ORDER : 1. This petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 seeking to quash the charge-sheet No. 2/2015 and the entire proceedings in Special C.C. No. 490/2015 pending on the file of XXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Bengaluru City. 2. The main contention urged by Sri Murthy D. Naik, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the proceedings conducted by Trial Court suffer from serious illegality, inasmuch as the order of cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate indicate total non-application of mind and solely on that ground impugned order is liable to be quashed. 3. The second contention urged by the learned Counsel for petitioner is that the allegations levelled in the charge-sheet are directed against the Firm. Charge-sheet material does not disclose the active role of the petitioner except that he was representing the Company as the Managing Partner. Under the circumstance, prosecution of petitioner without making the Firm as accused is legally untenable and is liable to be quashed. 4. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the following citations: 1. R. Kalyani vs. Janak C. Mehta and Others, (2009) 2 SLT 157 : (2009) 1 SCC 516 2. K. Sitaram and Another vs. CFL Capital Financial Service Limited and Another, AIR 2017 SC 1560 : 2017 (174) AIC 152 (SC) : 2017 ACR 413 : 2017 (1) CRIMINAL 521 (SC) : (2017) 3 SLT 217 : 2017 (3) SCJ 521 : (2017) 11 CCR 49 (SC) 3. Sharad Kumar Sanghi vs. Sangita Rane, 2015 (149) AIC 134 (SC) : (2015) 5 SLT 441 : (2015) 12 SCC 781 4. Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited, AIR 2012 SC 2795 : 2012 Cri. L.J. 2525 (SC) : 2012 (114) AIC 172 (SC) : (2012) 3 SLT 417 : 2012 (5) SCJ 544 : 2012 (172) Comp. Cas. 75 (SC) : (2012) 5 SCC 661 5. Rajesh Adani and Another vs. Assistant Labour Commissioner and Another, 2010 : ILR 2010 Kar. 3287 6. Standard Chartered Bank and Others vs. Directorate of Enforcement and Others, AIR 2005 SC 2622 : (2005) 275 ITR 81 (SC) : 2005 (31) AIC 375 (SC) : 2005 Cri. Cas. 75 (SC) : (2012) 5 SCC 661 5. Rajesh Adani and Another vs. Assistant Labour Commissioner and Another, 2010 : ILR 2010 Kar. 3287 6. Standard Chartered Bank and Others vs. Directorate of Enforcement and Others, AIR 2005 SC 2622 : (2005) 275 ITR 81 (SC) : 2005 (31) AIC 375 (SC) : 2005 Cri. L.J. 4917 (SC): (2005) 4 SLT 387 : 2005 (4) SCJ 645 : (2005) 4 SCC 530 7. Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2015 SC 923 : 2015 Cri. L.J. 1130 (SC): 2016 (1) CRIMINAL 40 (SC) : (2015) 1 SLT 263 : 2015 (1) SCJ 324 : 2015 SCLT 14 (Online) : 2015 (1) CRIMINAL 301 (SC) : (2015) 4 SCC 609 8. Constitution Bench, Sarah Mathew vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its Director Dr. K.M. Cherian and Others, AIR 2014 SC 448 : 2014 Cri. L.J. 586 (SC) : (2013) 9 SLT 587 : 2013 (8) SCJ 849 : (2014) 2 SCC 62 9. Mehmood Ul Rehman vs. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and Others, AIR 2015 SC 2195 : 2015 Cri. L.J. 2856 (SC) : (2015) 6 SLT 550 : (2015) 12 SCC 420 10. Sanjaysingh Ramarao Chavan vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke and Others, 2015 Cri. L.J. 1259 (SC) : 2015 (148) AIC 204 (SC) : (2015) 1 SLT 436 : 2015 (2) SCJ 253 : 2015 SCLT 37 (Online) : (2015) 3 SCC 123 11. State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Sanjay, 2014 (143) AIC 200 (SC) : AIR 2015 SC 75 : (2014) 7 SLT 531 : 2014 (10) SCJ 101 : (2014) 9 SCC 772 12. Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, 2013 Cri. L.J. 2313 (SC) : 2013 (126) AIC 97 (SC) : (2013) 4 SLT 555 : 2013 (3) SCJ 595 : (2013) 6 SCC 348 13. T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala and Others, AIR 2001 SC 2637 : 2001 Cri. L.J. 3329 (SC) : (2001) 5 SLT 211 : (2001) SCC (Cri.) 1048 14. Thermax Limited and Others vs. K.M. Johny and Others, (2011) 9 SLT 34 : (2011) 13 SCC 412 15. Goa Foundation vs. Union of India and Others, (2015) 5 SLT 108, (2014) 6 SCC 590 16. Virendra Giri vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 2008 All. 75 17. Thermax Limited and Others vs. K.M. Johny and Others, (2011) 9 SLT 34 : (2011) 13 SCC 412 15. Goa Foundation vs. Union of India and Others, (2015) 5 SLT 108, (2014) 6 SCC 590 16. Virendra Giri vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 2008 All. 75 17. State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, AIR 2005 SC 359 : 2005 (25) AIC 90 (SC) : (2004) 7 SLT 339 : 2005 (1) SCJ 222 : 2004 (8) ACE/SCJ 583 : (2005) 1 SCC 568 18. Pepsi Foods Limited and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, AIR 1998 SC 128 : 1998 Cri. L.J. 1 (SC) : (1998) 5 SCC 749 19. Keki Hormusji Gharda and Others vs. Mehervan Rustom Irani and Another, AIR 2009 SC 2594 : 2009 (78) AIC 108 (SC): 2009 Cri. L.J. 3733 (SC) : 2009 (150) Comp. Cas. 70 (SC): (2009) 4 SCJ 579 : 2009 AIR SCW 4513 : (2009) 6 SCC 475 20. Popular Muthiah vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2006 (44) AIC 718 (SC) : (2006) 5 SLT 282 : 2006 (8) SCJ 279 : (2006) 7 SCC 296 21. G. Sagar Suri and Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 2000 SC 754 : 2000 Cri. L.J. 824 (SC) : 