances in which if accused could be discharged in a warrant case. The section reads as under, 239. When accused shall be discharged. If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. From this provision it is clear that at the stage of framing charges, the court has to consider only the documents sent under Section 173 of the Code and should examine the accused if it thinks necessary. Any other documents including the document produced by the accused cannot be taken into consideration by the learned Magistrate at the stage of framing the charge. 28. What is meant by making such examination, if any, of the accused as provided in Section 239 Cr.P.C. has been explained by this Court in K.D.APPACHU vs. STATE OF MYSORE, (1962) AIR Mysore 167 , as under: The examination, if any, of the accused under the provisions of this section must necessarily be with regard to the material against him in the documents referred to in Section 207 Cr.P.C. and the answers given by him during such examination explaining those documents, can, at the most, be the material on which a Magistrate can discharge the accused against him. 29. On the same question, the Hon ble Delhi High Court in SURINDER KUMAR YADAV & Others vs. Smt. SUVIDYA YADAV & Another in Crl.Misc.(M).1467/1985 decided on 22.08.1986 has observed that: In view of the plain language pertaining to documents of section 239 Cr.P.C. the consideration of any other documents including the documents produced by the accused cannot be taken into consideration by the Magistrate while passing the order of discharge. 30. 30. In this regard, the Hon ble Supreme Court in STATE OF ORISSA vs. DEBENDRA NATH PADHI, (2005) 1 SCC 568 , in para 16, has summarized the position of law as under:- All the decisions, when they hold that there can only be limited evaluation of materials and documents on record and sifting of evidence to prima facie find out whether sufficient ground exists or not for the purpose of proceeding further with the trial, have so held with reference to materials and documents produced by the prosecution and not the accused. The decisions proceed on the basis of settled legal position that the material as produced by the prosecution alone is to be considered and not the one produced by the accused. The latter aspect relating to the accused though has not been specifically stated, yet it is implicit in the decisions. It seems to have not been specifically so stated as it was taken to be well settled proposition. This aspect, however, has been adverted to in State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad and Another v. P. Suryaprakasam, (1999) SCC(Cri) 373 where considering the scope of Sections 239 and 240 of the Code it was held that at the time of framing of charge, what the trial court is required to, and can consider are only the police report referred to under Section 173 of the Code and the documents sent with it. The only right the accused has at that stage is of being heard and nothing beyond that. (emphasis supplied). Further, in para 20 of the said decision, the Hon ble Supreme Court on considering the identical submissions made by the accused in the said case, has observed thus: 20. Reliance placed on behalf of the accused on some observations made in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar and Others, (1994) 4 SCC 142 to the effect that in exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence is misplaced for the purpose of considering the point in issue in these matters. If para 7 of the judgment where these observations have been made is read as a whole, it would be clear that the judgment instead of supporting the contention sought to be put forth on behalf of the accused, in fact, supports the prosecution. If para 7 of the judgment where these observations have been made is read as a whole, it would be clear that the judgment instead of supporting the contention sought to be put forth on behalf of the accused, in fact, supports the prosecution. Para 7 of the aforesaid case reads as under:- "7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima case has been made out - as has been done in the instant case - the persons arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence." In the instant case, no such unimpeachable documents are produced by the petitioner which could have the effect of overruling the view taken by the learned Magistrate / Special Judge in framing the charges against the petitioner without recording the evidence. 31. On going through the impugned orders, I find that the learned Special Judge has considered the documents produced by the prosecution as well as the material allegations leveled against the petitioner and has observed that these materials prima facie disclose that the custody of the seized iron ore was entrusted to the petitioner and the same was allowed to be exported by the petitioner. At the stage of framing charge, the learned Special Judge was not expected to embark upon any enquiry into the legality or veracity of the documents produced by the prosecution nor could he have appreciated the statements of the witnesses as contended by the learned counsel for petitioner. I have extensively referred to the contents of these documents only to highlight that these documents and the statements referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not lead to any conclusion or convey any meaning other than the one taken by the learned Special Judge. The documents discussed above belie the contention of the petitioner that he was not aware of the seizure and demarcation of the alleged ore as contended. 32. In this regard, it may be relevant to refer to a recent decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in M.E.SHIVALINGAMURTHY vs. CBI,2020 SCCOnline(SC) 5, wherein the legal principles applicable in regard to an application seeking discharge have been summarized by the Hon ble Apex Court as under:- 14. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions, viz., P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and another2 and discern the following principles: i. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused. ii. The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution. iii. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the Police or the documents produced before the Court. iv. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial . v. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. vi. v. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. vi. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons. vii. At the time of framing of the char7ges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true. viii. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused. 33. On scrutiny of the impugned orders, I find that the learned Special Judge has followed these legal principles in letter and spirit and having arrived at a clear conclusion that the allegations made in the charge sheet and the documents produced in support thereof prima facie make out the ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner under sections 120(B) read with sections 409 and 420 of IPC and sections 7, 12 and 13(2) read with section 13(1)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, has proceeded to frame charges against the petitioner. I do not find any infirmity in the said order warranting interference under section 482 Cr.P.C. 34. The argument of learned counsel for petitioner that the proceedings initiated against the petitioner are vitiated on account of the illegality in the seizure of the iron ore by the forest officials and for lack of competence and jurisdiction on the part of the forest officials to seize the said iron ore which is a mineral as defined under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as MMDR Act ) and is regulated by the provisions of the MMDR Act is concerned, in my view, it does not affect either the jurisdiction of CBI to investigate into the alleged offences nor does it affect the order passed by learned Special Judge in dismissing the applications filed by the petitioner for discharge. 35. Indisputably, the investigation in the instant case was undertaken pursuant to the orders of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.562/2009 dated 07.09.2012. 35. Indisputably, the investigation in the instant case was undertaken pursuant to the orders of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.562/2009 dated 07.09.2012. In the said order, there was a specific direction to the CBI to immediately institute FIR(s) and to investigate the case(s) relating to (i) illegal extraction of about 50.79 lakhs MT of Iron Ore from the forest areas of Karnataka during the period from 01.01.2009 to 31.05.2010; (ii) the illegal transport of the aforesaid quantity of iron ore from the area(s) of extraction to Belekeri Port and (iii) from there its illegal export to other countries. Pursuant to this direction, separate FIRs were registered by the CBI. R.C.No.14(A) of 2012 relates to the illegal mining in the forest area and transportation thereof without payment of royalty and forest development tax. R.C.No.17(A) of 2012 is registered in respect of iron ore which was under seizure in FOC.17/2009-10. This order and the FIRs registered in respect of the alleged offences therefore make it evident that the scope of investigation essentially related to the period subsequent to the seizure and the consequent order passed by learned Magistrate entrusting the seized material to the custody of accused No.1 namely the Conservator of Ports. In the said circumstances, the illegality, if any, committed by the forest officials in effecting the seizure of the iron ore and even if the said seizure was effected without jurisdiction, it does not concern the CBI, since the investigation was undertaken by the CBI only in respect of the acts committed by the petitioner and other accused subsequent to the seizure and subsequent to the entrustment of the seized property to the custody of accused No.1. Even otherwise, the above FIRs having been registered and investigation having been conducted pursuant to the orders of the Hon ble Supreme Court, the contention urged by the petitioner in this regard does not furnish a ground to the petitioner to seek discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C. 36. Even otherwise, the above FIRs having been registered and investigation having been conducted pursuant to the orders of the Hon ble Supreme Court, the contention urged by the petitioner in this regard does not furnish a ground to the petitioner to seek discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C. 36. Likewise, the contention urged by the learned counsel for petitioner regarding the competency and capacity of the petitioner to deal with the seized iron ore as he was not appointed to the substantive post of Conservator of Ports is concerned, it is relevant to note that the petitioner is sought to be prosecuted on the specific allegation that the seized iron ore was entrusted to him in his capacity as Conservator of Ports. It is not the case of the petitioner that at the relevant time, there was any other person, other than him, working as Conservator of Ports at Belekeri Port. It is trite law that an act does not cease to become official act merely because it does not fall within the scope of functions of the office of the public servant. As held by the Hon ble Apex Court in Dr.V.SEBASTIAN vs. THE STATE, (1988) CriLJ 1150 , A public servant may have power to do certain officials acts by virtue of the rank he holds as a public servant. He may get other powers by virtue of the office which he holds. When he exercises either of the powers, his act is official. No line of distinction can be made as between the acts in exercise of a particular office and acts in exercise of his position as a public servant. If the act is done in his official capacity, as distinguished from his purely private capacity, it amounts to official act. Even if it does not come within the scope of the functions of his office, the act does not cease to become official act. 37. In the instant case, the prosecution stands on better footing as there is no dispute that the petitioner was placed in charge of the post of Conservator of Ports at the relevant time. The documents discussed above clearly reveal that in respect of the complained acts, petitioner himself has transacted the business under his seal and signature. 37. In the instant case, the prosecution stands on better footing as there is no dispute that the petitioner was placed in charge of the post of Conservator of Ports at the relevant time. The documents discussed above clearly reveal that in respect of the complained acts, petitioner himself has transacted the business under his seal and signature. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for petitioner that the petitioner was totally unaware of the transaction in question and that he has been made a scapegoat by the forest officials to save themselves from the illegalities committed by them in effecting seizure of the forest produce cannot be accepted. Upon considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the direct evidence produced by the prosecution in support of the accusations made against the petitioner, which prima facie attract the ingredients of the offences charged against the petitioner, I do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned orders. Consequently, the petitions being devoid of merit are liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. In view of dismissal of the petitions, all the pending I.As. are also dismissed as the same do not survive for consideration.