ORDER : Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. In S.B. Crl. Misc. Petition Nos. 2191 of 2007 & 2342 of 2007 : 1. These criminal misc. petitions are pending before this Court since 2007. These petitions were listed before this Court on the previous date on 3.1.2020, however, complainant, who is an advocate now, was absent on that day. Thus, taking note of the fact that these petitions are pending since 2007, in the interest of justice, the same was adjourned for 15.1.2020. On 15.1.2020, the case was further adjourned for 16.1.2020 and then, case has been listed again today i.e. on 23.1.2020. Today also, the case was taken up in the first round, but no one appeared for the complainant and in the second round also, no one appeared for the complainant. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Public Prosecutor. 3. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that in terms of Section 207 of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1956"), a complaint has been filed before the learned Special Court (Economic Offences), Jaipur, alleging that the dividends have not been released by the petitioner - company. The petitioners before this Court are: company - Indian Oil Corporation Limited having its registered office at Bandra, Mumbai and other are the Chairman, Directors and Ex-Directors of the company, Learned counsel submits that jurisdiction did not lie with the learned Special Court (Economic Offences), Jaipur, to take cognizance on the complaint under Section 207 of the Act of 1956 as the cause of action would be said to have been taken place only at the registered office of the petitioner - company. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relies on the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Hanuman Prasad Gupta Versus Hiralal reported in AIR 1971 SC 206 and in the case of H.V. Jayaram Versus The Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2000) 2 SCC 202 , to submit that a complaint is required to be quashed as subsequent cognizance has been taken by the learned Special Court (Economic Offences), Jaipur. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the criminal misc. reported in (2000) 2 SCC 202 , to submit that a complaint is required to be quashed as subsequent cognizance has been taken by the learned Special Court (Economic Offences), Jaipur. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the criminal misc. petitions and principally submits that the law has already been settled by the Supreme Court and also submits that the complaint ought to be returned for filing in the concerned Court having the jurisdiction. 6. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Public Prosecutor and perused the material available on record. 7. Section 207 of the Act of 1956 reads as under: "207. Penalty for failure to distribute dividends within forty- two days. Where a dividend has been declared by a company but has not been paid, or the warrant in respect thereof has not been posted, within 1 forty- two days] from the date of the declaration, to any shareholder entitled to the payment of the dividend, every director of the company; its managing agent or secretaries and treasurers; and where the managing agent is a firm or body corporate, every partner in the firm and every director of the body corporate; and where the secretaries and treasurers are a firm, every partner in the firm and where they are a body corporate, every director thereof; shall, if he is knowingly a party to the default, be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven days and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that no offence shall be deemed to have been committed within the meaning of the foregoing provision in the following cases, namely:- (a) where the dividend could not be paid by reason of the operation of any law; (b) where a shareholder has given directions to the company regarding the payment of the dividend and those directions cannot be complied with; (c) where there is a dispute regarding the right to receive the dividend; (d) where the dividend has been lawfully adjusted by the company against any sum due to it from the shareholder; or (e) where, for any other reason, the failure to pay the dividend or to post the warrant within the period aforesaid was not due to any default on the part of the company. Payments of interest out of capital." 8. Payments of interest out of capital." 8. From the record, this Court finds that the complaint has been filed by non-petitioner - complainant - Mahendra Gaur, who has alleged in the complaint that the company has illegally withheld and adjusted the dividends after 04.12.1998 and has appropriated the same in its own favour in violation of Section 206 of the Act of 1956. It is submitted that he is a shareholder and the payment of dividend ought to have been released to him. Thus, he submits that there has been a violation by the company and therefore, the company and its directors are liable for punishment under Section 207 of the Act of 1956. In the complaint, the complainant submits that the jurisdiction lies at Jaipur as the consequences of the acts and omissions of the company have ensued in Jaipur and therefore, the Court had jurisdiction to try the offence under the Code and has, therefore, prayed, apart from other prayers, to take action against the company and its Chairman and Directors for violation of Sections 206 and 207 of the Act of 1956 and also for committing criminal breach of trust. 9. The law in this regard is no more res-integra so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned of accepting a complaint under Section 207 of the Act of 1956. In Hanuman Prasad Gupta (supra), after referring to the law prevalent in the India as well as the Abroad, the Apex Court held that the place where a dividend warrant would be posted, the post-office being the agent of the shareholder is the place where the obligation to pay the debt is discharged, however, it specifically held as under: "11. The offence under Section 207 is the failure to pay dividend or to post a cheque or a warrant for the dividend amount. Since the obligation to post the warrant arose at the registered office of the company, failure to discharge that obligation also arose at the registered office of the company. Therefore, the alleged offence must be held to have taken place at the place where the company's registered office is situate and not where the dividend warrant, when posted, would be received. 