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2020 DIGILAW 216 (ALL)

Leela Devi v. A. D. J. Court No. 16

2020-01-20

SURYA PRAKASH KESARWANI

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri H.N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Abhishek Dwivedi, learned counsel for the plaintiff -landlady/petitioner and Sri Manish Goyal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Archit Mehrotra, learned counsel for the defendant -tenant/respondents. 2. This writ petition has been filed by the plaintiff – landlady praying to set aside the impugned judgment dated 4.7.2016 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 16, Kanpur Nagar and affirm the order dated 13.2.2013 in Rent Case No. 22 of 2008 (Smt. Leela Devi Vs. M/s Nav Durga Jewelers & another) passed by the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kanpur Nagar for eviction of the tenant – respondent from the disputed premises No. 494-A Rastogi Market, Kazi Khera Road, Lal Bunglow, Kanpur Nagar. Facts 3. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that undisputedly the plaintiff/ landlady/petitioner purchased the premises in question bearing Municipal No. 494-A Rastogi Market, Kazikhera Road, Lal Bunglow, Kanpur Nagar by a registered Sale Deed dated 28.6.2002. The respondent is an old tenant of the disputed shop in the aforesaid premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 250/- which is governed by the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 4. The plaintiff – landlady is an old lady. She had four sons, namely Siddha Gopal Rastogi, Madan Gopal Rastogi, Kishan Gopal Rastogi and Jay Gopal Rastogi. According to plaintiff – landlady, except Jay Gopal Rastogi, her other sons are carrying on their own business. She wanted to settle her unemployed son – Jay Gopal Rastogi by setting up business in the disputed shop. Therefore, she filed Rent Case No. 22 of 2008 for eviction of the tenant – respondent from the disputed shop, on the ground of her bonafide need for starting business by her son – Jay Gopal Rastogi who is also holding her power of attorney. She also made pleadings in the form of an undertaking that if the disputed shop is vacated, then she shall use that shop only for the business of her son and shall not let out it. An allegation of sub-tenancy was also made in the plaint. The respondent – tenant filed his objections. Thereafter parties led their evidence. 5. She also made pleadings in the form of an undertaking that if the disputed shop is vacated, then she shall use that shop only for the business of her son and shall not let out it. An allegation of sub-tenancy was also made in the plaint. The respondent – tenant filed his objections. Thereafter parties led their evidence. 5. The aforesaid Rent Case No. 22 of 2008 was decreed and the release application of the plaintiff – landlady was allowed by judgment and order dated 13.2.2013 passed by the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kanpur Nagar and the respondent was directed to vacate the disputed shop and to handover its vacant and peaceful possession to the plaintiff – landlady within sixty days. 6. Aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and order of eviction, the tenant respondent filed a Rent Appeal No. 19 of 2013 which has been allowed by the impugned judgment dated 4.7.2016 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 16, Kanpur Nagar. The reasons for allowing the appeal are mentioned in paragraph 28 of the impugned judgment, which are briefly as under:- (i) The pleadings in the release application are defective and not clear. (ii) The power of attorney was given by the landlady to her son – Jay Gopal Rastogi in the year 2008. Therefore, evidence adduced by the power of attorney holder relating to the events prior to the date of power of attorney was not permissible. (iii) The plaintiff – landlady herself has not adduced evidence, but the evidences were adduced by the power of attorney holder (son of the landlady). Therefore, the bonafide need shown in the release application is not proved. 7. Aggrieved with the judgment in the aforesaid Rent Appeal, the plaintiff – landlady initially filed a petition under Article 227 No. 5241 of 2016 of the Constitution of India which was subsequently converted by the order of the Court dated 22.2.2019 in the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Submissions on behalf of the plaintiff/landlady/petitioner 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted as under :- (i) Undisputedly, the plaintiff is the owner and landlady of the disputed shop which she had purchased by a registered sale deed dated 28.6.2002. Submissions on behalf of the plaintiff/landlady/petitioner 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted as under :- (i) Undisputedly, the