ORDER : M. Venkata Ramana, J. 1. This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order in E.P. No. 11 of 2015 in O.S. No. 263 of 2000 dated 07.01.2016 on the file of the Court of learned III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Guntur. 2. The decree-holders are the petitioners. The respondents are the Judgment-debtors. The first respondent died and respondents 2 to 6 being her legal representatives were brought on record in execution petition itself. 3. The execution petition was levied on the strength of a decree for specific performance, dated 13.12.2000 passed in favour of the petitioners and against the deceased first respondent. The terms of the decree are as under: "1. that the defendant be and is hereby directed to execute a registered sale deed in pursuance of Ex. A1 agreement of sate within three months from the date of decree, if the defendant fails to do so, the plaintiffs are at liberty to get the sate deed executed through court by following procedure as per law; and 2. that the defendant do pay to the plaintiffs a sum of Rs. 4189/- towards costs of the suit and do bear his own costs of Rs. Nil." 4. The relief sought in the execution petition was under Order 21 Rule 34 CPC calling upon respondents 2 to 6 to execute a regular sate deed in terms of the agreement for sate executed by the deceased first respondent for conveying the plaint schedule property and in the event of their failure to do so, to get the sate deed executed through process of the Court. 5. The plaint schedule property is also described in the E.P. schedule. It is a house bearing door No. 26-1-5 at Nagarampalem, near Guntur, along with a vacant site. 6. A day before expiry of period of limitation under Article 136 of Limitation Act, viz., period of twelve years, the execution petition was presented along with E.A. No. 31 of 2013 filed under Section 50 CPC to bring respondents 2 to 6 on record. The executing Court in the order impugned in the above circumstances observed that the execution petition, so filed, is within period of limitation. 7. The executing Court in the order impugned in the above circumstances observed that the execution petition, so filed, is within period of limitation. 7. The contention of the petitioners is that in spite of their best efforts, they could not get the particulars of respondents 2 to 6, after death of the first respondent, (who died on 19.06.2003) and therefore they could not deposit the balance sate consideration of Rs. 75,050/- into the Court and to lay the execution petition. Thus stating, the petitioners requested the executing Court to permit them to deposit the balance sate consideration. At this stage itself, it is desirable to state that the agreement for sate entered into between the petitioners and the deceased first respondent was on 29.08.1996 agreeing to sell the E.P. schedule house along with the site for Rs. 85,050/- and an advance of Rs. 10,000/- was paid then. Remaining balance stood at Rs. 75,050/-. 8. The objection of respondents 2 to 6 in this respect is that as per the decree, the balance sale consideration should be deposited within three months and then atone, question of execution of regular sate deed arises. They further contended that merely because the decree did not state specifically that balance consideration shall be paid within particular period, the petitioners cannot remain silent without complying with their part of contract under the agreement for sate upon depositing the balance sate consideration. Even otherwise, according to the respondents it should be deposited within three years in terms of the agreement for sale. Questioning the conduct of the petitioners in failing to deposit the balance of sate consideration, alleging want of necessary funds, which is in the nature of waiving the contract in terms of the decree, they contended that execution of the decree is barred. Attempt of the respondents 2 to 6 in filing a petition under Section 28 of Specific Relief Act is also adverted to by them. 9. Upon considering the contentions of the parties and the material, the executing Court accepting the objections of the respondents 2 to 6, dismissed the execution petition mainly on the ground that there was gross delay in filing the execution petition and that on account of conduct of the petitioners failing to deposit the balance sate consideration within a reasonable time. 10. 10. It is now contended by Sri P. Gopala Das, learned counsel for the petitioners that in as much as a valid decree is passed in favour of the petitioners and which is outstanding against the respondents, it is executable within twelve years in terms of Article 136 of the Limitation Act. It is further contention of the learned counsel that there is no stipulation in decree specifically mentioning that the balance sate consideration shall be deposited within a particular period and that the terms of the decree that the petitioners should obtain a regular registered sate deed, from the deceased first respondent within three months, is not conclusive by itself in this respect. Referring to effect of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, learned counsel Sri P. Gopala Das, further contended that it is discretion of the Court to extend time for payment and therefore, the executing Court should have permitted the petitioners to deposit, for which purpose they have already filed a lodgment schedule. 