Bhavani W/O Narayan v. State Of Karnataka, Represented By Secretary Department Of Rural Development And Panchayat Raj
2020-12-08
G.NARENDAR, M.I.ARUN
body2020
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, learned Principal Government Advocate and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. In the lead petitions, the brief facts are that petitioner No.1 was elected as a Member of the 5th respondent-Gram Panchayath in the year 2010, that thereafter, he was elected as President of the Panchayath and thereafter was again re-elected in the year 2015. Similarly, the 2nd petitioner was also elected for the first time in the year 2010 and again was re-elected in the year 2015 and during the second term, the 2nd petitioner was elected and has served as the Vice-President. In the connected writ petition, the sole petitioner was elected for the first time in the year 2004-2005 and thereafter, has been consecutively successful in the elections held in 2010 and 2015 and as on the date of the impugned orders, all the three petitioners were sitting members of their respective Gram Panchayaths. 3. The nature of allegations in respect of the two petitioners in the lead petition is that the Gram Panchayath by resolution dated 06.11.2001 was pleased to grant permission to one of the residents to put up construction in Sy.No.223B measuring 0-1-12 guntas of Chandavar village. Subsequently, permission came to be granted and construction was completed. That in the year 2014, the said resident sought permission to put up first floor of the existing building and the when the matter was taken up, the Council was informed that clearance from Public Works Department was not received. The Council taking note of the delay in effecting its opinion, by the PWD, proceeded by unanimous resolution to grant sanction. Consequently, licence fee etc., have been collected and building permission was issued. 4. That one Annappa Mukri and Ganapathi Madivari residents of the village lodged a complaint with the Lokayuktha alleging that the petitioners have committed misconduct in the discharge of their duties. The Upalokayuktha –3rd respondent registered a case and conducted an investigation under Section 9 of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Act, 1984. During the investigation, the petitioners intimated that as the Assistant Executive Engineer of the Public Works Department had failed to respond to the panchayath letter dated 03.07.2014 and as it had neither rejected nor granted the NOC, for the proposed construction, and as there was unnecessary and unwarranted delay on the part of the PWD, the Council passed the resolution unanimously.
It was also pointed out that what was sanctioned was only permission to put up first floor on the existing building and the original construction was of the year 2001. That, during the investigation, the PWD submitted a report to the Lokayuktha stating that the original construction itself is within 7½ metres from the middle of the road and thereafter, the Lokayuktha submitted a report under Section 12 (3) of the Lokayuktha Act, directing that action be initiated under Section 48(4) of the Karnataka Panchayatraj Act. Section 48(4) of the said Act reads as under: “48. (4) Every Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Grama Panchayat shall , after an opportunity is afforded for hearing him, and if necessary after obtaining a report from the Taluk Panchayat and considering the same be removable from his office as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha by the Government for being persistently remiss or guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties and an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha so removed who does not cease to be a member under sub-sect ion (2) shall not be eligible for re-elect ion as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha during the remaining term of off ice as member of such Grama Panchayat .” 5. That contrary even to the Lokayuktha’s recommendation, the 2nd respondent on receipt of the investigation report, issued a show cause notice and thereafter proceeded to fix the hearing date to 24.08.2016 on which date the petitioners’ filed their detailed version of their case. It is contended that by order dated 23.03.2017, the 2nd respondent was pleased to pass the impugned order invoking the provisions of Section 43-A of the Karnataka Panchayathraj Act, against the petitioners, in the lead petitions. 6. On a perusal of the impugned proceedings, the same does not disclose as to whether any enquiry was held at all or whether the materials collected by the Lokayuktha was put against them or as to whether an opportunity was accorded to the petitioners to test the veracity of the materials or cross examine the authors of the material upon which the 2nd respondent has placed reliance to pass the impugned order. 7. In the connected petition, the gist of the allegations is that the complainant one Manjappa Vaidya complained of irregularities in the development work undertaken by the Gram Panchayath, more particularly, to the agricultural water pond and work executed on the school ground.