plaintiff is the owner and landlady of the disputed shop which she had purchased by a registered sale deed dated 28.6.2002. Notice for eviction was given on 22.8.2007 after expiry of more than three years, the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act was filed on 14.3.2008. (ii) The findings of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the plaintiff -landlady is in bonafide need of the disputed shop to settle his unemployed son – Jay Gopal Rastogi for starting business, no other shop is available either to her or to her son who is not even partner in any business/shop of his brothers, comparative hardship is in favour of the plaintiff – landlady and that alternative accommodation is available to the respondent – tenant, have neither been set aside nor any finding of these points based on any relevant evidence have been recorded in the impugned judgment by the Appellate Authority. Therefore, the impugned judgment of the Appellate Authority deserves to be quashed. (iii) The Appellate Authority has noticed the affidavits of Smt. Vandana Rastogi and Dr. Satyendra Sharma, but has completely failed to consider it. (iv) The Appellate Authority has recorded perverse finding of absence of specific pleadings in release application that the pleadings are vague and defective. He relied upon the Panchshala of 1978 – 1987. The Appellate Authority completely misguided itself in this regard inasmuch as the Panchshala of 1978-87 was not relevant as the plaintiff – landlady purchased the house in question on 28.6.2002 and the rent case was filed on 14.3.2008. A specific statement of fact was made by the plaintiff – landlady in paragraphs 4 to 7 that except Jay Gopal Rastogi, other sons are doing business, and the disputed shop is needed for Jay Gopal Rastogi, and if it is released the same, will be used only for the running business of Jay Gopal Rastogi. She stated in paragraphs 8 to 12 of the release application that the tenant – respondent has got a shop after the demise of his father and carrying on business from that shop bearing Municipal No. 49/63 Nayaganj, Kanpur Nagar under the name and style Balbhadra Jewelers having Registration No. 120/559. She stated in paragraphs 8 to 12 of the release application that the tenant – respondent has got a shop after the demise of his father and carrying on business from that shop bearing Municipal No. 49/63 Nayaganj, Kanpur Nagar under the name and style Balbhadra Jewelers having Registration No. 120/559. Therefore, comparative hardship is in favour of the plaintiff – landlady and her need for the disputed shop is a bonafide need. (v) The plaintiff – landlady is an old lady who has filed the release application on 14.3.2008 for release of the disputed shop for starting business by his son - Jay Gopal Rastogi to whom she also gave her power of attorney who was fully aware of all relevant facts since the date of purchase of the disputed shop and has always been looking after the affairs of the disputed shop in question. Therefore, adverse inference drawn by the Appellate Authority on the ground that plaintiff – landlady herself did not appear to adduce evidence, is wholly arbitrary, illegal and against the settled principle of law in rent matters that a son or daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old parent can give evidence if the landlady/landlord seeks eviction of his/her tenant on the ground of his/her bonafide need. (vi) The Appellate Authority has baselessly held that the plaintiff – landlady had not disclosed as to who are the tenants in particular shops and that Dr. Satyendra Sharma is a tenant. The Appellate Authority has completely ignored the sketch map filed by the tenant itself. (vii) The findings recorded by the Appellate Authority are perverse and in ignorance of evidences on record. The tenants – Vandana Rastogi and Dr. Satyendra Sharma filed affidavits and stated that they are in occupation of two shops each, which they had not vacated. The tenant – respondent, Vijay Singh had filed reply to the affidavit of the aforesaid two tenants in which he had not denied that Vandana Rastogi and Dr. Satyendra Sharma are in occupation of two shops each. The tenant – respondent merely stated that without allotment shops could not be given to the tenants – Satyendra Sharma and Vandana Rastogi. (viii) The impugned judgment and order of the Appellate Authority is wholly arbitrary, illegal and unjustified and the findings recorded therein are perverse. Satyendra Sharma are in occupation of two shops each. The tenant – respondent merely stated that without allotment shops could not be given to the tenants – Satyendra Sharma and Vandana Rastogi. (viii) The impugned judgment and order of the Appellate Authority is wholly arbitrary, illegal and unjustified and the findings recorded therein are perverse. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the Appellate Authority deserves to be quashed and the order of the Prescribed Authority deserves to be affirmed. 9. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the plaintiff -landlady/petitioner has relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai & others (2003) 6 SCC 675 (paragraphs 22, 25 & 32), Achutananda Baidya Vs. Prafullya Kumar Gayen & others (1997) 5 SCC 76 (paragraphs 10 & 11) and Savita Chemicals (P) Ltd. Vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union & another (1999) 2 SCC 143 (paragraph 19). Submissions on behalf of the tenant – respondent 10. Learned counsel for the tenant – respondent has submitted as under :- (i) In rent control proceedings, pleadings form integral part to deal with release application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. A finding of fact has been recorded by the Appellate Authority regarding absence of relevant pleadings in the release application by the plaintiff -landlady/petitioner. Therefore, the Appellate Authority has not committed any error of law to allow the appeal and to dismiss the release application. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Roop Ram & others Vs. Geeta Rani & others (2018) 1 All.LJ 177 (paragraphs 8, 10 & 11). (ii) Scope of interference under Article 226 and alternatively under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in rent case is limited to patent errors which cannot be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging into long drawn process of reasoning. If two opinions are possible on the same material, the finding arrived at by the Court below cannot be called to be a patent error. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash (2004) 3 SCC 682 (paragraph 4). (iii) The High Court has power to the extent of finding out the legality, regularity and propriety of the impugned order and not to re-appreciate evidence so as to draw a different conclusion. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash (2004) 3 SCC 682 (paragraph 4). (iii) The High Court has power to the extent of finding out the legality, regularity and propriety of the impugned order and not to re-appreciate evidence so as to draw a different conclusion. The arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner amounts to persuading this Court to re-appreciate evidence to draw a different conclusion which is not permissible. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78 (paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 & 45). (iv) The need set up by the plaintiff -landlady/petitioner is not bonafide need, but it was merely desired to get the disputed shop vacated. A release application cannot be allowed on the basis of desire of a landlord/landlady. The findings recorded by the Appellate Authority that the plaintiff – landlady has no bonafide need, is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed upon the judgments of this Court in Suresh Prasad Vs. Additional District Judge & others (2012) 2 ARC 38 , Baldev Singh Vs. IIIrd Additional District Judge Etah (1999) 2 ARC 132, Ram Shanker Jaiswal Vs. Additional District Judge (ST/SC) Act, Lucknow & other (2015) 3 AWC 3076 , and judgment of Hon'ble Uttarakhand High Court in Arun Kumar Vs. Ramwati Devi & others (2015) 113 ALR 790 and the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Rahabar Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra K. Tandon (1998) 4 SCC 49 , Maqboolunnisa Vs. Mohd. Saleha Quaraishi (1998) 9 SCC 585 (paragraph 3), Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 (paragraph 13) and Amarjit Singh Vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain AIR 1987 SC 741 . Discussion and Findings 11. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsels for the parties and perused the records of the present writ petition. 12. In paragraphs 4 to 13 of the release application dated 14.3.2008 being Rent Case No. 22 of 2008, the plaintiff – landlady has pleaded as under:- “4. Discussion and Findings 11. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsels for the parties and perused the records of the present writ petition. 12. In paragraphs 4 to 13 of the release application dated 14.3.2008 being Rent Case No. 22 of 2008, the plaintiff – landlady has pleaded as under:- “4. That one son of the petitioner i.e. Jai Gopal Rastogi is unemployed and the rest of the sons of the petitioner namely Sindh Gopal Rastogi, Madan Gopal Rastogi and Kishan Gopal Rastogi are employed and carrying out their business from their shops and petitioner wants to settle her son namely Jay Gopal Rastogi in the shop in question. 