ORDER : The petitioner in this writ petition has called in question the orders of the Assistant Commissioner dated 25.05.2011 and the Deputy Commissioner dated 17.07.2018, whereby both the Authorities in unison have held that the sale to be in violation of the Section 4(2) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Act’ for short) and resumed the land in favour of the legal heirs of the original grantee. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of writ petition are that, the land was granted on 20.08.1960 to one Puttaiah with a condition of non-alienation for a period of 15 years. The original grantee sold the land to the husband of the petitioner on 10.12.2001. After the sale of land, the State has acquired the lands of the petitioner in the year 2009 and handed it over to the KIADB for development. The legal heirs of the original grantee filed an application before the Assistant Commissioner on 19.06.2009 contending that the sale was in violation of Section 4(2) of the said Act. The Assistant Commissioner accepting the said claim holding that prior permission of the Government was not taken before selling the granted land, notwithstanding the fact that the land was sold beyond a period of condition of non-alienation, restored the land in favour of the legal heirs of the original grantee. 3. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner in terms of Section 5(A) of the said Act, which also came to be dismissed by an order dated 17.07.2018 affirming the findings of the Assistant Commissioner. It is the aforesaid orders that are called in question by the petitioner in this writ petition. 4. Heard the learned counsel, Sri. H. Ashok Kumar, appearing for the petitioner, the learned counsel, Sri. N. Jagadish Baliga, appearing for respondent No.1, the learned HCGP Smt. Savithramma, appearing for respondent Nos.3 and 4 and the learned counsel, Sri. P.V. Chandrashekar, appearing for respondent No.5. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the said Act itself makes it clear that no permission need be sought once the period of condition of non-alienation was over. N. Jagadish Baliga, appearing for respondent No.1, the learned HCGP Smt. Savithramma, appearing for respondent Nos.3 and 4 and the learned counsel, Sri. P.V. Chandrashekar, appearing for respondent No.5. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the said Act itself makes it clear that no permission need be sought once the period of condition of non-alienation was over. The period of non-alienation as stipulated in the grant was 15 years in the case of the original grantee and the grant was of the year 1960 and the sale is 41 years after the grant i.e., 10.12.2001 and would submit that there is no illegality in the sale and the orders of both the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner are erroneous. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State and the legal heirs of the original grantee in unison would submit that the land is sold after the said Act coming into force on 10.12.2001 and seeking permission of the Government was mandatory on the part of the legal heirs of the original grantee. 7. Sri. B.V.Chandrashekar, learned counsel appearing for the KIADB which is a party, 5th respondent herein submits that the land is acquired by the State Government and is handed over to the KIADB for development. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned counsel and perused the material on record. 9. The admitted facts are that the land was granted on 20.08.2016 with a condition of non-alienation for a period of 15 years. After the death of the original grantee, the legal heirs of the original grantee sold the land in favour of the present petitioner on 10.12.2001. After the sale, the State Government acquired the land and handed it over to the KIADB for development. 10. The legal heirs of the original grantee, who had sold the land in favour of the present petitioner filed an application before the Assistant Commissioner seeking resumption of the land on 19.06.2009. During the pendency of the application for restoration before the Assistant Commissioner, the State Government issued a notification under Section 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966 seeking to acquire the lands in question on 04.12.2009 and a notification dated 23.07.2010 under Section 28(4) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966. During the pendency of the application for restoration before the Assistant Commissioner, the State Government issued a notification under Section 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966 seeking to acquire the lands in question on 04.12.2009 and a notification dated 23.07.2010 under Section 28(4) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966. Thus, the legal heirs of the original grantee were before the Assistant Commissioner long before the acquisition proceedings were initiated by the State Government. 