JUDGMENT : SHAJI P. CHALY, J. The appeal is filed by respondents 3 to 5 in the writ petition against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated 31.01.2020 in W.P.(C) No. 2843 of 2020. Respondents 1 and 2 are the petitioners therein, who are the tenants of a building complex owned by the appellants. 2. The subject issue raised by the writ petitioners is one under Section 411 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (for short 'Act, 1994) dealing with precautions in case of dangerous structures on the basis of the power conferred on the Secretary of the Municipal Corporation. 3. The learned single Judge, after hearing learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipal Corporation, has passed the following directions: “4. I am not adverting to this rival contentions as of now. However, I make it clear that building shall not be demolished pursuant to any order passed, if any, adversed to the interest of the petitioner, without waiting for a week, after serving a copy on the petitioner.” 4. The case has a chequered history. The issue started with a Public Interest Litigation filed by one P.D. Joseph as W.P.(C) No. 37864 of 2016, that many dangerous buildings are situated within the limits of Thrissur Municipal Corporation and sought for a direction to the Municipal Corporation to demolish the buildings, especially the building in question. As per judgment dated 28.11.2016, the said writ petition was disposed of observing that it is for the Thrissur Municipal Corporation to visit the building in question and initiate appropriate action, if it is really in a dilapidated and dangerous condition, in accordance with law. It was further observed that, the Court sitting in writ jurisdiction cannot visualise the state of each of the building while disposing of the writ petition, and therefore, on facts the authorities need to take a decision in the matter. Still later, pursuant to the common judgment dated 04.07.2017 in W.P.(C) Nos. 25876, 40747 & 16184 of 2016, the engineer of the Municipal Corporation, the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department (Buildings Division) along with other authorities, conducted inspection of the building during January, 2018 in the presence of the landlords and the tenants and has pointed out instability of the building remaining in dilapidated condition and the danger likely to be caused to the occupants. The Corporation Engineer and the PWD Executive Engineer have in separate reports cited that the building poses great risk to the general public, as there is no proper set back provided to the building since the same was constructed before the commencement of the Municipality Building Rules. Accordingly, an order dated 06.02.2018 was passed by the Secretary of the Municipal Corporation under Section 411 of Act, 1994. The said order was challenged before the Tribunal for the Local Self Government Institutions by the tenants of the buildings i.e., respondents 1 and 2 by filing Appeal No. 170/2018 and obtained an ex parte interim order staying demolition. However, later the appeal was dismissed as per order dated 30.10.2019. Thereupon, the Secretary of the Corporation issued a notice dated 11.08.2019 directing all the tenants to vacate the premises. However, no action was initiated thereafter, though the tenants have filed various complaints before the police, and has even approached this Court seeking direction for police protection. Anyhow, it appears that, later the tenants have withdrawn the said writ petition. Matters being so, the appellants seeking implementation of Annexure A4 notice, has filed W.P.(C) No. 26889 of 2019 before this Court and sought for a direction not to permit any person from entering into the buildings owned by the appellants. The said writ petition was disposed of as per Ext.P1 judgment dated 17.12.2019 directing the Secretary of the Corporation to hear the appellants as well as the tenants at the earliest and then decide on the further course of action with respect to the building as per the powers conferred under Section 411 of Act, 1994 and specifically adverting to the reports available on record of the Assistant Executive Engineer, PWD and that of the Assistant Professor of the Thrissur Engineering College, within two months thereafter. The tenants and the landlords were directed to be present before the Secretary of the Corporation on 30.12.2019, apart from other directions issued taking into account the reports that were available on record in respect of the buildings. In fact, in view of the stiff resistance put forth by the tenants, an inspection report was also secured by this Court from the Assistant Executive Engineer, PWD, Buildings Division, Thrissur. In fact, in view of the stiff resistance put forth by the tenants, an inspection report was also secured by this Court from the Assistant Executive Engineer, PWD, Buildings Division, Thrissur. It appears, thereafter a hearing was conducted by the Secretary after duly serving notice to the landlords and the tenants and final orders were being awaited in the said case. Anyhow, while matters were pending so, instant writ petition was filed by the tenants as a today motion, and the writ petition was disposed of on the same day without serving notice to the appellant-landlords, directing that the building in question shall not be demolished pursuant to any order passed, if any, adversed to the interest of the tenants, without waiting for a week, after serving a copy on respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It was basically challenging the said direction that the writ petition is filed by the landlords. 