2000 SCC (Cri.) 513 22. Securities and Exchange Board of India vs. Gaurav Varshney and Another, (2016) 5 SLT 136 : 2016 (8) SCJ 521 : (2016) 3 CCR 248 (SC) : 2016 (2) CRIMINAL 287 (SC) : 2016 (3) Crimes 240 (SC) : 2016 SCLT 1007 (Online) : (2016) 14 SCC 430 5. In addition to the above, learned Counsel for petitioner has also raised certain subsidiary contentions which may not be relevant for the purpose of the petition as the fate of the case depends upon the aforesaid two contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 6. Sri Venkatesh S. Arabatti, learned Counsel for the respondent by placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Cri. P. No. 7847/2018 would submit that the identical contentions urged by the petitioner are already heard and decided by the Coordinate Bench of this Court and therefore, there is no merit in the contention urged by the learned Counsel for petitioner. P. No. 7847/2018 would submit that the identical contentions urged by the petitioner are already heard and decided by the Coordinate Bench of this Court and therefore, there is no merit in the contention urged by the learned Counsel for petitioner. Further he would submit that the allegations in the charge-sheet are directed against the petitioner in his capacity as Managing Partner of the Firm M/s. Zeenath Transport Company and therefore, there is no illegality in the charge-sheet filed by the respondents. Further he would submit that allegations made in the complaint indicate that all the affairs of the Firm were conducted by the petitioner and he was the face and mind of the Firm and therefore, by application of Section 23 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 he alone could be proceeded and it is for the petitioner to demonstrate at trial that the alleged offences were not within his knowledge and that he was not responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Firm when the alleged offences were committed. Regarding the alleged illegalities highlighted by the learned Counsel for petitioner in the matter of taking cognizance, the learned Special Public Prosecutor would contend that the entire proceedings are not required to be quashed instead, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bharati Mittal's case the matter may at the most call for remand requiring the Trial Court to apply its mind to the facts of the case and thereafter to proceed in accordance with law. 7. Considered the submissions and perused the records. 8. A reading of the charge-sheet would indicate that the material allegations are levelled only against the Firm by name M/s. Zeenath Transport Company. According to the prosecution, the said Firm is registered under the provisions of the Partnership Act and it consisted of four partners. Petitioner herein is described as Managing Parmer of the afore said Firm. The material allegations constituting the above offence find place in Column 17 of the charge-sheet, which read as under. 9. As could be seen from the above narration, in Column 17 of the charge-sheet the accused is referred as "accused Firm" meaning thereby that the person sought to be prosecuted is the Firm namely M/s. Zeenath Transport Company, represented by the petitioner herein as its Managing Partner. 9. As could be seen from the above narration, in Column 17 of the charge-sheet the accused is referred as "accused Firm" meaning thereby that the person sought to be prosecuted is the Firm namely M/s. Zeenath Transport Company, represented by the petitioner herein as its Managing Partner. But in the array of accused, the accused is described as Sri Syed Ahmed, S/o. late S.A. Tavab, Managing Partner, aged 59 years, M/s. Zeenath Transport Company, Zeenath House, Kowli Bazar, Bellary. Apparently for this reason, the petitioner has taken up a plea that without making the Firm a party, he has been prosecuted in his personal capacity. But as stated above the accused in the charge-sheet is the Firm. 10. Every paragraph in Column 17 starts with the expression "accused Firm" and the details of the transactions entered into by the said Firm are mentioned in detail, making it evident that the allegations in the charge-sheet are directed only against the Firm and not against the petitioner in his individual capacity. Nowhere in the charge-sheet any reference has been made to the petitioner in his personal capacity. No specific act is attributed to the Managing Partner or other Partners allegedly in control and management of the Firm to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the Firm. Therefore, there is no scope at all for the petitioner to contend that he is prosecuted in his personal capacity. On the other hand, the facts narrated above would clearly go to show that it is a case of misdescription of the accused. Since the averments made in the charge-sheet and the documents/materials placed along with the charge-sheet disclose the commission of the offence by the Firm, the alleged misdescription could always be rectified by making appropriate prayer to the Trial Court. Therefore, the argument of learned Counsel