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2020 DIGILAW 24 (TRI)

Rupak Debroy v. State of Tripura

2020-01-31

ARINDAM LODH

body2020
JUDGMENT : Arindam Lodh, J. 1. By means of filing the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order of rejection of his prayer for voluntary retirement from service. 2. Heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned Advocate General, assisted by Mr. D. Sarma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the respondents. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts relevant to decide the issue in question only may be set-forth herein: 3.1. The petitioner has been serving as Physical Instructor under the respondents from 06.12.1989. After 20 years of continuous service, the petitioner had tendered a prayer on 21.05.2013 for voluntary retirement from service w.e.f. 30.08.2013 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) since his mother had suffered brain stroke and had been in bed ridden condition. 3.2. Having no response, the petitioner again submitted a representation dated 03.06.2015 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) for proceeding on voluntary retirement w.e.f. 03.06.2015. Without taking into account the said two prayers to allow the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement, a departmental proceeding was initiated against him vide memorandum dated 11.03.2016 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition). Due to delayed departmental proceeding, the petitioner had further prayed for proceeding on voluntary retirement vide his prayer dated 17.03.2018 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition). 3.3. Vide memorandum dated 31.03.2018 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) the respondent No. 2 informed the petitioner that his prayer for voluntary retirement would not be accepted on the ground of pending departmental proceeding against him. 3.4. Since the departmental proceeding was not concluded within a reasonable time and also due to the fact that the respondents were not allowing the petitioner to proceed on voluntary retirement, he filed a writ petition being WP(C) No. 84/2019, inter alia, praying for the following reliefs: "..... a) Admit this petition; (b) Call for the records; (c) Issue writ in the nature of Certiorari calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why Memo No. F.6(R9)/GOT/AS/Estt/C&G/2015/13878-80 dated 31/03/2018 should not be set aside and quashed. (d) Issue writ in the nature of mandamus calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why the petitioner should not be allowed to go on voluntary retirement from 16/06/2018. (d) Issue writ in the nature of mandamus calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why the petitioner should not be allowed to go on voluntary retirement from 16/06/2018. (e) Issue writ in the nature of Certiorari calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why the Memo No. F.6(R9)/GOT/AS/Estt/C&G/2015/20325-326 dated 11/03/2016 should not be set aside and quashed. (f) Pass any other relief/reliefs which Your Lordships may deem fit and proper in this case...... " 3.5. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 22.02.2019, inter alia, with the following directions: "..... Be that as it may, I direct the respondent No. 2, i.e., the Director of Youth Affairs and Sports Department, Government of Tripura to dispose of the representation dated 26.12.2018 by issuing a speaking order within a period of 30 days from today. However, the representation of the petitioner for voluntary retirement may be considered by the respondents. This Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and all the issues are left open. The present case relates to permitting the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement. In the meantime, the disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against the writ petitioner. On the face of the record it is revealed that the article of charges have been framed at a belated stage and it is the specific case of the petitioner that the mother of the petitioner is 80 (eighty) years old and he is urgent need to go on voluntary retirement for welfare of his mother. On consideration of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is directed that the respondent No. 2 i.e., the Director of Youth Affairs and Sport Department, Government of Tripura, shall complete the disciplinary proceeding within a period of two months from the date of passing of this order, failing which the proceeding initiated against the petitioner shall be treated to be dropped of automatically....... " (underlined for emphasis) 3.6. Manifestly, the respondents had failed to conclude the departmental proceeding within the period as directed by this Court, i.e. within 22.04.2019 and consequently, it was dropped. " (underlined for emphasis) 3.6. Manifestly, the respondents had failed to conclude the departmental proceeding within the period as directed by this Court, i.e. within 22.04.2019 and consequently, it was dropped. Thereafter, referring to such automatic termination of the departmental proceeding and seeking an order in the context of his previous prayer for voluntary retirement, the petitioner vide his prayer dated 23.04.2019 (Annexure-17 to the writ petition), had submitted a representation, inter alia, wherein he urged to allow him to proceed on voluntary retirement from service in no time. Relevant portion of the said representation is extracted hereunder: "........ Within the stipulated period of said 2(two) months you did not complete the disciplinary proceeding and as such, it has became automatically dropped and thus kindly pass order of my voluntary retirement from service in no time...... " 3.7. Having no response, the petitioner served a demand notice dated 6th May, 2019 through his learned counsel stating, inter alia, that:- "....... That, by prayer dated 23.04.2019, my client has apprised you about the expiry of 2(two) months, given by the Hon'ble High Court, on 22.04.2019 and asked for order of his voluntary retirement from service. Surprisingly, till now you remain sitting over it without action arbitrarily. Hence, this Demand Notice..... " 3.8. After presentation of the present writ petition, the respondents had filed counter affidavit, inter alia, contending that out of total 1135 number of posts of Physical Instructors under the Directorate of Youth Affairs and Sports, Government of Tripura, respondent herein, only 286 posts are occupied and the remaining posts are lying vacant and thus there is acute shortage of Physical Instructors. On the premise thereof, the respondents made a communication dated 14.05.2019(Annexure-R.