JUDGMENT : Vireshkumar B. Mayani, J. 1. The appellant State has filed the present Appeal against the acquittal judgment and order dated 16.01.1997 passed by the Additional City Sessions Judge, Court No.11, Ahmedabad in Sessions Case No.393 of 1995, acquitting all the three accused from the charges under Section 498 (A), 302 read with Section 34 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. It is the case of the prosecution that wife of Narendrabhai Babulal Nadiya named Heenaben lodged the F.I.R. on 09.06.1995 before Madhupura Police in which she has mainly narrated that she resides at her in-law’s house with her husband, elder brother-in-law namely Jagubhai (jeth), elder sister-in-law Lakhiben (jethani) and sister-in-law Bhagvatiben (Nanand) and Bhagvatiben’s husband and children. Her marriage life is about three years from the date of incident. Today, she was at home at about 04:00 pm and her husband had gone to the village named Telavi. At that time, Bhagvatiben told her that you are instigating your husband and eating very good food, why are you staying here and this is not your father’s place. In such a way, she had unnecessarily quarreled with her and tortured her. She was always torturing her to go to her father’s house and also tortured that it is not necessary for you to stay here. Her sister-in-law Bhagvatiben, brother-in-law Jagubhai and elder sister-in-law Lakhiben poured kerosene on her and set fire with matchstick and therefore, she got burnt injury on her whole body. The neighbour gathered and she was taken to the Civil Hospital. Such type of complaint was lodged by the deceased herself. 3. After registering the offence, the Investigation Agency investigated the offence and recorded the statement of various witnesses, drawn different panchnamas and seized certain articles, which were sent for analysis to the F.S.L. After the investigation, the Investigating Officer considered that there is sufficient evidence and therefore, submitted the charge-sheet in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad Court No.12. 4. The copies of the charge-sheet were supplied to the accused by the Metropolitan Magistrate and as the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and therefore, committed the case against the accused to the Court of Sessions for trial on 18.12.1995. 5. 4. The copies of the charge-sheet were supplied to the accused by the Metropolitan Magistrate and as the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and therefore, committed the case against the accused to the Court of Sessions for trial on 18.12.1995. 5. Thereafter, the Additional City Sessions Judge, Court No.6 had framed the charge under Section 498 (A), 302, 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code vide Exhibit – 2. The accused denied the charges leveled against them and prayed for trial and therefore, the trial was commenced before the Sessions Judge. 6. After filing closing pursis by the prosecution, further statements of accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was recorded. The accused have denied the case of the prosecution and submitted that a false case is filed against them. 7. In order to bring home the charges against the accused person, prosecution has examined several witnesses, which are as under. Sr.No. Witness Name Exh.No. 1 Jagdishbhai Sundarlal Parmar 8 2 Manubhai Maganbhai Nadiya 11 3 Govindbhai Shivabhai Makwana 13 4 Amaratlal Gangaram Joshi 14 5 Dr.Rathindra Balasaheb Deshmukh 21 6 Kalidas Revabhai 24 7 Chandrakant Lalluram Vohra 27 8 Dr.Archana Ravindrabhai Kajrekar 33 8. After appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned Judge vide impugned Judgment, acquitted the respondent –accused. 9. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order of acquittal dated 16.01.1997 passed by the Additional City Sessions Judge, Court No.11, Ahmedabad in Sessions Case No.393 of 1995, the appellant – State has preferred the present appeal before this Court. 10. Heard Mr. Hardik Soni, learned APP for the appellant State. He has contended that the judgment and order passed by the learned Judge is contrary to law and evidence on record. He has contended that the learned Judge has not properly appreciated oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties in its proper perspectives. 11. Mr. Hardik Soni, learned APP for the appellant State has mainly submitted that all the three accused are brother-in-law (Jeth), wife of the brother-in-law (Jethani) and sister-in-law (Nanand) of the deceased Heenaben wife of Narendrabhai Babulal Nadiya, who died on 09.06.1995 as all the three accused had tortured and harassed her and afterward, poured kerosene upon the deceased Heenaben and set fire. He has further submitted that the case of the prosecution is mainly based upon the dying declaration given by the deceased before the Executive Magistrate when she was admitted at the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad as well as the F.I.R. lodged by the deceased herself before the police and oral dying declaration before the father. He has submitted that the learned trial Court has not considered properly the dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate and not appreciated the whole evidence in proper perspective resulted into the acquittal of all the three accused. He has also submitted that all the required witnesses are examined by the prosecution but due to error in appreciation of the evidence, the trial Court had acquitted all the three accused. He has submitted that the case of the prosecution is a strong evidented case, which is required to be resulted into conviction of all the three accused in which a lady has lost her life. The trial Court has disbelieved the evidence of the Executive Magistrate considering other evidence, but at the same time, the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, at last he prayed to allow the present appeal and convict the respondent herein for the above mentioned offences. 