ORDER : This petition is filed seeking to issue a Writ of Prohibition restraining the 2nd respondent, who is the Chairperson-cum-Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Anantapuramu, from proceeding with M.P.No.15 of 2019, under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, filed by the 3rd respondent. 2. The facts of the case, which lead to the filing of this petition, are as follows: Shree Renuka Sugars Limited, who is the petitioner herein, had taken over M/s.Nizam Sugars Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as, “NSL”), at it’s the then unit at Sudhanagar Hindupur, pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, dated 30.09.1997, by virtue of which this petitioner has specifically agreed that the services of all the workman will be utilized on the same terms and conditions in that location. The 3rd respondent is the erstwhile employer of NSL at it’s the then unit at Sudhanagar, Hindupur. He was never engaged by the petitioner. The 3rd respondent never reported for duty and earn wages, pursuant to the process of the transfer of undertaking i.e., shifting and transferring of the machinery and assets of NSL, which is evident from the fact that the 3rd respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent by filing the impugned M.P.No.35 of 2019 on 01.06.2019 with a prayer to award Rs.31,66,288/-towards wages for the period from 01.09.1998 to 31.05.2019 and interest of Rs.5,39,838/-, total Rs.37,06,125/-and direct the respondent therein to pay Rs.37,06,125/-with interest at the rate of 9% per annum. The brief averments of the impugned petition filed by the 3rd respondent are as follows: The 3rd respondent was appointed as casual Labourer for the season 1980-81 by his erstwhile employer NSL and later on he was appointed as Mazdoor on a salary of Rs.292/-plus DA in the scale of 292-3-319-4-339 in the Chemical department. He was later promoted as Asst. Bagging Housemate and further promoted on 01.05.1988 as Bagging house Mate skilled-C and that he was discharging his duty. It is further stated by the 3rd respondent that NSL was taken over by the petitioner. The petitioner-Management has introduced voluntary retirement scheme with an illegal motive to get rid of all the workmen and the 3rd respondent did not agree. He has been discharging his duties. The management has not paid salaries to the 3rd respondent from September, 1998. It is further stated by the 3rd respondent that NSL was taken over by the petitioner. The petitioner-Management has introduced voluntary retirement scheme with an illegal motive to get rid of all the workmen and the 3rd respondent did not agree. He has been discharging his duties. The management has not paid salaries to the 3rd respondent from September, 1998. The charge sheet was issued to him on 10.05.2001, alleging that he was absent for duties from 30.08.1998 to 10.05.2001, for which he submitted a detailed explanation denying the charges. An enquiry was conducted. The petitioner management had re-designated the 3rd respondent as authorized representative with effect from 20.12.2005, to look after the affairs of its properties in Hindupur like payment of necessary statutory fees, maintenance of buildings and their security. The 3rd respondent had no supervisory and administrative and managerial powers and functions and that he had also no power to leave sanction and to take any disciplinary action and that he had no power to enter into any agreement with third parties on behalf of the petitioner-management. The 3rd respondent is entitled for wages from 01.09.1998 to 31.05.2019. A mere glance at the above averments of the 3rd respondent in the claim petition filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (for short, “the Act”), makes it evident that the 3rd respondent was an employee on the rolls of the erstwhile NSL, Sudhanagar Unit, which was taken over by the petitioner under a settlement. Pursuant to the above settlement, all the then existing plant and machinery and other movable assets, including disposal of all properties situated at Hindupur, leaving only the immovable property i.e., the land and building alone for disposal, without any activity left. After the shifting, no business activity of the petitioner is ever carried on at the said place as it has remained closed and eventually, the property had been sold out in or about 2006 itself. It is only for the mere looking after the said land and building that the 3rd respondent was given a letter on 20.12.2005. After the shifting, no business activity of the petitioner is ever carried on at the said place as it has remained closed and eventually, the property had been sold out in or about 2006 itself. It is only for the mere looking after the said land and building that the 3rd respondent was given a letter on 20.12.2005. In the entire claim petition, there is no whisper that the 3rd respondent had ever reported for duty after the transfer of the Sudhanagar Unit by the petitioner-Management to its new location at Belgaum in the State of Karnataka, the actual place of employment of the 3rd respondent in pursuance of the valid memorandum of settlement in terms of the provisions of Section 25FF of the Act. There is no employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the 3rd respondent at any point of time. The mere allegation that the 3rd respondent was re-designated as authorized representative with effect from 20.12.2005 is not sufficient as the same cannot be treated as an offer of employment and would not give rise to any legally enforceable rights. The 2nd respondent would not have jurisdiction to entertain the impugned MP filed by the 3rd respondent under Section 33-C(2). Hence, this writ petition, seeking to restrain the 2nd respondent from proceeding with the said MP. 3. In the counter, the 3rd respondent reiterates the contentions made in the MP, referred to above, and contends that the petitioner himself has engaged the 3rd respondent to look after its properties at Hindupur by virtue of letter, dated 20.12.2005. Since the place of work is at Hindupur, the 2nd respondent has the jurisdiction to entertain his claim notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner is located in the State of Karnataka. The 3rd respondent seeks to vacate the interim order dated 08.01.2020 on the above grounds and also to dismiss the writ petition. 