JUDGMENT : This Regular Second Appeal is filed by the plaintiff/appellants against the judgment and decree dated 24.02.2007 in O.S.No.55/2003 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Jewargi, and judgment and decree dated 22.11.2008 in R.A.No.42/2007 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jewargi, dismissing the suit of the plaintiff/appellants. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their ranking before the trial Court. 3. Factual aspects of the case are that, father of the plaintiff, Basannagouda Biradar S/o Rudrappagouda was in possession of the suit schedule properties. There are four suit schedule properties viz., Sy.No.83 measuring 31 acre 23 guntas; Sy.No.3 measuring 5 acre 4 guntas; Sy.No.4 measuring 12 acre 22 guntas and Sy.No.83 measuring 5 acres, all situated at Yadrami village. Sy.No.83 at Sl.No.1 above is the ancestral property and the survey numbers at Sl.Nos.2 and 3 are the malai lands. It is further averred in the plaint that the father of the plaintiff had no rights of ownership to transfer the malai lands at Sl.Nos.2 and 3. The plaintiff further stated that after the death of his father he had inherited the same. The land mentioned at Sl.No.4 was granted by the government in favour of the wife of the plaintiff as per the proceedings dated 02.03.1999 and thus, the lands are belonging to the plaintiff and defendants have no semblance of right over these properties. Despite the same, the defendants being influential persons have created fictitious sale deed in respect of the suit lands at Sl.Nos.1 to 3 in the name of defendant No.2. It is further stated that father of the plaintiff had no right to execute the sale deed dated 30.12.1969 in respect of the suit schedule properties and therefore, the said sale deed dated 30.12.1969 is void and not binding on the plaintiff. It is further averred in the plaint that the plaintiff has preferred No.REV/LND/108/96-97 before the Assistant Commissioner with regard to change of mutation and the Assistant Commissioner by order dated 25.02.1997 passed an order in favour of the plaintiff and his wife Smt. Indirabai and pursuant to the same, record of rights were mutated in the name of the plaintiff. It is further averred in the plaint that the plaintiff has preferred No.REV/LND/108/96-97 before the Assistant Commissioner with regard to change of mutation and the Assistant Commissioner by order dated 25.02.1997 passed an order in favour of the plaintiff and his wife Smt. Indirabai and pursuant to the same, record of rights were mutated in the name of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 25.02.1997, defendant No.2 has preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner in REV/RP/12/1997-98 and the Deputy Commissioner has reversed the order of the Assistant Commissioner and directed the parties to approach the civil Court for adjudication of their civil rights. Hence, the plaintiff in order to safeguard his right and interest in respect of suit schedule properties has filed a suit for declaration and consequential relief of injunction in O.S.No.55/2003 on the file of the trial Court. 4. After service of summons, the defendants have entered appearance and have filed detailed written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and also stated that father of the plaintiff Sri Basannagaouda Biradar was the owner of the suit schedule properties mentioned at Sl.Nos.1 to 3 and he has sold all the three lands in Sy.No.83, Sy.No.3 and Sy.No.4 situated at Yadrami village to defendant No.2 by sale deed dated 30.12.1969 and since then the defendants are in peaceful possession of the suit schedule properties. It is also contended by the defendants in the written statement that the suit is barred by law of limitation and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the suit. 5. The trial Court after considering the pleadings on record has framed the following issues for its consideration: “i. Whether the plaintiff proves that, he is the absolute owner of the suit property mentioned in para 2 of the plaint? ii. Whether the plaintiff further proves that, the sale deed dated:30.12.1969 is not binding on him? iii. Whether the plaintiff further proves that, as on the date of filing of the suit he was in lawful possession of the suit property? iv. Whether suit is barred by law of limitation? v. What order or decree?” 6. In order to prove the case, the plaintiff got examined four witnesses as PWs.1 to 4 and got marked documents Exs.P1 to P10. iv. Whether suit is barred by law of limitation? v. What order or decree?” 6. In order to prove the case, the plaintiff got examined four witnesses as PWs.1 to 4 and got marked documents Exs.P1 to P10. Defendant No.2 was examined as DW.1 and got examined one more witness as DW.2 and produced 71 documents and the same were marked as Exs.D1 to D71. The trial Court, after considering the material on record and the contentions raised by the parties therein, has dismissed the suit on 24.02.2007. 7. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff preferred appeal in R.A.No.42/2007 on the file of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Jewargi. The first appellate Court after considering the material on record has formulated the following points for consideration: “i. Whether the trial Court has taken up correct issues and the reasons and findings given thereto are harmonious to each other? ii. Whether the appellant makes out the ground of appeal as aged in the appeal memo? iii. Whether the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is illegal requiring my interference to be set aside? iv. What order?” 8. The first appellate Court after considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and on re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, by its judgment dated 22.11.2008 dismissed the appeal preferred by the plaintiff/appellant and confirmed the judgment passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.55/2003. 