5. That on the other hand opposite party no. 2 i.e. Vijay Singh is not in need of the said shop in question and under the utter violation of the terms and conditions have sub-letted the shop in question to one Sri Rama Kant Trivedi S/o Sri R.N. Trivedi r/o 71-A Perdavanpurwa, Kanpur by taking the pagri without the previous consent in writing and against the will of the petitioner and which is not permissible under the law for the time being in force and is the sole grounds of eviction of the opposite parties from the shop in question for which petitioner is entitled for. 6. That at present opposite party no. 2 is not carrying out the business from the shop in question and after the said demise of the father of the opposite party no. 2 i.e. Late Balbhadra Singh opposite party no 2 is also in possession of shop situated at 49/63 Nayaganj, Kanpur Nagar under the name and style M/s Balbhadra Jewelers being proprietor of the same and having Registration No. 120/559 for the period 2006 to 2011 in his own name as proprietor and carrying out the business from there and this was the very reason by which the shop in question has been subletted to one Sri Rama Kant Trivedi as stated in proceeding paragraph, as the opposite party no. 2 is not in need of the shop in question. 7. That on the release of the shop in the question occupied by the opposite party, petitioner and his son shall occupy the same. 8. 2 is not in need of the shop in question. 7. That on the release of the shop in the question occupied by the opposite party, petitioner and his son shall occupy the same. 8. That the opposite party no.2 has got a shop after the demise of his father and carrying out the business from the shop at 49/63 Nayaganj, Kanpur being proprietor of M/s Balbhadra Jewelers and having Registration No. 120/559 and as such has got alternate accommodation. 9. That the opposite parties have already been informed of the said purchase of premises No. 393-A Rastogi Market, Kazikhera Road, Lal Bunglow, Kanpur and they have also been served with a notice dated 22.8.2007 through speed post with A.D. Six month earlier. It is pertinent to mention here that opposite parties have not made any efforts to find out alternative accommodation i.e. shop because the opposite party no. 2 is already in exclusive possession of shop of his late father as mention in preceding paragraph. 10. That in these circumstances, no hardship a inconvenience is likely to be caused to the opposite parties. On the other hand petitioner is suffering much hard ship and in convenience and the petitioner can not get any other shop. 11. That comparatively the hardship which is being caused and is likely to be caused to the petitioner is much more greater, as would be evident from facts detailed above, than the opposite parties. 12. That the need of the petitioner is genuine, bonafide and hand pressing and the release deserves to be allowed. 13. That the petitioner hereby undertake that on the release of the shop in question occupied by the opposite parties, she shall not let out the same to any other person but shall keep the same for use and occupation of her Son namely Jai Gopal Rastogi.” 13. In his objections, the tenant – respondents have not specifically denied the facts stated in paragraphs 4, 8, 10 & 13 of the release application, but made vague averments in paragraphs 4, 8, 10 & 12 of objections which are reproduced below:- “4. That the contents of para no.4 of the release petition is totally false, fake, crooked one and just to prepared /written to harasses and defame the opposite party and also to oust the opposite party from his legal tanancy. That the contents of para no.4 of the release petition is totally false, fake, crooked one and just to prepared /written to harasses and defame the opposite party and also to oust the opposite party from his legal tanancy. In fact, all sons of the petitioner have got number of shops in the same premises and they have much more accommodation for their business than their requirements. The opposite party tenant reserves his right to file an application for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner, who will ascertain the accommodation in possession of the petitioner and her sons. 8. That the contents of para no.8 of the release petition is nothing else, but a repetition of para no.6 of this release petition. The detailed objections have been submitted through aforegoing para. 10. That the contents of para no.10 of the release petition is illegal and against the law. There is no any reason or sufficient ground to file release petition, as the petitioner's son have much more accommodation than their requirements. The map attached is best evidence for the opposite party which the opposite party can not deny. 12. That the contents of para nos. 12 & 13 of the release petition are wrong, hence denied, actual bonafide need goes only in the favour of the opposite party -tenant, because he has no any other shop to run his business in or out of Kanpur City except under tenency.” 