ORDER : 1. Regard being had to the similitude of the question involved, on the joint request of the parties, the matters are analogously heard and decided by this common order. The facts are taken from W.P. No.15334/2011. 2. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, takes exception to the order dated 31.03.2011, passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court Bhopal-I in case No.29/99/ID-Ref., on a reference of Industrial dispute for adjudication as to whether the action of respondent College in terminating the service of petitioner w.e.f. 30.04.1996 is without justification and illegal? If yes, what relief the workman would be entitled for? The Labour Court while holding the retrenchment illegal for non-compliance of Section 25-F of the ID Act, 1947 has granted compensation of Rs.15,000/-. 3. The petitioners/workmen in aforesaid petitions are aggrieved by the award to the extent that instead of reinstatement, the Labour Court has granted compensation. 4. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the present petition (W.P. No. 15334/2011) are that petitioner/workman was engaged as daily wager in Horticulture Department of the respondent/College on 03.01.1991. It is his case that he worked continuously till 30.04.1996. His service was however, illegally terminated without payment of retrenchment compensation. He claimed that as he has worked for continuous 5 years, he is entitled for reinstatement with back-wages. 5. In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No.1, it was pleaded that the petitioner/workman was a daily wager and engaged through contractor as per the availability of work. He was not engaged against any vacant post nor any appointment letter was ever issued in his favour. It was contended that the petitioner was not terminated rather he himself has left the service and started working somewhere else, therefore, not entitled for regularization or retrenchment compensation. 6. The Labour Court after consideration of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence produced by them, passed an award of Rs.15,000/-. The Labour Court held that the petitioner has worked for 240 days in a year preceding the termination of his service, he was not given any notice or retrenchment compensation. Thus the mandatory pre-condition of retrenchment in paying dues in accordance with Section 25-I of the I.D. Act has not been complied with, rendering the termination as illegal. It is pertinent to mention that the finding has attained finality as not challenged by respondent-College. 7. Thus the mandatory pre-condition of retrenchment in paying dues in accordance with Section 25-I of the I.D. Act has not been complied with, rendering the termination as illegal. It is pertinent to mention that the finding has attained finality as not challenged by respondent-College. 7. However, considering that the petitioner was daily wage employee and was appointed contrary to the recruitment rules and regulations, was not found entitled to reinstatement and relying on the decisions of State of M.P. and others Vs. Arjun Lal Rajak 2006 Second C.L.R. 1063= 2006(2) JLJ 24 Nagar Palika (Municipal Corporation) Vs. State of UP and others, 2006(10) FLR 1092 and Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Mamani, 2006 Second CLR 1047= 2006(109) FLR 1000 SC awarded a compensation of Rs. 15,000/-in place of reinstatement. 8. The issue whether, when the termination is held illegal, what relief the workman would be entitled for came up for consideration before the Apex Court in (2016) 16 SCC 610 State of Madhya Pradesh and another Vs. Vinod Kumar Tiwari, the Apex Court taking note of its earlier decision in Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board (2009) 15 SCC 327 has held that reinstatement is not automatic upon a finding that retrenchment is in violation of Section 25-F of the ID Act. 9. Further in the case of (2014) 7 SCC 190 Harinandan Prasad and another Vs. Employer I/R to Management of Food Corporation of India and another has held :- “19. The following passage from the said judgment would reflect the earlier decisions of this Court on the question of reinstatement: “29 The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two judgments wherein this Court granted compensation instead of reinstatement. In the case of BSNL vs. Man Singh (2012) 1 SCC 558 , this Court has held that when the termination is set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not necessary that relief of reinstatement be also given as a matter of right. In the case of Incharge Officer & Anr. vs. Shankar Shetty (2010) 9 SCC 126 , it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily wage basis, and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2-3 years and where the termination had taken place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement. vs. Shankar Shetty (2010) 9 SCC 126 , it was held that those cases where the workman had worked on daily wage basis, and worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2-3 years and where the termination had taken place many years ago, the recent trend was to grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement. 30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty, this trend was reiterated by referring to various judgments, as is clear from the following discussion. “2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement of a daily wager has been brought to end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the ID Act”)? The course of the decisions of this Court in recent years has been uniform on the above question. 3. In Jagbir Singh vs. Haryana State Agriculture Mktd. Board (2009) 15 SCC 327 delivering the judgment of this Court, one of us (R.M.Lodha,J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court, namely, U.P.State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Uday Narain Pandey (2006) 1 SCC 479 , Uttaranchal Forest Department Corpn. Vs. M.C.Joshi (2007) 9 SCC 353 , State of M.P. vs. Lalit Kumar Verma (2007) 1 SCC 575, M.P.Admn. vs. Tribhuban (2007) 9 SCC 748 , Sita Ram vs. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (2008) 5 SCC 75 , Jaipur Development Authority vs. Ramsahai (2006) 11 SCC 684 , GDA vs. Ashok Kumar (2008) 4 SCC 261 and Mahboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula (2008) 1 SCC 575 and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp.330 & 335 paras 7 & 14). “7.It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decision reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. 14. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. 14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. Jagbir Singh has been applied very recently in Telegraph Deptt. Vs. Santosh Kumar Seal (2010) 6 SCC 773 , wherein this Court stated: (SCC p.777, para 11) In view of the aforesaid legal position and the fact that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers about 25 years back and they worked hardly for 2 or 3 years, relief of reinstatement and back wages to them cannot be said to be justified and instead monetary compensation would sub-serve the ends of justice. 20. Taking note of the judgments referred to in the aforesaid paragraphs and also few more cases in other portion of the said judgment, the legal position was summed up in the following manner: “33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or malafide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of procedural defect, namely in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. 34. The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. 34. The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularization (See: State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (2006) 4 SCC 1 ). Thus when he cannot claim regularization and he has no right to continue even as a daily wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. 35. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him wee regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied”. 21. We make it clear that reference to Uma Devi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, appellant No.1 would not be entitled to reinstatement. 21. We make it clear that reference to Uma Devi, in the aforesaid discussion is in a situation where the dispute referred pertained to termination alone. Going by the principles carved out above, had it been a case where the issue is limited only to the validity of termination, appellant No.1 would not be entitled to reinstatement. This could be the position in respect of appellant No.2 as well. Though the factual matrix in his case is slightly different, that by itself would not have made much of a difference. However, the matter does not end here. In the present case, the reference of dispute to the CGIT was not limited to the validity of termination. The terms of reference also contained the claim made by the appellants for their regularization of service. 10. In the present case, the petitioner/workman in his cross-examination has admitted that he worked in the respondent-college as daily wager through the contractor and was on muster roll. He further admitted that after his termination, he was gainfully employed with another employer and was receiving wages from him. 11. The issue regarding power of the High Court for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been considered by the Apex Court in (2014) 11 SCC 85 Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs M/S Hindalco Industries Ltd., considering the case of Devindar Singh Vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur (2011) 6 SCC 584 held thus :- “20 Further, in the case of Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanaur[3], it was held that : “20. ……A careful analysis thereof reveals that the High Court neither found any jurisdictional infirmity in the award of the Labour Court nor it came to the conclusion that the same was vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Notwithstanding this, the High Court set aside the direction given by the Labour Court for reinstatement of the Appellant by assuming that his initial appointment/engagement was contrary to law and that it would not be in public interest to approve the award of reinstatement after long lapse of time. Notwithstanding this, the High Court set aside the direction given by the Labour Court for reinstatement of the Appellant by assuming that his initial appointment/engagement was contrary to law and that it would not be in public interest to approve the award of reinstatement after long lapse of time. In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court in dealing with the award of the Labour Court was ex facie erroneous and contrary to the law laid down in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan AIR (1964) SC 477, Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 2 SCC 868 P.G.I. of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh v. Raj Kumar (2001) 2 SCC 54 , Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 and Shalini Shyam v. Rajendra Shankar Path (2010) 8 SCC 329 . 21. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (supra), this Court identified the limitations of certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the following words: “7.....The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. 22. “In the second judgment -Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), this Court reiterated the limitations of certiorari jurisdiction indicated in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan (supra) and observed: “13..In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 22. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an Order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court shall interfere with factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or have made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer the point No. 1 in favour of the appellant. 12. Hence, in view of the aforesaid legal position and the admitted factual position that the petitioners were not only engaged as daily wagers but post termination also, they were gainfully employed, no interference is required in the impugned order. 13. Consequently, petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. 14. A photocopy of this order be also placed in the records of aforesaid connected writ petitions.