JUDGMENT : A.S. CHANDURKAR, J. 1. Rule. Heard learned counsel by making the Rule returnable forthwith. The question that arises for consideration is whether a person who by virtue of the provisions of Section 13 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958 (for short, the said Act) is not qualified to vote and get elected as a member of the Gram Panchayat can be said to be a person aggrieved for the purposes of the provisions of Section 16(2) of the said Act in proceedings seeking disqualification of an elected member. 2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The petitioner claims to be a resident of the area falling within the jurisdiction of Gram Panchayat, Khandala. The respondent no.2 was elected as a member of Gram Panchayat, Savargaon Barde in the general elections that were held in 2017. The respondent no.2 was then elected as its Sarpanch. The petitioner initiated proceedings under Section 14(1)(j-5) of the said Act before the Collector seeking disqualification of the respondent no.2 on the ground that the respondent no.2 did not have the facility of toilet in his house. The respondent no.2 filed his reply and raised objection to the maintainability of the said proceedings at the instance of the petitioner. He also denied the allegations made in the disqualification application. The Collector by his order dated 16.08.2018 held that as the respondent no.2 did not have the facility of toilet in his house he was liable to be disqualified in view of the provisions of Section 14(1)(j-5) of the said Act. The respondent no.2 then filed an appeal challenging the aforesaid order before the Divisional Commissioner. The Divisional Commissioner on 17.12.2018 found that as per the panchnama submitted by the Talathi there was a toilet existing at the house of the respondent no.2. On that count the order passed by the Collector was set aside and the application for disqualification came to be rejected. Being aggrieved the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order. 3. Shri A. M. Ghare, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 at the outset raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition at the instance of the petitioner. According to him, as the petitioner had no locus whatsoever to challenge the election of the respondent no.2, he had no locus also to file the writ petition challenging the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner. According to him, as the petitioner had no locus whatsoever to challenge the election of the respondent no.2, he had no locus also to file the writ petition challenging the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner. The petitioner did not suffer any legal injury on account of the impugned adjudication and therefore he did not have any legal right to question the said adjudication. Placing reliance on the decisions in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2013) 4 SCC 465 and Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. District Collector, Raigad and others, (2012) 4 SCC 407 it was submitted that the petitioner could not be treated as a complainant in view of the fact that he had not suffered any legal injury nor was he deprived of any legal right. In absence of the petitioner having locus to challenge the said order the writ petition as filed did not deserve to be entertained. Without prejudice to the aforesaid it was submitted that the Commissioner rightly found that there was a toilet existing in the premises where the respondent no.2 was residing. The documents placed on record clearly indicated the same and there was no reason whatsoever to interfere with that adjudication. The respondent no.2 was not disqualified under provisions of Section 14(1)(j-5) of the said Act. No objection was also raised to the nomination form of the respondent no.2. On these counts it was submitted that the impugned order did not call for any interference. 4. Shri A. R. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand submitted that the expression 'any person' in Section 16(2) of the said Act could not be given a restricted meaning. The question whether a vacancy had occurred under Section 16 could be raised by the Collector suo motu or on an application made to him by any person in that behalf. As 'any person' could make an application seeking disqualification of a member, such person could also file proceedings by way of appeal if he was aggrieved by the decision of the Collector. According to him, it was the petitioner who had initiated proceedings seeking disqualification of the respondent no.2 and the adjudication by the Commissioner having gone against him, the petitioner could challenge the same by filing the writ petition. There was no reason to give a restrictive meaning to the said expression. According to him, it was the petitioner who had initiated proceedings seeking disqualification of the respondent no.2 and the adjudication by the Commissioner having gone against him, the petitioner could challenge the same by filing the writ petition. There was no reason to give a restrictive meaning to the said expression. In that regard the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in M.S. Jayaraj Vs. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala and others, (2000) 7 SCC 552 and Tara Chand and others Vs. Gram Panchayat, Jhupa Khurd and others, (2012) 13 SCC 269 . It was then submitted that mere submission of a certificate issued by the Secretary as regards existence of a toilet in the premises of the respondent no.2 was not sufficient. The requirements of Section 14(1)(j-5) of the said Act were not satisfied by mere issuance of such certificate. There was no resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat as contemplated by the said provisions. Moreover, the certificate indicated that the premises in question were standing in the name of the wife of respondent no.2. It was the submission of the learned counsel that since it was the requirement of the statute that a person seeking to be elected as a member of the Gram Panchayat should have a toilet in his premises, there was a legal right conferred for raising a grievance as to nonexistence of such toilet in the premises of an elected member. Relying upon the decisions in Nimba Dashrat Koli and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2015) 3 MhLJ 598 and the judgment dated 24.08.2018 in Sau. Roopali Ananta Barde Vs. The Additional Commissioner and others in Writ Petition No.884 of 2017 as well as judgment dated 09.08.2018 in Suresh Atmaram Shirsat Vs. The Divisional Commissioner, Amravati and others in Writ Petition No.2218 of 2018 it was urged that the legal position in this regard was clear and the order passed by the Collector was not liable to be interfered with by the Commissioner. It was thus submitted the impugned order was liable to be set aside. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and I have given due consideration to their respective submissions. It would be necessary to first consider the objection as raised to the tenability of the writ petition as raised by the respondent no.2. It was thus submitted the impugned order was liable to be set aside. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and I have given due consideration to their respective submissions. It would be necessary to first consider the objection as raised to the tenability of the writ petition as raised by the respondent no.2. It is undisputed that the petitioner is a resident of Gram Panchayat, Khandala. Village Khandala has its own Gram Panchayat. It is also not in dispute that a certificate indicating residence of the petitioner in Gram Panchayat, Khandala has been issued by the Sarpanch thereof. It is further not in dispute that the respondent no.2 has been elected as a member of Gram Panchayat, Savargaon Barde and thereafter as its Sarpanch. Gram Panchayat Khandala and Gram Panchayat Savargaon Barde are thus two distinct Gram Panchayats. As per provisions of Section 10 of the said Act a Gram Panchayat should consist of a minimum of seven members and maximum of seventeen members who are elected in accordance with Section 11 of the said Act. Each village is divided into number of wards and the members of the Panchayat are to be elected from each ward. The Gram Panchayat is constituted by holding elections to elect each member. Under Section 12 (1) of the said Act the electoral roll of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly as prepared and thereafter notified for such part of the constituency of the Assembly as is included in a ward or a village shall be the list of voters for such ward or village. As per the Section 13 of the said Act, every person whose name is included in the list of voters shall be qualified to vote at the election of a member for the ward to which such list pertains. Section 13(2) specifies that no person whose name is not entered in the list of voters for such village shall be qualified to be elected for any ward of the Gram Panchayat and Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. Section 14 of the said Act prescribes various disqualifications and under Section 15 the manner in which the validity of any election of a member of a Gram Panchayat has to be determined has been stipulated. Section 16 of the said Act prescribes the disabilities from continuing as a member of a Gram Panchayat. Section 14 of the said Act prescribes various disqualifications and under Section 15 the manner in which the validity of any election of a member of a Gram Panchayat has to be determined has been stipulated. Section 16 of the said Act prescribes the disabilities from continuing as a member of a Gram Panchayat. Under Section 16(2) any question with regard to the occurrence of vacancy can be considered by the Collector suo motu or on an application made to him by any person in that behalf. It is also provided in Section 16(2) of the said Act that any person who is aggrieved by the decision of the Collector in that regard can file an appeal before the Commissioner. 6. The aforesaid provisions therefore indicate the requirements which a person has to satisfy for being qualified to vote and be elected as a member of the Gram Panchayat and as its Sarpanch. The primary requirement prescribed by Section 13 of the said Act for being eligible to vote and be elected is that the name of the person concerned should be entered in the list of voters of such village for being elected from any ward of the said village. In other words, it is only such person whose name figures in that part of the list of voters of such ward or village who is so entitled to vote and contest such election. Even if the name of a person is included in the list of voters in the constituency of the Assembly, such person would not be qualified to vote and be elected as a member of a particular Gram Panchayat unless his name is shown as being included in the ward or the village were such elections are held in which members of the said Gram Panchayat are to be elected. Thus the sine-qua-non for a person to be qualified to vote and be elected is the presence of his name in the list of voters pertaining to the particular ward or village were such elections are held. 7. In the present case it is an admitted position that the petitioner is a resident of village Khandala which has an independent Gram Panchayat while the respondent no.2 has been elected as a member and Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Savargaon Barde which is a distinct Gram Panchayat than Gram Panchayat, Khandala. 7. In the present case it is an admitted position that the petitioner is a resident of village Khandala which has an independent Gram Panchayat while the respondent no.2 has been elected as a member and Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Savargaon Barde which is a distinct Gram Panchayat than Gram Panchayat, Khandala. It therefore becomes clear that the petitioner's name figures in the list of voters who are eligible to vote for electing members of Gram Panchayat, Khandala. The petitioner is not a voter who is eligible to elect any member of Gram Panchayat, Savargaon Barde. This would thus indicate that for the purposes of Section 13 of the said Act the petitioner is not a person qualified to vote and be elected a member of Gram Panchayat, Savargaon Barde but he is a person qualified to vote and be elected as a member of Gram Panchayat, Khandala. 