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2020 DIGILAW 23 (TRI)

Satyendra Bhattacharya v. Tripura Gramin Bank

2020-01-31

ARINDAM LODH

body2020
JUDGMENT : ARINDAM LODH, J. 1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner by way of challenging the order of penalty of dismissal imposed by the disciplinary authority, affirmed by the appellate authority and for a direction upon the respondents for reinstating him in service with all consequential service benefits. 2. Brief facts are as under: The petitioner being an employee of respondent-Tripura Gramin Bank, Bishalgarh Branch [hereinafter referred to as Bank] was faced with a disciplinary proceeding. A charge-sheet was submitted against him vide Memo dated 07.02.2012. As many as 14 (fourteen) charges levelled against him along with imputation of misconduct having been violated regulations 18 and 20 of the Tripura Gramin Bank [Officers and Employees] Service Regulations, 2010 by not complying with the rules and regulations of the Bank, etc. The crux of the charges is that the petitioner while in service under the Bank had prepared many irregular vouchers against different account nos. in the name of different persons. Huge money was siphoned off by him causing financial loss with the Bank. As Second officer of the Branch, the petitioner made entries and passed the entries without preparing any vouchers by himself fraudulently, thereby misappropriated Bank's money being indulged in financial indiscipline, fictitious entries were made and passed by him, acting with malafide intention detrimental to the interest of the Bank against violation of the relevant provision of the regulations of the Tripura Gramin Bank [Officers and Employees] Service Regulation, 2010. In course of proceeding, the petitioner had submitted written statement in his defence denying the charges levelled against him. The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry. The petitioner participated in the proceeding, evidences were recorded by their respective witnesses. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 14th August, 2014 holding that the charges 1 to 12 and 14 were fully proved wherein charge No. 13 was proved partially. A copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner. He was allowed to make his representation against the report of the Enquiry Officer which he did vide communication dated 8th September, 2014. A copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner. He was allowed to make his representation against the report of the Enquiry Officer which he did vide communication dated 8th September, 2014. At one point of time the petitioner had challenged the decision of the disciplinary authority since according to him, it was not a reasoned order and the said order of the disciplinary authority being challenged, this High Court in WP (C) No. 299/2015, dated 09.02.2016 had interfered with the decision of the disciplinary authority directing him to pass a reasoned order dealing with the submissions raised by the delinquent officer in his representation directed against the enquiry report. Similar direction was also issued upon the appellate authority to pass a reasoned and speaking order. 3. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority had passed a reasoned order dated 9th March, 2016 imposing a penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner, the relevant portion of the order may be reproduced herein-below:- “...So, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the gravity of your misconduct, I, the undersigned, being the Disciplinary Authority, impose the following punishment as per sub-regulation 1(b) of regulation 39 of Tripura Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulation, 2010. “DISMISSAL WHICH SHALL ORDINARILY BE A DISQUALIFICATION FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENT” with immediate effect. The period of your suspension will not be treated as on duty and you will not be paid any pay and allowances except what has already been paid during the period of suspension and also in terms of the Hon'ble High Court's order as subsistence allowance.” 4. Being aggrieved by the order of said penalty, the petitioner had preferred a statutory appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority had affirmed and upheld the punishment order of dismissal dated 09.03.2016 imposed by the disciplinary authority and the said order of the appellate authority was made available to the petitioner under a communication dated 30.07.2016 by a competent officer of the Bank. Further, being aggrieved with the order of dismissal from service, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. 5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties to the lis. Mr. Further, being aggrieved with the order of dismissal from service, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. 5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties to the lis. Mr. R.N. Bag, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order of dismissal had badly suffered from perversity, the order of dismissal was based on no evidence and the petitioner was highly prejudiced being deprived of providing some important documents which were relied upon by the Bank and there was violation of established principle of natural justice. 