5. The paramount contention advanced by the appellant-landlords is that the tenants have filed the instant writ petition without disclosing the events, facts and circumstances involved in the subject issue, and in Ext.P1 judgment dated 17.12.2019, the learned single Judge has concluded the proceedings by directing to consider the issue taking into account reports of experts available before the Secretary of the Corporation. It is also pointed out that the relief granted by the learned single Judge is not one sought for by the tenants in the writ petition and is therefore per se illegal and arbitrary. That apart, it is contended that the judgment in question defeats the very purpose of Ext.P1 judgment, especially when a specific direction was issued by this Court to conclude the proceedings invoking the power conferred on the Secretary under Section 411 of Act, 1994. That apart, it is submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions in Appeal No. 170 of 2018 has become final against the tenants, since the said order was never challenged by the tenants. It is also contended that the learned single Judge has not assigned any reasons while issuing direction to the Secretary not to demolish the building till the expiry of one week period after serving notice of order on the tenants. It is also contended that the learned single Judge has not assigned any reasons while issuing direction to the Secretary not to demolish the building till the expiry of one week period after serving notice of order on the tenants. On the other hand, learned counsel for the tenants submitted that the appellants have not made out any grounds so as to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge since the directions contained therein are innocuous in nature and issued with the intention of protecting the interest of the tenants to take the matter in appeal before the appropriately constituted authority. 6. We have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, Sri. P. Ravindran, assisted by Adv. Sabari C.P, Sri. G. Sreekumar Chelur appearing for respondents 1 and 2 i.e., the tenants and Sri. Santhosh P. Poduval, Standing Counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation and perused the pleadings and documents on record. 7. Since the subject issue revolves around Section 411 of Act, 1994, it is only appropriate that the nature of power conferred on the Secretary as per the said provision is discussed. The said provision reads thus: “411. Precautions in case of dangerous structures.— (1) Where any structure is deemed by the Secretary to be in a ruinous state and dangerous to the passers-by or to the occupiers of neighbouring structures, the Secretary may by notice require the owner or occupier of such structure to fence off, take down, secure, demolish or repair the same so as to prevent any danger therefrom. (2) Where immediate action is necessary, the Secretary shall, before giving such notice or before the period of such notice expires, cause to fence off, take down, secure, demolish or repair such structures, or fence off a part of any street or take such temporary measures as he deems fit to prevent danger, and the cost thereof shall be recoverable from the owner or occupier in the manner provided in section 538. (3) Where in the opinion of the Secretary the said structure is imminently dangerous to the inmates thereof, the Secretary shall order the immediate evacuation thereof, and any person disobeying the order may cause to be removed if necessary, with the assistance by a police officer.” 8. (3) Where in the opinion of the Secretary the said structure is imminently dangerous to the inmates thereof, the Secretary shall order the immediate evacuation thereof, and any person disobeying the order may cause to be removed if necessary, with the assistance by a police officer.” 8. In our considered opinion, Section 411 of Act, 1994 confers a discretionary power on the Secretary, that if any building is in a ruinous state and dangerous to the passers-by, or to the occupiers of neighbouring structures, to issue a notice under sub-Section (1) thereunder requiring the owner of the building or occupier of such structure to fence off, take down, secure, demolish or repair the same so as to prevent any danger therefrom. However, as per sub-Section (2), if the Secretary is of the opinion that an immediate action is necessary, either before giving such notice or before the period of such notice expires, he is vested with powers to direct the owner or occupier to take action so as to protect the interest of the public at large. As per sub-Section (3), the Secretary is vested with powers to order immediate evacuation, if the said structure is imminently dangerous to the inmates thereof, and if the direction is not so complied with, he is also vested with powers to seek police assistance for evacuation. 9. On appreciation of the said provision, what we could gather is that a discretion coupled with duty and power is conferred on the Secretary of the Municipal Corporation to protect the interest of the public at large and to ensure the safety of the occupiers of the buildings. We have no doubt in our mind that the Secretary has to exercise the discretionary power so conferred under Section 411 reasonably, fairly, cogently and if possible applying the principles of natural justice. Anyhow, in the case on hand, notice was issued by the Secretary directing the owner of the building to demolish the structure, since the same was found to be in a dangerous condition to the public. Eventhough the tenants have challenged the said order before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions in the appeal specified above, it was ultimately dismissed. The said order has become final and conclusive. Eventhough the tenants have challenged the said order before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions in the appeal specified above, it was ultimately dismissed. The said order has become final and conclusive. It was thereafter that a notice dated 11.08.2019 was issued by the Secretary stating that the building is in a dilapidated condition and no person shall be allowed to enter and conduct business until further orders; but no action was initiated. It was thereupon that the landlords have approached this Court and has secured Ext.P1 judgment in W.P.(C) No. 26889 of 2019 dated 17.12.2019. On a reading of the said judgment, what we could gather is that, apart from the already available report of an expert on record, learned single Judge secured a report from the Assistant Executive Engineer of the PWD, Buildings Division, Thrissur. Yet another report was placed before the learned single Judge, drawn by the Head of the Department of Civil Engineering, Government Engineering College, Thrissur. It was taking into account the said aspects, observations and directions were made in the said judgment. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment would be relevant to the context, which read thus: “10. When I consider the afore reports on record, it is indubitable that the extent to which this Court can now go on with an investigation is extremely limited, particularly, because I am acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India whereunder, it is now well recognized that assessment and evaluation of factual factors and materials are substantially proscribed. Further, it is now too well established in law to be reinstated that this Court cannot substitute its wisdom for the wisdom of the experts and that I will have to be guided substantially by the reports available, particularly because the expert from the Thrissur Engineering College-was deputed solely as per the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the party respondents. 11. In the afore perspective, it is without doubt that the building now comes across as being in an extremely dilapidated condition and dangerous for occupation, either by the respondents 3 to 5 or their staff and customers. 11. In the afore perspective, it is without doubt that the building now comes across as being in an extremely dilapidated condition and dangerous for occupation, either by the respondents 3 to 5 or their staff and customers. This, of course, is only a prima facie view going by the reports available, and hence I am of the view that the Secretary of the Thrissur Corporation must now exercise his jurisdiction under Section 411 of the Municipality Act to take further action in terms of law. When I says this, I am full cognizance of the submissions of Sri. N.N. Sugunapalan, the learned Senior counsel and Sri. Sreekumar Chelur learned counsel, that the building has reached this situation only on account of certain actions that are attributed to the petitioners also. However, since the petitioners have refuted this in their counter pleadings, I am of the view that these are also matters that will have to considered by the Secretary, while completing the exercise that I propose hereunder. Resultantly and for the reasons above, I order this writ petition and direct the Secretary of the Thrissur Corporation to hear the petitioners and respondents 3 and 5, at the earliest and then decide on the further cause of action with respect of the building, under Section 411 of the Kerala Municipality Act, specifically adverting to the reports available on record of the 7th respondent and that of the Assistant Professor of the Thrissur Engineering College, the contents which have been substantially extracted above. The Secretary will, thereupon, complete proceedings under Section 411 of the Act, as found warranted, without any delay, but not later than two months thereafter. In order to enable the Secretary of the Corporation to comply expeditiously with the directions herein, I direct the petitioners and respondents 3 to 5, to mark appearance at his office at 11.00 a.m. on 30.12.2019; on which day, the said Authority shall hear them or fix another convenient date for hearing and then complete the proceedings within the time frame stipulated therein. Since, I am directing the Secretary to take further action on the basis of the two reports that are available before this Court, that all action under Section 411 shall be completed in terms of the afore directions based on these reports alone and not based on any of the earlier proceedings. Since, I am directing the Secretary to take further action on the basis of the two reports that are available before this Court, that all action under Section 411 shall be completed in terms of the afore directions based on these reports alone and not based on any of the earlier proceedings. After I dictated this judgment, the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation, Sri. Santhosh Pothuwal, submitted that in the interregnum should anything happened to the building, the Secretary may not be held responsible. This is recorded.” 10. The thrust of the contention advanced by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants is that the restrictions imposed by the learned single Judge in the judgment in the instant writ petition to keep the order, if adverse to the tenants, in abeyance till a week after the service of the order, is interfering with the discretionary power conferred on the Secretary in terms of Section 411 of Act, 1994. We find force in the said contention, because the power is conferred on the Secretary of the Corporation to exercise its discretion in accordance with the provisions contained thereunder. In that view of the matter, if any fetter is created in exercising the discretion on finding that the building is in a dilapidated and dangerous condition, it would be nothing short of transgressing into the power enjoyed by the Secretary of the Corporation which is not expected under law. Therefore, we find, it is only appropriate that the law developed in respect of the discretionary power is discussed to have a logical and meaningful conclusion. 11. In S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1967 SC 1427 ) at Para 14 held thus :- “14. In this context it is important to emphasize that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law.. (See Dicey-“Law of the Constitution-Tenth Edn., Introduction cx). “Law has reached its finest moments”, stated Douglas, J in United States v. Wunderlich. (1951) 342 US 98, “when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler ...Where discretion is absolute man has always suffered. It is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. Discretion as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic terms in the case of John Wilkes. (1770) 4 Burr 2528 at p.2539 “means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule not by humour it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful.” 12. In J.K. Synthetics Ltd. & others v. Central Board of Direct Taxes & Ors. (1972) 83 ITR 335 (SC), it is held as follows in Paragraph 1: “1. The Board is not competent to give directions regarding the exercise of the any judicial power by its subordinates. The opinions expressed in those communications pertain to the exercise of judicial powers by the taxing authorities, as it is for those authorities to determine as to the year in which the undertaking began to "manufacture or to produce articles" within the meaning of Section 80J of the Income tax Act, 1961. The communications sent by the Board and impugned in the Writ Petition are replies sent by the Board to the letters written by the appellant. They cannot bind the taxing authorities who have to decide the question in issue on its own merits, uninfluenced by extraneous consideration.” 