8. It is a settled and well recognized principle of election law that the right to elect and the right to get elected is not a common law right but it is a right governed entirely by statute. If the relevant statute confers such right to vote and contest elections, only then that right would be available and not otherwise. The expression 'any person' as occurring in Section 16(2) of the said Act would therefore have to be given its meaning in the light of the scheme of the entire Act and especially Sections 13 and 15 of the said Act. Under the provisions of Section 15(1) of the said Act the validity of any election of a member of a Panchayat can be put to question only by any candidate at such election or by person qualified to vote at such election. In other words, unless a person satisfies the requirements of Section 13 of the said Act he is not entitled to question the validity of such election of a Panchayat. Since the provisions of Section 16 of the said Act also prescribe a mode for preventing a member who suffers from any disability as contemplated to continue as such, the expression 'any person' occurring in Section 16(2) of the said Act would take colour from the provisions of Sections 13 and 15 of the said Act. Since the provisions of Section 16 of the said Act also prescribe a mode for preventing a member who suffers from any disability as contemplated to continue as such, the expression 'any person' occurring in Section 16(2) of the said Act would take colour from the provisions of Sections 13 and 15 of the said Act. The said expression in Section 16(2) cannot be given a wide meaning so as to take away the effect of what has been provided by Sections 13 and 15 of the said Act. The provisions of Sections 10 to 16 of the said Act would have to be harmoniously construed. One provision in the Act cannot be read in a manner that would militate against or nullify some other provision of the same Act. 9. In this context it would be profitable to refer to the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 12 of its decision in Sultana Begum Vs. Prem Chand Jain, (1997) AIR SC 1006: "12.....On a conspectus of the case law indicated above, the following principles are clearly discernible: (1) It is the duty of the Courts to avoid a head on clash between two Sections of the Act and to construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner as to harmonise them. (2) The provisions of one Section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other provisions unless the Court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect reconciliation between them. (3) It has to be borne in mind by all the Courts all the time that when there are two conflicting provisions in an Act, which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is the essence of the rule of "harmonious construction". (4) The Courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a "dead letter" or "useless lumber" is not harmonious construction. This is the essence of the rule of "harmonious construction". (4) The Courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a "dead letter" or "useless lumber" is not harmonious construction. (5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose." The limited scope available for a person to be qualified to vote and elect a member of the Panchayat cannot be permitted be expanded by holding the provisions of Section 16(2) of the said Act to be of such wide import that would enable an election to be challenged by a person who otherwise is not qualified to vote and elect such member of the Gram Panchayat. It is thus clear that the expression 'any person' in Section 16(2) of the said Act would mean such person who is qualified to vote and be elected as member of the concerned Gram Panchayat in terms of Section 13 of the said Act or is a person who is in a position to question the validity of the election of a member of the said Gram Panchayat as contemplated by Section 15 of the said Act. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir (supra) has examined the aspect of the rights of a complainant who could be in a position to challenge the election of an elected representative. It has been observed that a complainant in this regard has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied a legal right and that he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. As person cannot be permitted to make out a case of general public interest and a person having a remote interest cannot be permitted to become party in the lis. Such person cannot be heard as a party unless he answers the description of an aggrieved party. In the light of aforesaid observations it becomes clear that the petitioner cannot be said to be an aggrieved party for the simple reason that the petitioner was not eligible to either elect or seek election to Gram Panchayat, Savargaon Barde. The decisions in M.S. Jayaraj and Tara Chand and others (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the ratio thereof is clearly distinguishable in the lights of the facts of the present case. 11. The decisions in M.S. Jayaraj and Tara Chand and others (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the ratio thereof is clearly distinguishable in the lights of the facts of the present case. 11. The preliminary objection as regards absence of locus of the petitioner thus has substance and is therefore upheld for the aforesaid reasons. It is held that since the petitioner is not a person qualified to vote and get elected as prescribed by Section 13 of the said Act he cannot be said to be 'a person aggrieved' to permit him to seek disqualification of the respondent no.2. In fact, the proceedings initiated by him under Section 16(1) read with Section 14(1)(j-5) of the said Act were not tenable at the inception itself. The application as moved by the petitioner on 30.12.2017 before the Collector was itself was not maintainable. Accordingly the writ petition is not entertained at the instance of the petitioner for want of locus and in view of the fact that he is not 'a person aggrieved' under Section 16(2) of the said Act. A statutory right not conferred by the statute cannot be sought to be enforced in exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is therefore not necessary to enter into the merits of the adjudication by the Authorities. Hence, for the reasons aforesaid stated the following order is passed.:- (1) It is held that the petitioner is not a person aggrieved as contemplated by Section 16(2) of the said Act for seeking disqualification of the respondent no.2. The application filed by the petitioner on 30.12.2017 therefore stands rejected. (2) It is however clarified that this Court has not gone into the question whether the respondent no.2 has incurred disqualification under Section 14(1)(j-5) of the said Act. If that question is raised in appropriate proceedings it shall be answered in accordance with law without being influenced by the present adjudication. (3) Rule is accordingly discharged. The Writ Petition is not entertained on merits and is thus disposed of. (4) The petitioner shall bear the costs of the respondents.