6. Before adverting to the realm of controversy, we may visit the principles necessarily to be applied to deal with the power and scope of judicial review arising out of the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as well. 7. In a writ proceeding, the Court cannot sit as an appellate Court over an order of the disciplinary authority passed basing on the findings of the departmental inquiry. As the High Court cannot exercise power of the appellate court/authority, over the finding of the departmental inquiry, the scope of writ jurisdiction of the High Court is very limited, for instance, where it is found that domestic inquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of the principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity, findings are based on no evidence or punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee. 8. The Apex Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Another vs. Asok Kumar Arora, (1997) 3 SCC 72 , at para-20 has held thus:- “At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/Authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are base on no evidence, and or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee. There is catena of judgments of this Court which had settled the law on this topics and it is not necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to refer to few decisions of this Court on this topic viz. There is catena of judgments of this Court which had settled the law on this topics and it is not necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to refer to few decisions of this Court on this topic viz. State of Andhra Pradesh vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, 1963 (3) SCR 25, State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Chitra Venkata Rao, 1976 (1) SCR 521 , Corporation of City of Nagpur vs. Ramachandra, 1981 (3) SCR 22 and Nelson Motis vs. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1981 .” 9. In the long line of decisions, High Courts and Supreme Court have held that in exercise of its powers under Article 226 and Article 32 respectively cannot re-appreciate the evidence as if they are the appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The Apex Court in Joginath D. Badge vs. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 7 SCC 739 at Para 51 held thus:- “51......The law is well-settled that if the findings are perverse and are not supported by evidence on record or the findings recorded at the domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person would have reached, it would be open to the High Court as also to this Court to interfere in the matter. In Kuldeep Singh vs. The Commissioner of Police and Others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , this Court, relying upon the earlier decisions in Nand Kishore vs. State of Bihar, (1978) 3 SCC 366 , State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , Central Bank of India vs. Prakash Chand Jain, AIR 1969 SC 983 , Bharat Iron Works vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel and Others, AIR 1976 SC 98 as also Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , laid down that although the court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer in a departmental enquiry, it does not mean that in no circumstance can the court interfere. It was observed that the power of judicial review available to a High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and the Courts can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse.” 10. The High Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction ought to have examined as to whether the evidence adduced before the enquiry officer had nexus with the charge and could or could not lead to the guilt of the employee. Enquiry Officer was entitled to draw his own inference and so long as the inference drawn by him was supported by some materials on record, a Court of judicial review would not interfere therewith. Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United Insurance Co. Ltd. (2006) 4 SCC 713 . 11. Again the Apex Court in Government of Tamil Nadu vs. A. Rajay Pandian, (1995) 1 SCC 216 held that: “It has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of this Court that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a Court of appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. The administrative Tribunal, in this case, has found no fault with the proceedings held by the inquiring authority. It has quashed the dismissal order by re-appreciating the evidence and reaching a finding different than that of the inquiring authority.” 12. The ratio enunciated in A. Rajay Pandian's case (supra) is followed in Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625 . At Para 21 the Apex Court held thus: “21. In B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , this Court opined: The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate them evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate them evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. Further it was held: A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Aribam Priyogopal Sharma vs. United Bank of India and Others, (2012) 1 GLR 160, the High Court of Gauhati (Imphal Bench) held as under: “Sufficiency or Insufficiency of Materials: 18. The findings of the departmental enquiry cannot be interfered with for the ground that there is insufficiency of evidence for which finding in a writ proceeding; but it be interfered with when the finding is based on no evidence. The Apex Court in Syed Rahimuddin vs. Director Central C.S.I.R. and Others, AIR 2001 SC 2418 held: 5. The further grievance that the findings of the Enquiring Officer are findings on no evidence is belied by the very report of the Enquiring Officer. The Enquiring Officer has dealt with the Articles of charge chronologically and the relevant materials on the basis of which the ultimate conclusion is arrived at. It is well settled that a conclusion or a finding of fact arrived at in a disciplinary inquiry can be interfered with by the Court only when there is no materials for the said conclusion; or that on the materials, the conclusion cannot be that of a reasonable man. It is well settled that a conclusion or a finding of fact arrived at in a disciplinary inquiry can be interfered with by the Court only when there is no materials for the said conclusion; or that on the materials, the conclusion cannot be that of a reasonable man. Having examined the report of the Enquiring Officer, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the findings of the Enquiring Officer cannot be held to be findings based on no evidence. 