-1 to the counter affidavit) addressed to learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. Based on the aforesaid facts, at the threshold of the hearing of this writ petition, learned Advocate General, Mr. A.K. Bhowmik had questioned the maintainability of the writ petition, as according to him, the writ petition was a premature one. Learned Advocate General, drawing my attention to the representation dated 23.04.2019 and the demand notice dated 06.05.2019 (Annexure 17 & 18 to the writ petition), further contended that those representations were not in accordance with the relevant rules as because the said representation and notice were silent from which date the prayer for voluntary retirement of the petitioner would be effective. 5. 5. Immediately controverting the said submission of learned Advocate General, Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the actual notice for voluntary retirement was served upon the respondents by the petitioner on 17.03.2018 where a specific effective date of voluntary retirement was mentioned and the representations dated 23.04.2019 and demand notice dated 06.05.2019 were only reminders and reiterations of the previous notice for voluntary retirement dated 17.03.2018 and should not be treated to be fresh notice(s). The notice/prayer for voluntary retirement dated 17.03.2018 is reproduced here-in-below in extenso, for convenience: "Sir, I have the honour to inform you that, following some unavoidable circumstances I am unable to continue in service and therefore, I tender this prayer for Voluntary retirement from Service to be affected from the date of Expiry of 3(Three) Month from the date of this prayer. Yours Faithfully Dated, Agartala The 17TH March, 2018 Sd/- (Rupak Debroy, P.I.) Kabirajtilla H/S School Badharghat, Sadar, West Agartala." 6. The entire controversy hinges on the effective date of voluntary retirement and the legality and validity of the reasons assigned in the rejection order dated 14.05.2019 which ultimately had led both the counsels to look into the relevant rules on this subject. In course of argument, the learned counsels appearing for the parties to the lis referred to Rule 48-A of Central Civil Services(Pensions) Rules, 1972(here-in-after referred to as "said Rule") as amended in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and adopted by the Government of Tripura by issuing a notification dated 28th December, 1983, and placed their own interpretation, since the said Rule is material and has bearing on the issues to be determined. Amended Rule 48-A reads as under: "48-A. Retirement on completion of 20 years' service. (i) Government Servants who have put in not less than 20(twenty) years qualifying service may, by giving three months notice in writing to the appointing authority retire from service voluntarily. The scheme is purely voluntary, the initiative resting with the Government servant himself. The Government shall have no right to retire a Government servant on its own, under this scheme. (ii) The benefit of 'retiring pension' will be admissible to Government servants retiring under this Scheme. The scheme is purely voluntary, the initiative resting with the Government servant himself. The Government shall have no right to retire a Government servant on its own, under this scheme. (ii) The benefit of 'retiring pension' will be admissible to Government servants retiring under this Scheme. (iii) A notice of less than three months may also be accepted by the appointing authority in deserving cases, with prior concurrence of the Finance Department. (iv) If a Government servant retires under this Scheme of voluntary retirement while he is on 'leave not due' without returning to duty, the retirement shall take effect from the date of commencement of the 'leave not due' shall be recovered/adjusted against gratuity/pension etc. (v) Before a Government Servant gives notice of voluntary Retirement with reference to those instructions, it shall be the responsibility of the Government Servant to satisfy himself by means of a reference to the appropriate administrative authority that he has in fact completed 20(twenty) years of service qualifying for pension. (vi) A notice of voluntary retirement may be withdrawn subsequently only with the approval of the appointing authority provided the request for such withdrawal is made in writing to reach before the expiry of the period of notice, since approval by the appointing authority or non-approval being at the appointing authority's sole discretion. (vii) A notice of voluntary retirement given after completion of 20 years of qualifying service will require acceptance by the appointing authority if the date of retirement on the expiry of the notice would be earlier than the date on which the government servant would have retired voluntarily under the existing rules applicable to him [e.g. FR56(k), rule 48 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, as adopted by the State Government, Article 459(i) of C.S.Rs. or any other similar rules. Such acceptance may be generally given in all cases except the following cases: (a) in which disciplinary proceedings are pending or contemplated against the Government servant concerned for the imposition of major penalty and the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, is of the view that the imposition of the penalty or removed or dismissal from service might be warranted in the case. (b) in which prosecution is contemplated or may have been launched in a Court of law against the Government Servant concerned. (b) in which prosecution is contemplated or may have been launched in a Court of law against the Government Servant concerned. If it is proposed to accept the notice of voluntary retirement even in such cases approval of the Minister-in-charge should be obtained in regard to Class-I and Class-II Government servants and that of the Head of Department in the case of Class-III and Class-IV Government Servants. NOTE: Even where the notice of voluntary retirement given by a Government Servant requires acceptance by the appointing authority, the Government Servant giving notice may presume acceptance and the retirement shall be effective in terms of notice unless the competent authority issues an order to the contrary before expiry of the period of notice. (viii)(a) The qualifying service as on the date of intended retirement of the Government servant retiring under rule 48(1)(a) or rule 48-A of this rule or clause(k) or rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules, or clause (i) of Article 459 of the Civil Service Regulations, with or without permission, shall be increased by a period not exceeding five years, subject to the condition that the total qualifying service rendered by the Government servant does not in any case exceed thirty three years and it does not take him beyond the date of superannuation. (b) The weightage of five years under clause (a) above shall not be admissible in cases of those Government servants who are prematurely retired by the Government in the public interest under Rule 48(a)(b) or F.R. 56(j)." 