9. Being aggrieved by the aforementioned judgments and decree passed by the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court, the plaintiff has preferred this second Appeal. 10. This Court by order dated 02.12.2019 has framed the following substantial question of law and the same is as under: “Whether the Courts below could have dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation without there being any material to show that the plaintiff had knowledge of the registration of the sale deed three years earlier to the filing of the suit?” 11. I have heard Smt. Sharada R. Patil, learned counsel for the appellants; Sri Subhash Mallapur, learned counsel for respondent No.1(A); Sri Shivakumar R. Tengli, learned counsel for respondent No.1(B) and Smt. Neeva M. Chimkod, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 12. I have heard Smt. Sharada R. Patil, learned counsel for the appellants; Sri Subhash Mallapur, learned counsel for respondent No.1(A); Sri Shivakumar R. Tengli, learned counsel for respondent No.1(B) and Smt. Neeva M. Chimkod, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 12. Smt. Sharada R. Patil, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiff contended that dismissal of the suit by the trial Court on the ground of limitation is blatantly erroneous and affirming issue Nos.2 and 4 by the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court on the premise that the plaintiff had the knowledge of the execution of the sale deed dated 30.12.1969 during the pendency of the appeal and revision before the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner respectively is bad in law. She further submitted that the finding recorded by the trial court which came to be affirmed by the first appellate Court on the ground that the alleged sale deed has been acted upon and there is no evidence adduced by the plaintiff to prove the sale deed is not binding upon him as per issue No.2 is bad in law. She further contended that both the Courts below have considered the knowledge of the execution of the sale deed by the plaintiff from the date of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 17.02.2003 and therefore, the finding recorded by both the Courts below is perverse which requires to be set aside in this appeal. 13. Smt. Neeva M. Chimkod, learned counsel contended that both the courts below after considering the material on record have passed the impugned judgments and decree which cannot be interfered with under Section 100 of CPC. 14. After considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondents, the question before me is whether the appellants have made out a case for allowing the appeal satisfying the substantial question of law framed in the instant appeal. 15. I have carefully examined the original records and perused the impugned judgments passed by the Courts below. Perusal of the plaint would clearly indicate that father of the plaintiff claimed to be owner in possession of the suit schedule properties and father of the plaintiff had executed the sale deed dated 30.12.1969 in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of suit schedule properties. Perusal of the plaint would clearly indicate that father of the plaintiff claimed to be owner in possession of the suit schedule properties and father of the plaintiff had executed the sale deed dated 30.12.1969 in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of suit schedule properties. It is a clear case of the plaintiff that after demise of his father he has inherited the suit schedule properties and he is in possession of the suit schedule properties. Admittedly, the disputed sale deed was executed by the father of the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.2 on 30.12.1969 and the suit was filed on 09.04.2003. As per Article 56 of the Limitation Act the relief for cancellation or setting aside the instrument or decree or rescission of contract shall be made within three years from the date of knowledge. The plaintiff has stated in the plaint that he filed an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner, Gulbarga, in respect of the suit schedule properties and the Assistant Commissioner by order dated 25.02.1997 passed an order in favour of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved by the same, the defendant No.2 preferred Revision Petition before the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner by order dated 17.02.2003 has allowed the revision petition filed by defendant No.2. I have carefully considered the order dated 17.02.2003 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gulbarga, in REV/RP/12/1997-98. The defendants have clearly stated in the Revision Petition filed before the Deputy Commissioner, Gulbarga, that they have purchased the suit schedule properties from the father of the plaintiff on 30.12.1969 and thereafter, they are in cultivation of the suit schedule properties. The said proceedings dated 17.02.2003 in REV/RP/12/1997-98 on the file of the Deputy Commissioner, Gulbarga, under Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act is enclosed as Annexure-C to the application filed by the appellants/plaintiff under Order XLI Rule 27 r/w Section 151 of CPC for production of additional documents. The said proceedings dated 17.02.2003 in REV/RP/12/1997-98 on the file of the Deputy Commissioner, Gulbarga, under Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act is enclosed as Annexure-C to the application filed by the appellants/plaintiff under Order XLI Rule 27 r/w Section 151 of CPC for production of additional documents. Perusal of the order dated 17.02.2003 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gulbarga, would clearly reflect the fact that the defendants have purchased the suit schedule properties from the father of the plaintiff on 30.12.1969 and the same is stated in the Revision Petition and the Deputy Commissioner, taking into consideration of sale deed dated 30.12.1969 has relegated the parties to