ORDER : I.A.No.1/2019 for condonation of delay of 16 days is allowed. Heard. This revision petition is directed against the order passed by the III Addl. District and Sessions Judge, DK, Mangaluru, dated 04.01.2019 in Spl.C.No.129/2016 on the application filed by the respondents (hereinafter referred to as “accused Nos.2 and 3”) under section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, discharging accused Nos.2 and 3 from the alleged offence under section 3, punishable under section 4 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “PML Act”). 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The Karnataka Lokayukta Police, registered a case against accused No.1 (now deceased) in Crime No.20/2009 on 22.09.2009 under section 13(1)(e) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “PC Act”), on the allegation that during his tenure as Deputy Revenue Officer in Kalaburagi City Corporation, between 02.01.1976 and 22.09.2009, he amassed assets disproportionate to his known source of income to an extent of Rs.42,25,859/-. During the pendency of the trial in Special Case No.18/2015, the Directorate of Enforcement, Bangalore Zonal Officer, registered a case against accused No.1 in Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) No.12/BZ/2009 dated 26.10.2009 and took up investigation under PML Act. On 08.06.2016, he filed a complaint before the Special Court for trial of the cases under the provisions of the PML Act, alleging commission of the offence under section 3 of the PML Act. In the meanwhile, learned Special Judge (Lokayukta) and the Principal Sessions Judge at Kalaburagi, after trial, acquitted accused No.1 of the alleged offences punishable under section 13(1)(e) read with section 13(2) of the PC Act, vide judgment dated 27.04.2017. 3. Contending that in view of the acquittal of accused No.1 in the predicate offence, prosecution of accused Nos.2 and 3 for the offence under section 3 of the PML Act cannot be sustained, accused Nos.2 and 3 along with accused No.1 moved an application under section 227 of Cr.P.C., seeking discharge. It was contended that in view of the acquittal of accused No.1 in the predicate offence, the very basis for prosecution of the accused having been vanished, no proceedings under the PML Act could be continued. It was contended that in view of the acquittal of accused No.1 in the predicate offence, the very basis for prosecution of the accused having been vanished, no proceedings under the PML Act could be continued. It was also contended that the proceedings under the PML Act were initiated in respect of the offences which have been committed prior to the coming into force of PML Act. Considering the submissions of the accused and placing reliance on the decisions of the Delhi High Court in RAJIV CHANANA vs. DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT (Manu/DE/2403/2014) and the judgment of High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in ANOSH EKKA vs. ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE (W.P.(Cr.) No.257/2012 dd.19.2.2013) and MAHANIVESH OILS & FOODS PVT. LTD. vs. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT (W.P.(C) No.1925/2014 & CM.No.4017/2014 dd.25.01.2016) rendered by the High Court of Delhi, learned Trial Judge was of the view that the occurrence of a scheduled offence is a substratal condition for giving rise to ‘proceeds of crime’ and commission of ‘scheduled offence’ is a pre-condition for proceeding under the PML Act and with this reasoning, allowed the application in part and discharged accused Nos.2 and 3 from the alleged offences under section 3 of the PML Act. I have heard Sri.M.B.Nargund, learned ASG appearing for revision petitioner and Sri.Chidananda Urs, learned counsel for respondents. 4(i) Learned ASG, at the outset submitted that the decision relied on by learned Trial Judge in RAJIV CHANANA vs. DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT (referred supra) was set aside by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court vide order dated 13.01.2015 in LPA.No.11/2015 and C.M.No.493/2015 directing the Appellate Authority under the PML Act to dispose of the appeal preferred by the writ petitioner against the order of attachment within a period of eight weeks. As such, the dictum laid down in the said decision could not have been relied on by the trial Court. 4(ii) Regarding the decision rendered by the Delhi High Court in DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT vs. M/s.MAHANIVESH OILS & FOODS Pvt. LTD., the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court vide its order dated 30.11.2016 in LPA.No.144/2016 CM.APPL.8046/2016 with WP(C).No.4717/2016 and WP(C).No. 4747/2016 had made it clear that the findings so recorded by learned Single Judge shall not be construed as conclusive and binding precedent until further orders. 4(iii) In ANOSH EKKA vs. ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE (W.P. (Cr.) No.257/2012), no law has been laid down to the effect that commission of a scheduled offence is a precondition for any proceedings. Thus he argued that the learned Trial Judge having discharged the accused solely based on the dictum laid down in the above decisions, the impugned order is liable to be set-aside. 5. Sri.Chidananda Urs, learned counsel for the respondents however argued in defence of the impugned order reiterating that in view of the acquittal of accused No.1 there was no cause of action for the petitioner to invoke the provisions of PML Act as the existence of predicate offence is a sine qua non to sustain the charge under section 3 of the PML Act. Considered the submissions and perused the records. 6. Insofar as the averments made in the complaint lodged by the Directorate of Enforcement is concerned, it is seen that direct allegations are leveled against the accused attracting the ingredients of the offence under section 3 of the PML Act. Direct allegations are made in the complaint to the effect that Shri.Shankar Kollur s/o. late Bhimshya Kollur (A1), Smt.Parvati Kollur w/o. Shri Shankar Kollur (A2) and Shri Avinash Kollur s/o. Shri.Shankar Kollur (A3) were involved in money laundering and made a total pecuniary gain of Rs.36,24,077/-by laundering in the property obtained through commission of the offence under section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. Details of the properties standing in the name of the respective accused have been furnished in the complaint. These allegations, therefore, prima facie disclose the ingredients of section 3 of the PML Act. 7. From the plain reading of section 3 read with section 2(1)(u) of the PML Act, it is clear that what is made punishable under section 3 is the activity connected with the proceeds of crime either by getting oneself involved in the process or activity connected thereto or directly or indirectly attempting to indulge or knowingly assist or knowingly be a party to the alleged activities and projecting it as untainted property. The prosecution under section 3 of the PML Act cannot be equated with the prosecution under section 13 of the PC Act. Both are distinct and separate offences. The prosecution under section 3 of the PML Act cannot be equated with the prosecution under section 13 of the PC Act. Both are distinct and separate offences. A reading of section 3 of PML Act would clearly indicate that even without there being any conviction of the accused in a predicate offence and even if the offender under section 3 of the PML Act is not a party to the predicate offence, still the prosecution could be launched against the offender, if he is found involved in any process or activity connected with the ‘proceeds of crime’. Considering the purport of section 3 of the PML Act and the intendment of the Legislature in enacting the said provision in the light of the dictum laid down by this Court as well as various other High Courts, in Criminal Petition No.5698/2019 and other connected matters, decided on 14.12.2020, this Court has held that that even without the existence of predicate offence and without there being any conviction of the offenders for the predicate offence, their prosecution for the offence of money-laundering can be sustained as long as they continue to be in possession andenjoyment of the “proceeds of crime”. Since the law on this point is elaborately considered in the above decision as well as the various other decisions rendered by this Court referred therein, the reasoning assigned by the learned Trial Judge to discharge the accused cannot be sustained. 8. Section 227 of Cr.P.C. lays down the circumstances in which a Court of Sessions could discharge the accused before it. This Court in Smt.J.UMADEVI & Another vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA, By Indiranagar Police, ILR 2013 Karnataka 4471, has held that: 21. Section 227, Cr.P.C. is part of Chapter 18 which applies to trial before the sessions court. It reads thus: 'Discharge -If upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. The language of Sections 239 and 227 are different. The scope of power exercisable to grant discharge under Section 227 is less compared to the power of discharge conferred on the Magistrate under Section 239. The language of Sections 239 and 227 are different. The scope of power exercisable to grant discharge under Section 227 is less compared to the power of discharge conferred on the Magistrate under Section 239. It is for this reason Sessions Judge is required to examine only the record of the case and documents submitted therewith for ascertainment as to whether a case is made out for framing charge or discharge. For doing so, the Sessions Judge can only ‘hear’ the submission of the prosecution and the accused. But under Section 239, the requirement is different. It envisages ‘If upon consideration the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing.’ 22. Therefore, examination of the accused is permissible under Section 239, undoubtedly, for ascertainment about the truth or otherwise of the allegations made, which is not contemplated in Section 227. Therefore, it implies that the magistrate cannot merely on the basis of reference to the charge sheet, reject the request of the accused to discharge only because prima facie case is made out. He is required not only to examine the records submitted along with the final report under Section 173, Cr.P.C., but also to examine the accused for ascertainment as to whether a case is made out for framing charge. All the contentions of the accused need to be taken into consideration.” 9. Since the allegations made in the complaint and the material produced in support thereof prima facie disclose ingredients of the above offences, the Trial Court was not justified in discharging the accused solely relying on the overruled decisions rendered by the High Court of Jharkhand and Delhi. The material on record clearly makes out sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. In that view of the matter, impugned order cannot be sustained. Accordingly, Criminal Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 04.01.2019 passed in Spl.C.No.129/2016 by learned III Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangaluru is set-aside. Consequently, the application filed by the accused Nos.2 and 3/respondents under section 227 Cr.P.C. is dismissed. In that view of the matter, impugned order cannot be sustained. Accordingly, Criminal Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 04.01.2019 passed in Spl.C.No.129/2016 by learned III Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangaluru is set-aside. Consequently, the application filed by the accused Nos.2 and 3/respondents under section 227 Cr.P.C. is dismissed. The Trial Court shall proceed with the trial in accordance with law.