JUDGMENT : RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J. 1. Heard Sri Upendra Nath Mishra, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Neel Kamal Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ran Vijay Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 2. The order under challenge is the suspension order dated 10.12.2019 passed by the Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Finance (Lekha Parikchha), Anubhag-1, Civil Secretariat, Lucknow, which is contained as Annexure no. 1 to the writ petition. 3. By means of aforesaid suspension order the petitioner has been placed under suspension on the allegation that by wrongly indicating the Government Order dated 24.12.2009 instead of Government Order dated 7.9.2009 the employees of the department has illegally been given the benefit of pay fixation. However, the charge-sheet dated 31.12.2019 has been issued against the petitioner containing three charges which has been framed by breaking the sole allegation of wrong fixation of revised pay scale of Class-III employees of the Cooperative Societies and Panchayat into three charges. The three charges are (i) wrong fixation of pay of Senior Assistants of the Department due to issuance of alleged illegal order dated 25.6.2017 by the petitioner, (ii) issuance of an irregular correction order dated 29.3.2019 by the petitioner and (iii) the alleged excess payment of arrears due to pay fixation thereby causing huge loss to the State-Exchequer. 4. The aforesaid charge-sheet has been assailed by the petitioner by filing Service Single No. 299/2020 wherein the counter affidavit has been called to the effect as to whether charge-sheet dated 28.12.2019 is dated 31.12.2019 when the inquiry officer has made signature on the said charge sheet on 28.12.2019 as it is said to have been prepared by the disciplinary authority on 28.12.2019. No interim protection restraining to conduct the departmental inquiry has been passed. As a matter of fact this Court is of the view that since the charge-sheet has been issued containing some charges, veracity of the charges may not be examined and those charges may be proved or disproved during the course of the departmental inquiry strictly in accordance with law. 5. So far as the suspension order dated 10.12.2019 is concerned the Court is appreciating the validity of the suspension order as under. 6. 5. So far as the suspension order dated 10.12.2019 is concerned the Court is appreciating the validity of the suspension order as under. 6. This Court is conscious that if the allegations of the suspension order and the charge-sheet are appreciated, the inquiry officer/disciplinary authority would have nothing to inquire during the course of the departmental inquiry inasmuch as the allegations so levelled against the petitioner must be proved on the basis of preponderance of the probabilities for which the relevant material and evidences are led and examined by the inquiry officer. Therefore, the validity of the suspension order shall be tested on the settled principles as to whether the suspension order is sustainable in the eyes of law. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted with vehemence that the impugned suspension order is violative of Rule 4 of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. For the brevity Rule 4(1) is being reproduced herein-below: “4. Suspension - (1) A Government servant against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated, or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority: Provided that suspension should not be resorted to unless the allegations against the Government servant are so serious that in the event of their being established may ordinarily warrant major penalty: Provided further that concerned Head of the Department empowered by the Governor by an order in this behalf may place a Government servant or class of Government servants belonging to Group 'A' and 'B' posts under suspension under this rule: Provided also that in the case of any Government servant or class of Government servants belonging to Group 'C' and 'D' posts, the appointing authority may delegate its power under this rule to the next lower authority.” 8. A bare perusal of the aforesaid Rule 4 clearly mandates that the suspension order can be issued only when the charges against an employee are very serious entailing the major punishment i.e. dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. In other words in case the charges are not so serious and grave entailing the major punishment, the recourse of suspension order should be avoided. 9. In the present case the charges mentioned in the impugned suspension order are not serious enough, prima-facie, which in the event of being proved, would warrant imposition of any major penalty. 10. In other words in case the charges are not so serious and grave entailing the major punishment, the recourse of suspension order should be avoided. 9. In the present case the charges mentioned in the impugned suspension order are not serious enough, prima-facie, which in the event of being proved, would warrant imposition of any major penalty. 10. Notably, the petitioner has been placed under suspension on the allegations that petitioner has allegedly issued wrong directions in his letter dated 26.5.2017 and 29.3.2019, whereby subordinate authorities were directed to apply the provisions of G.O. dated 22.3.2013 read with G.O. dated 24.12.2009 and fitment table contained in G.O. dated 7.9.2009. However, the respondent-authorities are of the opinion that pay revision of Class-III employees i.e. Senior Assistants working in the department should have been made only as per provisions of para 11 of Government Order dated 8.12.2008 and not as per Government Order dated 7.9.2009 and 24.12.2009. Therefore, the said authorities have observed that the benefit of pay revision to such employees of the department should have been made only as per para 11 of the Government Order dated 8.12.2008 read with fitment table of G.O. dated 11.12.2008. Accordingly, the petitioner has been charged for having committed misconduct as per Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules, 1956 for not applying the aforesaid Government Order dated 8.12.2008 and 11.12.2008. 11. While doing so, it appears, prima-facie, the State-respondents have not noticed that the provisions of Government Order dated 8.12.2008 were amended by the subsequent Government Order dated 24.12.2009 and similarly the provisions of fitment table applicable on the Pay-Band of Rs. 5200-20200 (relevant for the issue in question) were also amended by the fitment table issued through the subsequent Government Order dated 7.9.2009. However, the petitioner appears to have applied, prima-facie, both the aforementioned amended Government Orders dated 24.12.2009 and 7.9.2009. It appears that petitioner in a bonafide manner has applied those government orders which, as per him, were applicable at that point of time. There may be some confusion to that effect on the part of the petitioner but there is no allegation in the suspension order or charge-sheet to the effect that petitioner having any ulterior motive or malafide intention has applied the Government Orders dated 24.12.2009 and 7.9.2009 instead of 8.12.2008. There may be some confusion to that effect on the part of the petitioner but there is no allegation in the suspension order or charge-sheet to the effect that petitioner having any ulterior motive or malafide intention has applied the Government Orders dated 24.12.2009 and 7.9.2009 instead of 8.12.2008. Therefore, for any bonafide confusion having cogent explanation to that effect the petitioner should have not been placed under suspension. If there was no bonafide confusion on the part of the petitioner as aforesaid, the explanation from the petitioner could have been called and necessary orders against those employees who have received the benefit of revised pay scale could have been issued. During the course of argument it has been noted that the notices of recovery against all the employees who have got benefit of pay revision have been issued seeking explanation from those employees, therefore, if those employees could not justify the benefit so availed by them would be liable for recovery proceedings and in that case, prima-facie, no loss would be caused to the State-Exchequer. 