JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Sri S.M.Chandrashekar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4, and also perused the impugned order. 2. This appeal is filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.1057/2017 on the file of the XIX Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, (for short, ‘CivilCourt’) whereby, the civil Court by the impugned order dated 17.7.2017 has allowed the application (IA No.VII) filed by the defendant Nos.1, 3 and 4 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 vacating the exparte interim order of temporary injunction. As such, this miscellaneous first appeal. 3. The learned Senior Counsel do not join debate on the following: (a) The appellant, after the impugned order dated 17.7.2017, has filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 for amendment of the plaint to include the prayers for declaration of title and possession of the suit schedule property and this application is allowed by the civil Court permitting inclusion of such prayer for declaration and possession. (b) The subject property was a vacant site at the time of initiation of the suit. However, the respondent Nos.3 and 4, who asserted possession thereof even as of the date of the suit pursuant to the sale deed in their favour, have commenced construction and the construction is midway. (c) The revenue records for the subject property are mutated in favour of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 and that revenue records for the subject property are mutated in their favour after considering the different proceedings culminating with the directions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the State to deliver possession of the properties, including the land in which the subject property is carved out, to the erstwhile land owners. The respondent Nos.3 and 4 claim title to the subject property from such erstwhile landowners who were given possession pursuant to the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 4. Sri S.M.Chandrashekar, learned Senior Counsel on instructions from the learned counsel on record for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, submits that these respondents undertake not to sell or otherwise create third party rights in the subject property until the disposal of the suit. 4. Sri S.M.Chandrashekar, learned Senior Counsel on instructions from the learned counsel on record for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, submits that these respondents undertake not to sell or otherwise create third party rights in the subject property until the disposal of the suit. The merits of the impugned order are examined in the light of the subsequent events, the undisputed facts and the undertaking not to alienate the subject property until the disposal of the suit. 5. As canvassed by Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the appellant claims title to the subject property through a Housing Society which, though unsuccessful in establishing the title to the larger land (in which the subject property is curved out) under acquisition proceedings initiated in its favour, asserts title based on the transactions executed by the erstwhile land owners independent of the acquisition proceedings. While, as submitted by Sri S.M. Chandrashekar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4, these respondents claim title to the subject property under deeds executed by the erstwhile owners after the acquisition proceedings in favour of the Housing Society were setaside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The respondent Nos. 3 and 4 assert that transfer of the subject property in favour of the Housing Society (under whom the appellant claims title) by the erstwhile owners after acquisition is set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is an affront to the due process of law and therefore, the appellant’s claim for title and possession of the subject property is untenable. 6. It is obvious from these submissions that there is a primafaciecase in the sense that there is triable issue between the appellant and the respondents insofar as title to, and possession of, the subject property. This would particularly be so because it is undisputed that the Housing Society, in a contempt proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has filed compliance report placing on record before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Housing Society had entered into transactions with erstwhile land owners and under such transactions, the Housing Society had transferred sites to its allottees. The Hon’ble Supreme Court on consideration thereof, has reserved liberty to the affected to approach the civil Court for adjudication of rights to the property. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court on consideration thereof, has reserved liberty to the affected to approach the civil Court for adjudication of rights to the property. 7. However, the question that remains is, how the balance of convenience, a necessary concomitant to decide the prayer for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, will have to be balanced in the light of irreparable loss that could be occasioned to a party. In an earlier proceeding involving the dispute between the allottees claiming under the Housing Society and the purchasers similarly placed as the appellant and the respondents in this appeal, this Court, in the facts and circumstances of such case, while assessing the balance of convenience has concluded that a person claiming under the Housing Society would be entitled to the use of the property claimed but subject to perils of final adjudication without the right to claim any equity and that such person will also be liable to answer any substantiated claim for damages by the other party for the loss that could have occasioned as a consequence of the dispute being finally adjudicated against the party in possession. 8. In the case on hand, because of the peculiar facts, and in the light of the undisputed subsequent facts as submitted in unison by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that balance of convenience would lie in favour of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 and as such, the appellant would not be entitled for temporary injunction. But then again, every use of the subject property by the respondent Nos.3 and 4, including the construction put up by them, would be litigious and therefore should be subject to the condition that the respondent Nos.3 and 4 shall not be entitled to claim equity whatsoever because the construction is put up by them. Further, the respondent Nos.3 and 4, subject to all just exceptions, will also be liable to answer substantiated claim for damages by the appellant if the appellant is put to any injury and the suit is finally adjudicated in favour of the appellant. It is further observed that the claim for damages by the appellant, if any, will have to be adjudicated as part of the present dispute. It is further observed that the claim for damages by the appellant, if any, will have to be adjudicated as part of the present dispute. Furthermore, and as submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4, these respondents shall not sell or otherwise alienate the subject property until the disposal of the suit. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. In view of disposal of the appeal, pending applications do not survive for consideration and the same are disposed of.