12. In that view, the High Court was in error in holding that the Magistrate at Meerut had the jurisdiction to try the said complaints. Therefore, the alleged offence must be held to have taken place at the place where the company's registered office is situate and not where the dividend warrant, when posted, would be received. 12. In that view, the High Court was in error in holding that the Magistrate at Meerut had the jurisdiction to try the said complaints. The appeals must accordingly be allowed and the High Courts orders set aside. Order accordingly." 10. In H.V. Jayaram (supra), the Supreme Court again reiterated the view taken in Hanuman Prasad Gupta (supra) and set aside a contrary view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. Versus Smt. Indra Kala and held as under: "11. In our view, it appears that the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to the decision rendered by this Court in H.P. Gupta v. Hiralal 1971 Cri LJ 262 and also to Section 113 of the Act, which inter alia provides that company shall deliver the documents, such as, certificates of shares, debentures and certificates of debenture stocks allotted or transferred in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 53. Section 53 prescribes the mode of delivery inter alia by sending the document by post at registered address and Sub-section (2) is the deeming provision for delivery of such letter. In Upendra Kumar Joshi v. Manik Lal Chatterjee and Ors. MANU/BH/0069/1979, the Patna High Court has followed the decision rendered by this Court in the case of H.P. Gupta (Supra) and has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the cause of action would arise at the place where registered office of the company is situated." 11. Viewed from another angle so far as the cause of action is concerned, although it is essentially a matter to be looked in the civil cases. However, the Supreme Court in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. Versus Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr. reported in (2004) 8 SCC 100 examined the position in terms of Section 177 Cr.P.C. and held as under: "12. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused. 13. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused. 13. While in civil cases, normally the expression "cause of action" is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression "cause of action" is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases. 14. It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. 15. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in "cause of action". 16. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts. 17. 16. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts. 17. The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (Black's Law Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In "Words and Phrases" (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action" in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf." 12. Keeping in view the said principle, in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 5227/2019, decided on 20.01.2020 held that if the cause of action has arisen in another State, FIR cannot be registered at any other place and further held as under: "14. Keeping in view the aforesaid, this Court is satisfied that the cause of action as discussed at length (supra) lies at Shivpuri (MP) alone and no part of cause of action exists at Jaipur. 15. Therefore, the criminal proceedings initiated by the Police and the concerned court at Jaipur pursuant to the FIR impugned herein are held to be without territorial jurisdiction and are quashed and set aside. 16. The complaint filed by the petitioner would be treated as returned to respondent no. 2 who, if so chooses, may file the same in appropriate Court having territorial jurisdiction to be dealt with in accordance with law. 17. The instant Criminal Misc. Petition is accordingly allowed." 13. 16. The complaint filed by the petitioner would be treated as returned to respondent no. 2 who, if so chooses, may file the same in appropriate Court having territorial jurisdiction to be dealt with in accordance with law. 17. The instant Criminal Misc. Petition is accordingly allowed." 13. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is satisfied that the complaint filed by the complainant under Section 207 of the Act of 1956 at Special Court (Economic Offences), Jaipur, was not maintainable and the concerned Court could not have taken cognizance and issued process vide order dated 11.9.2007 and could not have proceeded to stay the substance of the accused. 14. It is noticed that the proceedings taken by the concerned Special Court have already been stayed by this Court and the record was also called. Keeping in view the aforesaid findings on the question of jurisdiction, this Court's order dated 6.4.2009 is made absolute. The proceedings undertaken by the concerned Court are quashed and set aside. The complaint shall, however, be returned to the complainant - Mahendra Gaur leaving it open for him to take up appropriate proceedings, which would be dealt with in accordance with law. Record be returned to the trial Court and proceedings be closed. In S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition Nos. 49/2008 and 50/2008 : In both the criminal misc. petitions, subsequent orders passed by the Special Court (Economic Offences), Jaipur, dated 28.11.2007 and 29.11.2007 are under challenge. In view of the findings and conclusions arrived at as above whereby the proceedings undertaken before the Special Court (Economic Offences), Jaipur, have been quashed, these criminal misc. petitions are allowed. The orders passed by the Special Court (Economic Offences), Jaipur dated 28.11.2007 and 29.11.2007 are quashed and set aside. A copy of this order be placed in each of the file.