12. Heard Mr. N.R. Kodekar, learned advocate for all the three respondents. He has mainly submitted that at the time of first instance, when the deceased was taken to the hospital, she had given the history before the doctor that there was an accident and therefore, she burnt. He has also submitted that this is the first version of the deceased Heenaben, which should be believed, which is the correct version of the incident. He has further submitted that in the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, where the Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the deceased Heenaben, at that time, she was not in a position to give the dying declaration. Moreover, the evidence of the Executive Magistrate as well as the dying declaration itself contained infirmity, which weakened the case of the prosecution. The trial Court has appreciated the evidence in its proper manner, which is not required any interference by this Court. He has lastly submitted that the appeal of the State may be rejected and the order and judgment passed by the trial Court acquitting the original accused may be confirmed. 13. The trial Court has appreciated the evidence in its proper manner, which is not required any interference by this Court. He has lastly submitted that the appeal of the State may be rejected and the order and judgment passed by the trial Court acquitting the original accused may be confirmed. 13. The case of the prosecution is mainly based upon three dying declarations, which are (i) oral dying declaration before the father of the deceased namely Manubhai Maganbbhai Nadiya, (2) dying declaration in the form of F.I.R. before the police officer, (3) dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate. There is one another dying declaration, which is in the form of history before the doctor. 14. To understand the evidentiary value of all the three above dying declarations, it is required to consider the time factor, which is on record. The deceased Heenaben had been brought by one Mr.Babubhai at the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad at 17.35 hrs., afterwards Dr. Greeshmaben wrote the vardhi to the police station, which has been received by Madhupura police station at 17:50 hrs., P.S.I. Amaratlal Gangaram Joshi reached Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad at about 19:55 hrs., which is nearby 08 : 00 pm as per the cross examination by the defence, the intimation (yaadi) was sent to the Executive Magistrate by this P.S.I. Mr.Joshi, which has been received by the Executive Magistrate Mr.Jagadish Sundarlal Parmar, which contained an endorsement of the Doctor Archana Kajrekar that the patient is conscious and the endorsement is made at 06 : 45 pm., the father of the deceased namely Manubhai Maganbhai Nadiya saw the deceased at 07 : 30 pm in the Civil Hospital. The Police Officer started of recording of the F.I.R. at 08 : 00 pm and completed at 08 : 30 pm, the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate started at 08 : 50 pm and completed at 09 : 05 pm. 15. It has come on the record that the police officer who recorded F.I.R. reached at the Civil Hospital at 19:55 means about 08: 00 pm at the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. It has also come on the record that he wrote an-intimation (yaadi) to the Executive Magistrate to come to the Civil Hospital to record the dying declaration of the deceased Heenaben, which contained the endorsement of the doctor regarding consciousness of the patient and the doctor has written the time 06:45 pm. It has also come on the record that he wrote an-intimation (yaadi) to the Executive Magistrate to come to the Civil Hospital to record the dying declaration of the deceased Heenaben, which contained the endorsement of the doctor regarding consciousness of the patient and the doctor has written the time 06:45 pm. Therefore, the question arises that when the police officer reached the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad at 08:00 pm, then how he sent the intimation to the Executive Magistrate containing the endorsement of the doctor, which has been taken at 06:45 pm. Moreover, the F.I.R. had been taken by the police officer at 08:00 pm to 08:30 pm. If the police officer had sent the intimation to the Executive Magistrate containing the endorsement of the doctor regarding condition of the patient, then the question arises as to why he has not taken the endorsement of the doctor regarding the condition of the patient on the complaint, which has been lodged by the deceased. The thumb impressions were taken on the F.I.R. twice, which contained different measurement. Moreover, a person namely Parshottambhai Mafabhai, who identified the thumb impressions of the deceased Heenaben, was not examined before the trial Court and his statement was also not recorded by the police. Therefore, the timing of reaching of the police officer at the Civil Hospital at 08:00 p.m., whereas taking endorsement at 06:45 p.m. and non recording of the police statement of Parshottambhai Mafabhai and non examination before the trial Court, not taking endorsement of doctor on the F.I.R. create doubt itself for the recording of the F.I.R., in the manner as shown by the prosecution. 