JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The sole appellant has faced the trial on the charge under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for committing murder of Maino Tudu and under section 201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for causing disappearance of her dead body and under section 3 and section 4 of the Prevention of Witch (Daain) Practices Act, 1999. 2. In S.C. No. 11 of 2010, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced to RI for life and fine of Rs.2000/- under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, RI for seven years and fine of Rs.1000/- under section 201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and RI for three months under section 3 and RI for six months under section 4 of the Prevention of Witch (Daain) Practices Act, 1999. 3. The informant of this case is daughter of Maino Tudu. On the basis of her fardbeyan which was recorded on 10.10.2009, at about 15:00 hrs., Maheshpur P.S. Case No. 98/09 was lodged against Sunil Soren, Nura Hembram, Pradhan Soren and Sanatan Soren under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, under section 201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 3, 4 and 5 of the Prevention of Witch (Daain) Practices Act, 1999. After the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant and he has faced the trial on the aforesaid charges. 4. During the trial the prosecution has examined ten witnesses; the informant is PW-8. 5. The case set up by the prosecution against the appellant is based on circumstantial evidence. 6. In “Chandru @ Chandrasekaran v. State Rep. By Deputy Superintendent of Police CB CID and Another”, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 176 the Supreme Court has observed thus: “9. ……. The law with regard to appreciation of circumstantial evidence has been clearly enunciated in the case of Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, wherein this Court held as follows: “10……It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 7. To prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has laid evidence on: (i) last-seen-together, (ii) motive, and (iii) medical evidence. 8. The informant is the only witness who has stated that the appellant along with Nura Hembram, Pradhan Soren and Sanatan Soren came to her house in the morning of 08.10.2009 and on the pretext of performing some ritual on brother of the appellant who was sick took her mother along and thereafter she has not been seen alive. In her fardbeyan the informant has stated that her mother did not come back home after she was taken away by the appellant and the others and, therefore, she has lodged a report with the police on 10.10.2009. She has claimed that on inquiry she came to know that the accused persons have killed her mother and disposed off her dead body in Bisloi River. In the court also she has deposed that the appellant along with Nura Hembram, Pradhan Soren and Sanatan Soren came to her house in the morning of 08.10.2009 and took her mother to the house of the appellant for performing some rituals. She has further stated that the police has recovered a hoe from house of the appellant and she has identified the dead body of her mother by her finger. 9. Mr. Abhishek Kumar Dubey, the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that in absence of cogent and convincing evidence on identification of the dead body the appellant cannot be convicted for committing murder of Maino Tudu. 10. The law on absence of corpus delicti is well-settled. The old English view that “I would never convict a person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body was found dead”, has not been adopted by the Indian Courts. The law on the subject has been summarized by the Supreme Court in “Rishipal Vs. The old English view that “I would never convict a person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body was found dead”, has not been adopted by the Indian Courts. The law on the subject has been summarized by the Supreme Court in “Rishipal Vs. State of Uttarakhand” reported in “ (2013) 12 SCC 551 ”, thus: “14. In the absence of corpus delicti what the court looks for is clinching evidence that proves that the victim has been done to death. If the prosecution is successful in providing cogent and satisfactory proof of the victim having met a homicidal death, absence of corpus delicti will not by itself be fatal to a charge of murder. Failure of the prosecution to assemble such evidence will, however, result in failure of the most essential requirement in a case involving a charge of murder. That is precisely the position in the case at hand. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial about Abdul Mabood having met a homicidal death. The charge of murder leveled against the appellant, therefore, rests on a rather tenuous ground of the two having been last seen together to which aspect we shall presently advert when we examine whether the two being last seen together is proved as a circumstance and can support a charge of murder.”………………………………….. 