4. Heard Sri C.R.Sridharan, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri Saloori Ramesh, learned counsel for the petitioner; learned Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2; and Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent. 5. The 3rd respondent seeks to vacate the interim order dated 08.01.2020 on the above grounds and also to dismiss the writ petition. 4. Heard Sri C.R.Sridharan, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri Saloori Ramesh, learned counsel for the petitioner; learned Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2; and Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent. 5. The contentions of the petitioner’s counsel are that there is no employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the 3rd respondent and that there is no jurisdiction for the 2nd respondent to entertain and proceed with the MP filed by the 3rd respondent, since under Section 33-C(2), there should be money that the workmen is entitled to receive from the employer, which is capable of being computed in terms of money. In support of the contentions of the petitioner, the counsel reads out Section 33-C(2) of the Act, which is as under: “33-C(2): -Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government; within a period not exceeding three months:] Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.] 6. He also draws the attention of this court to the petition filed by the 3rd respondent before the 2nd respondent wherein the prayer is to determine the amount to which the petitioner therein is entitled. He contends that nowhere in the said petition, the 3rd respondent has mentioned the wages or the salary that is fixed by the petitioner. 7. A perusal of the said petition would support the contention of the petitioner’s counsel. Except stating that the 3rd respondent/petitioner is entitled for wages for a particular period, the wages that are fixed are not mentioned. There is absolutely no basis for arriving at a figure of Rs.37,06,125/-towards wages. 7. A perusal of the said petition would support the contention of the petitioner’s counsel. Except stating that the 3rd respondent/petitioner is entitled for wages for a particular period, the wages that are fixed are not mentioned. There is absolutely no basis for arriving at a figure of Rs.37,06,125/-towards wages. The letter dated 20.12.2005, appointing the 3rd respondent as authorized person, is also relied upon, to draw support to the contention of the petitioner’s counsel that no wages are fixed in the said order. A reading of the said order shows that the 3rd respondent was appointed with effect from 20.12.2005 as an authorized representative of the company to look after the affairs of the company relating to the lands that were mentioned in the said letter, like payment of necessary statutory fees, maintenance of buildings and their security. He was also directed to submit a report regarding the status of the properties to the company every fortnightly and that he is responsible for the maintenance and security of the properties of the company. Nowhere in the said letter, the salary or the wages of the 3rd respondent are specified. The counsel also takes this court through the legal notice issued by the 3rd respondent to the petitioner, dated 11.09.2018, wherein also no salary or wages for his appointment at Hindupur, are mentioned. 8. It is on the basis of the above submissions that the counsel contends that the 2nd respondent does not have jurisdiction to entertain the MP. The wording of Section 33-C (2) is clear to the extent that the money that the workmen is entitled to receive should be capable of computation in terms of money. 9. The contention of the counsel for the 3rd respondent is that Section 33-C (2) leaves scope for the 2nd respondent to decide the question as to the amount of money due and as to the amount at which such benefit should be contributed. There is no dispute with regard to the 3rd respondent being employed at NSL and the petitioner taking over the said factory by virtue of a memorandum of understanding dated 13.09.1997. It is also not disputed that the claim of the 3rd respondent is only in respect of salary that is due from the petitioner for the period of his work at Hindupur under the appointment letter, dated 20.12.2005. It is also not disputed that the claim of the 3rd respondent is only in respect of salary that is due from the petitioner for the period of his work at Hindupur under the appointment letter, dated 20.12.2005. If the 3rd respondent is accepted to be employed by virtue of the letter, dated 20.12.2005, he falls to be an employee of the petitioner, but whether he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act or not is a question which has to be decided by the labour court. But the objection here is that the 3rd respondent never performed duties in pursuance of the appointment letter and even if it is assumed that he has performed, the contention is that since no salary or wages is fixed, he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 10. The rulings relied upon by both the counsel in support of their contentions can be looked into. 11. The respondents’ counsel relies on the judgment of the supreme court reported in D.P.MAHESHWARI vs. DELHI ADMINISTRATION (1983) 4 SCC 293 , which is on the aspect of deciding an issue as a preliminary issue. The Supreme Court no doubt struck a note of dissuasion to the labour courts, to decide any issue as a preliminary issue. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment can be extracted for better understanding, which reads as follows: “It was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Art. 226 and Art. 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections journeyings up and down. It is also worth while remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Art. 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.” 