13. The communications sent by the Board and impugned in the Writ Petition are replies sent by the Board to the letters written by the appellant. They cannot bind the taxing authorities who have to decide the question in issue on its own merits, uninfluenced by extraneous consideration.” 13. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress & others ( AIR 1991 SC 101 ), it was held thus in Para 276: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx If an individual action is taken as per the procedure on its own facts its legality may be tested. But it would be no justification to confer power with wide discretion on any authority without any procedure which would not meet the test of justness, fairness and reasonableness envisaged under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution. In this context it is important to emphasise that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. (See Dicey-"Law of the Constitution) xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 14. In Delhi Science Forum & others v. Union of India & another ( 1996 (2) SCC 405 ), it was held thus in Paragraph 11: “11. The new experiment has to fulfill the tests laid down by courts for exercise of a statutory discretion. It cannot be exercised in a manner which can be held to be unlawful and which is now known in administrative law as Wednesbury principle, stated Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. [1947] 2 All E.R. 680. The aforesaid principle is attracted where it is shown, that an authority exercising the discretion has taken a decision which is devoid of any plausible justification and any authority having reasonable persons could not have taken the said decision. [1947] 2 All E.R. 680. The aforesaid principle is attracted where it is shown, that an authority exercising the discretion has taken a decision which is devoid of any plausible justification and any authority having reasonable persons could not have taken the said decision. In the case of Bromley LBC (supra) it was said by Lord Diplock :- “Powers to direct or approve the general level and structure of fares to be charged by the LTE for the carriage of passengers on its transport system, although unqualified by any express words in the Act, may nonetheless be subject to implied limitations when expressed to be exercisable by a local authority such as the GLC...” As such Central Government is expected to put such conditions while granting licences, which shall safeguard the public interest and the interest of the nation. Such conditions should be commensurate with the obligations that flow while parting with the privilege which has been exclusively vested in the Central Government by the Act.” 15. In Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagadamba Oil Mills { 2002 (3) SCC 496 ; AIR 2002 SC 834 ; (2002) 110 Company Cases 20 (SC)}, it was held in Paragraph 10 thus :- “The obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi-judicial authorities are bound to observe. It is true that the distinction between a quasi-judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this Court as far back as 1970 in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India { [1970] 1 SCR 457}. Even so the extent of judicial scrutiny/judicial review in the case of quasi-judicial action. If the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi-judicial authorities, it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. In the matter of administrative action, it is well known, more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities; they have a certain amount of discretion available to them. They have "a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred". They have "a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred". (as per Lord Diplock in Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Metropolitan Borough Counsel of Tameside (1977 AC 1014)]. The Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of administrative authorities in such cases. Only when the action of the administrative authority is so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, can the Court intervene. To quote the classic passage from the judgment of Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 1947 (2) ALL ER 680: "It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with the discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority." 16. In National Insurance Company Ltd v. Keshav Bahadur and Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 370 , it was held as follows in Paragraphs 9 to 12: “9. Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and proper. It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which enables a person to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with caution; nice discernment, and judgment directed by circumspection; deliberate judgment; soundness of judgment; a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadow and substance, between equity and colorable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to the will and private affections of persons. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 10. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 10. The word "discretion" standing single and unsupported by circumstances signifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as distinguished from folly, unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a discretion cannot be arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking. The word in itself implies vigilant circumspection and care; therefore where the legislature concedes discretion it also imposes a heavy responsibility. "The discretion of a Judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown. It is different in different men. It is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper, passion. In the best it is oftentimes caprice; in the worst it is every vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is liable," said Lord Cmaden, L.C.J., in Hindson and Kersey (1680) 8 St.Tr 57. 11. If a certain latitude or liberty is accorded by statute or rules to a judge as distinguished from a ministerial or administrative official, in adjudicating on matters brought before him, it is judicial discretion. It limits and regulates the exercise of the discretion, and prevents it from being wholly absolute, capricious, or exempt from review. 