approach the Civil Court on the ground that defendant No.2 has purchased the suit schedule properties from the father of the plaintiff on 30.12.1969. In fact, wife of the plaintiff had appeared before the Deputy Commissioner and participated in the proceedings. In that view of the matter, the plaintiff had knowledge about the alleged sale deed dated 30.12.1969 and therefore, the contention raised by the appellants cannot be accepted. I have carefully considered the finding recorded by the trial Court with reference to issue No.4. The trial Court at paragraph-17 of its judgment has clearly considered the relevant dates for considering the date of knowledge of the plaintiff with regard to the alleged sale deed and has rightly come to the conclusion that the suit is barred by law of limitation, as the record of rights were standing in the name of the defendants from the year 1969 till the date of filing of the suit and the said finding recorded by the trial Court is based on the material on record. Hence, the evidence adduced by the parties and the said finding recorded by the trial Court is just and proper which do not require to be interfered in this appeal. I have also perused the finding recorded by the first appellate Court at paragraph-14 of its judgment which substantiate the fact that the first appellate Court has re-appreciated the material on record and the evidence adduced by the parties before the trial Court and has rightly affirmed the judgment passed by the trial Court which do not call for interference in this appeal. 16. 16. This Court in the case of Siddalingaiah since dead by his LRs., vs. H.K.Kariappa reported in ILR 2009 KAR 2272 has held has follows: “Suit for cancellation of the Adoption Deed-Period of limitation prescribed-Suit filed after a lapse of 40 years-Duty of the Court, even though limitation has not been set up as a defence-HELD, The suit itself was filed almost after 40 years from the date of the adoption deed and, therefore, the suit of the plaintiff is hopelessly barred by limitation. No doubt, the trial Court did not go into this aspect of the matter. It is clear from Section 3 of the Limitation Act that every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and an application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. In other words, it was the bounden duty of the Court to have taken note of the aforesaid mandatory provision of Section 3 of the Limitation Act and the suit of the plaintiff ought to have been dismissed on that score alone. As far as the said question of law being raised in second appeal is concerned, it is well settled that there can be no bar to raise the plea of limitation even at the stage of second appeal.” 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxmidevamma and others vs. Ranganath and others reported in (2015) 4 SCC 264 ; Syeda Rahimunnisa vs. Malan Bi (Dead) by Legal Representatives and another reported in (2016) 10 SCC 315 ; and Bhagmal and others vs. Kunwar Lal and others reported in AIR 2010 SC 2991 has held that while exercising power under Section 100 of CPC the High Court is having limited scope to interfere with the concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below unless the finding recorded by the Courts below are blatantly perverse. In the instant case, both the Courts below have rightly held that the appellants/plaintiff has slept over the matter and therefore, there is delay in approaching the competent Court as per Article 56 appended to the Schedule under Limitation Act. Applying the principles evolved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, I do not find any ground to interfere with the well reasoned judgments rendered by the Courts below. 18. Applying the principles evolved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, I do not find any ground to interfere with the well reasoned judgments rendered by the Courts below. 18. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in the appeal and the substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in favour of the defendants/respondents. The plaintiff/appellants have filed application under Order XLI Rule 27 r/w Section 151 of the CPC for production of additional documents and the same is considered to determine whether both the Courts below were justified in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. Having taken note of the findings recorded by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of revenue records, as well as the finding recorded by the Courts below, I am of considered view that the contentions raised by the appellants herein have been considered by both the Courts below and arrived at a conclusion that the father of the plaintiff has executed a sale deed in favour of the father of the defendants and in that view of the matter, I do not find any justification in the reasons assigned by the appellants in Application filed for production of additional documents and consequently, the application also deserves to be dismissed. 19. Perusal of the finding recorded by the first Appellate Court indicate that the first Appellate Court, after considering the fact that the plaintiffs have not made out a case for interference as the appellant is not a person aggrieved under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V.N. KRISHNA MURTHY AND ANOTHER v. RAVIKUMAR AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2020 SC 4038 . Having re-appreciated the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff/appellant on merits and rightly affirmed the Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. Therefore, the substantial question of law framed is answered favouring the defendants. Hence, the following: ORDER (i) The appeal is dismissed. (ii) The judgment and decree dated 22.11.2008 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jewargi, in R.A.No.42/2007 and the judgment and decree dated 24.02.2007 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Jewargi, in O.S.No.55/2003 are confirmed.