ORDER : K.P. Dinesh, Member 1. Since common question of law and facts are involved in both applications a common order is passed in order to avoid repetition. It is not necessary to narrate the facts of the case in detail for the purpose of disposing of the present applications. Suffice it to say that the respondents-flat purchasers entered into registered agreements for sale and construction with appellants in Appeal No. (K-REAT) 113/2020 on 8-4-2015 and Appeal No. (K-REAT) 117/2020 on 6-4-2014 to purchase a Flat bearing No. 807, block 11, Alston Sale and 806, Block-Greenwich Sale in the project "Blue Waters Phase 1" respectively. The due date for completion of the projects as per the agreements was June 2017 with a grace period of 6 months. As promoter failed to complete the project and deliver possession of the flat in time and complaints came to be filed before Adjudicating Officer for payment of delay compensation under Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The Adjudicating Officer by his orders dated 30-1-2019 and 25-4-2019 allowed the complaints by granting compensation. The appellants aggrieved by the impugned orders of the Adjudicating Officer preferred the above appeals before this Tribunal. 2. The appellants-developer/applicants aggrieved by the impugned orders dated 30-1-2019 and 25-4-2019 passed by the Adjudicating Officer preferred the above appeals in which the present applications came to be filed under Section 53 read with Section 43 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (hereinafter called "the Act") to waive 100% pre-deposit of the compensation amount awarded by the Adjudicating Officer. The contention of the appellants/applicants is that the applicants have already deposited 50% of the compensation amount in both appeals and the respondent 1 have sought for dismissal of the appeals on the ground that appellants required to deposit 100% of the pre-deposit amount as per Section 43(5) of the Act. It is contended that the Tribunal has recorded during the proceeding that the appellants to deposit the entire compensation awarded by the Adjudicating Officer before this Tribunal. The appellants were attempting to ascertain the quantum of compensation to be deposited before this Hon'ble Tribunal and was not certain of how much should be deposited to maintain appeals and therefore made such submission on an erroneous understanding of the law. The appellants were attempting to ascertain the quantum of compensation to be deposited before this Hon'ble Tribunal and was not certain of how much should be deposited to maintain appeals and therefore made such submission on an erroneous understanding of the law. It is further contended that the appellants/applicants may be permitted to withdraw the statement so made before this Tribunal and permitted to maintain the appeals on the basis of the deposit already made or such percentage as this Tribunal may determine. It is contended that 100% deposit of the amount awarded by the Adjudicating Officer is opposed to the letter and spirit of the Act. It is contended that the Act being a welfare legislation the right of the promoter would be undermined if the appellants are forced to make good the compensation awarded by the Adjudicating Officer during the pendency of the appeals and the entire purpose of the appeals itself would stand vitiated. The impugned orders itself is under challenge and asking for deposit of entire compensation during the pendency of the appeals are grossly unjust. It is contended that appellants should not be made to suffer by making a deposit of 100% pending adjudication of the appeals and for which it is necessary to waive the requirement to deposit 100% in the place of 30% as envisaged under the Act. It is contended that respondents approached this Tribunal seeking dismissal of the appeals on the understanding that 100% deposit is a pre-requisite for any appeals. It is submitted that the said understanding is incorrect and bare reading of the Act itself shows that if the appellants makes 30% deposit before this Hon'ble Tribunal at the time of preferring an appeals, provided this Hon'ble Tribunal permit such deposit. For all the reasons narrated above appellants/applicants pray to allow the applications. 3. The learned Counsels appearing for respondent 1 opposed the applications orally. 4. Heard arguments. 5. In view of the rival submissions of the parties following points arise for our consideration: (1) Whether the Tribunal has discretionary power either to reduce or to waive the statutory pre-deposit as envisaged under proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act in an appeal filed by the developer under Section 44 of the Act? (2) What order? 6. Our findings on the above points are: (1) Negative. (2) As per the final order. For the following: REASONS 7. (2) What order? 6. Our findings on the above points are: (1) Negative. (2) As per the final order. For the following: REASONS 7. Point No. 1.