JUDGMENT : Aggrieved by the order dated 14.07.2016 passed in Writ Petition No.35175 of 2016, whereby the learned Single Judge has affirmed the order of the Deputy Commissioner remitting the matter back to the Assistant Commissioner for a fresh consideration, the writ petitioner has preferred the instant writ appeal. 2. The parties will be referred to as per their ranking in the writ petition before the learned Single Judge. 3. Brief facts of the case are as follows: Originally, one Mutthamma was granted land bearing Survey No.113(old Survey No.24) measuring 2 acres situated in Mallanakuppe village, Ataguru Hobli, Maddur Taluk, Mandya District. The original grantee sold the land by executing a registered sale deed dated 12.6.1969 in favour of the petitioner and the mutation entries in terms of the sale was changed in favour of the petitioner. 4. After the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) coming into force i.e. on 1.1.1979, for the first time, the legal representative of the original grantee sought restoration of the land by making a claim before the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner in the year 2001 in the proceedings PTCL No.11 of 2001-02. It was 32 years after the land was sold in favour of the petitioner by the original grantee. The Assistant Commissioner allowed the claim of Mallaiah, who claimed to be the legal heir of the original grantee in terms of his order dated 20.3.2009 by which he restored the land property in question in favour of Mallaiah. This order of the Assistant Commissioner was passed without considering the relationship of Mallaiah with the original grantee Mutthamma. 5. The petitioner challenged the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 20.3.2009 before the Deputy Commissioner by filing an appeal in PTCL No.6 of 2009. The Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 7.2.2011 set aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner directing restoration of land in favour of Mallaiah on the strength of the gift deed from the original grantee. The Deputy Commissioner further directed that the land could be appropriated to the State Government. This order of Deputy Commissioner was challenged by Mallaiah before this Court in Writ Petition No.46492 of 2011. The Deputy Commissioner further directed that the land could be appropriated to the State Government. This order of Deputy Commissioner was challenged by Mallaiah before this Court in Writ Petition No.46492 of 2011. This Court by its order dated 27.3.2012, set aside both the orders of the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner, and remitted the matter back for a fresh consideration with a direction to first record a finding regarding the entitlement of Mallaiah to maintain the proceedings under the Act. 6. In the remand proceedings in PTCL No.8 of 2012-13, the Assistant Commissioner passed an order dated 16.7.2015 holding that Mallaiah failed to establish any relationship between him and the original grantee and that he was not the legal heir entitled to succeed to the land in question either under the gift deed or any other document and accordingly, rejected the claim of Mallaiah. This order of the Assistant Commissioner was challenged by Mallaiah before the Deputy Commissioner in PTCL No.19 of 2015. The Deputy Commissioner allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner with a direction to assess the material available on record and give a finding as to whether there was violation of the provisions of the Act and if there are no legal heirs, the land must be appropriated to the Government. 7. This order of the Deputy Commissioner was challenged by the petitioner before this Court in the instant Writ Petition No.35175 of 2016. The learned Single Judge noticing the fact that the Deputy Commissioner had remitted the matter back to the Assistant Commissioner and that it was only a remand order that was challenged in the writ petition, dismissed it on the ground that if the petitioner had any grievance with reference to the claim, it was open for him to contest the same before the Assistant Commissioner in the remand proceedings. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the writ petitioner has filed the instant writ appeal. 8. We have heard Sri Shivaramu H.C. learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri Kiran Kumar, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Sri L. Raja, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.3 to 5. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the writ petitioner has filed the instant writ appeal. 8. We have heard Sri Shivaramu H.C. learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri Kiran Kumar, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Sri L. Raja, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.3 to 5. 9. On hearing the learned Counsels for the parties, the points that would arise for our consideration are: (1) Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that it was only a remand from the Deputy Commissioner to the Assistant Commissioner ? 2. Whether the order of the learned Single Judge requires interference ? 10. Re. Point No.1: The original grantee Mutthamma was granted the land bearing Sy. No.113 measuring 2 acres situated in Mallanakuppe village, Ataguru Hobli, Maddur Taluk, Mandya District. Even before the promulgation of the Act, the grantee sold the land in favour of the petitioner by a registered sale deed on 12.6.1969. The revenue records also changed in the name of the petitioner in terms of the registered sale deed. 11. The Act came into force on 1.1.1979. Surprisingly, in the year 2001, one Mallaiah, claiming to be the legal heir of late Smt. Mutthamma to whom the land was originally granted, initiated proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner in PTCL No.11 of 200102. The Assistant Commissioner, without deciding as to whether Mallaiah was in fact the legal heir of Mutthamma or otherwise, allowed the claim of Mallaiah and directed restoration of land by his order dated 20.3.2009. This order of the Assistant Commissioner was challenged by the petitioner before the Deputy Commissioner in PTCL Mo.6 of 2009. The Deputy Commissioner cancelled the sale deed dated 12.6.1969 as also the alleged gift deed made in favour of Mallaiah and ordered forfeiture of the land to the Government by his order dated 6.2.2011. The order of the Deputy Commissioner was challenged by Mallaiah before this Court in Writ Petition No.46492 of 2011. This Court by its order dated 27.3.2012 