11. Sri P.V.A. Padmanabham, learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 6 referring to the fact situation as well as Section 28 of Specific Relief Act, strenuously contended that the conduct of the petitioners did not reflect that they are entitled for equitable relief of specific performance and even though a decree was in their favour, they waited for 12 tong years without either depositing the balance sate consideration or levying the execution petition for obtaining a regular sate deed. In these circumstances, white supporting the order under revision, learned counsel also contended that law expects that the petitioners shall deposit the balance sate consideration in terms of decree even if there is no such stipulation prescribed in the decree, within a reasonable time, which in any eventuality shall be a maximum period of three years in view of Article 54 of Limitation Act. Learned counsel further contended that when a suit for specific performance has to be laid in terms of Article 54 of Limitation Act within three years, in the circumstances contemplated there under, filing a execution petition leisurely after almost twelve years and on the last date of limitation for execution of the decree, clearly disentitles the petitioners for relief. 12. Learned counsel further contended that when a suit for specific performance has to be laid in terms of Article 54 of Limitation Act within three years, in the circumstances contemplated there under, filing a execution petition leisurely after almost twelve years and on the last date of limitation for execution of the decree, clearly disentitles the petitioners for relief. 12. In the backdrop of these circumstances, now the point that emerges for determination is:--"Whether the petitioners be permitted to deposit the balance sate consideration in the execution petition and if execution petition be directed to be proceeded further?" 13. The facts are admitted. There is no dispute in respect of an enormous delay in levying the execution petition on the strength of the decree in question by the petitioners. It is also not in dispute that the terms of the decree of the trial Court referred in para-3 above, did not stipulate any specific time within which the balance sale consideration shall be deposited into Court. It only directed that a regular sale deed shall be executed by the deceased first respondent within three months from the date of the decree. 14. As seen from the contentions of both the parties and the material on record, it appears that the petition filled by the petitioners in the trial Court under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, was dismissed for default. There is also no material to show that any effort was made by the petitioners to revive such application or any fresh application was filed for such purpose. 15. The law is well settled now that a decree in a suit for specific performance passed in terms of Order 20 Rule 12-A CPC is in the nature of a preliminary decree. Any terms of the decree of such nature, can be subjected to further proceedings in the suit itself. 16. 15. The law is well settled now that a decree in a suit for specific performance passed in terms of Order 20 Rule 12-A CPC is in the nature of a preliminary decree. Any terms of the decree of such nature, can be subjected to further proceedings in the suit itself. 16. In V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan and another (1999) 4 SCC 702 , the above situation was considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court, referring to an earlier judgment in Ramankutty Gupthan v. Avam (1994) 2 SCC 642 and observed in para-16 that an application for extension of time can be entertained by the executing Court when the trial Court and executing Court are one and the same treating such an application as the one filed in the main suit and on similar basis, the judgment-debtors can also seek rescission of the contract of sate or raise a plea in defence, bar of execution of the decree. The relevant observations are as under: "16. In view of the decision of this Court in Ramankutty Guptan case (1994) 2 SCC 642 (supra) when the trial Court and the executing Court are the same, the executing court can entertain the application for extension of time though the application is to be treated as one filed in the main suit. On the same analogy, the vendor judgment-debtor can also seek rescission of the contract of sate or take up this plea in defence to bar the execution of the decree." 17. On behalf of the petitioners, no separate application was filed in terms of-Section 28 of Specific Relief Act requesting the executing court to extend the time for deposit. It is further to be noted in this case that the decree under execution was passed by the same Court on original side, which is being executed on execution side. Filing execution petition straight away, by the petitioners with a request to permit them to deposit along with a lodgment schedule, is not in compliance with the legal requirement under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. 