14. The Prescribed Authority considered the evidences in detail and pleadings and recorded the following findings of fact:- (i) The plaintiff – landlady is the owner and landlady of the disputed shop. (ii) The plaintiff – landlady is in bonafide need of the disputed shop for starting business by her unemployed son – Jay Gopal Rastogi. (iii) The tenant – respondent could not prove by any evidence that the plaintiff – landlady has any other shop in a vacant state other than the disputed shop or that the son of the plaintiff – landlady, namely Jay Gopal Rastogi is running business from any shop. (iv) The tenant – respondent succeeded house No. 49/63 Nayaganj Kanpur Nagar after the death of his father in the year 2006 in which business in the name and style Balbhadra Jewelers is being run. 15. (iv) The tenant – respondent succeeded house No. 49/63 Nayaganj Kanpur Nagar after the death of his father in the year 2006 in which business in the name and style Balbhadra Jewelers is being run. 15. The stand taken by the opposite party that the said shop was received by his brother by alleged Will dated 13.1.2006 was disbelieved by the Prescribed Authority on the basis of documentary evidences on record that the tenant – respondent and his brother both themselves submitted affidavit dated 24.4.2008 (paper nos. 62/11 to 62/14) before the Assistant Labour Commissioner stating that their father has not executed any will deed. The said affidavit was filed by the tenant – respondent after filing of the release application dated 14.3.2008 by the plaintiff – landlady. 16. In the rent appeal filed by the respondent – tenant, the Appellate Authority has recorded the findings in paragraph 28 of the impugned order as under:- ^^28- i=koyh ij miyC/k leLr vfHkys[kh; lk{;ksa] 'kiFki=ksa] Áfr'kiFki=ksa rFkk ÁR;qRrj 'kiFki=ksa dk ,d lkFk rqykukRed #i esa foospu djus ij ;g fu"d"kZ fudyrk gS fd ;kph@ ÁR;FkhZx.k dh fueqZfDr ;kfpdk Li"V IyhfMax u gksus ds dkj.k u dsoy =qfViw.kZ o vLi"V gS cfYd ,slh ;kfpdk iwjs ekeys ds fy, (Fatal) ?kkrd gS D;ksafd cxSj IyhfMax ds lk{; ÁLrqr ugha fd;k tk ldrk gSA blds vfrfjDr tks lk{; ;kph@ ÁR;Fkhx.k dh rjQ ls ewy ;kfpdk esa fn;s Hkh x;s gS os ;kph@HkouLokeh ds ikoj vkQ vkVkuhZ dh rjQ ls fn;s x;s gS ftldh fu;qfDr o"kZ 2008 ls dh x;h gS fdUrq ikoj vkQ ,VkuhZ dh rjQ viuh fu;qfDr ds iwoZ ds Hkh Lkk{; ÁLrqr fd;s x;s gS ftudks ÁLrqr djus dk vf/kdkj ikoj vkQ ,VkuhZ dh ugha gS D;ksafd ikoj vkQ ,VkuhZ viuh fu;qfDr ds le; ds o mlds mijkUr dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa ds lEcU/k esa gh lk{; ÁLrqr dj ldrk gSA ikoj vkQ ,VkuhZ dks fu;qDr djus ls iwoZ dh lk{; ÁLrqr dj ldrk gSA ikoj vkQ ,VkuhZ dks fu;qDr djus ls iwoZ dh lk{; ÁLrqr djus dk vf/kdkj Hkou LOkfeuh Jherh yhykorh dks gh Fkk tks fd iwoZ ds dFkuksa ds lEcU/k esa egRoiw.kZ lk{kh Fkh fdUrq mudh rjQ ls ewy okn esa dksbZ lk{; ÁLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA vr% mudk lk{; ÁLrqr u gksus ds dkj.k fueqZDr ÁkFkZuki= esa lökoh vko';drk ds rF; lkfcr ugha gksrs gSA** 17. The finding of the Appellate Authority that the pleadings are erroneous and vague and not clear, is wholly baseless inasmuch as the plaintiff – landlady has made clear averments in a release application to set up her bonafide need for starting business by his unemployed son – Jay Gopal Rastogi which is evident from the pleadings in the release application reproduced above in paragraph 12. The landlady also stated in her release application that if the disputed shop is vacated, then she shall use it for the business of her son and shall not let out it to any person. No evidence, whatsoever was brought on record by the respondent – tenant to establish that the son of the plaintiff – landlady, namely Jay Gopal Rastogi is carrying on business from any shop or that the plaintiff – landlady is in occupation of any vacant shop to start the business by her son – Jay Gopal Rastogi. The tenant – Dr. Satyendra Sharma had filed his affidavit stating that he is in occupation of shop of two shutters in the house property in question. No evidence could be filed by the respondent – tenant to prove that Dr. Satyendra Sharma is not continuing as tenant and has vacated the shop. Likewise, the affidavit of tenant – Vandana Rastogi, proprietor M/s Vandana Jewelers Centre was also filed in evidence annexing therewith various documentary evidences, like registration with the Labour Department, Kanpur and commercial Electric Connection No. 079286 obtained from KESCO etc. In her affidavit, she clearly stated that she was a tenant of three shutters shop, but tenancy of one shutter shop was vacated to the landlady who needed it for construction of staircase for the first floor which she wanted to construct. She stated that she is tenant in occupation of two shutters shop. She also filed photographs of the shops in her occupation as tenant along with her affidavit. These facts could not be rebutted by the respondent – tenant by any evidence. The findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority were not even set aside by the Appellate Authority. 