7. Inviting my attention to the order passed in WP(C) No. 84 of 2019, as reproduced hereinabove, Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel for the petitioner had laid much emphasis on the prayer "(d)" of the reliefs sought for in the said writ petition, wherein, according to him, the petitioner had unambiguously prayed for permitting him to proceed on voluntary retirement. The said relief "(d)" reads as under: "d) Issue writ in the nature of mandamus calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why the petitioner should not be allowed to go on voluntary retirement from 16/06/2018." 8. Next, the learned counsel had taken this court to consider a particular relief granted by this Court, allowing other relief, which is extracted below: "However, the representation of the petitioner for voluntary retirement may be considered by the respondents....... " 9. Next, the learned counsel had taken this court to consider a particular relief granted by this Court, allowing other relief, which is extracted below: "However, the representation of the petitioner for voluntary retirement may be considered by the respondents....... " 9. Laying much emphasis on the aforesaid relief in the order dated 22.02.2019 in WP(C) No. 84 of 2019, the learned counsel contended that along with other reliefs, this Court has specifically passed a direction upon the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner seeking voluntary retirement. 10. The learned counsel has strenuously argued that in terms of the said order dated 22.02.2019 in WP(C) No. 84 of 2019, the prayer of the petitioner seeking voluntary retirement dated 17.03.2018 had again been restored which led the petitioner to submit the prayer dated 23.04.2019 and subsequent representation dated 06.05.2019 for allowing him to proceed him on voluntary retirement from service in no time, were simply the reminders of the notice of voluntary retirement dated 17.03.2018. 11. On the other hand, the sum and substance of the submissions of the learned Advocate General are two folds. Firstly, the notice for voluntary retirement dated 17.03.2018 had no force in the eye of law, and the subsequent prayer dated 23.04.2019 and the representation dated 06.05.2019 should not be treated as notices of voluntary retirement, and as such, those were bad in law. Secondly, the prayer was rejected on the ground of Public Interest since there was dearth of adequate number of Physical Instructors in the schools and in such a situation, public interest will prevail over the individual interest. 12. To answer the controversy, the order dated 22.02.2019 passed in WP(C) No. 84 of 2019, in my opinion, is very significant to the context of the case, apparently, for the reason that it creates a chain between the order dated 17.03.2018 with the final order of rejection of the prayer for voluntary retirement of the petitioner on the ground of Public Interest. In terms of the order dated 22.02.2019, this Court passed an order directing the respondents to consider the notice of the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement, it appears to be obvious that the petitioner after the disciplinary proceeding being dropped would legitimately expect that since his notice for voluntary retirement was rejected solely on the ground of pending disciplinary proceeding, there remained no embargo on the part of the respondents to give effect of the notice dated 17.03.2018 and it was for that reason, in his representation dated 23.04.2019, the petitioner had prayed for giving effect of his notice of voluntary retirement "in no time". The use of the word "in no time" in his prayer in the present writ petition is quite significant since the said representation quite unambiguously spoke of enforcing the notice dated 17th March, 2018 since by that time prescribed period of three months was expired. 13. I have also given my anxious consideration to the memorandum dated 31.03.2018 issued by the Director (Disciplinary Authority), Youth Affairs & Sports, Government of Tripura. For convenience, the said memorandum may be recapitulated here-in-below: "GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA Directorate of Youth Affairs & Sports Shiksha Bhavan, Office Lane, 4th Floor Agartala, West Tripura No. F.6(R-9)/DYAS/Estt/C&G/2015/13878-80 Dated: 31/3/2018 MEMORANDUM Prayer dated 17.03.2018 submitted by Sri Rupak Debroy, Jr. P.I, Kabiraj Tilla H.S School, Badharghat, Agartala for Voluntary Retirement from Government service, which has been forwarded by the Headmaster, Kabiraj Tilla H.S. School, Badharghat vide his letter No. F.3(16)HM/KHSS/2018/404 dated 17.03.2018 has been examined by the competent authority and it has been decided that since disciplinary proceeding is pending against Sri Debroy, Jr. P.I, the notice of voluntary retirement cannot be accepted by the appointing authority. Now, therefore, the prayer dated 17.03.2018 submitted by Sri Rupak Debroy, Jr. P.I, Kabiraj Tilla H.S School, Badharghat, Agartala for Voluntary Retirement from Government Service is hereby rejected on grounds stated above. This is issue in pursuance of the note issued by Law Department, Government of Tripura vide UO No. 663/Addl. Secretary/Law/2016 dated 09.08.2016. Director (Disciplinary Authority) Youth Affairs & Sports Govt. of Tripura To Sri Rupak Debroy, Jr. P.I" 14. To re-iterate, in the case in hand, the petitioner by his prayer dated 17.03.2018 had sought for voluntary retirement from service with effect from the date of expiry of 3(three) months. Secretary/Law/2016 dated 09.08.2016. Director (Disciplinary Authority) Youth Affairs & Sports Govt. of Tripura To Sri Rupak Debroy, Jr. P.I" 14. To re-iterate, in the case in hand, the petitioner by his prayer dated 17.03.2018 had sought for voluntary retirement from service with effect from the date of expiry of 3(three) months. In response to the said notice, the respondents informed the petitioner that the said request/notice of the petitioner for voluntary retirement could not be accepted due to the pending disciplinary proceeding. It is obvious that the State respondents had invoked the conditions laid down in Clause (a) of the of Sub-Rule (vii) of Rule 48-A of the said Rules. Thereafter, the petitioner had filed a writ petition before this court being WP(C) No. 84 of 2019 with a specific prayer to issue writ in the nature of mandamus to allow the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement terms of his notice dated 17.03.2018. This Court while disposing of the said writ petition had passed a direction upon the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner for voluntary retirement. Thereafter, the disciplinary proceeding being not completed within the stipulated period as determined by this Court was automatically dropped. In consequence thereto, the petitioner vide his letter dated 23.04.2019 requested the respondents to pass an order of his voluntary retirement from service in no time. Having found no response, the petitioner through his learned counsel served a demand notice upon the respondents on 06.05.2019 asking the respondents to pass an order of his voluntary retirement from service in no time, but, the petitioner did not receive any response to the said demand notice and, ultimately, he filed the instant writ petition before this Court and the Registry note reveals that the said writ petition was filed on 04.05.2019. 