ORDER : These two petitions for anticipatory bail are disposed of by a common order as the State Public Prosecutor has raised question of maintainability. 2. The petitioners have sought anticipatory bail in connection with two FIRs in Crime No.8/2020 and Crime No.11/2020 registered by the respondent police in relation to offences punishable under Section 406 of Indian Penal Code and Section 9 of Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial Establishments Act (‘the Act’ for short) read with Section 34 of IPC. The first petitioner is the President and the second petitioner is the Vice President of Gurusarva Bhowma Souharda Credit Co-operative Limited. FIR in Crime No.8/2020 was registered at the instance of a depositor by name Y.G.Prasanna Narasimha, and Crime No.11/2020 at the instance of Mr. Sanjay Koratakar, Special Officer. Both the complainants have alleged misappropriation by the management of Gurusarva Bhouma Souharda Credit Co-operative Limited. 3. The State Public Prosecutor Sri. V.M.Sheelavant takes preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petitions under Section 438 of Cr.P.C., he refers to Section 18(2) of the Act and argues that it excludes the applicability of Section 438 of Cr.P.C. But learned counsel for petitioners Sri. I.S.Pramod Chandra argues this way: Section 18(2) is bar for the Special Court constituted under the Act, it is not applicable to the High court. And this is the reason for the petitions for anticipatory bail being filed in the High court directly. A Co-ordinate bench of this court has granted anticipatory bail for the similar offences, he refers to query report pertaining to Criminal Petition 3921/2020 and Criminal Petition 4171/2020 obtained from the official website of this Court. His further submission is that High Court has concurrent jurisdiction, the bar is only in respect of offences under the Act, not under IPC; and since the offence under Section 9 of the Act had not been invoked when FIR was registered, Section 18(2) of the Act has no application. 4. I find it difficult to accept the argument of Sri. I.S.Pramod Chandra. Section 18 of the Act reads as below:- “18. 4. I find it difficult to accept the argument of Sri. I.S.Pramod Chandra. Section 18 of the Act reads as below:- “18. Procedure and powers of Special Court regarding offences:-(1) The Special Court may take cognizance of the offence without the accused being committed to it for trial and in trying the accused person, shall follow the procedure specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act II of 1974) for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. (2) The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act II of 1974) except the provisions of section 438 shall, so for as may be, apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purpose of the said provisions, Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Judicial Magistrate, First class or Metropolitan Magistrate as the case may be.” 5. Thus it is clear that according to Section 18(1) of the Act, the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable for trial of an accused in the Special Court constituted according to Section 10 of the Act, and it is a warrant trial. Section 18(2) specially excludes the applicability of Section 438 of the Code or in other words jurisdiction exercisable under Section 438 is taken away. This is nothing but a bar contained in the Act. What is to be stated is if a statute bars granting of anticipatory bail, it must be understood with reference to the offence under the statute, not the court. For the reason that there is reference to the Special Court only in Section 18, it is not possible to construe that the bar operates only in relation to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 438 of the Code by the Special Court. If this interpretation is given, it frustrates the purpose behind excluding the operation of Section 438. The offence under the Act relates to the interest of the depositors; probably in order to protect their interest, such a provision as is found in Section 18(2) might have been introduced. The Co-ordinate bench of this court might have granted anticipatory bail, but it appears that the question relating to maintainability of the petition for anticipatory bail did not emerge there. The petitioners are the persons who are/were in the management of the financial institution, hence Section 9 of the Act can be invoked against them. The Co-ordinate bench of this court might have granted anticipatory bail, but it appears that the question relating to maintainability of the petition for anticipatory bail did not emerge there. The petitioners are the persons who are/were in the management of the financial institution, hence Section 9 of the Act can be invoked against them. Therefore I hold that the petitions are not maintainable, they are dismissed.