for petitioner that the petitioner has been prosecuted in his capacity as the Managing Partner of the Firm without arraying the Firm as an accused is misconceived and is factually incorrect. Since the Firm itself is sought to be prosecuted, the principle laid down in Sunil Bharti Mittal and various other decisions cited on the principle of vicarious liability do not get attracted to the facts of this case. Since the Firm itself is sought to be prosecuted, the principle laid down in Sunil Bharti Mittal and various other decisions cited on the principle of vicarious liability do not get attracted to the facts of this case. On the other hand, the Firm itself being the offender, vicarious liability could be imputed to the petitioner by virtue of the statutory provision contained in Section 23 of the MMDR Act which provides that when an offence is committed by a Company, every person, who at the time the offence was committed was in-charge of, and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Therefore, the first contention urged by learned Counsel for petitioner in this regard is liable to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. 11. Validity of Order of Cognizance and Summons: Coming to the order of taking cognizance by the magistrate is concerned, the said order reads as under: "Perused the final report. Cognizance is taken against A1. Register the case and issue summons to A1 and returnable by 24-11-2015." 12. As rightly submitted by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner-accused that this order does not specify the offences in respect of which cognizance has been taken by the Special Court. It is also not forthcoming in this order as to whether cognizance has been taken in respect of the offences under Indian Penal Code, 1860 or under the provisions of MMDR Act. Nonetheless, it is submitted at the Bar that the summons issued to the accused contained the details of the offences for which the summon was issued. Records also indicate that on appearing before the learned Special Judge, the petitioner moved for bail based on the offences mentioned in the summons. Therefore, it is clear that right from the inception, the petitioner was aware of the offences for which summons was issued to him. It is in this background, the objection raised by the petitioner-accused questioning the correctness and legality of the order of cognizance and the consequent summoning order issued by the Special Court requires to be considered. 13. What is taking cognizance is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It is in this background, the objection raised by the petitioner-accused questioning the correctness and legality of the order of cognizance and the consequent summoning order issued by the Special Court requires to be considered. 13. What is taking cognizance is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. But, it is now well-settled that any Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence must apply his mind to the facts of the case for the purpose of proceedings in a particular way. In R.R. Chari vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1951 SCR 312 : 1952 Cri. L.J. 775 (SC) : AIR 1951 SC 207 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court relying on the dicta on Gopal Marwari and Others vs. Emperor, AIR 1943 Pat. 245, has observed that, "the word 'cognizance' was used in the Code to indicate the point when the Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is a different thing from the initiation of proceedings". Section 209 of the Code also provides for taking cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate while committing the case to the Sessions Court for trial but, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate under Section 209 is quite different from the cognizance taken by the Magistrate under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code or the cognizance taken by the Sessions Court before commencing the trial after committal. In the instant case, undisputedly, the learned Special Judge has proceeded to take cognizance of the alleged offences after the submission of the final report by SIT. 14. The reading of the cognizance orders passed by the learned Special Judge clearly indicate that on perusal of the charge-sheet submitted by the SIT learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the alleged offences purportedly under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and has proceeded to issue summons to the petitioner-accused, as such, there cannot be any difficulty in holding that by considering the facts of the case as borne on the final report, the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of IPC offences as well as the offences under the provisions of Forest Rules and MMDR Act. 15. 15. It is trite law that while taking cognizance and issuing summons in respect of IPC offences, based on the report under Section 173 of the Code, law does not require the Magistrate to pass elaborate order recording reasons for issuance of summons; though the order must reflect that he has considered the final report and satisfied himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused named in the final report. 