15. After filing of the writ petition, the respondents virtually took cognizance of the prayer for voluntary retirement dated 17.03.2018 and vide communication dated 14.05.2019 issued by the respondent No. 2, it was informed to the petitioner that his prayer for voluntary retirement from Government service was not possible in public interest since there was acute shortage of Physical Instructors in schools across the State. For convenience, the said reply dated 14.05.2019 issued by the respondent No. 2 may be reproduced here-in-below for convenience in extenso: "Subject:- Demand Notice dated 06/05/2019 on behalf of Sri Rupak Debroy, S/O, Lt. For convenience, the said reply dated 14.05.2019 issued by the respondent No. 2 may be reproduced here-in-below for convenience in extenso: "Subject:- Demand Notice dated 06/05/2019 on behalf of Sri Rupak Debroy, S/O, Lt. Sudhir Ranjan Debroy, Dhaleswar Road No. 8, Agartala-799007, West Tripura. Dear Sir, The undersigned received demand Notice dated 06/5/2019 issued by you on behalf of Sri Rupak Debroy, Junior Physical Instructor of this directorate. In response to your said Notice, it is admitted that the disciplinary proceeding which was pending against your client Sri Rupak Debroy is deemed to have been dropped with effect from 22.04.2019 in terms of the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Tripura in WP(C) No. 84 of 2019. So far as the questions of accepting Sri Debory's prayer for voluntary retirement from government service, I am to state that it is not possible to allow Sri Debroy to go on voluntary retirement from the service at this stage in public interest. This is due to the fact that a large number of posts of Physical Instructors are lying vacant in the Department of Youth Affairs & Sports and as a result there is acute shortage of physical Instructors in schools across the State. In view of the prevailing situation, it is not possible at this stage to spare your client and allow him to avail voluntary retirement from government service." 16. A glimpse of the said reply dated 14.05.2019 it is clear that while disposing of the notice for voluntary retirement submitted by the petitioner, the respondent No. 2 had considered the order of this Court dated 22.02.2019 passed in WP(C) No. 84 of 2019. In my opinion, the reply dated 14.05.2019 issued by the respondent No. 2 is in continuation and consequence of the notice dated 17.03.2018, which, constitutes the ultimate rejection of the prayer of the petitioner for voluntary retirement from government service. 17. I further emphasize that the communication dated 14.05.2019 as stated above, carries enough significance to consider the submission of learned Advocate General that the notice dated 17.03.2018 had no life, which, according to me, deserves no merit. 17. I further emphasize that the communication dated 14.05.2019 as stated above, carries enough significance to consider the submission of learned Advocate General that the notice dated 17.03.2018 had no life, which, according to me, deserves no merit. From the reply dated 14.05.2019 issued by the respondent No. 2, it is clear and certain that the prayer/notice of voluntary retirement dated 17.03.2018 and the contents therein coupled with the order dated 22.02.2019 were duly considered in WP(C) No. 84 of 2019 directing the respondent No. 2 to consider the notice for voluntary retirement of the petitioner, and taking cognizance of the said notice of voluntary retirement, the respondent No. 2 also stated the grounds of rejection therein, as highlighted herein-above. Thus, I re-iterate that the reply dated 14.05.2019(Annexure-R.1, p-50 of the counter affidavit) is the ultimate rejection of the prayer for voluntary retirement of the petitioner and not the reply dated 31.03.2018. As such, I repel the submission of learned Advocate General on this count that the notice dated 17.03.2018 had no life. Furthermore, it is apparent from the reply dated 14.05.2019 that the respondent No. 2 has taken a new plea and fresh ground to reject the prayer for voluntary retirement of the petitioner which covers the second fold of submission of learned Advocate General and it requires examination and discussion. 18. Thus, coming to the second fold of submission of learned Advocate General that the rejection of the prayer for voluntary retirement made by the petitioner on the ground of public interest is legally sound and valid even if there is no such stipulation available in Rule 48-A has been taken into consideration. 19. To fortify this submission, learned Advocate General has heavily relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., Vs. Achal Singh, reported in (2018) 17 SCC 578 , which leads me to take note of the said decision. 19. To fortify this submission, learned Advocate General has heavily relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., Vs. Achal Singh, reported in (2018) 17 SCC 578 , which leads me to take note of the said decision. The main controversy arose before the Apex Court for consideration in the said case was as to whether under Rule 56 of the Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules(here-in-after referred to as "the Fundamental Rules") as amended, an employee had unfettered right to seek voluntary retirement by serving a notice of three months to the State Government or whether the State Government under the Explanation attached to Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules, is authorized to decline the prayer for voluntary retirement in the public interest under clause (c) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 20. At this juncture, before I dwell upon the detailed discussion of the case of Achal Singh (supra), I have revisited Rule 48-A of the said Rules along with its amended proviso as amended vide notification dated 28.12.1983, and adopted by the State Government. On cumulative reading of the relevant provisions as envisaged in Rule 48-A, following essential elements, according to me, may be summarized, required for voluntary retirement:- (i) A Government Servant must have completed 20(twenty) years of qualifying service; (ii) On such completion of qualifying service, the Government servant has to serve a three months' notice in writing to the appointing authority; (iii) The Scheme is purely voluntary; (iv) It is the absolute prerogative of the Government servant himself; (v) The Government shall have no right to retire a Government servant on its own, under this Scheme; (vi) Notice of less than three months may also be accepted by the appointing authority in particular and appropriate cases, but, such acceptance must be made with prior concurrence of the Finance Department; (vii) Withdrawal of such notice of voluntary retirement is not automatic; (viii) Notice of voluntary retirement only can be withdrawn with the approval of the appointing authority. However, such request for withdrawal has to be made in writing before the expiry of the period of notice. (ix) It