16. As per the deposition of Mr.Jagdish Sundarlal Parmar, who is the Executive Magistrate, has recorded the dying declaration between 08:50 pm to 09:05 pm. As stated above, the sending of intimation and the endorsement on the intimation of the doctor is doubtful as stated above considering the timing, besides this, looking to the dying declaration, it appears that there is an endorsement of Dr. As stated above, the sending of intimation and the endorsement on the intimation of the doctor is doubtful as stated above considering the timing, besides this, looking to the dying declaration, it appears that there is an endorsement of Dr. Archana upon the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate, but at the same time, the Executive Magistrate had started the recording of the dying declaration at 08 : 50 pm and he had written the timing on the top of the dying declaration and at that time, if the endorsement of the concerned doctor had been taken regarding the condition of the patient, then it might be written below the timing mentioned by the Executive Magistrate, which is 08 : 50 pm, means the chronology will be writing of timing of the starting of dying declaration by the Executive Magistrate and thenafter, the endorsement of the doctor below the starting time of the dying declaration or the endorsement might be upon the timing of starting of dying declaration. But, here in the present case, the dying declaration contained the endorsement of the concerned doctor in the margin of the dying declaration. In this regard, Mr. Parmar who is the Executive Magistrate has deposed that I have to write the dying declaration under the starting timing of the dying declaration and therefore, the endorsement of the doctor regarding the condition of the patient had been taken in the margin of the dying declaration. But, at the same time, Dr. Archana who has written the endorsement regarding the condition of the patient, had been examined as P.W.No.8 and in the cross examination, she had deposed that she does not remember that when she made the endorsement on the dying declaration at Exhibit – 10, at that time whether the dying declaration was written or not. But, at the same time, she had also deposed that she made the endorsement in the margin of the dying declaration because there was no any other placeat the time of writing the endorsement. Meaning thereby, when she wrote the endorsement regarding condition of the patient, at that time, there was no space on the paper and therefore, she wrote the endorsement in the margin, which nullify the deposition of Mr. Meaning thereby, when she wrote the endorsement regarding condition of the patient, at that time, there was no space on the paper and therefore, she wrote the endorsement in the margin, which nullify the deposition of Mr. Jagdish Sundarlal Parmar, Executive Magistrate that he had to write the dying declaration and therefore, the endorsement of the doctor had been taken in the margin. It appears from all the records that the endorsement of the doctor regarding the condition of the patient had been taken after the completion of the dying declaration. Moreover, in the chief-examination, she had stated that before the endorsement, she examined the patient and afterward, wrote down the endorsement and also she had deposed that the Executive Magistrate had come to her for taking such type of endorsement. If the doctor has examined the patient and at the same time, if she had made the endorsement, then there is no question of coming of the Executive Magistrate towards her. So, in overall effect, the whole scenario makes the situation doubtful. 17. Therefore, the trial Court has considered the timing as well as the endorsement made by the doctor regarding the condition of the patient minutely and rightly came to the conclusion that the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate and another dying declaration in the form of the F.I.R. are not trustworthy and reliable. 18. One another dying declaration is regarding the oral dying declaration by the deceased Heenaben before her father Manubhai Maganbbhai Nadiya. Manubhai Maganbbhai Nadiya - father of the deceased had deposed before the trial Court that the deceased Heenaben was residing at her in-law’s place nicely and before two days of the incident, she had come to his house and she had not told anything about the harassment or torturing etc. In view of the above mentioned, when before two days of the death of the deceased, the deceased Heenaben had met her father and at that time, she had not complained anything and also the father contended that the deceased Heenaben was residing at her in-law’s place nicely, then there is not question or anything came on the record that within two days, how the version had been changed and therefore, the oral dying declaration before the father of the deceased cannot be believed, which has been rightly appreciated by the trial Court. 