11. The Assistant Commissioner holds that the land was sold in contravention of Section 4(2) of the said Act inasmuch as no permission was sought from the hands of the Government as required in law. Permission to sell the granted land has to be sought in a manner that is depicted in the Circular dated 09.03.2009, which is reiterated in Circular dated 03.11.2016 which depicts elaborate procedure for granting permission to sell the granted land. This permission having not come about, the order of the Assistant Commissioner resuming the land in favour of the legal heirs of the original grantee, cannot be found fault with and the order of the Deputy Commissioner affirming the findings of the Assistant Commissioner also cannot be found fault with. 12. It is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SATYAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS (Civil Appeal No.2975-2983 of 2019 decided on 30th April 2019) which is rendered on identical set of facts, where prior permission of the Government was not taken before selling of the land by the legal heirs of the original grantee after the said Act coming into force. The Apex Court at para., has held as follows: “29. Turning to the last aspect first, i.e., suppression of material fact, we must observe that the manner of dealing with facts by the appellant does leave much to be desired. There ought to have been full disclosure of documents. However, we cannot be oblivious of the fact that all the orders below are predicated on a reasoning that while the appellant sought to make out a case that permission had been granted, no such permission had actually been granted by the competent authority, and the documents furnished in this behalf were found to be forged and fabricated. However, we cannot be oblivious of the fact that all the orders below are predicated on a reasoning that while the appellant sought to make out a case that permission had been granted, no such permission had actually been granted by the competent authority, and the documents furnished in this behalf were found to be forged and fabricated. The criminal proceedings, however, are still pending qua that aspect, and we would not like to delve in the matter any further, on this aspect, which is really in the nature of a preliminary objection by the respondent-State. It is not necessary to non-suit the appellant on this ground itself, as we feel that the merits of the matter itself ought to be dealt with. 30. There is substance in the contention of the respondent-State that the appellant had throughout sought to make out a case based on prior permission by the competent authority. It was nobody’s case that permission was not required to be obtained. At this stage of the civil appeal, without any pleadings being there, it is not even really open to the appellant to have pleaded the interpretation they so sought to plead. This really cannot be categorized as a legal plea alone, and that too raised at the fifth level of scrutiny in the hierarchy of proceedings. The appellant, really faced with a factual situation where the permissions do not exist, now sought to build another bridge to contend that be that as it may, no permission is required. Such a plea cannot be countenanced. (emphasis supplied) 31. If we analyze the aforesaid plea also, we find no merit in the same. We cannot lose sight of the objective with which the said Act was enacted. The non-alienation clause existing in the said Rules, and incorporated in the grants, was found to be inadequate to protect the interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who were given land owing to their ignorance and poverty. Influential and powerful sections of society were stated to be obtaining sales and mortgages for consideration, and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes became victims of circumstances. The objective of the State Government in enacting the said Act was to prevent such misuse and, therefore, in categorical terms, transfer with permission was prescribed. This would be de hors the terms of the grant or the said Rules. The objective of the State Government in enacting the said Act was to prevent such misuse and, therefore, in categorical terms, transfer with permission was prescribed. This would be de hors the terms of the grant or the said Rules. Thus, whether it was a case where it was within the window of five (5) to fifteen (15) years, or the period beyond fifteen (15) years, such permission would be required. (emphasis supplied) 32. No doubt Rule 9 of the said Rules, enacted under a different enactment, prior to the enactment of the said Act (and thereafter even amended), does contemplate transfer between the window of five (5) to fifteen (15) years on certain terms and conditions, which are required to be satisfied by the Deputy Commissioner. There is, in fact, a prohibition in grant of such permission until and unless there is satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner that the alienation is for the purpose of acquiring other land, or for improving the remaining land and that the grantee credits to Government an amount equal to fifty percent of the market value of such land as on the date of sanction of such alienation. Thus, more rigorous terms have been put for transfer within the window of five (5) to fifteen (15) years. 34. Section 4 of the said Act, dealing with prohibition of transfer of granted land, in sub-section (1), begins with a non obstante clause. It is notwithstanding anything in any agreement, contract or instrument, or for that matter in any law. Section 11 of the said Act further enforces this by giving the said Act an overriding effect over any other law. The said Section 11 reads as under: “11. Act to override other laws.-The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or contract or any decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or other Authority.” 13. The said Section 11 reads as under: “11. Act to override other laws.-The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or contract or any decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or other Authority.” 13. The facts obtaining the case before the Apex Court are identical to the facts obtaining in the case at hand as the land in question is sold after the said Act coming into force without complying with Section 4(2) of the said Act and in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, no fault can be found with the orders passed by both the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.