6. The only other contention that survives for consideration is the allegation of bias. Though no specific allegation of bias had been made but the contention is based upon the very reasoning of the Enquiring Officer and the conclusion arrived at. According to the counsel for the appellant, a reference to the order of the Enquiring Officer would indicate that the said Officer was actuated with bias and proceeded to deal with the materials with that bias in the mind which resulted in the ultimate conclusion of finding of guilt of the charges levelled against the delinquent. We were taken through paragraph 4.2 which is at page 290 volume II of the paper books that is produced before us and before the Tribunal paragraph 4.11 which is at page 296 of the same volume had been placed. On going through the aforesaid two paragraphs, we are unable to accept the contention that the assertions made in those paragraphs indicate or establish any bias of the Enquiring Officer towards the delinquent. Bias undoubtedly, would have to be established either by evidence or on the materials on record which are relied upon by the Enquiring Officer in coming to his conclusion as to the guilt of the delinquent. In the case in hand, after applying our mind to the relevant materials, we do not find any substance on the allegation of bias made by the delinquent as against the Enquiring Officer.” 14. In the case in hand, after applying our mind to the relevant materials, we do not find any substance on the allegation of bias made by the delinquent as against the Enquiring Officer.” 14. Again, the Apex Court in the case of Principal Secretary, Government of A.P. vs. M. Adinarayana, (2004) 12 SCC 579 has held that the judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness of the charges as it is not an appeal, but only a review of the matter in which the decision was arrived at and power of judicial review could be exercised in case the finding of the disciplinary authority are found to be perverse; i.e. not based on legal evidence. At Para 24, 25 & 26 of the said judgment, the Apex Court has held thus:- “24. The order of the Administrative Tribunal interfering with the well-considered order of the TDP is unwarranted. The APAT cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on the finding of the enquiry authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably supported the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the APAT to review the same and reach a different conclusion. So, it is well settled that if the findings recorded by the Tribunals or of the disciplinary authorities, are found to be perverse, which are not based on the legal evidence, then the administrative tribunal or the court is empowered to treat such flaw as a legal flaw and quash the impugned action. In the instant case, the fact finding authority has based its findings on legally permissible substantive evidence. And, therefore, such a finding on fact based on substantive evidence is not permissible to be interfered with.” 25. In our opinion, the Administrative Tribunal cannot ignore the findings of the disciplinary authority or the tribunals. The truth or otherwise of the charge is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. The finding of the court or tribunal under judicial review which, in our opinion, cannot extend to the re-examination of all evidence to decide the correctness of the charge. In our view, the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on finding of the enquiry authority in disciplinary proceedings. The finding of the court or tribunal under judicial review which, in our opinion, cannot extend to the re-examination of all evidence to decide the correctness of the charge. In our view, the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on finding of the enquiry authority in disciplinary proceedings. This court, time and again, categorically stated that court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material has reasonable support, the conclusion reached by the Disciplinary Tribunal. It is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach a different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. 26. In our opinion, judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness of the charges as it is not an appeal but only a review of the manner in which the decision was made. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court for reasons stated (supra).” 15. Needless to say, that a Bank officer should act with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and should do nothing unbecoming of a Bank officer. The Bank officer acting beyond his authority even if not causing any loss to the bank is nonetheless committed the act of misconduct. The Apex Court in Chairman Managing Director Union Bank vs. K.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 , at para-14 held that:- “14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 , it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 , it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.” 