-The appellants have filed I.A. No. III in the above appeals to waive 100% pre-deposit of the compensation amount awarded by the Adjudicating Officer as required under Section 43(5) of the Act. The learned Counsel Sri Aditya Venugopalan, for the appellants contended that the appellants have already deposited 50% of the compensation amount while preferring the appeals. It is-contended by the appellants that they may be permitted to maintain the appeals on the basis of the deposit already made or such percentage as the Tribunal may determined. It is further contended that 100% deposit of the amount awarded by Adjudicating Officer is opposed to the letter and spirit of the Act. The Act being welfare legislation the right of the promoter would be undermined if the appellant is forced to make good the compensation awarded by the Adjudicating Officer during the pendency of the appeals and the entire purpose of the appeals itself would stand vitiated. It is contended that appellants should not be made to suffer by making a deposit of 100% of the penalty/compensation or other amounts payable to the respondent 1 as per the impugned orders pending adjudication of the appeals and for which it is necessary to waive the requirement to deposit 100% in the place of 30% as envisaged under the Act. On the contrary the learned Counsels for the respondents Sri Vikas Mahendra and Miss Prerana A.N contended that the proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act mandates deposit of entire compensation amount and other amounts payable to the respondents are to be deposited and no discretion is left with the Tribunal. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondents in support of his contention placed reliance on the following judgments: (a) Radicon Infrastructure and Housing Private Limited v. Koran Dhyani, (All.). (b) Air Force Navel Housing Board, Air Force Station Race Course v. Union of India, (c) Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 16-10-2020 the case of Experian Developer Private Limited v. State of Haryana and Others, CWP No. 38144 of 2018. 9. (b) Air Force Navel Housing Board, Air Force Station Race Course v. Union of India, (c) Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 16-10-2020 the case of Experian Developer Private Limited v. State of Haryana and Others, CWP No. 38144 of 2018. 9. The learned Counsel for the appellants relied on the following judgments: (a) The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 5188 of 2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1830 of 2007), dated 21-8-2008 between Monotosh Saha v. Special Director, Enforcement Directorate and Others 2008(69) AIC 10 (SC): 2008(229) ELT 492 (SC): VII(2008) SLT 486 : 2008(7) SCJ 132. (b) Judgment of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal East Regional, Calcutta between Exquisite Impex Private Limited v. Collector of Customs dated 28-5-1986. 10. The rival contentions of the parries as could be seen from the pleadings in the affidavit accompanying the IA is purely on the question of interpretation of statutory provision envisaged under Section 43(5) of the Act. For better appreciation of the statute in question we deem it necessary to reproduce the same to the extent relevant for the case on hand as under: "43. (5) Any person.........: Provided that where a promoter files an appeal with the Appellate Tribunal, it shall not be entertained, without the promoter first having deposited with the Appellant Tribunal at least thirty per cent of the penalty, or such higher percentage as may be determined by the Appellate Tribunal, or the total amount to be paid to the allottee including interest and compensation imposed on him, if any, or with both, as the case may be, before the said appeal is heard." 11. The contention of the appellants/applicants Counsel is that in appeals filed by the promoter pre-deposit of 30% of the penalty is sufficient and satisfies the requirement of proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act. It is further contended that the Appellate Tribunal has got discretion either to order for deposit of 30% of the penalty or compensation amount or to waive the same in an appropriate case. It is further contended that the Appellate Tribunal has got discretion either to order for deposit of 30% of the penalty or compensation amount or to waive the same in an appropriate case. On the other hand respondents Counsels contended that as per the proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act pre-deposit of at least 30% of the penalty amount is mandatory in an appeal filed by the promoter and Tribunal has got discretionary, power only over and above 30% in case of penalty. Further it is submitted at bar that as far as interest and compensation amount is concerned there is no discretion left with the Tribunal and the appellants has to pre-deposit the total amount to be paid to the allottee as envisaged under proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act. 12. It is further submitted at bar that sub-section (5) of Section 43 expressly provides that the proviso requires to be split into two parts i.e., first part in respect of penalty and the second part in respect of compensation and interest. The first part of the proviso relates to an appeals filed by the promoter/developer against the impugned orders of the Adjudicating Officer regarding penalty and the second part relates to the interest and the compensation. The appeals shall not be entertained without the promoter first having deposited with the Appellate Tribunal at least 30% of the penalty, or such higher percentage as may be determined by the Appellate Tribunal. 13. It is seen that where the order appealed against imposing a penalty the promoter has to deposit at least 30% of the penalty, amount or such higher amount as may be directed by the Appellate Tribunal. Where the appeal is against any other order which involves the payment of amount to the allottee, then what has to be deposited with the Appellate Tribunal is "The total amount to be paid to the allottee by such promoter/appellants "including interest and compensation" imposed on him, if any, or with both, as the case may be". Further, such amount has to be deposited "before the appeals are heard". As observed by the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 16th October, 2020 in CWP No. 38144 of 2018 stated supra. Further, such amount has to be deposited "before the appeals are heard". As observed by the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 16th October, 2020 in CWP No. 38144 of 2018 stated supra. The learned Counsel for the appellants filed above applications to waive the pre-deposit mandated under the proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act, contending that the deposit of 30% of the penalty or total amount of compensation and interest to be paid to the allottee is against the letter and spirit of the statute. It is further submitted that entire purpose of the Act itself is to promote the real estate sector and ensure Real Estate Transaction in a fair and efficient manner whilst up holding the rights of the consumer and the same would not entail that the right of promoter to be taken away. The Act being welfare legislation cannot undermine the right of the promoter and if the appellants are forced to virtually make good the compensation awarded by the Adjudicating Officer during the pendency of the appeals, the entire purpose and right of appeals itself would stand defeated. The above submissions, though attractive are not impressive. The proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act, clearly states that the pre-deposit require to be made "before the said appeals are heard". In other words, the Appellate Tribunal is not obliged to proceed to "entertain" or hear an appeals that has been filed, if the promoter, who has filed such appeals, fails to comply with the direction for making the pre-deposit in terms of the proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act. 14. Typically where the Appellate Tribunal rejects the plea of the appellants for waiver of pre-deposit, then it grants one more opportunity to the appellants that would defeat the very object of the Act providing a mechanism for expeditious redressal of the disputes. As explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Technimont Pvt. Ltd. The Appellate Tribunal has no power to waive the requirement of making of a pre-deposit as mandated by the proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act. As explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Technimont Pvt. Ltd. The Appellate Tribunal has no power to waive the requirement of making of a pre-deposit as mandated by the proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act. Further, as explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union Bank of India v. Rajath Infrastructures Private Limited (decision dated 2nd March, 2020 in C.A. No. 1902 of 2020), even the High Court cannot issue any direction in that regard contrary to the Act, since it does not have the power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In other words if the appellants fails to make pre-deposit within the time granted for that purpose once by the Appellate Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal would be justified in proceeding to dismiss the appeals for failure to make the pre-deposit vide judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 16th October, 2020 in CWP No. 38144 of 2018 stated supra. The Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana referring to the case in M/s. Land Mark Apartments Private Limited further affirmed that for the purpose of the appeals before the Appellate Tribunal making of the pre-deposit in terms of the Act would be mandatory. 15. The Hon'ble High Court referring to the case of Technimont Private Limited v. State of Punjab, AIR 2019 SC 4489 has held as under: Right of appeals are the creature of statute and therefore, is and can be made conditional upon fulfilling certain conditions by the statute itself and therefore, further been held that the Appellate Authority does not have the inherent powers to waive the limitation or precondition prescribed by the statute for filing an appeals as the inherent incidental or implied powers vested in the Appellate Authority cannot be invoked to render a statutory provision nugatory or meaningless. 16. Admittedly, appellants have deposited 50% each of the compensation awarded by the Adjudicating Officer in the impugned orders under challenge by the appellants in the present appeals on hand. The appellants have filed the present applications to waive the entire statutory pre-deposit contemplated under Section 43(5) of the Act. Adverting to the ratio of law lay down by the Hon'ble High Courts stated supra there is no scope for the Appellate Tribunal to waive the statutory obligation envisaged under Section 43(5) of the Act. 17. The appellants have filed the present applications to waive the entire statutory pre-deposit contemplated under Section 43(5) of the Act. Adverting to the ratio of law lay down by the Hon'ble High Courts stated supra there is no scope for the Appellate Tribunal to waive the statutory obligation envisaged under Section 43(5) of the Act. 17. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the contesting respondent 1 that in an appeal filed by the developer against the impugned orders passed by the Adjudicating Officer for return of amount paid by the allottee with interest by way of compensation the appellant has to deposit the entire amount payable to the allottee as per the second part of the proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act. Adverting to the law on the issue the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in the case of Ratiocon Infrastructure and Housing Private Limited v. Koran Dhyani, (All.) framed and decided an additional substantial question of law as under: "Whether the Appellate Tribunal while passing an order in terms of the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43 has any discretion to allow the deposit of a lesser portion of the total amount to be paid to the allottee including interest and compensation imposed on him or the entire amount, as such has to be deposited without any discretion in this regard with the Appellate Tribunal to reduce the same and whether in view of the use of the word determined by the Appellate Tribunal in the first part of the proviso is indicative of requirement of applications of mind by the Appellate Tribunal?" 18. It is observed by the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad that the additional substantial question of law was framed to put an end to the issue with regard to the meaning purport and applications of the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43 of the Act, so that the case does not get unnecessarily lingered before the First Appellate Tribunal. It is observed by the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad that the additional substantial question of law was framed to put an end to the issue with regard to the meaning purport and applications of the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43 of the Act, so that the case does not get unnecessarily lingered before the First Appellate Tribunal. It is further observed with regard to penalty the Appellate Tribunal has to "determine" whether 30% of the penalty imposed or such a higher percentage as it may determine is to be deposited, but when it comes to deposit of the total amount to be paid to the allottee including interest and compensation under the orders of the Regulatory Authority or Adjudicating Officer, no such discretion based on a "determination" appears to have been vested in the Appellate Tribunal by the Legislature. The words "as the case may be" following the words "or with both" or a reference to the deposit either of penalty or the total amount or both as the facts of the case may require. These words have no independent applications to the second part of the proviso requiring the deposit of the total amount. The object appears to be to protect the interest of the consumer once an adjudication has been made by the Regulatory Authority. The words "at least 30% penalty" in the proviso to Section 43(5) obviously refers to penalties mentioned under Chapter VIII of the Act 2016. 19. The Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad at Lucknow Bench in yet another case of Air Force Naval Housing Board, Air Force Station Race Course v. Union of India, Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty and Others. Following a judgment in Radicon Infrastructure state supra observed that so far as penalty is concerned, the Appellate Tribunal has to determine 30% of the penalty imposed or such a higher percentage as it may determine is to be deposited but when it comes to the deposit of the total amount to be paid to the allottee including interest and compensation under the orders of the Regulatory Authority or Adjudicating Officer, no such discretion based on a determination appears to have been vested in the Appellate Tribunal by the Legislature. To recapitulate, in an appeal filed by the developer against the impugned orders of the Regulatory Authority imposing penalty 30% of the penalty, or such higher percentage as may be determined by the Appellate Tribunal shall be deposited, before the said appeals are heard. Whereas, in an appeal filed by the developer against the impugned orders of the Adjudicating Officer granting compensation the appellants shall deposit total amount to be paid to the allottee including interest and compensation, or with both as the case may be before the said appeals are heard. From the above it is clear that in an appeal filed by the developer there is no discretion left with the Appellate Tribunal either to reduce the pre-deposit or to waive as contemplated under proviso to Section 43(5) of the Act. Admittedly, in the present case on hand the impugned orders under challenge are in respect of compensation granted by the Adjudicating Officer and hence, the judgment stated supra relied by the respondent 1 are squarely applicable to the question of law involved in the case on hand and on the contrary judgments relied on by the appellants are not applicable under facts and circumstance of the case. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that the applications I.A. No. III filed by the appellants are devoid of merit and the points are answered in the negative. 20. Point No. 2.-In view of the foregoing reasons we proceed to pass the following: ORDER The I.A. No. III filed by the appellants in both appeals under Section 53 read with Section 43 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 are dismissed. Keep the original order in Appeal No. (K-REAT) 113/2020 and copy thereof in the other appeal.