12. Learned Additional C.S.C. has submitted with vehemence that since there is no case of the petitioner that the impugned suspension order is an outcome of malafide nor it is without jurisdictional order, therefore, such suspension order should not be interfered. In support of aforesaid argument Sri Ran Vijay Singh has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Orissa vs. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, 1994 (4) SCC 126 and Punjab National Bank vs. D.M. Amarnath, (2006) 10 SCC 162 by submitting that if the suspension order has been passed pending departmental inquiry it should not be interfered with. 13. Sri Ran Vijay Singh has also placed reliance on some judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court by submitting that normally the constitutional courts should not interfere with the show cause notice or charge-sheet, therefore, the charge-sheet issued against the petitioner may not be interfered. Since the subject matter of the present writ petition is suspension order not the charge-sheet, therefore, those case laws are not applicable in the present issue. 14. However, Sri Upendra Nath Mishra, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Union of India and Another vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal placing reliance on para 21 and 22 of the aforesaid judgment which are being reproduced herein-below: “21. 14. However, Sri Upendra Nath Mishra, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Union of India and Another vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal placing reliance on para 21 and 22 of the aforesaid judgment which are being reproduced herein-below: “21. The power of suspension should not be exercised in an arbitrary manner and without any reasonable ground or as vindictive misuse of power. Suspension should be made only in a case where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent employee and the allegations involving moral turpitude, grave misconduct or indiscipline or refusal to carry out the orders of superior authority are there, or there is a strong prima facie case against him, if proved, would ordinarily result in reduction in rank, removal or dismissal from service. The authority should also take into account all the available material as to whether in a given case, it is advisable to allow the delinquent to continue to perform his duties in the office or his retention in office is likely to hamper or frustrate the inquiry. 22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that suspension order can be passed by the competent authority considering the gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of omission or commission and the nature of evidence available. It cannot be actuated by mala-fide, arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. Effect on public interest due to the employee’s continuation in office is also a relevant and determining factor. The facts of each case have to be taken into consideration as no formula of universal application can be laid down in this regard. However, suspension order should be passed only where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent and if the charges stand proved, would ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment i.e. removal or dismissal from service, or reduction in rank etc.” 15. As per the Hon'ble Apex Court the suspension order should not be exercised in arbitrary manner and without any reasonable ground or as misuse of power. As per the Hon'ble Apex Court the suspension order should not be exercised in arbitrary manner and without any reasonable ground or as misuse of power. Suspension should be made only in a case where there is a strong prima-facie case against the delinquent employee and the allegations involving moral turpitude, grave misconduct or indiscipline or refusal to carry out the orders of superior authority are there or there is strong prima-facie case against him, if proved, would ordinarily result in major punishment. The Hon'ble Apex Court has cautioned that while issuing the suspension order the aforesaid facts should be considered by the authority concerned carefully. The aforesaid observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court makes it abundantly clear that the authority competent who passed the suspension order must take care of the gravity of the seriousness of the charges and he must have strong satisfaction, prima-facie, that in case the charges are proved the delinquent employee would have to face major punishment. 16. In the present case the sole allegation against the petitioner is that he has wrongly applied the Government Order while providing the benefit of revised pay scale to the Class-III employees of the department. It has also been noted that the necessary orders seeking explanation from the employees who have received the benefit of revised pay scale, have been issued for recovery and if those employees could not justify the benefit received by them, necessary orders of recovery may likely to be issued and in that case there would be no loss to the State Exchequer. Further, there is no allegation against the petitioner to the effect that while applying the government orders which as per the State-respondent are not applicable in the issue in question, the petitioner was having any ulterior motive or malafide intention, therefore, at the best the petitioner could have been asked as to how he has applied wrong government orders and after considering the reply of the petitioner appropriate decision may be taken strictly in accordance with law during the course of the departmental inquiry but for this allegation, I think the major punishment may not be awarded to the petitioner subject to the findings of enquiry officer. It is clarified here that this observation shall not affect the departmental proceedings in any manner whatsoever and the inquiry officer shall not only conduct and conclude the departmental inquiry strictly in accordance with law while affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner but shall not be influenced from any finding being given herein above. However, on the material available on records and the arguments so advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered opinion that in view of dictum of Hon'ble Apex Court in re: Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra) the impugned suspension order is not sustainable in the eyes of law and prima facie appears to be violative of Rule 4 of the Rules of 1999 besides being unwarranted and uncalled for in view of the facts and circumstances of the issue in question. 17. Accordingly, the suspension order dated 10.12.2019 passed by the Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Finance (Lekha Parikchha), Anubhag-1, Civil Secretariat, Lucknow which is contained as Annexure no. 1 to the writ petition, is hereby quashed. 18. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties to reinstate the petitioner and pay him salary and other emoluments regularly with promptness, preferably within a period of 15 days from the date of production of certified copy of the order of this Court. 19. It is made clear that the departmental inquiry against the petitioner may be conducted and concluded, if it is so warranted but strictly in accordance with law. 20. In the result the writ petition succeeds and accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.