19. 19. One of the contentions of the prosecution that there is a smell of kerosene on the hairs of the deceased Heenaben as per the deposition of Dr.Deshmukh, who performed the postmortem of the deceased Heenaben. In this regard, the father as well as Dr. Archana had deposed that the deceased was pregnant and having 8 (eight) months child in her womb. But, at the same time, Dr. Deshmukh who performed the postmortem, had deposed that when he had performed the postmortem, there was no child in the womb of the deceased and therefore, the trial Court had come to the conclusion that either Dr. Deshmukh has not performed the postmortem or he may have performed the postmortem of another lady. Moreover, Dr. Deshmukh had deposed that there was no any liquid from any limb like nose, ear or mouth. But, at the same time, the inquest panchmana described that red coloured liquid from the nostril and mouth. Therefore the deposition of Dr. Deshmukh regarding the smell of kerosene from the hairs of the deceased was not believed by the trial Court. When there is discrepancy in the deposition of the Dr. Deshmukh regarding the pregnancy and coming of liquid from the limb of the deceased and other evidences, then the evidence of Dr. Deshmukh regarding the smell of kerosene in the hairs of the deceased, had not been believed by the trial Court. 20. The police statements of Babulal who brought the deceased to the Civil Hospital, husband of the deceased and Mr. Parshottambhai Mafabhai, who had identified the thumb impression of the deceased on the F.I.R. are not recorded by the police and not examined before the trial Court that also create doubt. 21. The original accused side had examined the defence witness no.1 – Jagdishbhai Jeevabhai Nadiya vide Exhibit 35. The defence witness had deposed that earlier about two years ago, there was some quarrel between himself and Girishbhai Mansingbhai. Girishbhai Mansingbhai is the son of the brother of Manubhai Maganbhai Nadiya, who is the father of the deceased means Girishbhai Mansingbhai Nadiya is the nephew of the father of the deceased. The defence witness had also deposed that when there was a quarrel between himself and Girishbhai Mansingbhai, there was a talk for compromise and at that time, the accused no.1 Jagdishbhai @ Jagubhai Babubhai Nadiya had refused for the settlement and compromise with Girishbhai Mansingbhai. The defence witness had also deposed that when there was a quarrel between himself and Girishbhai Mansingbhai, there was a talk for compromise and at that time, the accused no.1 Jagdishbhai @ Jagubhai Babubhai Nadiya had refused for the settlement and compromise with Girishbhai Mansingbhai. In this regard, the trial Court has considered that there might be an enmity between Girishbhai Mansingbhai and the present accused no.1 and therefore, the name of the accused had been written as the accused in the F.I.R. 22. The first version of the deceased when she was brought to the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, at that time, she had given history before the Dr.Greeshmaben that she got burnt injuries due to the accident, when she was making a tea upon the stove. This aspect also requires to be considered in its right perspective. This is the first version of the deceased Heenaben and the oral dying declaration. The F.I.R. lodged by the deceased, the dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate come and recorded afterwards. Moreover, she died within a short period of time and therefore, as per the evidence of Dr. Deshmukh, in such a situation, after passage of time, the condition of the deceased in such a situation diminishing. Therefore, it can be considered that the condition at the first version at the time of history before the doctor may be better than other aforesaid dying declarations. 23. We have appreciated the evidence and considered it minutely. The trial Court had appreciated the evidence in its judgment, more particularly, in para nos.11 to 20 in its right manner and right perspective and therefore, the trial Court has not erred in coming to the conclusion for the acquittal of all the three accused. 24. It is settled legal position that in an acquittal Appeal, the Appellate Court is not required to rewrite the Judgment or to give fresh reasonings when the Appellate Court is in agreement with the reasons assigned by the Trial Court acquitting the accused. In the instant case, this Court is in full agreement with the reasons given and findings recorded by the trial Court while acquitting the respondent – accused and adopting the said reasons as well as the reasons aforesaid, in our view, the impugned Judgment is just, legal and proper and requires no interference by this Court. Hence, this Appeal requires to be dismissed. 25. Hence, this Appeal requires to be dismissed. 25. In the result, acquittal appeal of the State deserves to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated 16.01.1997 passed by the Additional City Sessions Judge, Court No.11, Ahmedabad in Sessions Case No.393 of 1995, acquitting the accused is upheld and confirmed. Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled.