ORDER : The petitioner has challenged the order dated 25.11.2015 passed by the respondent No.3 and the endorsement dated 6.6.2016 issued by the respondent No.4 at Annexures Y and Z respectively whereby the respondent No.3 Controlling Authority has directed the Petitioner-Bank to disburse the amount of Rs.14,86,788/(Rupees Fourteen lakhs eighty six thousand seven hundred eighty eight only) to the respondent workmen and the Appellate Authority has rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner on the ground of delay. 2. The petitioner-Bank was impleaded as respondent No.2 before the Controlling Authority in the proceedings relating to the claim of the workmen seeking for the gratuity amount payable to them by their employer. The petitioner-Bank being a secured creditor has alienated the properties of the employer under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2012 (‘SARFAESI Act’ for short). Considering the same, the Controlling Authority has saddled the liability on the petitioner-Bank. The Appellate Authority having considered the appeal filed belatedly, beyond he statutory period of limitation prescribed under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (‘Act’ for short), dismissed the same. Hence, the writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Controlling Authority had no jurisdiction to fix the liability on the petitioner-Bank to disburse the gratuity amount which is liable to be paid by the employer under the provisions of the Act. The Controlling Authority erroneously placed reliance on Sections 529, 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 in arriving at a decision that the dues of the workmen has to be settled by the secured creditor albeit there being no winding up proceedings pending against the employer Company. Reliance is placed on Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act to contend that the provisions of Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Learned counsel has referred to host of judgments in support of the aforesaid submissions. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents-workmen supporting the impugned order submitted that notwithstanding the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the dues of the workmen would have priority vis-à-vis the dues to the Financial Institution/Bank. The workmen’s dues must be distributed subject to pari passu charge to the extent of the workmen’s portion. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents-workmen supporting the impugned order submitted that notwithstanding the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the dues of the workmen would have priority vis-à-vis the dues to the Financial Institution/Bank. The workmen’s dues must be distributed subject to pari passu charge to the extent of the workmen’s portion. Statutory period of limitation provided under the provisions of the Act cannot be relaxed or the delay in filing the appeal before the Appellate Authority cannot be condoned by this Court either by exercising the powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or invoking the extraordinary discretionary powers under the writ jurisdiction. In support of their contentions, reliance is placed on catena of judgments. 5. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be apt to refer to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of The Assistant Executive Engineer, Cauvery Neeravari Nigam Limited and others Vs. The Deputy Labour Commissioner and Appellate Authority in W.A.No.37013702/2016 whereby the Division Bench of this Court referring to subsection (7) of Section 7 of the Act has categorically held that the provisions of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under the Act. The Cognate Bench of this Court in the case of Shri B. Basha Vs. The Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum-Appellate Authority in W.P.No. 35266/2011 (D.D.28.1.2013) placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs & Central… Vs. M/s. Hongo India (P) Limited & another (Arising out of SLP (C) No.18999/2007) has held that the High Court has no power to condone the delay, when the statute itself prescribes the limitation period, Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not be invoked to negate such a statutory limitation. 6. In the light of the aforesaid judgments and in the circumstances of the Appellate Authority rejecting the appeal on the ground of delay, adjudicating upon the merits of the case at this stage is not warranted. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the decision taken by the Appellate Authority is in consonance with law.