while setting aside the orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner, at paragraph No.7 ordered thus: “7. The impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner are set aside. The matter is remitted for fresh consideration to the Assistant Commissioner. This Court by its order dated 27.3.2012 while setting aside the orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner, at paragraph No.7 ordered thus: “7. The impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner are set aside. The matter is remitted for fresh consideration to the Assistant Commissioner. The Assistant Commissioner shall first record a finding regarding the entitlement of the petitioner to maintain the application as the sole legal heir of deceased Muttamma. All other contentions of the parties are kept open. The Assistant Commissioner is directed to notify the 3rd respondent and hear him afresh in accordance with law.” In terms of the order passed by this Court as extracted hereinabove, the Assistant Commissioner took up the proceedings, and held that Mallaiah has failed to establish any relationship between himself and the original grantee namely, Mutthamma. It was also held that Mallaiah was not the legal heir entitled to succeed to the land in question under the gift deed or any other document, through which he was claiming the land and dismissed the claim of Mallaiah on 16.7.2015. This was challenged by the legal representative of the original grantee before the Deputy Commissioner in PTCL No.19 of 2015. The Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 15.12.2015 set aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner holding that merely because there was no legal heir to the original grantee, the proceedings could not be closed. The Assistant Commissioner was directed to assess the material available on record and give a finding whether there was violation of the provisions of the Act and if there is no legal heir, the land must be appropriated to the Government. 12. The petitioner challenged the order of the Deputy Commissioner before the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.35175 of 2016. The learned Single Judge, without going into the merits of the matter, dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the order of the Deputy Commissioner which was impugned was only a remand to the Assistant Commissioner to consider the entire proceedings. The learned Single Judge was of the view that if the petitioner had any grievance, it was open for him to contest the same before the Assistant Commissioner in the remand proceedings. The learned Single Judge was of the view that if the petitioner had any grievance, it was open for him to contest the same before the Assistant Commissioner in the remand proceedings. The learned Single Judge did not go into the merits of the matter with regard to the first sale of the property in question made in favour of petitioner on 12.6.1969 and the proceedings that were initiated for the first time in the year 2001 i.e., 22 years, after the Act coming into force and 32 years, after the petitioner being put into possession of the property in terms of the same. 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner was the purchaser of the land from the original grantee on 12.6.1969 and he continues to be in possession of the land for the last 50 years as on date. The order of remand by the Deputy Commissioner to the Assistant Commissioner is without looking into the date of initiation of the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner. The order of the Deputy Commissioner remitting the matter on the ground that if there has been violation of provisions of the Act, the land could be appropriated to the Government, even if there are no legal heirs to the original grantee, is erroneous. The learned Counsel further contended that in the light of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the remand proceedings were unwarranted as it was an admitted fact that one Mallaiah claiming to be the legal heir of the original grantee, initiated the proceedings after 22 years of the sale of the land in question. 14. Per contra, learned Counsel for respondent Nos.3 to 5 would seek to justify the order of the Deputy Commissioner on the ground that it is only a remand proceeding and it was open to the petitioner to urge all his grounds before the Assistant Commissioner. It is further contended that if there is violation of the provisions of the Act, it is open to the Assistant Commissioner to order resumption of the land. 15. In our considered view, the Deputy Commissioner could not have been remanded the matter back to the Assistant Commissioner to decide the claim afresh. The learned Single Judge was not informed of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI Vs. 15. In our considered view, the Deputy Commissioner could not have been remanded the matter back to the Assistant Commissioner to decide the claim afresh. The learned Single Judge was not informed of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER 2017 SCC Online 1862, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed at paragraph Nos.4 and 8 as under: “4. Section 5 of the Act provided for resumption and restitution of granted lands. It provided that for an application to be made by a interested person to the Assistant Commissioner for restoration of such land. It also provided for exercise of suo motu power. 8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No.3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R.Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors., 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly.” The aforesaid extracted judgment is further reiterated in the case of MR.VIVEK M HINDUJA AND OTHERS v. MR. ASWATHA AND OTHERS reported in 2019 Kar.L.J. 819 (SC), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticing the chronology of events and the proceedings being initiated after almost 22 years of the Act coming into force rejected the claim of the grantee. The order of the Apex Court at paragraph Nos.2, 4, 5, 9 and 10 reads thus: “2. The chronology of the events in the three appeals before us is different. The area of the lands and the original grantees are also different. The number of times the land changed hands is also different. But a common feature of all these cases, which enable us to deal with them at the same time is the fact that after the Karnataka Act came into force on 111979, the Competent Authorities did not take any action till the year 1998. It was then that they apparently took suo motu action and served notices on the appellants to show cause as to why the lands should not be resumed by them and why the proceedings under which the rights for the lands were acquired should not be annulled. 