18. Thus, this is one of the objections, which has bearing in this case. 19. Filing execution petition straight away, by the petitioners with a request to permit them to deposit along with a lodgment schedule, is not in compliance with the legal requirement under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. 18. Thus, this is one of the objections, which has bearing in this case. 19. However, on behalf of the petitioners, contending that the Court has power in terms of Section 28 of Specific Relief Act to extend the time, reliance is placed in Kumar Dhirendra Mullick and others v. Tivoli Park Apartments (P) Ltd. (2005) 9 SCC 262 . After review of the case law in this respect, in given facts and circumstances of the case, finding that there was justification to extend the time, Hon'ble Supreme Court permitted to deposit the balance sate consideration. Relevant observations with reference to the facts in that case are in para 34 of this ruling and they are extracted hereunder: "34. ......the decree in question is not a self operative final decree. It is a preliminary decree. It merely directs the trust to execute the lease on or before 24.10.1985. It does not prescribe any consequence of non-deposit of premium. It does not prescribe any consequence of non-tender of rent on or before 24.10.1985. Till date, the decree-holder has paid the premium of Rs. 30.00 lakhs. It has paid rent amounting to Rs. 96.00 lakhs. In the circumstances, it cannot 8 be said that the decree holder intended to abandon the contract dated 16.8.1980. There is no positive refusal on the part of the respondent to complete the lease. There is no explanation given by the Trust for not moving the application for rescission of the contract for nine years. The decree was passed on 25.7.1985 whereas the application for rescission of the agreement is dated 3.10.1994. As stated above, the trust did not lead the evidence in Suit No. 176 of 1981. The corresponding Suit No. 87 of 1981 filed by the trust was dismissed for non-prosecution. The trust moved under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the decree dated 25.7.1985. That application was dismissed for default vide order dated 1.8.1987. The trust moved the application for restoration which was also dismissed for default on 16.7.1988. The trust moved in appeal against the decree dated 25.7.1985. That appeal was also dismissed. The trust moved under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the decree dated 25.7.1985. That application was dismissed for default vide order dated 1.8.1987. The trust moved the application for restoration which was also dismissed for default on 16.7.1988. The trust moved in appeal against the decree dated 25.7.1985. That appeal was also dismissed. The decree-holder has referred to the entire correspondence between the parties which indicates that during this period of nine years in the guise of negotiations, the decree-holder was prevented from filing execution application. The decree-holder was repeatedly assured of settlement. The decree-holder was repeatedly assured that lease would be executed in its favour. Attempt was also made by the Trustees during the interregnum to lease the property to Dilip Chand Kankaria and Smt. Sudha Kankaria. Lastly, in the present case, the decree-holder was put in possession under the deed of assignment dated 20.8.1970. The respondent was not put in possession under the agreement dated 16.8.1980. In the circumstances, the trial court erred in directing rescission of the said agreement dated 16.8.1980: For the aforestated reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal." 20. One of the cases in the above ruling was Ouseph v. Devassy AIR 2001 Kerala 104 a judgment of Kerala High Court and in the circumstances when the balance sate consideration was not deposited for 18 years, and taking into account that the decree-holder was in possession of the property in question, the delay was condoned. In para-32', the above case was considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court recording as follows: "32. In the case of Ouseph and another v. Devassy, the decree was silent as to the date by which the decree-holder was to pay the balance of the price. Possession was with the decree-holder. The purchaser deposited the balance before filing of the petition for rescission of the agreement but after expiry of the period fixed by the decree. The decree-holder applied for condonation of the delay. The same was granted. In doing so, the Court observed that Section 28 enables the Court to extend the time which by itself implies that mere failure to deposit the balance need not result in the rescission of the contract. On facts, it was found that the decree was silent as to the date by which the decree-holder was to deposit the balance of the sate consideration. On facts, it was found that the decree was silent as to the date by which the decree-holder was to deposit the balance of the sate consideration. On facts, it was found that the decree holder was in possession for 18 years. On facts, it was found that the vendor did not take any steps to get the balance of the sate consideration. That the vendor failed to seek rescission for 18 years. In the circumstances, the Court allowed the decree-holder condonation of delay in depositing the balance consideration." 