16. Keeping in view the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases discussed here-in-above, I have given anxious consideration to the case of the writ petitioner. In the instant case, the petitioner along with other officers including the Manager of the Bank were charged. Articles of charges were framed against all the officers. All were tried in separate proceedings. In course of proceeding the instant petitioner was given opportunity to submit written submission against the Articles of charges framed against him. The petitioner submitted written submissions and participated in the inquiry proceedings, however, he has prayed for some documents. 17. Mr. Bag, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that the petitioner has applied for 26 documents which were neither considered by the inquiry officer nor by the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority. Out of the list of documents, the petitioner had sought for, the bank authority had only supplied the documents relating to Sl. Nos. 23 and 24 in the list. At Sl. No. 23 the petitioner had sought for supplying copy of manual transfer journal for the date against Sl. Nos. 1 to 22 of the list. That means the documents which the petitioner had mentioned at Sl. Nos. 1 to 22 relating to particulars of vouchers [Annexure-3 to the writ petition] were supplied to the petitioner. At Sl. No. 24 of the list dated 16th October, 2012 [Annexure-3 to the writ petition] the petitioner had urged for supplying copy of Attendance Register for the month of February, 2011 & March, 2011. The said document was also supplied to the petitioner. 18. Mr. At Sl. No. 24 of the list dated 16th October, 2012 [Annexure-3 to the writ petition] the petitioner had urged for supplying copy of Attendance Register for the month of February, 2011 & March, 2011. The said document was also supplied to the petitioner. 18. Mr. Bag, learned counsel for the petitioner further strenuously argued that non-supply of copy of “User ID Register” mentioned at Sl. No. 25 and “sealed envelope where password of Satyendra Bhattacharya has been recorded which is under the custody of Branch Manager, TGB Bishalgarh Branch”, mentioned at Sl. No. 26 was the principal document to which the entire allegation levelled against the petitioner rooted through. 19. After perusal of the records, I find that the petitioner had submitted an application to the inquiry officer for supplying of those documents on 04.12.2013 [Annexure-7 to the writ petition]. In reply, vide communication dated 24.12.2013 the concerned authority informed the petitioner that during inquiry proceeding itself it was informed to the petitioner that those documents were not available with the bank. 20. After completion of the stage of examination of witnesses from both sides, after receipt of the written argument from the presenting officer, the petitioner at the stage of filing counter argument vide his letter dated 04.12.2013 prayed before the inquiry officer stating that for effective counter argument the petitioner was in need of the documents under Sl. Nos. 1 to 22, 25 and 26. Responding to the said letter, the respondent-bank vide its letter dated 24.12.2013 had informed the petitioner stating inter alia that- “I am to inform that as per your requirement, documents have been provided to you on requisition from your end and any document which could not be supplied by the management representative has been clarified to you during inquiry proceeding from time to time by the P.O. Consequently, your requisition for providing with documents at this argument/counter argument submission stage cannot be considered.” Being aggrieved, the petitioner had filed a writ petition before the High Court bearing No. WP (C) 13/2014. After being heard, a Division Bench of this Court disposed of the writ petition with the following observation:- “.... After being heard, a Division Bench of this Court disposed of the writ petition with the following observation:- “.... We examined the written argument carefully, the stand of the bank is that these vouchers, if any, were produced by the petitioner and retained by him or destroyed by him, as the case may be but were never given to the bank.” It was further opined that-”this Court, at this stage, when the proceedings are at the final stage is not going into the merits of the case. The only question is whether the bank should be directed to supply the copies of these documents to the petitioner or not. Since the bank has stated on affidavit and today also at the time of arguments it is repeated before us that no such documents are in existence, we cannot direct the bank to supply such documents.” It was further observed by the Court that “we make it clear that since according to the bank no such documents are in its custody, the effect of this will be seen only by the Disciplinary Authority. It shall be for the Disciplinary Authority to decide whether such documents were created and whether such documents were handed over to the bank or not and it if comes to the conclusion that they were handed over to the bank then whether any adverse inference is to be drawn against the bank is an issue for the Inquiry Office to decide and this Court cannot in any manner influence the order of the Inquiry Officer in this regard.” 