16. In Bhushan Kumar vs. State of (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2012 SC 1747 : 2012 Cri. L.J. 2286 (SC): 2012 (113) AIC 116 (SC) : (2012) 3 SLT 221 : 2012 (6) SCJ 382 : (2012) 5 SCC 424 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the requirement of application of mind in the process of taking cognizance and following the decision in Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Limited, AIR 2008 SC 1213 : 2008 (2) SCR 36 : 2008 (64) AIC 150 (SC) : 2008 Cri. L.J. 1636 (SC) : (2008) 2 SLT 15 : 2008 (4) SCJ 1037 : (2008) 2 SCC 492 , has held that in the process thus issued, the Magistrate need not explicitly state the reasons. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the decision in Chief Enforcement Officer, read as under: "12. A "summons" is a process issued by a Court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in Court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the Court on the given date and time. Wilful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. It is a ground for contempt of Court. 13. Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. It is a ground for contempt of Court. 13. Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a prerequisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued." 17. In the backdrop of the above principle, if the order of cognizance and the summons issued by the learned Magistrate in the instant case is analysed, it is clear from the above order that on consideration of the final report submitted by SIT, the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the alleged offences and has issued summons to the petitioner. Therefore, there can be no difficulty in upholding the validity of the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge and the summons issued to the petitioner insofar as the IPC and Forest offences are concerned. 18. However, in respect of the offences under the provisions of MMDR Act are concerned, Section 22 of the Act creates a restriction on the Courts in taking cognizance of the offences under the Act. The section reads as under: "22. Cognizance of offences.-No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or any rules made thereunder except upon complaint in writing made by a person authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the State Government." 19. Learned Counsel for the petitioner-accused has placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772 , in paragraph 70, wherein it is held as under: "70. There cannot be any dispute with regard to restrictions imposed under the MMDR Act and remedy provided therein. In any case, where there is a mining activity by any person in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 and other sections of the Act, the officer empowered and authorised under the Act shall exercise all the powers including making a complaint before the jurisdictional Magistrate. In any case, where there is a mining activity by any person in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 and other sections of the Act, the officer empowered and authorised under the Act shall exercise all the powers including making a complaint before the jurisdictional Magistrate. It is also not in dispute that the Magistrate shall in such cases take cognizance on the basis of the complaint filed before it by a duly Authorised Officer. In case of breach and violation of Section 4 and other provisions of the Act, the police officer cannot insist Magistrate for taking cognizance under the Act on the basis of the record submitted by the police alleging contravention of the said Act. In other words, the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the Act against prosecution of a person except on a complaint made by the officer is attracted only when such person sought to be prosecuted for contravention of Section 4 of the Act and not for any act or omission which constitute an offence under the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied) 20. What emerges from the above decision is that based on the final report filed under Section 173 of the Code, the Special Court cannot take cognizance of the offences under the provisions of the MMDR Act. Apparently, to get over this restriction, the respondent appears to have filed a complaint in the proceedings before the Special Court in terms of Section 22 of the MMDR Act. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent has made available copy of the complaint filed by the authorised officer before the learned Special Judge which contain the very same allegations as found in the charge-sheet submitted by SIT. This complaint therefore could be taken as due compliance of the statutory requirement prescribed in Section 22 of the MMDR Act. But the question still remains to be considered is, whether by mere filing the complaint, can it be said that the Special Court has taken cognizance of the offence based on the said complaint as mandated in Section 22 of the MMDR Act? 21. But the question still remains to be considered is, whether by mere filing the complaint, can it be said that the Special Court has taken cognizance of the offence based on the said complaint as mandated in Section 22 of the MMDR Act? 21. Though it is Vehemently argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-accused that such exercise has not been done by the Special Court as the impugned order of cognizance does not reflect that the learned Special Judge has looked into the averments made in the complaint yet, what is significant to be noted is that the allegations made in this complaint as well as the facts constituting the offences alleged against the petitioner-accused in the final report filed by the SIT are one and the same. Under the said circumstance, if the learned Special Judge has looked into the allegations made in the final report filed by the SIT and on satisfying himself that these allegations prima facie disclose the commission of offences by the petitioner-accused under IPC as well as under the MMDR Act, it could possibly be held that the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the offences in terms of Section 22 of MMDR Act. 22. In drawing the above conclusion, I am fortified by the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Fakhruddin Ahmad vs. State of Uttaranchal and Another, 2008 Cri. L.J. 4377 (SC) : (2008) 8 SLT 362 : (2008) 17 SCC 157 , wherein it is observed that "whether Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of offence will depend upon circumstances of the particular case, including mode in which case is sought to be instituted and the nature of preliminary action". No doubt, even in the said case it is held that "before a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence, it is imperative that he must have taken notice of accusations and applied his mind to allegations made in complaint or in police report or information received from a source other than a police report, as the case may be, and material filed therewith. It is only when the Magistrate applies his mind and is satisfied that allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence and decides to initiate proceedings against the alleged offenders, that it can be positively stated that he has taken cognizance of the offence." 23. It is only when the Magistrate applies his mind and is satisfied that allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence and decides to initiate proceedings against the alleged offenders, that it can be positively stated that he has taken cognizance of the offence." 23. Similar view is taken in Mehmood Ul Rehman vs. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and Others, (2015) 12 SCC 420 , wherein it is held that "though no formal or speaking or reasoned orders are required at the stage of Section 190/204 of Cr. P.C., there must be sufficient indication in the order that the Magistrate is satisfied that: (i) the facts alleged in the complaint constitute an offence; and (ii) these facts when considered along with the statements recorded under Section 200 of Cr. P.C. and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under Section 202 of Cr. P.C., if any, prima facie make the accused answerable before the Criminal Court". 24. As the impugned order and the records of the proceedings disclose that the learned Special Judge has considered the material placed before him namely, the charge-sheet which contain identical allegations as found in the complaint filed by the authorised officer under Section 22 of the Act, I hold the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge and the summons issued by him in respect of MMDR offences is in accordance with Section 22 of MMDR Act. 25. Viewed from another angle, on filing a complaint either under Section 200 Cr. P.C. or under Section 22 of MMDR Act, the course open for the Court/Magistrate was either to take cognizance based on the facts alleged in the complaint or to refer the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C. or to postpone the process and hold an enquiry in terms of Section 202 of Cr. P.C. In the instant case, detailed investigation into the alleged offences having already been undertaken by SIT pursuant to the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and necessary evidence having been collected in respect of the alleged offences, the Special Court could not have ordered a parallel investigation nor could it have rejected the final report. It is not the case of the petitioner that the report submitted by the SIT is without authority of law. It is not the case of the petitioner that the report submitted by the SIT is without authority of law. Even otherwise, investigating of the offences is within the domain of the police and the power of the Police Officer to investigate into cognizable offence is not ordinarily impinged by any fetters. There is no provision under the MMDR Act that the Appropriate Authority alone shall investigate any complaint of breach of any of the provisions of the MMDR Act. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanwar Pal Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (Cri. Appeal No. 1920/2019, arising out of SLP (Cri.) No. 10707/2019, dated December 18, 2019), "the violation of Section 4 being cognizable offence, the police could always investigated the same, there being no bar under the MMDR Act". Therefore, it follows that when the police have the power to investigate the contraventions of Section 4 of the Act, they have also the power to submit the final report. Therefore, no illegality could be attached to the final report and the evidence collected by the Police Officers in proof of the offences investigated by them under the Act. This report, therefore, cannot be excluded from consideration while taking cognizance of the offence under the Act, provided a complaint as required under Section 22 is filed by the Authorised Officer. If the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted, despite there being a report on investigation, the Court has to either order for fresh investigation or hold an enquiry under Section 202 of Cr. P.C., which would tantamount to nullifying the investigation ordered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Government of Karnataka, which in the circumstances of the case cannot be permitted. It is a cardinal principle of law that every law is designed to further the ends of justice and shall not be frustrated on mere technicalities. When the law authorises the police-SIT to investigate the offences including the offences under the MMDR Act, the said report cannot be excluded from consideration at the stage of cognizance or issuance of summons to the accused subject to the compliance of the requirements of Section 22 of the Act. 26. When the law authorises the police-SIT to investigate the offences including the offences under the MMDR Act, the said report cannot be excluded from consideration at the stage of cognizance or issuance of summons to the accused subject to the compliance of the requirements of Section 22 of the Act. 26. In the light of these principles and for the reasons discussed above, and especially keeping in mind the peculiarities of the present case and the special circumstances arising on account of the investigation report submitted by SIT, in my view, the course adopted by the learned Special Judge in considering the final report for issuing process to the petitioner cannot be faulted with. Likewise, as held in the above decisions, non-recording the reasons by the Special Court while issuing summons to the petitioner also cannot be a reason to set aside the orders of cognizance and the summons issued to the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case, even if there is an error or omission on the part of the learned Special Judge, it is not something so vital as to cut at the root of jurisdiction so as to render the impugned orders illegal or without jurisdiction so as to quash the entire proceedings as sought for by the petitioner. Since the petitioner was notified of the offences at the earliest point of time before his appearance, there is substantial compliance of the "outward forms of the law" as held by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Willie (William) Slaney vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1955 (2) SCR 1140 : 1956 Cri. L.J. 291 (SC) : AIR 1956 SC 116 . 27. As a result, I hold that the impugned order of cognizance and the consequent order of summons issued by the learned Special Judge do not suffer from any error or illegality vitiating the proceedings pending against the petitioner. 28. The allegations made in the complaint which are duly supported by the material collected by SIT during investigation undoubtedly make out the ingredients of the offences under Sections 409 and 420 of IPC and Sections 21 read with 4(1-A) of MMDR Act, 1957. In the course of the arguments, the learned Special Public Prosecutor has referred to the relevant documents which prima facie disclose the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offences. In the course of the arguments, the learned Special Public Prosecutor has referred to the relevant documents which prima facie disclose the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offences. Under the said circumstances, the criminal action having been rightly initiated against the petitioner, I do not find any justifiable ground to interfere in the impugned proceedings. Accordingly, rejecting the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the writ petition is dismissed. 29. In view of dismissal of main petition, all pending I.As, if any, are also dismissed. 30. At this juncture the learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks leave of the Court to reserve the right of the petitioner to urge appropriate contentions before the Trial Court at the stage of hearing before charge. 31. Such a right is available to the petitioner under law and the same is not taken away by this order. The Trial Court shall hear the petitioner and consider the grounds raised at the stage of hearing before charge and shall proceed in the matter as per law.