V N Manjunath, S/O Late Nanjegowda v. State Of Karnataka Represented By Its Secretary, Department Of Rural Development And Panchayath Raj
2020-10-19
S.G.PANDIT
body2020
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The petitioner is before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the order dated 10.08.2017 bearing No.Ne.Gra.Pum.B.Ka.a.Manjunath/Loka/2017-18, issued by the 5th respondent by which the petitioner is kept under suspension. 2. Heard Sri A Nagarajappa, learned counsel for the petitioner through video conference and Sri. C.N. Mahadeshwaran, learned AGA for respondent No.1 and Sri B.J. Somayaji, learned counsel for respondents 2 to 5 in person. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that the impugned order of suspension was passed on 10.08.2017 and till this date neither Disciplinary enquiry was initiated by issuing charge memo nor the order of suspension was reviewed. Learned counsel further would submit that allegation against the petitioner was that while working as Bill Collector in the Panchayath he got allotted a site in his wife’s name. Learned counsel denying the said allegation submits that the site was allotted on 12.08.2005, whereas the petitioner was appointed as Bill Collector in the 4th respondent -Panchayath on 10.08.2017. Therefore, the allegation would not stand to reasons and even on merits also the order of suspension requires to be quashed. 4. Per contra, Sri B.J. Somayaji, learned counsel for respondents 2 to 5 would submit that the order of suspension is passed by the 5th respondent – the President of Nelligere Grama Panchayath in exercise of his power under Section 62 (d) of the Karnataka Grama Swaraj and Panchayath Raj Act, 1993, on the allegation that he got allotted a site in his wife’s name contrary to the rules, when he was working as a Bill Collector. Sri Somayaji, learned counsel further submits with regard to, as to whether the enquiry is initiated or whether the order of suspension is reviewed, no such action is taken in view of the interim order passed by this Court staying the order of suspension. 5. A perusal of the order of suspension at Annexure-K would reveal that 5th respondent – the President of Nelligere Grama Panchayath, kept the applicant under suspension in exercise of his power under Section 62(d) of the Act pending enquiry. But it is also an admitted fact that till this date no charge memo is issued initiating Departmental Enquiry. Even there is no contemplation of initiating Departmental Enquiry.
But it is also an admitted fact that till this date no charge memo is issued initiating Departmental Enquiry. Even there is no contemplation of initiating Departmental Enquiry. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that interim order was operating, as such charge memo has not been issued, would not stand to reasons. Interim order passed by this Court was staying the order of suspension, but there was no interim order staying the further proceedings or from initiating enquiry against the petitioner. 6. The order of suspension is dated 10.08.2017, even though more than three years have elapsed, no review of suspension order, has taken place. The relevant Government orders governing the suspension would require the suspension authority to review the order of suspension, once in three months. The review is necessary, to examinate as to whether continuation of the suspension is necessary ? The order of suspension also would not state the reasons for keeping the petitioner under suspension. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in AJAY KUMAR CHOUDHARY Vs. UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY AND ANOTHER reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 , dealing with protracted period suspension at paragraphs 11, 12 and 21 has held as follows: “11. Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must perforce be of short duration. If it is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this would render it punitive in nature. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the memorandum of charges, and eventually culminate after even longer delay. 12. Protracted periods of suspension, reported renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society and the derision of his department, has to endure this excruciation even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour, indiscreation or offence. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement.
His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. Indubitably the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the presumption of innocence to the accused. But we must remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable tenets of common law jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna Carta of 1215, which assures that -"We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." In similar vein the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. 21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the person concerned to any department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognised principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognise that previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice.
We recognise that previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.” 8. In the case on hand, the order of suspension is continued indefinitely for more than three years without initiating enquiry by issuing charge memo and the authority has also failed to review the suspension from time to time, so as to examine necessity of continuance of suspension. 9. For the reasons recorded above, I am of the view, that order of suspension dated 10.08.2017 bearing No.Ne.Gra.Pum.B.Ka.a.Manjunath/Loka/2017-18, issued by the 5th respondent, requires to be quashed. 10. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. the order of suspension dated 10.08.2017 bearing No.Ne.Gra.Pum.B.Ka.a.Manjunath/Loka/2017-18, issued by the 5th respondent, is quashed. Quashing of order of suspension would not come in the way of initiating Departmental Enquiry by the respondents.