21. After the disposal of the aforesaid writ petition, participating in the proceedings, on the prayer of the petitioner, the inquiry officer permitted the petitioner to change his defence assistant. To substantiate the charges framed against the petitioner, the presenting officer had produced good number of exhibits marked as M.E.1 to M.E.66 on different dates. The inquiry officer had given the petitioner and his defence assistant to verify the original documents to their satisfaction. In reply, the petitioner and his defence assistant stated that they accepted all the management exhibits and need not require any further verification accepting M.E. 20 and 21 i.e. the Employee Register for which they required some clarification. The inquiry officer had given the petitioner and his defence assistant to verify the original documents to their satisfaction. In reply, the petitioner and his defence assistant stated that they accepted all the management exhibits and need not require any further verification accepting M.E. 20 and 21 i.e. the Employee Register for which they required some clarification. Subsequently, on 09.01.2019 by producing required document relating to M.E. 20 and M.E.21, the presenting officer clarified the matter and against queries of inquiry officer, the petitioner and his defence assistant confirmed their satisfaction. 22. I have meticulously scrutinized the entire analysis and findings of the inquiry officer in regard to the charges framed against the petitioner in course of proceedings. The inquiry officer explicitly had given sufficient reasons to hold that the charge Nos. 1 to 12 and 14 are fully proved and charge No. 13 was proved partially. 23. The petitioner was afforded an opportunity to submit his written submission to the findings of the inquiry officer. I have perused the written submission of the petitioner which he filed on 08.09.2014 wherein the petitioner again raised the plea of non-supplying of the ID Register and passwords mentioned in Sl. No. 25 and 26 against which the petitioner approached the High Court by way of filing a writ petition which was disposed of by the High Court with the observations as aforestated. But, for a moment as a matter of refreshing the memory, I like to reiterate that from the very beginning of the proceedings, the stand of the bank before the High Court as well as in course of disciplinary proceeding that those documents were created by the petitioner which were never handed over to the bank and thus those documents were not available with the bank and the High Court in its clear term had observed that in that situation the Court could not direct the bank to produce the said documents. 24. As I said earlier, the inquiry officer had discussed in detail and considered the evidence brought on record adduced by both the parties. The disciplinary authority had considered the findings of the inquiry officer as well as the written submissions and the pleas taken by the delinquent officer i.e. the writ petitioner. Initially, the disciplinary authority while dismissing the service of the petitioner had not shown sufficient reason in its order. The disciplinary authority had considered the findings of the inquiry officer as well as the written submissions and the pleas taken by the delinquent officer i.e. the writ petitioner. Initially, the disciplinary authority while dismissing the service of the petitioner had not shown sufficient reason in its order. The said order was challenged by the petitioner before the High Court and the High Court directed the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority to pass reasoned and speaking order. 25. Accordingly, the disciplinary authority had considered the matter again. I have perused the order dated 09.03.2016 passed by the disciplinary authority. Some relevant portions may be reproduced here-in-below for ready reference, in extenso: “Against point (d) of your submissions I am of the view that non-supply of documents asked for by you did not make you unable to make an effective defence. The Bank had only relied on the Management Exhibits as were enclosed with the Charge Sheet and also those handed over to you subsequently at the time of the Departmental Enquiry. Those were duly corroborated by the Management Witnesses, who were your former colleagues in the Branch. Nowhere in the argument had the Bank referred to any document which was not provided to you. Thus, no prejudice has been caused to you for any alleged denial of Natural justice and there is no procedural failure on the part of the E.O. in finding you guilty as the Bank had not relied on any documents which could not be supplied to you as per your prayer dated 16.10.2012. Besides, the Charge Sheet itself indicated that either vouchers were not found with the day's voucher bundle, or fictitious entries were made without any vouchers, against several charges framed against you. The Presenting Officer and the E.O. have taken the support of other related documents and evidences, which were otherwise sufficient to prove the charges in the absence of the vouchers claimed by you. In respect of point (e) of your submissions I find that though the User ID Register and the sealed cover containing confidential password could not be produced it could not make you scot-free as you were found guilty of almost all the charges on the basis of plenty of Management Exhibits and corroborating evidence of several Management Witnesses. In respect of point (e) of your submissions I find that though the User ID Register and the sealed cover containing confidential password could not be produced it could not make you scot-free as you were found guilty of almost all the charges on the basis of plenty of Management Exhibits and corroborating evidence of several Management Witnesses. Your claim that no User ID was created in the Branch in your name is unacceptable as you have not clarified how you were working in the Branch without creating any User ID. Your secret password must have been known to you personally and not supposed to be