JUDGMENT Joymalya Bagchi, J. - Priya Sarkar the unfortunate victim housewife committed suicide within one and half year of marriage. In connection with her death, her uncle Himangshu Sarkar, PW1 lodged first information report against the appellant i.e. her husband and other in-laws i.e. mother-in-law, Pratima Mondal, uncle-in-law Dilip Mondal, married sister-in-law Pratilata Sarkar and her husband Sanjit Sarkar. In the first information report, it was alleged that a sum of Rs.50,000/-, gold ornaments of 03 bhories and other articles were given as dowry at the time of her marriage. Soon after marriage, the appellant and other in-laws subjected Priya to mental and physical torture on further demand of money. PW1 and others tried to settle the matter but to no avail. On 15.08.2013 at 7 P.M. he received information that Priya had been assaulted and set on fire by the accused persons. 2. In course of investigation, the appellant who had been admitted at Balurghat Hospital from the date of incident due to burn injuries was arrested on 31.1.2013 upon his discharge from the hospital. 3. In conclusion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial and disposal. Charges were framed against the appellants under sections 498A/302/304B/34 IPC. They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In the course of trial prosecution examined 18 witnesses and exhibited a number of documents. 4. The defence of the appellants was one of innocence and false implication. 5. In conclusion of trial, learned trial judge by the impugned judgment and order dated 11.05.2016 and 12.5.2016 convicted the appellant for the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 1 month for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and 10 years rigorous imprisonment for offence punishable under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. By the selfsame judgment trial court, however, acquitted the other accused persons including the mother-in-law Pratima Sarkar and uncle-in-law Dilip Mondal. Hence, the present appeal. 6. Mr. Chatterjee, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently argued that the prosecution case has not been proved against the appellant beyond doubt. By the selfsame judgment trial court, however, acquitted the other accused persons including the mother-in-law Pratima Sarkar and uncle-in-law Dilip Mondal. Hence, the present appeal. 6. Mr. Chatterjee, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently argued that the prosecution case has not been proved against the appellant beyond doubt. Evidence of prosecution witnesses are at variance to one another with regard to the demand of dowry by the appellant. P.Ws 2 & 4 claimed the dowry demand and torture originated from uncle-in-law of the deceased. In fact, the appellant had protested against the demand of dowry by his relations and had eloped with the victim and married her surreptitiously in a Kali temple. Victim was a temperamental lady and committed suicide in a fit of rage. Appellant tried to save her and suffered burn injury. The evidence on record particularly the aforesaid conduct of the appellant rebut the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. Trial court erred in law in convicting the appellant while acquitting the in-laws on the selfsame evidence. Hence, he prayed for acquittal of the appellant. 7. Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing with Mr. Banerjee on behalf of the State argued that the appellant had made further demands of dowry and subjected the victim housewife to torture. As a result she was compelled to commit suicide. No explanation is forthcoming from the appellant why his wife committed suicide and he did not lead any defence evidence to show that he suffered burn injuries while trying to save his wife. On the other hand, trial court correctly relied on the evidence on record and other attending circumstances to come to a finding that the appellant had subjected the victim to torture over demands of dowry resulting in her unnatural death within one and half years of marriage. He further argued that hostile witnesses had been extensively cross-examined with regard to their previous statements to the police. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. From the evidence on record it appears Priya Sarkar was married to the appellant and committed suicide at her matrimonial home within one and half years of marriage. Moot question is whether the appellant is responsible for the death of the housewife. 9. Pw 1, Himangshu Sarkar, uncle of the victim deposed at the time of marriage a sum of Rs.30,000/- and three bhories of gold were given as dowry. Moot question is whether the appellant is responsible for the death of the housewife. 9. Pw 1, Himangshu Sarkar, uncle of the victim deposed at the time of marriage a sum of Rs.30,000/- and three bhories of gold were given as dowry. After marriage appellant demanded more money as dowry. As such demand could not be met she was subjected to torture. On the day of the incident he was informed that Priya had caught fire and was in the hospital. On the next day he went to the hospital and found Priya had died. His son Bidhan Sarkar (PW 3) and his cousin brother Saral Sarkar (PW 9) had accompanied him to the hospital. He lodged complaint at Balurghat Police Station which was scribed by Samar Mondal (PW 5). 10. Evidence of PW 1 with regard to demand of dowry by the appellant and torture upon the housewife, however, does not find support from his wife, PW 2. She narrates a different story. According to her, at the time of marriage demand of dowry was made by the uncle of the appellant. Since such demand could not be met, marriage did not fructify. Under such circumstance, the appellant had eloped with the victim and married her at a local Kali Temple, namely, Bolla Kali Temple. Thereafter the deceased stayed at her matrimonial home and was subjected to torture over non-payment of dowry. Finally she committed suicide by setting herself on fire. 11. Evidence of PW 2 is corroborated by PW 4, a neighbour who stated she heard the facts from PW2, mother of the deceased. Her deposition with regard to demand of a showcase and more money by the appellant and other in-laws, however, do not find support from the evidence of PW 2. 