will be the sole discretion of the appointing authority to approve or not to approve such a request for withdrawal of the notice of voluntary retirement. However, such request for withdrawal has to be made in writing before the expiry of the period of notice. (ix) It will be the sole discretion of the appointing authority to approve or not to approve such a request for withdrawal of the notice of voluntary retirement. (x) A Government servant after completion of 20(twenty) years of qualifying service can make a prayer to go on voluntary retirement on any date earlier to the statutory period of 3(three) months, but in that case, such prayer or notice will require acceptance by the appointing authority. (xi) The appointing authority may not accept the notice for voluntary retirement if there is pending disciplinary proceeding or on contemplation against the Government servant concerned for the imposition of major penalty and the disciplinary proceeding having regard to the circumstances of the case, is of the view that the imposition of penalty or removed or dismissal from service might be warranted in the case. (xii) The notice of voluntary retirement also may not be accepted in which prosecution is contemplated or may have been launched in a Court of law against the Government servant concerned. If it is proposed to accept the notice of voluntary retirement even in such cases, approval of the Minister in-charge should be obtained in regard to Class I and Class II Government servants and that of the Head of the Department in the case of Class III and Class IV Government servants; (xiii) Refusal to accept the notice for voluntary retirement must be communicated to the Government servant before expiry of the period of notice; (xiv) Notice of voluntary retirement shall be effective after the expiry of three months' notice, if communication refusing its acceptance is not made to such Government servant before expiry of the period of notice; (xv) The said Rule binds the Government as well as the Government servant. There is no question of acceptance of the request for voluntary retirement by the Government. 21. In the instant case, admitted position is that the petitioner has crossed the prescribed age of qualifying service. Thereafter, due to the illness of his mother he prayed for voluntary retirement as afore-stated giving the Government three months' prior notice in writing. The State-respondents have rejected the prayer of the petitioner on the ground of public interest due to shortage of Physical Instructors in Schools across the State. 22. Thereafter, due to the illness of his mother he prayed for voluntary retirement as afore-stated giving the Government three months' prior notice in writing. The State-respondents have rejected the prayer of the petitioner on the ground of public interest due to shortage of Physical Instructors in Schools across the State. 22. Now, it is necessary to discuss the core issue involved in the case of Achal Singh(supra). In the said case, the Apex Court took into account its decision in Tek Chand v. Dile Ram, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 290 . In para 26 of the case of Achal Singh (supra) it was observed thus: "26. The decision in Tek Chand v. Dile Ram has been relied upon by the respondents. This Court considered Rule 48-A(2) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, proviso to said Rule contained a provision where the appointing authority did not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of the said period. The relevant observations are extracted hereunder: (SCC pp. 309-11, paras 31, 33 & 35) "31. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 33. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 35. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx " Having analyzed Rule 48-A, the Supreme Court in the case of Achal Singh (supra) had observed thus: "....................The Rule which came up for consideration was entirely different. There is no provision contained in the Rule in question in the case at hand like the proviso to Rule 48-A(2) referred to above due to which the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of period of notice in case the same was not refused." After being so observed, the Supreme Court in Achal Singh (supra) had again observed in para 27 thus: "27. In our considered opinion, under Rule 56 as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, notice of voluntary retirement does not come into effect automatically on the expiry of the three months' period. Under the Rule in question, the appointing authority has to accept the notice for voluntary retirement or it can be refused on permissible grounds." 23. Further, in the case of Achal Singh (supra), it was argued on behalf of Dr. Achal Singh that after the issuance of notice or request of voluntary retirement the State of Uttar Pradesh has no power to decline such request. Further, in the case of Achal Singh (supra), it was argued on behalf of Dr. Achal Singh that after the issuance of notice or request of voluntary retirement the State of Uttar Pradesh has no power to decline such request. On the other hand, it was the argument of the State of Uttar Pradesh that as per Explanation attached to Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules as amended in the State of Uttar Pradesh, it was open to the State Government to take a decision whether to retire an employee voluntarily under Rule 56(a) duly considering the public interest or decline the applications for voluntary retirement. It was also submitted that there is no automatic retirement on the expiry of the period of notice of three months served under Rule 56 as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. For convenience, the said Explanation as inserted by State of Uttar Pradesh by amendment may be reproduced here-in-below: "Explanation.-(1) The decision of the appointing authority under clause (c) to require the government servant to retire as specified therein shall be taken if it appears to the said authority to be in public interest, but nothing herein contained shall be construed to require any recital, in the order, of such decision having been taken in the public interest. (2) In order to be satisfied whether it will be in the public interest to require a government servant to retire under clause (c), the appointing authority may take into consideration any material relating to the government servant and nothing herein contained shall be construed to exclude from consideration- (a) any entries relating to any period before such government servant was allowed to cross any efficiency bar or before he was promoted to any post in an officiating or substantive capacity or on an ad hoc basis; or (b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (c) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (2-A) Every such decision shall be deemed to have been taken in the public interest. (3) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (4) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx." 