19. It is true that the tell-tale circumstances proved on the basis of the evidence on record give rise to a suspicion against the appellant but suspicion howsoever strong is not enough to justify conviction of the appellant for murder. The trial court has, in our opinion, proceeded more on the basis that the appellant may have murdered the deceased Abdul Mabood. In doing so the trial court overlooked the fact that there is a long distance between “may have” and “must have” which distance must be traversed by the prosecution by producing cogent and reliable evidence. No such evidence is unfortunately forthcoming in the instant case. The legal position on the subject is well settled and does not require any reiteration. The decision of this Court have on numerous occasions laid down the requirements that must be satisfied in cases resting on circumstantial evidence. No such evidence is unfortunately forthcoming in the instant case. The legal position on the subject is well settled and does not require any reiteration. The decision of this Court have on numerous occasions laid down the requirements that must be satisfied in cases resting on circumstantial evidence. The essence of the said requirement is that not only should the circumstances sought to be proved against the accused be established beyond a reasonable doubt but also that such circumstances form so compete a chain as leaves no option for the court except to hold that the accused is guilty of the offences with which he is charged. The disappearance of deceased Abdul Mabood in the present case is not explainable as sought to be argued before us by the prosecution only on the hypothesis that the appellant killed him near some canal in a manner that is not known or that the appellant disposed of his body in a fashion about which the prosecution has no evidence except a wild guess that the body may have been dumped into a canal from which it was never recovered.” 11. The evidence laid by the prosecution through the informant on last-seen-together may provide an additional link in the chain of circumstances provided it satisfies the proximity test and inspires confidence but in no case only on the basis of testimony of the informant, that is, the last-seen-together evidence conviction of the appellant can be recorded under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for committing murder of Maino Tudu. 12. In “Navaneethakrishnan v. State by Inspector of Police”, (2018) 16 SCC 161 , the Supreme Court has held, thus: “22. …… It is a settled legal position that the law presumes that it is the person, who was last seen with the deceased, would have killed the deceased and the burden to rebut the same lies on the accused to prove that they had departed. Undoubtedly, the last seen theory is an important event in the chain of circumstances that would completely establish and/or could point to the guilt of the accused with some certainty. However, this evidence alone cannot discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and requires corroboration.” 13. In her fardbeyan, the informant has not stated anything which would reflect intention of the appellant to commit murder of Maino Tudu. However, this evidence alone cannot discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and requires corroboration.” 13. In her fardbeyan, the informant has not stated anything which would reflect intention of the appellant to commit murder of Maino Tudu. According to her, he came to her house with co-villagers and asked her mother to perform some rituals on his brother who was sick. The mother of the informant has died on 08.10.2009 and according to the informant, the appellant has confessed before the police in her presence on 10.10.2009. Other prosecution witnesses have not spoken about enmity between the appellant and the mother of the informant, though some of them have stated that Maino Tudu has been murdered on account of a doubt that she was practicing witchcraft. PW-1 has admitted in his cross-examination that he has not seen the actual occurrence and he has given evidence in the court on the basis of what he has heard from the villagers. PW-2 has stated that the appellant came to the Police Station and made a confessional statement before the police. He has also stated that the police has recovered a blood-stained hoe but it was not sealed in his presence. However, the Investigating Officer has stated in paragraph No.4 of his evidence that he has not seen blood stains on hoe. PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5 have stated in the court that the police has not recorded their statement and for the first time they have given their evidence in the court. They are not the eye-witnesses. PW-6 has been declared hostile at the instance of the prosecution and PW-7 in his cross-examination has stated that he has not stated before the police that Sunil has told in his presence that he has killed Maino. 14. The Investigating Officer who has been examined as PW-9 has deposed in the court that on 11.10.2009 he has received an information from Suti Police Station, District Murshidabad about recovery of a beheaded dead body and, thereafter, the informant was sent along with the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, namely, Nand Kumar Singh to Iron Gate Outpost for identification of the dead body. The informant has identified the dead body of her mother through tattoo on her hand and her finger. The informant has identified the dead body of her mother through tattoo on her hand and her finger. In connection to recovery of the dead body, Suti P.S. Case No. 449/09 dated 10.10.2009 was registered and post-mortem examination was conducted. The doctor who has conducted the post-mortem examination over the dead body of a woman aged about sixty years has been examined in the present case also. He has stated that the body of the woman was decomposed and her head was not found. In his opinion, head from the body of the woman was chopped off by a sharp-cutting weapon, such as, hansua. 15. In absence of examination of the Investigating Officer of Suti P.S. Case No. 449/09 and the materials collected in the said case, we find that there is a considerable controversy on identification of the dead body as of Maino Tudu. We find that the evidence laid by the prosecution through PW-8 to prove the last-seen-together story does not satisfy the proximity test: dead body has been recovered at a distant place in a different state and the doctor has found the body decomposed. The prosecution has also failed to establish motive for the crime. Generally motive is not a determinative factor in a case supported by the eye-witnesses but in a case based on circumstantial evidence motive provides an additional link to the chain of circumstances [refer: Surinder Pal Jain Vs. Delhi Administration, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 681]. 16. In so far as confessional statement of the appellant before the police is concerned, we find that the Investigating Officer has stated in the court that at the time when the appellant has recorded his confessional statement there were several villagers present there, however, none has come forward to prove this fact. Under section 27 of the Evidence Act so much of information which is discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer, and which relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. In “Pulukuri Kottaya V. Emperor” reported in AIR 1947 PC 67 , the Privy Council has observed that section 27 of the Evidence Act incorporates an exception to the restrictions under section 25 and section 26 and enables certain statements made by an accused in police custody to be proved. In “Pulukuri Kottaya V. Emperor” reported in AIR 1947 PC 67 , the Privy Council has observed that section 27 of the Evidence Act incorporates an exception to the restrictions under section 25 and section 26 and enables certain statements made by an accused in police custody to be proved. It has been held that the condition necessary to bring section 27 of the Evidence Act into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates discovery to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The logic behind section 27 is that if pursuant to the statement of an accused a new fact, previously not known to the police, is discovered and it is supported by recovery of some incriminating article which can be connected to the crime, it lends truthfulness of the statement of the accused and, therefore, that part of his statement can be proved in evidence. 17. In the present case, no new fact has been discovered from the confessional statement of the appellant and, therefore, no part of his confessional statement can be read in evidence. 18. In view of the above state of evidence, we find that the prosecution has failed to establish that the chain of circumstances is complete. All that we gather from the prosecution’s evidence is that the appellant who is grandson of Maino Tudu and as stated by the informant he had a land dispute with her has been implicated in this case on suspicion, but then, suspicion howsoever strong cannot take place of the legal evidence. May be the evidence laid by the prosecution raises a strong suspicion against the appellant but only on suspicion he cannot be convicted for committing murder of Maino Tudu. 19. May be the evidence laid by the prosecution raises a strong suspicion against the appellant but only on suspicion he cannot be convicted for committing murder of Maino Tudu. 19. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction of the appellant, namely, Sunil Soren under section 302/34 and section 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Witch (Daain) Practices Act, 1999 dated 12.03.2013 and the order of sentence of RI for life and fine of Rs.2000/- under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, RI for seven years and fine of Rs.1000/- under section 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code and RI for three months under section 3 and RI for six months under section 4 of the Prevention of Witch (Daain) Practices Act, 1999 dated 14.03.2013 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Pakur in S.C. No. 11 of 2010 are set-aside. 20. The appellant, named-above, is acquitted of the criminal charges framed against him in S.C. No. 11 of 2010. 21. Mr. Shekhar Sinha, the learned Public Prosecutor states that the appellant, namely, Sunil Soren is in custody serving the sentence inflicted upon him in S.C. No. 11 of 2010. 22. Accordingly, the appellant, namely, Sunil Soren shall be set free forthwith, if not required in connection to any other case. 23. In the result, Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.221 of 2013 is allowed. 24. Let lower court records be transmitted to the court concerned, forthwith.