21. Another ruling retied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners, is Bapurao v. Hanumanthrao and others AIR 1950 Hyderabad 48. This ruling is besides the point. 22. K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P.S.S. Somasundaram Chettiar AIR 1980 SC 512 is also retied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The power of the court to extend time for deposit in a suit for specific performance is adverted to in this ruling. This question, as such, is not in dispute, provided the facts and circumstances in a given case entitled the decree-holder to request the court for exercise of discretion there for. 23. Cherukuri Venkata Rao v. Brahmojosyula Bala Gangadhara Sharma and others 1987 (2) ALT 229 is also retied on for the petitioners (which is referred to in para-15 of the order under revision). In this ruling, white referring to the Tuling of Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.I. Trust v. Haridas Mundhra : AIR 1972 SC 1826 and its effect in para-9 observations are recorded. The effect of these observations is to ascertain, what is the reasonable time to deposit the balance sate consideration, when decree did not prescribe such time. White holding that no hard and fast rule can be enunciated in that behalf, effect of Article 54 of the Limitation Act was considered and three years period of limitation contemplated there under was treated as reasonable time for such deposit. These observations are in consonance with the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to in V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar case (1999) 4 SCC 702 (supra). 24. Strong reliance is placed by learned counsel for the respondents in Suggida Venkata Subrahmanyam and others v. Desu Venkata Rama Rao (Died) by LRs. 2010 (5) ALT 791 . These observations are in consonance with the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to in V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar case (1999) 4 SCC 702 (supra). 24. Strong reliance is placed by learned counsel for the respondents in Suggida Venkata Subrahmanyam and others v. Desu Venkata Rama Rao (Died) by LRs. 2010 (5) ALT 791 . In this ruling Cherukuri Venkata Rao, K. Kalpana Saraswathi, Kumar Dhirendra Mullick, referred to above, as well as effect of Article 54 of The Limitation Act, are considered. However, it was a case where the decree for specific performance specifically stipulated the time of three months for deposit of balance sate consideration and to obtain a regular sale deed. In those circumstances, observing that the decree-holder has to comply with the contract in terms of Section 28(3) of Specific Relief Act, within a reasonable period, it was observed that execution petition levied by the decree-holders was not maintainable. 25. Learned counsel for the respondents also brought to the notice of this Court a reference to the above ruling in Prem Jeevan and another v. K.S. Venkata Raman (2017) 11 SCC 57 . 26. Thus, in admitted fact situation and in given circumstances, having regard to rulings of Hon'ble Supreme Court and Division bench of the then High Court of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad, referred to supra, a period of three years has to be taken as reasonable time, within which, a decree-holder in a suit for specific performance could deposit the balance sale consideration, particularly, when the decree sought to be executed did not stipulate any condition prescribing specific time within which such balance sale consideration should be deposited. Therefore, a period of nearly 12 years (11 years 364 days), involved in this case at which time the petitioners sought to execute the decree cannot be considered, reasonable. They cannot take advantage of omission or absence of any stipulation in the decree for such purpose'. 27. In this context, learned counsel for the respondents relied on Ambadas Khanduji Shinde and others v. Ashok Sadashiv Mamurkar and others (2017) 14 SCC 132 contending that the revisional Court cannot interfere with the findings on facts under Section 115 CPC in the absence of the order under revision suffering illegality or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. 28. 27. In this context, learned counsel for the respondents relied on Ambadas Khanduji Shinde and others v. Ashok Sadashiv Mamurkar and others (2017) 14 SCC 132 contending that the revisional Court cannot interfere with the findings on facts under Section 115 CPC in the absence of the order under revision suffering illegality or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. 28. In given facts and circumstances in this case and for the reasons stated supra, finding no illegality or irregularity in the order under revision, it has to be confirmed. 29. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed confirming the order of the executing Court. There shall be no order as to costs. All pending petitions, stand closed. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.