7. In the connected petition, the gist of the allegations is that the complainant one Manjappa Vaidya complained of irregularities in the development work undertaken by the Gram Panchayath, more particularly, to the agricultural water pond and work executed on the school ground. Yet again, an investigation was ordered by the Lokayuktha and report was obtained and despite denial of irregularities in the course of investigation, report came to be forwarded to the 3rd respondent and the 2nd respondent after issuing a show cause notice dated 12.05.2015 and after obtaining a reply and after holding hearing on 24.09.2016, proceeded to pass the impugned order on 20.03.2017. 8. In a nut shell, the facts involved in both the writ petitions are similar and hence, both the petitions are taken up for disposal by this common judgment in view of the commonality in facts, the provisions of law and the law laid down by this Court. 9. Section 43-A of the Karnataka Panchayatraj Act reads as under: 43-A. Removal of members.– (1) The Government if it thinks fit, on the recommendation of the Gram Panchayat, or otherwise, may remove any member after giving him an opportunity of being heard and after such enquiry as it deems necessary, – (i) if he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or of any disgraceful conduct; (ii) become incapable of performing duties as a member, or persistently remiss in performing duties; (a) on being medically unfit to hold the post as may be certified by the district surgeon; (b) as a result of insolvency or of unsound mind, (iii) has failed to attend four consecutive meetings of the panchayat, and in the case of an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha, failed to convene two consecutive meetings which were either due or were necessary; or (iv) if the member, by coercion or fraud entice any voter or member of Gram Panchayat or Taluk Panchayat or Zilla Panchayatas as the case may be to trade the post of member or Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha of Gram Panchayat or Taluk Panchayat or Zilla Panchayat, as the case may be, during election for a consideration.
(v) in the execution of any work of the panchayat, contractual or otherwise found involved directly with any person who is a nearest relative in the family or otherwise associated in any transaction related to such work as a partner, employee or a member on the Committee of such organisation, or otherwise. Explanation: For the purpose of this section, nearest relative in the family means, - (a) the wife or husband of a person residing with her or him; (b) son or daughter or step-son or step-daughter; (c) any other person related, whether by blood or marriage who is wholly dependent on such person; (2) An Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha or member so removed shall cease to function as such member and shall be disqualified from contesting election as provided in Section 12 of the Act to any panchayat for the next six years”. 10. From a reading of the above provisions, it is apparent that the Government is enabled to exercise power under the above provision if it thinks fit, on the recommendation of the Gram Panchayath or otherwise, to remove any member after affording an opportunity of being heard and after such enquiry as it deems necessary and only on the grounds enumerated in clauses (i) to (v). Sub Section (2) provides that such Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha on removal shall cease to function as a member and over and above that shall stand disqualified under Section 12 of the Act and thereby be prevented from contesting in the elections for the next six years i.e., the provision not only envisages a removal but also further punishment by way of prohibition from contesting the elections for the next six years. Thus, it is apparent that the provisions are penal in nature and involve curtailment of civil rights guaranteed under the Act. 11. Though, the provisions speak of enquiry, the term ‘enquiry’ is not defined under the Act. Hence, this Court places reliance on the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of DR.M.N.DASANNA VS. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH reported in (1973) 2 SCC 378 . While examining the scope and ambit of the word ‘enquiry’, in paragraph 10, the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe as follows: “In the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (supra) it was laid down that the word "enquiry" in Section 8 of the Act does not include a finding.