4. Arguments have been addressed before us at length on whether the present appellants had perfected their titles on the date of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. We are not inclined to go into this question because the instant matters can be decided on an aspect settled by this Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav and Others. We are not inclined to go into this question because the instant matters can be decided on an aspect settled by this Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav and Others. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (dead) Through L.Rs and Others, 2017(6)Scale 459 and Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka and Another, C.A.NO.1390 OF 2009, dated 26102017. In these two decisions, one of which arose under the Karnataka Act, this Court has held that the authorities entrusted with the power to annul proceedings purported to have been made by the original grantees, must exercise their powers to do so, whether on an application, or suo motu, within a reasonable time since no time is prescribed by law for taking such action. In the decided cases, action had been initiated after about 20 to 25 years of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. 5. In the present cases, it is undisputed that the action had been initiated after almost 20 years from the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. In principle, we do not see any reason why the delay in the present cases should be considered to be reasonable. There is no material difference between the period of delay in the present cases and he decided cases. 9. We do not find it possible to accede to this submission. This Court in the case of Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla vs. Hargovind Jasraj and Another, (2013)3 SCC 182 , reiterated the necessity of an order of a competent Court or Tribunal before which the impugned order can be declared as null and void. The Court relied on the of quoted passage in Smith Vs. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 Assistant Commissioner 736: (1956)2 WLR 888 :1956)1 All.E.R.855 (HL), which reads as under: ‘…An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. [Smith Case, AC pp.769-70] This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court. [Smith Case, AC pp.769-70] This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court. The necessity of recourse to the Court has been pointed out [sic] repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy Council without distinction between patent and latent defects [Ed. Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn. 1994].’ (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED) In the case of Pune Municipal Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007)5 SCC 211 , this Court reproduced the following observation with regard to the declaration of orders beyond the period of limitation as invalid: ‘39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the order intends to approach the Court for declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the Court within the period prescribed by limitation. ‘If the statutory time of limitation expires, the Court cannot give the declaration sought for’ (2007)5 SCC 211 ).’ 10. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to add that where limitation is not prescribed, the party ought to approach the competent Court or authority within reasonable time, beyond which no relief can be granted. As decided earlier, this principle would apply even to suo motu actions. The afore extracted judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, were the cases dealing with the violation of the provisions of the Act. The proceedings in the said cases were initiated between 20 and 24 years. 16. The learned Single Judge was not informed about the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and its application to the instant proceedings with regard to the date of sale, commencement of the Act and the date of initiation of the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner on the first occasion. 17. In view of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the remand by the Deputy Commissioner to the Assistant Commissioner was itself unwarranted. The order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground that it was only a remand proceeding and the grievance of the petitioner could be agitated before the Assistant Commissioner, warrants interference. Hence, we hold point No.1 in favour of the petitioner. 18. Re. The order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground that it was only a remand proceeding and the grievance of the petitioner could be agitated before the Assistant Commissioner, warrants interference. Hence, we hold point No.1 in favour of the petitioner. 18. Re. Point No.2: In terms of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the afore-extracted judgments, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has rejected the claim of the grantees on the ground that the proceedings were initiated between 20 and 24 years and those judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would cover on all fours to the facts of the instant proceedings, as the sale of the land was on 12.6.1969, the Act came into force on 1.1.1979 and the proceedings were initiated for the first time in the year 2001, i.e. 22 years after the Act coming into force. Thus, the order of the learned Single Judge warrants appropriate interference. 19. There is no explanation for the delay in approaching the Assistant Commissioner at the first instance after 22 years in any of the proceedings either before the authorities or before this Court. Accordingly, point No.2 is answered in favour of the petitioner. 20. For the aforementioned reasons, we pass the following order: (i) The writ appeal is allowed. (ii) The order dated 14.07.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.35175 of 2015 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. (iii) The order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 15.12.2015 passed in PTCL No.19 of 2015 is quashed. The order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 16.7.2015 passed in PTCL No.8 of 201213 is hereby restored. (iv) There shall be no order as to costs.