24. Interpreting the said Explanation, the Apex Court in the case of Achal Singh (supra) in para 11 had held thus: "11. The Explanation attached to Rule 56 makes it clear that the decision of the appointing authority under clause (c) of Rule 56 to retire a government servant shall be taken if it appears to be in public interest. The Explanation is applicable to both the exigencies viz. The Explanation attached to Rule 56 makes it clear that the decision of the appointing authority under clause (c) of Rule 56 to retire a government servant shall be taken if it appears to be in public interest. The Explanation is applicable to both the exigencies viz. when the Government retires an employee or when an employee seeks voluntary retirement, not only when Government desires to retire an employee in public interest. The Explanation attached to Rule 56 as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh is clear and precise." Then, at para 12 of the said decision, the Apex Court held: "12. In our opinion, whether voluntary retirement is automatic or an order is required to be passed would depend upon the phraseology used in a particular rule under which retirement is to be ordered or voluntary retirement is sought. The factual position of each and every case has to be seen along with applicable rules while applying a dictum of the Court interpreting any other rule it should be in pari materia. Rule 56(2) deals with the satisfaction of the Government to require a government servant to retire in the public interest. For the purpose, the Government may consider any material relating to government servant and may requisition any report from the Vigilance establishment." 25. The learned counsel appearing for Dr. Achal Singh had strongly relied on the dictum in Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam reported in (1977) 4 SCC 441 . On analysis of the case of Dinesh Chandra Sangma(supra) and on comparing the said case with the case of Achal Singh (supra), it was observed by the Supreme Court that the principle laid down by a three-Judge Bench in the case of Dinesh Chandra Sangma(supra) interpreting F.R. 56 is not applicable to the case of Achal Singh (supra) since there was no such Explanation to Rule 56 amended by State of Uttar Pradesh. After analyzing the cases, cited at the Bar, in the case of Achal Singh (supra), the Supreme Court at para 42 of the case of Achal Singh (supra) had observed: [scc p. 606, para 42] "42. After analyzing the cases, cited at the Bar, in the case of Achal Singh (supra), the Supreme Court at para 42 of the case of Achal Singh (supra) had observed: [scc p. 606, para 42] "42. There are several decisions of the High Court, namely, Anil Dewan v. State [ILR (2010) 1 P&H 46]; State of Punjab v. Harbir Singh Dhillon [MANU/PH/5248/2010] and Kalpana Singh v. State of Rajasthan [MANU/RH/1596/2014], which were cited to show that the decision in Dinesh Chandra Sangma had been followed. We have considered the aforesaid decisions and we find that it would depend upon the scheme of the Rules. Each and every judgment has to be considered in the light of the provisions which came up for consideration and question it has decided, language employed in the Rules, and it cannot be said to be of general application as already observed by this Court in State of Haryana v. S.K. Singhal, (1999) 4 SCC 293 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 859". 26. Now, it is necessary to give a bird's eye view whether the provisions of Rule 48-A permit the Government i.e. the respondents concerned herein to take the plea of public interest to reject the claim of the petitioner for voluntary retirement. From a bare reading of Rule 48-A of CCS(Pension) Rules, 1972 and the essential elements of the said Rule, it is clear as crystal that the scheme of Rule 48-A does not make any such provision enabling the Government to reject the prayer for voluntary retirement on the ground of public interest unlike the case of Achal Singh(supra) where the State Government of Uttar Pradesh has taken a decision as per the Explanations to decline the prayer for voluntary retirement considering the public interest. The legislature in its own wisdom does not feel it necessary to incorporate the ground of public interest in the entire scheme of Rule 48-A as a ground to refuse the prayer for voluntary retirement. A close look to sub-rule (1) of Rule 48-A, the language aptly makes it clear that the legislature intended to make the scheme of voluntary retirement for Government servants only for their interest. The language of the scheme is clear and explicit that the scheme is purely voluntary, the initiative resting with the Government servant himself. The legislature did not stop here. The language of the scheme is clear and explicit that the scheme is purely voluntary, the initiative resting with the Government servant himself. The legislature did not stop here. It further said that the Government shall have no right to retire a Government servant on its own, under the scheme. Only contingency/restrictions are enumerated under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-rule(7) of the said Rule 48-A. (emphasis supplied) 27. Here, I may profitably refer the case of Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424 , where Justice Chinnappa Reddy, J., emphasizing on the importance of the text and context in which every word is used in the matter of interpretation and statutes, opined: [scc p. 450, para 33] "33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place." 28. Again, in Union of India v. Elphinstone Spg. and Wvg. Co. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place." 28. Again, in Union of India v. Elphinstone Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. reported in (2001) 4 SCC 139 , the Constitution Bench, while dealing with the concept of interpretation and the duty of the Judge, opined that while examining a particular statute for finding out the legislative intent it is the attitude of the Judges in arriving at a solution by striking a balance between the letter and spirit of the statute without acknowledging that they have in any way supplement the statute would be the proper criteria. The duty of the Judges is to expound and not to legislate is a fundamental rule. There is, no doubt, a marginal area in which the courts mould or creatively interpret legislation and they are thus finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing. Reference in this context was made to Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways Inc., (1969) 1 QB 616 : (1968) 3 WLR 714 : (1968) 2 All ER 1059] (QB p. 638 : WLR p. 732 and State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, (1975) 2 SCC 810 (SCC p. 817, para 14). The Court further observed that by no stretch of imagination a Judge is entitled to add something more than what is there in the statute by way of a supposed intention of the legislature. The cardinal principle of construction of statute is that the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. 29. In Polestar Electronic (P) Ltd. v. CST [Polestar Electronic (P) Ltd. v. CST, (1978) 1 SCC 636 , it has been held: (SCC p. 657, para 11) "11. ... If the language of a statute is clear and explicit, effect must be given to it, for in such a case the words best declare the intention of the law-giver. 29. In Polestar Electronic (P) Ltd. v. CST [Polestar Electronic (P) Ltd. v. CST, (1978) 1 SCC 636 , it has been held: (SCC p. 657, para 11) "11. ... If the language of a statute is clear and explicit, effect must be given to it, for in such a case the words best declare the intention of the law-giver. It would not be right to refuse to place on the language of the statute the plain and natural meaning which it must bear on the ground that it produces a consequence which could not have been intended by the legislature. It is only from the language of the statute that the intention of the legislature must be gathered, for the legislature means no more and no less than what it says. It is not permissible to the Court to speculate as to what the legislature must have intended and then to twist or bend the language of the statute to make it accord with the presumed intention of the legislature. ..." 30. In the case of Union of India vs. Rajiv Kumar reported in (2003) 6 SCC 516 , the Apex Court has held thus:-[scc pp. 524, 525, 526, paras 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24] "18. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or rewrite a provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute or any statutory provision is the determinative factor of legislative intent of policy-makers. 19. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute or any statutory provision is to ascertain the intention of the legislature or the authority enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse [ (1997) 6 SCC 312 : AIR 1998 SC 74 ]. The intention of the maker is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moo PC 1 : 4 MIA 179], courts cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act; they cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (Also see State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel [ (1998) 3 SCC 234 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 737 : JT (1998) 2 SC 253]. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. [See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. [(1978) 1 All ER 948 : (1978) 1 WLR 231 (HL)] Rules of interpretation do not permit courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of a doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn, L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans [1910 AC 444 (HL)], quoted in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah [ AIR 1962 SC 847 ]. 20. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended, but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid" Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage [218 FR 547].) The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama [ (1990) 1 SCC 277 : AIR 1990 SC 981 ]. 21. In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. [ (1977) 2 SCC 273 : AIR 1977 SC 842 ], it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of an a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 22. While interpreting a provision, the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 22. While interpreting a provision, the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See CST v. Popular Trading Co. [ (2000) 5 SCC 511 ]) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. 23. ..................................................................... 24. .................................................................... A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle of quod enim semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute - casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni juris communis relinquitur; "a casus omissus", observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart [1 TR 44, 52 : 99 ER 963] (ER p. 967), "can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws". 31. In the case of M.G. Wagh & Ors. vs. Jay Engineering Works Ltd. reported in (1987) 1 SCC 542 , the Apex Court while interpreting a provision of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 has observed thus:- "................................When it is equally possible to take the view which would be conducive to the conclusion that there is no lacuna in the legislation, it would be unreasonable to take the view that the legislature has left a lacuna either by negligence or by lack of foresight or because it did not know its job". 32. Lord Brougham in the case of Robert Wigram Crawford, appellant vs. Richard Spooner, respondent, on the rule of interpretation stated thus:-[Dec. 11 and 15, 1846] "The construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the Act. We cannot fish out what possibly may have been the intention of the Legislature; we cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of the Act; we cannot add, and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there. 11 and 15, 1846] "The construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the Act. We cannot fish out what possibly may have been the intention of the Legislature; we cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of the Act; we cannot add, and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there. If the Legislature did intend that which it has not expressed clearly; much more, if the Legislature intended something very different; if the Legislature intended something pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for Judges to invent something which they do not meet with in the words of the text(aiding their construction of the text always, of course, by the context); it is not for them so to supply a meaning, for, in reality, it would be supplying it: the true way in these cases is to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is, ......................................................" 33. In the case of Nalinakhya Bysack vs. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors. reported in AIR 1953 SC 148 , a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has observed thus:- "It must always be borne in mind, as said by Lord Halsbury in Commissioner for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel [L.R.(1891) A.C. 531 at p. 549], that it is not competent to any Court to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature has made a mistake." 34. If we carefully dwell upon the entire scheme of Rule 48-A, it is discernible that the scheme is made only to put the Government servants in an advantageous position after completion of the prescribed age of qualifying service. It will not be wise for this Court to imagine that the framers of the said enactment were unaware of the concept of public interest. But, even then, the legislative intent was not to debarring a Government servant to go on voluntary retirement on the ground of "public interest" unlike the Rule applied in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It will not be wise for this Court to imagine that the framers of the said enactment were unaware of the concept of public interest. But, even then, the legislative intent was not to debarring a Government servant to go on voluntary retirement on the ground of "public interest" unlike the Rule applied in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The phraseology in the said Rule is clear and unambiguous and in this situation, this Court is refrained from interpreting the scheme otherwise for the reason that casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court and the present case is not the case where there is clear necessity of the application of the principle of casus omissus which, in my opinion will make the entire scheme of Rule 48-A is inconsistent and contrary to the legislative intent. (emphasis supplied) 35. The decision rendered in Achal Singh(supra) is distinguishable which was based on differently couched rule. The Explanation added in Rule 56 of Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules makes the provision different in the State of Uttar Pradesh where the State has legislated in clear and unambiguous language that while considering the prayer for voluntary retirement the appointing authority has to keep in mind, the public interest as provided in the Explanation attached to Rule 56. There should not any dispute to the settled proposition of law that Explanation can be read as proviso and it explains the scope of the main provision and the Explanation becomes the part of the main section. 36. While making inquiry to the factual and legal aspects surfaced in Achal Singh(supra), the Apex Court had made an analysis in detail to the decisions of the Court in Dinesh Chandra Sangma vs. State of Assam, (1977) 4 SCC 441 and B.J. Shelat vs. State of Gujarat, (1978) 2 SCC 202 and found that the said cases are comparable with the Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules. In the said cases, the respective State Governments did not employ or incorporate the word Public Interest in the respective Rules applicable to the Government employees seeking for voluntary retirement. But, this theory of Public Interest has been added to the Rule applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh which manifestly is quite different. 37. In the instant case, under Rule 48-A of the said Rule applicable in the State of Tripura did not employ the word Public Interest in the whole Scheme. But, this theory of Public Interest has been added to the Rule applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh which manifestly is quite different. 37. In the instant case, under Rule 48-A of the said Rule applicable in the State of Tripura did not employ the word Public Interest in the whole Scheme. Under the Scheme in question, the appointing authority is only empowered to refuse the permission to retire a Government servant against whom department enquiry is pending or contemplated. There is no other contingency incorporated in the Rule. Having regard to the factual and legal aspects of the case in hand, and keeping in mind the settled rule of interpretation as propounded in various authorities referred to here-in-above, this Court refrains itself to bring the theory of Public Interest to re-write or incorporate or employ the word "Public Interest" in the realm of Rule 48-A of the said Rule applicable in the State of Tripura. 38. In my considered view, the court should not be burdened with the duty to add or re-write a provision and depart from the original language engrafted in the statute, which duty absolutely lies with the legislature. Further, this Court cannot read the language of a provision in a manner otherwise alien to the statute. Similarly, this Court should not permit the executive authorities to exercise any such power which is not vested with them; and limited to the language of the statute. Further, relying upon well-neigh principle of statutory interpretation, the court will not imagine any such situation while reading into statutory provision that the legislature while drafting the legislation had missed something which ought to have been there and with this assumption the court should not take a view that the legislature has left a lacuna either by negligence or by lack of foresight or because it did not know its job. 39. It is further noticed that in the case of Achal Singh(supra), the Supreme Court relying upon the decision of C.V. Francis vs. Union of India, (2013) 14 SCC 486 has categorically observed that it would depend upon the plain and explicit language inbuilt in the statutory Scheme itself and no rule can be said to be of general application [State of Haryana vs. S.K. Singhal, (1999) 4 SCC 293 ]. As such, in absence of such specific stipulation in the prescribed Scheme, the Government employees cannot be denied the benefit of the provision of the scheme. (underline for emphasis) 40. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, both on points of facts and law, in my considered view, the ground of 'public interest' as urged by learned Advocate General to refuse the prayer for voluntary retirement of the petitioner, are beyond the scope and ambit of the provision of Rule 48-A of the said Rule as applicable in the State of Tripura and, therefore, I repel the ground of public interest taken by the State-respondents in rejecting the prayer for voluntary retirement of the petitioner, because, if such contention is accepted, then, it will be a clear infraction of the statutory scheme as prescribed in the said Rule. 41. For the reasons stated and analyzed above, in my opinion, the respondent No. 2, being the appointing authority has committed an error in passing the impugned order dated 14.05.2019 rejecting the prayer for voluntary retirement of the petitioner from service by way of introducing the theory of 'public interest' and other ancillary grounds, which are alien in the statute and deserves interference. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 14.05.2019 is set aside and quashed. Once the contingency of pending disciplinary proceeding is removed, the petitioner must be held to be lawfully retired as notified by him from the date such contingency is removed and his prayer dated 23.04.2019 deserves to be accepted as it fulfills all the essential elements of Rule 48-A of the said Rule. However, since the petitioner has been in service and the respondents have not given effect to the prayer/notice of voluntary retirement of the petitioner, in this circumstance, the respondents are directed to accept the prayer/notice of the petitioner for voluntary retirement from service immediately with all retiral benefits in terms of the relevant Rules engrafted in the Scheme. The entire exercise has to be completed within a period of 30(thirty) days from the date the petitioner shall furnish a copy of this order to the respondent No. 2. 42. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed in the above terms and stands disposed.