While examining the scope and ambit of the word ‘enquiry’, in paragraph 10, the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe as follows: “In the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (supra) it was laid down that the word "enquiry" in Section 8 of the Act does not include a finding. The enquiry was stated to cover the hearing of the case, i.e. recording evidence, admitting documents and generally completing the record upon which a finding would be based. It is only after all the material has been placed on the record by both the sides that the stage of reporting a finding would arise. We entirely concur with this view. In our opinion the stage of enquiry is completed before the arguments have to be advanced as is clear from Rule 7 (1) (iii) which is in the following terms :- "As the enquiry, oral and documentary evidence shall be first adduced by the prosecution and the Government servant charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and to explain any documents produced by the prosecution. After the enquiry is completed, the Government servant charged shall be entitled to advance the necessary arguments and the prosecution shall have a right of reply". 12. Further, the word ‘enquire’ and ‘enquiry’ has been defined in the book ‘The Law Lexicon with Maxims’ by Sumeet Malik and published by Eastern Book Company as to mean: Enquire -To enquire or inquire means to make investigation i.e., to examine systematically in detail and it can never mean that conclusions of the investigation would have any binding force or be conclusive, Enquiry – Covers the hearing of the case i.e., recording evidence, admitting documents and generally completing the record upon which a finding would be based. It is only after all the material has been placed on the record by both the sides that the stage of reporting a finding would arise. 13. In the light of the above, we now proceed to examine whether there is compliance with the provisions of Section 43-A(1) of the Karnataka Panchayathraj Act in the process of passing of the impugned order thereby removing the petitioners not only from their respective offices but also from the membership of the Gram Panchayath. 14.
13. In the light of the above, we now proceed to examine whether there is compliance with the provisions of Section 43-A(1) of the Karnataka Panchayathraj Act in the process of passing of the impugned order thereby removing the petitioners not only from their respective offices but also from the membership of the Gram Panchayath. 14. It can be gainfully stated that the word ‘enquiry’ as occurring in the Section clearly implies an investigation by the Government and a concomitant to such an enquiry is furnishing of material relied upon by the Government and an opportunity to rebut or test the veracity of the material put against or the persons acted against, and thereafter, the provision visualizes an opportunity of being heard which necessarily implies an opportunity of hearing to the parties to present their summation on the merits of the material relied upon and merits of the case. Further, the powers vested in the Government can be invoked only on the proof of certain charges as enumerated under clauses (i) to (v) of sub Section (1) of Section 43-A of the Panchayathraj Act. 15. On perusal of the impugned order, we find that the impugned order does not disclose as to what is the charge that has been proved and on what charge the petitioners have been removed. A bare reading of clauses (i) to (v) of sub Section (1) clearly demonstrates that it is impossible to charge a member on all the heads enumerated as each one are independent and unrelated. Under the first clause, the member should be found guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or of any disgraceful conduct. The second ground is, if he is incapable of performing his duties or persistently remiss in performing duties. The ground is further elaborated under sub Clauses (a) and (b). The third ground is where he has failed to attend four consecutive meetings as an ordinary member or failed to convene meetings as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha. The fourth ground speaks of coercion or fraud enticement to trade the post of the member or office bearer. The fifth ground pertains to pecuniary involvement of family members and near relatives in contractual matters of the panchayath. The term ‘near relative in the family’ has also been explained. 16.
The fourth ground speaks of coercion or fraud enticement to trade the post of the member or office bearer. The fifth ground pertains to pecuniary involvement of family members and near relatives in contractual matters of the panchayath. The term ‘near relative in the family’ has also been explained. 16. Thus, it is apparent that the competent authority is entitled to exercise the powers, only if either or all the charges are proved. 17. The impugned order fails to state as to which ground has been proved enabling the competent authority to pass the order of removal and punishment under sub Section (2) of Section 43-A of the Karnataka Panchayathraj Act. 18. On perusal of the impugned order, it is apparent that no enquiry worth its name has been conducted as the enquiry stood terminated on the first and only date of hearing itself. It does not reflect as to whether relied upon materials were furnished to the petitioners or as to whether the authors of statements were tendered for cross-examination to test the veracity of their statements. In this regard, reliance is placed on a ruling of a co-ordinate bench in Writ Petitions No.110780/2017 and 111067/2017 disposed off on 27.08.2018 wherein one of us was a member and the bench has been pleased to observe in paragraphs 8 and 9 as under: “8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having given our anxious consideration to the various contentions, we are of the view that the writ petitions require to be allowed on the short point being violation of principles of natural justice of audi alteram partem. The fact that the provisions of Section 43-A invoked by the official/respondent to remove the petitioner from the membership of the Gram Panchayath and also thereby impose the embargo to him to participate in the democratic process under Section 12 mandates an opportunity of being heard. The same is apparent on the bare reading of sub section (1) of Section 43-A. The interpretation placed by the petitioner is not misplaced. The provisions of sub section (1) clearly mandates that the Government if it thinks fit to remove any member after giving him an opportunity of being heard and after such enquiry, the Government must arrive at a conclusion that it is necessary to remove the said member.