known to anyone else. Particularly on 27.01.2011 you were in-charge of the Branch and on that day user ID “SKB” was used and obviously you were the user of the said ID. Against point (f) of your submissions I find no misinterpretation of any order of the Hon'ble High Court by the E.O. against you, as vaguely submitted by you. In respect of point (g) I find from the depositions made by the MWs that the Branch authority had acted as per the Circular dated 11.12.2008 as referred to by you and introduced manual User ID Register, but subsequently, somehow, it was not available with the Branch. Since, your secret password was exclusively known to you, you cannot escape your liability for the user of your ID proved on evidence against you. Against the point (h) I am of the view that it is unacceptable that the alleged transactions cannot be proved against you in absence of User ID Register, for the reasons already recorded above. With reference to point (i) of your submissions I find that this point and the next did not crop up for consideration before the E.O. as these are unrelated to any charge that was framed against you. Your plea that you were on leave on 14.01.2011 does not dilute your involvement in the fraudulent misconducts as it is quite possible to make advance transactions for the next working day in the system after closing of the day's business, since you were present in the Branch on 13.01.2011. Your plea that you were on leave on 14.01.2011 does not dilute your involvement in the fraudulent misconducts as it is quite possible to make advance transactions for the next working day in the system after closing of the day's business, since you were present in the Branch on 13.01.2011. As against the last point (j) your allegation that while you were on leave on 07.12.2009 the Bank authority used the User ID SKB (SKB) behind your back is unacceptable in the absence of any indication as to how your secret password could be accessed by anyone else. The advance transaction for the next working day using your User ID could have been only made by yourself on the previous working day, i.e. on 05.12.2009, as 06.12.2009 was a Sunday. Moreover, your unsubstantiated allegation against the Bank authority for the misuse of the said ID behind your back on 07.12.2009 necessarily implies your admission that the User ID SKB (SKB) was your User ID. Going through the findings of the Enquiry Officer, and after thorough consideration of all the issues raised by you and your explanations, I concur with the findings of the E.O. for the aforesaid reasons and find you guilty of the charges of major misconducts as recorded by the Enquiry Officer. It appears from record that all reasonable opportunities were given to you to defend yourself following the principles of natural justice and you have suffered no procedural prejudice at all.” 26. A bare perusal of the order passed by the disciplinary authority, I find that all the charges levelled against the petitioner were taken into consideration. The disciplinary authority has specifically dealt with the point of non-supplying of User ID password. In this context, the delinquent i.e. the writ petitioner could not establish the fact that those documents e.g. vouchers and his User ID password were at any point of time handed over to the appropriate authority of the bank. In contrast thereto, the disciplinary authority having verified the transactions came to a finding that the transaction for the next working day using the petitioner's User ID could have only made by the petitioner himself on the previous working day i.e. on 05.12.2009, as 06.12.2009 was a Sunday. In contrast thereto, the disciplinary authority having verified the transactions came to a finding that the transaction for the next working day using the petitioner's User ID could have only made by the petitioner himself on the previous working day i.e. on 05.12.2009, as 06.12.2009 was a Sunday. Moreover, the petitioner's denial that User ID (SKB) was his User ID has not been substantiated rather, by this assertion, the petitioner admitted that his User ID is 'SKB'. Further, it is the stand of the bank that the User ID of an employee like the petitioner was/is exclusively known to concerned officers. 27. From the evidence on record, I find no such material wherefrom this Court may come to a finding that the petitioner had ever shared his User ID with the bank. It is now well settled that the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, beyond all reasonable doubt. The inquiry officer performs a quasi judicial function. After perusal of the report of the inquiry officer, I find that the findings are based on substantive materials on record. Further, the disciplinary authority had considered all the relevant factors and materials placed in course of inquiry proceedings. The case in hand is not the case where the inquiry officer has based his findings on mere hypothesis. 28. Being aggrieved with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner had preferred statutory appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority also had concurred with the findings of the inquiry authority and the disciplinary authority declaring the petitioner as guilty of grave misconduct. 29. I have perused the order passed by the appellate authority. The appellate authority also had passed a reasoned and speaking order. The appellate authority has re-appreciated the evidence on record and the findings of the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority as well. After an elaborate discussion, the appellate authority came to a finding that neither the inquiry officer nor the disciplinary authority had committed any error to hold the petitioner as guilty of grave misconduct since all articles of charges levelled against the writ petitioner were proved. Having held so, the appellate authority did not find any reason to interfere with the order of punishment as imposed upon the writ petitioner by the disciplinary authority. 