12. Pw 3, Bidhan Sarkar, son of Himangshu Sarkar (PW 1) deposed that Priya Sarkar was subjected to torture at her matrimonial home by her in-laws and had committed suicide. 13. Apart from the aforesaid relations, neighbours of the appellant, particularly PW 6 to 9 and 13, did not support the prosecution case. They were declared hostile. 14. Pw 15, Nitai Debnath, a neighbour of PW 1 deposed that Priya Sarkar had committed suicide at her matrimonial home and claimed he had heard from Himangshu Sarkar that she was subjected to torture over demands of dowry by her in-laws. 15. They were declared hostile. 14. Pw 15, Nitai Debnath, a neighbour of PW 1 deposed that Priya Sarkar had committed suicide at her matrimonial home and claimed he had heard from Himangshu Sarkar that she was subjected to torture over demands of dowry by her in-laws. 15. Although, the appellant did not lead evidence with regard to his admission in the hospital due to burn injuries, PW 17, investigating officer deposed that the appellant was admitted from 15.08.2013 to 31.08.2013 at Balurghat Sadar Hospital as he had received burn injures while trying to save his wife. 16. The instant case gives rise to a peculiar conundrum. The appellant, a young person, who had eloped and surreptitiously married the deceased in the face of resistance to their marriage owing to unjustified demands of dowry by his uncle, finds himself convicted of the offence of 'dowry death' upon the unnatural death of his wife, while the in-laws, particularly the uncle-in-law, who had raised demand of dowry at the time of negotiations of the marriage, have been acquitted of the selfsame charge. 17. In arriving at such conclusion the trial court held that the appellant being the husband of the housewife was guilty of the offence as he had failed to explain the circumstances in which his wife suffered unnatural death due to burns and rebut the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. I am unable to accept such reasoning of the trial judge. It is settled law statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act is attracted after the initial onus of torture and demand of dowry upon a housewife is discharged by the prosecution. 18. No doubt, in Sher Singh v. The State of Haryana, 2015 3 SCC 724 , the apex court held such onus need not be discharged beyond reasonable doubt. However, that does not absolve the prosecution from establishing the primary facts on the anvil of preponderance of probability. Prosecution evidence with regard to demand of dowry by the appellant and torture of the housewife soon before her death is a divided house. While PW 1 claimed that the appellant subjected his wife to torture on demands of dowry, PW 2 deposed the husband had in the face of unjustified demands of his uncle, eloped and married his wife at a Kali Tample. While PW 1 claimed that the appellant subjected his wife to torture on demands of dowry, PW 2 deposed the husband had in the face of unjustified demands of his uncle, eloped and married his wife at a Kali Tample. Is it probable that a young person who elopes and marries his beloved in the face of demands of dowry by his relations would subsequently join them in making further dowry demands? Probably not. The evidence of PW 1 in that regard requires to be assessed on the anvil of reasonable broad probability and normal human conduct and cannot be treated as gospel truth. Hence, even on the anvil of preponderance prosecution appears to have failed to show the appellant had made further demands of dowry and tortured his wife soon before her death. On the other hand, it is more probable that the appellant was an unwilling spectator to the torture and an unfortunate demise of his beloved, whom he had married against the will of his relations who were demanding dowry from her family members. 19. My conclusion in this regard is further fortified by the fact the appellant had suffered burn injuries at the time when the housewife committed suicide and had been admitted to hospital for more than a fortnight. Trial court appears to have glossed over such circumstance on the specious plea that the appellant did not explain the injuries suffered by him. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove injuries on an accused when such injuries are grave and had occurred in the course of the incident. In fact, it is the prosecution case, as would appear from the evidence of PW17, Investigating Officer, that the appellant suffered injuries while trying to save the housewife. 20. In this backdrop, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has been unable to discharge its initial onus that the appellant had made demands of dowry and subjected the housewife to torture soon before her death. Under such circumstance, the prosecution cannot solely rely on the statutory presumption and secure a conviction on the premise that the said presumption stood unrebutted during trial. 21. Hence, I am of the opinion that the conviction of the appellant under Section 498A/ 304B is wholly unmerited and is accordingly set aside. 22. Under such circumstance, the prosecution cannot solely rely on the statutory presumption and secure a conviction on the premise that the said presumption stood unrebutted during trial. 21. Hence, I am of the opinion that the conviction of the appellant under Section 498A/ 304B is wholly unmerited and is accordingly set aside. 22. The appellant shall be forthwith be released from custody, if not wanted in any other case, upon executing a bond to the satisfaction of the trial court which shall remain in force for a period of six months in terms of Section 437A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 23. Copy of the judgment along with Lower Court records be sent down to the trial court at once for necessary compliance. 24. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, shall be given to the parties, as expeditiously as possible on compliance of all necessary formalities. 25. I agree.