The provisions of sub section (1) clearly mandates that the Government if it thinks fit to remove any member after giving him an opportunity of being heard and after such enquiry, the Government must arrive at a conclusion that it is necessary to remove the said member. It is also relevant to note that sub section (2) of Section 43-A imposes a further prohibition on the member so removed. The member so removed under Section 43-A is prohibited from participating in the democratic process of Panchayath elections for the next six years as provided by the provisions of Section 12. 9. In the light of the above consequences, it was mandatory upon the authorities to strictly adhere by the requirements of law i.e., of affording an opportunity of being heard in the course of an enquiry. In the instant case, no such enquiry as required by law is conducted and the impugned order is passed on the receipt of the reply to the show-cause notice. Such a cavalier approach is condemnable. To state the least, the respondents have considered the issue and acted in a whimsical manner. The authorities failed to realize the serious civil consequences that would be suffered by the aggrieved person. Further, it is settled law that an act which is mandated by law to be performed in a particular manner is required to be done in the said manner only and any departure from the stipulated procedure is unsustainable. In the instant case, the provisions of sub section (1) of Section 43-A vests an opportunity of being heard in the aggrieved person. That apart it also mandates the conduct of an enquiry and thereafter the authority has to arrive at a satisfaction that the results of the enquiry deem it necessary to remove him from the membership of the Panchayath. In the instant case, all the above factors are conspicuously absent. Neither is any opportunity afforded to the petitioner nor has any enquiry been conducted nor has the authority arrived at the satisfaction that it is necessary to remove him from the membership of the Panchayath. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petitions deserve to be allowed.
Neither is any opportunity afforded to the petitioner nor has any enquiry been conducted nor has the authority arrived at the satisfaction that it is necessary to remove him from the membership of the Panchayath. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petitions deserve to be allowed. Though the challenge is laid to the report of the Upa-Lokayuktha produced as Annexure-F to the writ petition, the same being merely recommendatory in nature, no lis is created on account of the said report and hence, the challenge to the report is inconsequential. 19. Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the said ruling is distinguishable as the facts of the said case are on a different footing as the impugned orders therein was passed on the basis of the replies received and in the instant case, an opportunity of hearing has been granted. 20. The learned counsel for the Lokayuktha nor the Principal Government Advocate are able to demonstrate from the order or even the report as to which is the ground or misconduct that has been demonstrated. In fact, the recommending authority itself has in its report under Section 12 (3) of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Act in the connected writ petition has recommended action under Section 48 (4) of the Karnataka Panchayathraj Act. 21. Be that as it may. When the law provides a thing to be done in a particular manner, the authorities shall perform the act in that manner only. The use of the word ‘enquiry’ is not superfluous. It has been used conjunctively with the phrase ‘opportunity of being heard’. If the word and the phrase are juxtaposed with sub Section (2) which mandates a penal consequence of curtailment of statutory rights vested in the citizen, what is envisaged by the provision cannot be treated as a summary enquiry by the competent authority and an enquiry and opportunity of hearing are mandatory in the light of the fact that a positive finding rendered under Section 43-A (1) of the Karnataka Panchayathraj Act entails severe civil consequences in the form of the citizen being deprived of his statutorily guaranteed rights to participate in the democratic process as sanctioned under the Panchayathraj Act, 1993 and such whimsical approach cannot be appreciated. 22. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed.
22. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned orders at Annexures D and E passed by respondents 2 and 3 in Writ Petitions No.103762/2017 and 104132/2017 and the impugned orders at Annexures-F and G passed by respondents 2 and 3 in Writ Petition No.104100/2017 stand quashed.