30. Having held so, the appellate authority did not find any reason to interfere with the order of punishment as imposed upon the writ petitioner by the disciplinary authority. 30. This Court in exercise of its power of judicial review is not unmindful to the settled principle of law that adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. Having regard to the ratio laid down in the long line of decisions as discussed here-in-above, I may unhesitantly hold that the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority on appeal, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. The bank officers are well acquainted with the day to day operation as well as the affairs of the bank. (Emphasis supplied) 31. Recently, a Division Bench of this Court in WA No. 23/2016 [Smt. Anjali Bhowmik vs. Tripura Gramin Bank and Others] had dealt with the charge levelled against the Branch Manager of the bank out of the same incident. The present writ petitioner was an officer under that Branch Manager of the said Branch. While dealing with the charges levelled against the Branch Manager, Smt. Anjali Bhowmik, this Court held that all the charges of negligence in discharge of her duties as a Manager of the bank were substantiated and the punishment imposed upon her was upheld by the Division Bench. It was the case of the bank in that case that for negligence of Smt. Anjali Bhowmik, the then Branch Manager of the said Tripura Gramin Bank, the bank had incurred substantial loss and the present petitioner of the bank was able to siphon off huge amount of money. 32. To conclude, I opine that the present case is not the case where findings are said to be perverse, illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or shocks to the conscience of the Court. In contrast, I find that there are relevant materials which support the conclusion that the officer, i.e. the writ petitioner is guilty and in this circumstance, it is not the duty of the Court to arrive at a different finding. Where the inquiry has been discreetly conducted, in such eventuality, the question of adequacy or reliability of evidence cannot be canvassed before the Court. Where the inquiry has been discreetly conducted, in such eventuality, the question of adequacy or reliability of evidence cannot be canvassed before the Court. This Court further reiterate that this Court cannot sit as an appellate court, and in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not revisit or look for the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence. That apart, I am not oblivious of the settled law that standard of proof required in a disciplinary proceeding is preponderance of probability. However, in the instant case, after perusal of the impugned orders I find that the findings and the reasonings given by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority to impose the penalty of dismissal upon the writ petitioner conform all the parameters of Rules 14 & 15 of Part VI of CCS & CCA Rules, 1965 and had observed the essential elements of principle of natural justice. For the views I have taken, the impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner from service is not called for any interference. (Underlined for emphasis) 33. Mr. Bag, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a few decisions, which are as follows:- (i) Kashinath Dikshita vs. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 229 (ii) Trilok Nath vs. Union of India and Others, 1967 SLR 759 (iii) The State of Punjab vs. Bhagat Ram (iv) State of U.P. and Others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 (v) Chandrama Tewari vs. Union of India, (1987) Supp SCC 518 (vi) Anil Kumar vs. Presiding Officer and Others, (1985) 3 SCC 378 (vii) Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and Others, judgment dated 19.12.2008 (viii) 1987 (2) Cal. L.J. 344 [Calcutta High Court Division Bench] (ix) Maya devi (dead) through LRs. vs. Raj Kumar Batra (dead) through LRs. (2010) 9 SCC 486 34. I have the opportunity to have a glance of the decisions cited at the Bar by the learned counsel of the petitioner, but, according to me, the facts of those cases are quite different from the facts of the present case and will not help the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. 35. Having observed thus, I re-iterate that the Court cannot take over the function of the disciplinary authority. 35. Having observed thus, I re-iterate that the Court cannot take over the function of the disciplinary authority. Further, the Court has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. In the instant case, I am persuaded to hold that this Court will not in any way verify the correctness of the repeated stand taken by the bank that the documents which could not be supplied to the petitioner were not available with the bank since those were never handed over to the bank by the petitioner, and in furtherance thereof, this plea of the petitioner has adequately been dealt with by both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. I find no infirmity in the findings of the punishing authority, legal and factual. 36. Situated thus, the challenge to the impugned order of punishment dismissing the petitioner from service deserves no merit. The writ petition is bound to fail, and accordingly stands dismissed. 37. However, there shall be no order as to costs.