12. Such discretion is usually given on matters of procedure or punishment, or costs of administration rather than with reference to vested substantive rights. The matters which should regulate the exercise of discretion have been stated by eminent judges in somewhat different forms of words but with substantial identity. When a statute gives a judge a discretion, what is meant is a judicial discretion, regulated according to the known rules of law, and not the mere whim or caprice of the person to whom it is given on the assumption that he is discreet (Per Willes J. in Lee v. Budge Railway Co. (1871) LR 6 CP 576 and Morgan v. Morgan 1862 LR 1 P & M 644” 17. In Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield and others (1891) A.C. 173, it is held thus :- “An extensive power is confided to the justices in their capacity as justices to be exercised judicially; and “discretion” means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion: Rooke's Case; according to law, and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. It is to be not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself.” 18. In Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union and Others {[1971] 2 Q.B. 175} the Court of Appeal held thus :- “Take first statutory bodies. It is now well settled that a statutory body, which is entrusted by statute with a discretion, must act fairly. It does not matter whether its functions are described as judicial or quasi judicial on one hand, or as administrative on the other hand, or what you will. Still it must act fairly. It must, in a proper case, give a party a chance to be heard: see In re H.K. (An Infant) [1967] 2 Q.B. 617, 630 by Lord Parker C.J. in relation to immigration officers; and Reg. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, Ex Parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 Q.B. 417, 430 by us in relation to the gaming board. The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means at least this: the statutory body must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant. If its decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith; nevertheless the decision will beset aside. That is established by Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] A.C. 997 which is a landmark in modern administrative law. Does all this apply to a domestiuc body? I think it does, at any rate when it is a body set up by one of the powerful associations which we see nowadays. Instances are readily to be found in books, notably the Stock Exchange, the Jockey Club, the Football Association, and inumerable trade unions. All these delegate power to committees. These committees are domestic bodies which control the destinies of thousands. They have quite as much power as the statutory bodies of which I have been speaking. They can make or mar a man by their decisions. All these delegate power to committees. These committees are domestic bodies which control the destinies of thousands. They have quite as much power as the statutory bodies of which I have been speaking. They can make or mar a man by their decisions. Not only by expelling him from membership, but also by refusing to admit him as a member: or, it may be, by a refusal to grant license or to give their approval. Often their rules are framed so as to give them a discretion. They then claim it as an “unfettered” discretion with which the courts have no right to interfere. They go too far. They claim too much. The minister made the same claim in the padfield case, and was roundly rebuked by the House of Lords for his impudence. So should we treat this claim by trade unions. They are not above the law, but subject to it. Their rules are said to be a contract between the members and the union. So be it. If they are a contract, then it is an implied term that the discretion should be exercised fairly. But the rules are in reality more than a contract. They are a legislative code laid down by Parliament itself. If the rules set up a domestic body and give it a discretion, it is to be implied that that body must exercise its discretion fairly. Even though its functions are not judicial or quasi judicial, but only administrative, still it must act fairly. Should it not do so, the courts can review its decision, just as it can review the decision of a statutory body.” 19. Therefore, bearing in mind the facts and circumstances involved in the case and the legal principles laid down by the Apex Court and other judgments discussed above, we are of the view that the authority, who is conferred with the power to exercise discretion, must exercise it legally, fairly, cogently, reasonably and without arbitrariness. It is also to be exercised judicially. As pointed out above, on a clear evaluation of the provisions of Section 411 of Act, 1994, we have no hesitation to hold that even though the discretion conferred under Section 411 of Act, 1994 is not without limitations, definitely the Secretary is vested with powers to exercise the discretion in accordance with law and tempered with legal principles specified above. Therefore, it is for the Secretary to decide after passing the order as directed in the judgment in question, the manner in which the discretion is to be exercised, so far as the building is concerned. Cogitating so, we are of the view, it was not proper on the part of the learned single Judge to direct the Secretary, not to demolish the building till the expiry of the period of one week after the service of the order on the tenants. This we say because the Secretary, who is exercising the power under Section 411 of Act, 1994 taking into account the reports of the experts available on record, alone can identify the situation and the condition of the building, and therefore, creating fetter to exercise the discretion would be unwanted interference with the power conferred on the Secretary, which is expected to be taken bearing in mind the said legal principles discussed above. The upshot of the above discussion is, writ appeal is partly allowed and the direction contained in the judgment that the building shall not be demolished pursuant to any order passed, if any, adverse to the interest of the respondents 1 and 2 without waiting for a week after serving a copy on them, would stand vacated.