18. Considering the entire facts and evidences on record, I hold that the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority that the plaintiff – landlady could not prove her bonafide need, is wholly perverse and his hereby set aside. 19. The findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority were not even set aside by the Appellate Authority. 18. Considering the entire facts and evidences on record, I hold that the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority that the plaintiff – landlady could not prove her bonafide need, is wholly perverse and his hereby set aside. 19. The conclusion of the Appellate Authority that the pleadings are defective, vague and not clear, is also wholly perverse. I have already reproduced the relevant paragraph of the release application which goes to show that the plaintiff – landlady has made clear pleadings in her release application for setting up her bonafide need for disputed shop and comparative hardship to be in her favour. Therefore, the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority that the pleadings are defective, not clear and vague, are set aside. 20. The conclusion of the Appellate Authority that the plaintiff – landlady has not herself filed her evidence rather the evidences were led by the power of attorney holder, Jay Gopal Rastogi who could not adduce evidence, is also wholly arbitrary and illegal and against the settled principle of law. Undisputedly, the plaintiff – landlady is an old lady. Jai Gopal Rastogi is her real son who was looking after the affairs on her behalf. To establish him by setting up business, the release application was filed by the plaintiff – landlady in the year 2008. 21. In the case of Man Kaur (dead) by Lrs. Vs. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010)10 SCC 512 (paragraph 18(g), the Supreme Court held as under:- “(g) Where the law requires or contemplated the plaintiff or other party to a proceeding, to establish or prove something with reference to his “state of mind” or “conduct”, normally the person concerned alone has to give evidence and not an attorney holder. A landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant, on the ground of his “bona fide” need and a purchaser seeking specific performance who has to show his ‘readiness and willingness’ fall under this category. There is however a recognized exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or ‘readiness and willingness’. There is however a recognized exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or ‘readiness and willingness’. Examples of such attorney holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad. “ (emphasis supplied) 22. Similar principles have been laid down by this Court in paragraph 29(a) of the judgment dated 26.9.2019 in Matters under Article 227 No. 6482 of 2019 (Pawan Kumar & another Vs. Smt. Sita Devi). 23. In view of the aforesaid settled principle of law, the conclusion of the Appellate Authority in the impugned judgment that Jay Gopal Rastogi (son of plaintiff – landlady and power of attorney holder) had no power to adduce evidence and that no evidence was adduced by the plaintiff – landlady herself, cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. 24. Considering the entire facts and circumstance of the case, I hold that the plaintiff – landlady has established her bonafide need for the disputed shop. She also established comparative hardship to be in her favour. The detailed findings of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority in this regard are based on consideration of relevant pleadings and evidences on record which do not suffer from any manifest error of law. 25. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent – tenant are distinguishable on facts of the present case. 26. For all the reasons aforestated, the impugned judgment and order dated 4.7.2016 in Rent Appeal No. 19 of 2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 16, Kanpur Nagar, cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. The order of the Prescribed Authority dated 13.2.2013 in Rent Case No. 22 of 2008 (Smt. Leela Devi Vs. M/s Nav Durga Jewelers & another), is upheld. The respondent – tenant shall vacate the disputed shop and pay damages in terms of the order dated 13.2.2013 passed by the Prescribed Authority and hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the disputed shop to the plaintiff – landlady within two months from today.