12. In answer to the said contention, the counsel for the petitioner argues that the said note of caution is only if a preliminary issue is sought to be decided by the lower court. In answer to the said contention, the counsel for the petitioner argues that the said note of caution is only if a preliminary issue is sought to be decided by the lower court. It does not apply to the cases where a litigant knocks the doors of the High Court seeking for a Writ of Prohibition on the ground that the labour court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The said contention seems to be profound. 13. The counsel for the respondents relies on a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad reported in EXECUIVE ENGINEER, PENSTOCK FABRICATION AND ERECTION DIVISION, CUDDAPAH V. P.SESHAGIRI RAO 2002(3) ALD 516 (DB) wherein, the court held that to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) either of the two ingredients must be present. The first is that a workman must be entitled to receive from the employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and the second one is that a question must have arisen as to the amount of money due, or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed. A plain reading of Section 33(C)(2) shows that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide both these ingredients. Thus, in a case where both these ingredients are satisfied or either of these ingredients is satisfied, the Labour Court will have the jurisdiction to determine the question. In other words, the Legislature has empowered the Labour Court to decide a dispute as to the right of workman to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and also has authorized to decide the question as to the amount of money due as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed. 14. The judgment of the same court reported in DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT SC RLY vs. LABOUR COURT 1983(1) HC 218, is also relied upon wherein it was held that when the enquiry under Section 33-C (2) is held to be in the nature of execution proceedings, the status of the claimant to be a “workman”, which is the basis for claiming the benefit having been disputed, the Labour Court cannot entertain and decide the question and proceed to contribute the benefit. 15. In another judgment reported in DESAI BROTHERS VS. 15. In another judgment reported in DESAI BROTHERS VS. LAXMI BAI PEDDAMALLA & ORS. 1988(1) APLJ 546 , the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by relying on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA VS. RAJAGOPALAN: MANU/SC/0149/1963, wherein it was observed as follows: “It is of course, true that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court; but like the executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33-C(2). Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under Section 33-C(2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman’s right rests.” held that it cannot make a roving enquiry about the respective rights. But as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the above case it has at least a right to interpret the award or settlement. It observed that there is no such settlement or award in the said case. It was also held that when an objection is raised that they are not at all workmen, the Labour Court has to make an enquiry to that limited extent. But, if it becomes a disputed question, then of course it cannot entertain applications under Section 33C(2) of the Act. But if it is, prima facie, satisfied that dispute is frivolous and does not in any manner change the character or the status or the relationship, then naturally it can proceed with the enquiry under Section 33-C(2). 16. A comprehensive understanding of all the above judgments, in the considered opinion of this court, would require the 3rd respondent to plead that he is entitled for wages as a workman in the factory and that he worked in Hindupur after the company was taken over by the petitioner. As can be seen from the claim statement and the legal notice issued on behalf of the 3rd respondent, except stating that the 3rd respondent was appointed as Mazdoor on a salary and was promoted subsequently while working in NSL, it does not specify that after the Company was taken over by the petitioner, he continued to work in Hindupur. As can be seen from the claim statement and the legal notice issued on behalf of the 3rd respondent, except stating that the 3rd respondent was appointed as Mazdoor on a salary and was promoted subsequently while working in NSL, it does not specify that after the Company was taken over by the petitioner, he continued to work in Hindupur. The said jurisdictional fact is missing in the claim statement and the legal notice. In the legal notice, it was clearly mentioned that by virtue of the memorandum of understanding between NSL and the petitioner, the management specifically agreed that the services of all the workmen will be utilized in the new location. But, since the location of the petitioner is in Belgaun, Karnataka, it has to be understood that the services of all the workmen were agreed to be utilized in the new location. There is nowhere mentioned in the claim statement or the legal notice that the 3rd respondent worked at Hindupur at any point of time after the change of management. The change over was effected on 30.09.1997. But in the legal notice and the claim statement, the petitioner claims salaries from September, 1998, only. As to why he did not claim salaries prior to that date is not known. The appointment order, dated 20.12.2005, only spells that the 3rd respondent was appointed as authorized representative of the company to look after the affairs of the company. It does not speak about any wages or the nature of work that the 3rd respondent has to perform. It only spells that he was an authorized representative. 17. In view of the above, this court opines that the petition filed by the 3rd respondent under Section 33-C(2), cannot be entertained by the 2nd respondent and hence, there shall be a direction to the 2nd respondent not to proceed further with M.P.No.35 of 2019 on its file. With the above observations, the writ petition is allowed. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.