JUDGMENT Anoop Chitkara, J. - Challenging the judgment of acquittal passed by Sessions Court, reversing the judgment of conviction for not possessing a proper license to run the shop and for selling sub-standard Haldi (Turmeric) in unsealed packets, the State has come up before this Court by filing the present appeal, seeking conviction of the shopkeeper. 2. The complainant, posted as the Food Inspector, filed a complaint dated 12.6.1998, against accused-respondent Ram Kumar seeking his prosecution for the offenses punishable under Section 16(1A) and 16(1) (a) (i) & (ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (after now called as 'PFA Act'). 3. The Food Inspector alleged in his complaint that on 18.4.1998, after associating his official Peon Krishan Lal (PW-1), as an independent witness, in his presence, he intended to take a sample of Haldi from the shop of respondent-accused. The complainant also asked the shopkeeper to produce the license for running the said shop, but he could not do so. The complainant further alleged that the accused showed him the license, which had already expired on 31.3.1998, i.e., 18 days prior to the date of inspection. 4. The Food Inspector noticed that there was a container of tin, which contained Haldi, and the weight of the Haldi was approximately 15 kgs. Rule 49 (24) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955 (after now called as 'PFA Rules'), prohibited the sale of powdered spices in unpacked conditions. Thus, the complainant asked the shopkeeper that he intended to take a sample of the said Haldi powder for analysis. After that, the Food Inspector served a notice in Form-VI of the PFA Rules, upon the accused. 5. After that, the Food Inspector purchased 450 grams of Haldi powder against payment and taken receipt against the same. Subsequently, he divided the said Haldi powder into three equal parts and placed each portion into clean and dry bottles, sealed all the containers, and obtained signatures of the independent witness on the same. After that, he wrapped the bottles as per the procedure prescribed under the PFA Rules and subsequently drawn Panchnama of the entire proceedings. 6. After that, the Food Inspector sent one sample of Haldi along with Form VII to Public Analyst Kandaghat through registered parcel along with specimen seal impression. He deposited the remaining two samples in the office of Local Health Authority, Bilaspur, H.P. 7. 6. After that, the Food Inspector sent one sample of Haldi along with Form VII to Public Analyst Kandaghat through registered parcel along with specimen seal impression. He deposited the remaining two samples in the office of Local Health Authority, Bilaspur, H.P. 7. As per the report of the Public Analyst, in the sample of Haldi, the total ash content is 9.25 against the maximum prescribed standard of 9%, and ash insoluble in dilute HCL is 1.92% against the maximum prescribed standard of 1.5%. The Laboratory further opined that the Haldi powder contains unpermitted yellow coal tar dye, whereas it should be free from added colouring material. 8. On this, the Food Inspector filed a complaint before Chief Medical Officer, Bilaspur for seeking sanction under Section 20(1) of the PFA Act to launch prosecution against the accused. 9. On receipt of the sanction, the complainant filed the complaint along with all documents and list of witnesses in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur. Vide order dated 17.6.1998, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur found a prima facie case and proceeded against the accused under Section 204 CrPC, for the commission of the alleged offense and consequently, summoned the accused. After receipt of the summons, the accused exercised his right under Section 13B of the PFA Act and sought analysis of the second sample from Central Laboratory. 10. Vide report Ex. PC1, the Director of Central Food Laboratory, Pune opined that the total ash content is 9.8 and ash insoluble in dilute HCL is 2.2%. The Laboratory also noticed the presence of extraneous synthetic yellow and orange oil-soluble colors. It opined that the sample does not conform to the standards of Haldi powder as per PFA Rules, 1955. 11. It led to the filing the complaint seeking prosecution of the shopkeeper for violating the provisions of the PFA. After taking cognizance of the offenses, vide order dated 21.4.2003, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur framed charges against the accused of the offenses punishable under Section 16(1A) and 16(1) (a) (i) & (ii) of the PFA Act, to which the accused did not admit his guilt and claimed trial. 12. After examination of the complainant's witnesses, the Trial Court examined the accused under Section 313 CrPC. In his statement under Section 313 CrPC., the accused did not deny that the Food Inspector had purchased from Haldi powder from him. 12. After examination of the complainant's witnesses, the Trial Court examined the accused under Section 313 CrPC. In his statement under Section 313 CrPC., the accused did not deny that the Food Inspector had purchased from Haldi powder from him. While answering question No.4, he told that the Haldi powder, which was acquired by the complainant were in sealed packets. The accused has also adduced evidence in his defense and examined one Rajesh as DW-1. 13. Vide judgment dated 23.7.2004, passed in case No.50/3 of 2004/98, the trial Court held the accused guilty and convicted him for the offenses punishable under Section 16(1A) and 16(1) (a) (i) & (ii) of the PFA Act and under Rule 50 of the PFA Rules. The Convicting Court sentenced the convict to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees One thousand only) under Section 16(1A), read with Section 16(1) (a) (i) & (ii) of the PFA Act, and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- (Rupees Five hundred only) under Rule 50 of the PFA Rules. 14. The accused challenged the conviction by filing an appeal under Section 374 CrPC before learned Sessions Judge, Una. Vide Judgment dated 31.3.2008, passed in Cr. Appeal No.7 of 2004, learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur while setting aside the judgment of conviction has acquitted the accused of all offenses. 15. Challenging this decision, the State has come up before this Court seeking restoration of the judgment of conviction by setting aside the judgment of acquittal. 16. I have heard Shri Ashwani K. Sharma and Mr. Nand Lal Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General for the State; Mr. B.C. Negi, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Raj Negi, Advocate for the respondent. I have also waded through the entire record. ANALYSIS AND REASONING: 17. Learned Sessions Judge while acquitting the accused held that the order of sanction was not on appropriate proforma, and as such, there was no application of mind. B.C. Negi, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Raj Negi, Advocate for the respondent. I have also waded through the entire record. ANALYSIS AND REASONING: 17. Learned Sessions Judge while acquitting the accused held that the order of sanction was not on appropriate proforma, and as such, there was no application of mind. Learned Session Judge has placed reliance upon the judgment of Full Bench of this Court in Rattan Lal versus State of H. P., 1990 1 ShimLC 126 , wherein the Full Bench has held that grant of sanction was not an idle formality and the Chief Medical Officer, i.e., Sanctioning authority must give his consent in writing, only in the cases where he was satisfied that the launch of the prosecution was in the public interest. Learned Sessions Judge held that filling up of the blank form would reveal that there was no application of mind. There cannot be any dispute about this position and learned Sessions Judge was right in his approach by dismissing the entire prosecution in the absence of sanction. 18. Admittedly, the Food Inspector had taken samples on 18.4.1998. He has mentioned in his complaint that at the time of lifting samples, the accused had shown one license, which was license No.551 dated 8.7.1997, and had expired on 31.3.1998. Even this license indicates that the date of renewal was 1.4.1998. Similarly, the renewed license was also valid until 31.3.1999. It reveals that the authority was renewing the license for the entire financial year. 19. The accused examined Shri Rajesh, Clerk of BMO office, as DW-1, who testified that the accused had applied for renewal of the license on 24.4.1998, and the department had issued a license in favor of the accused on 24.4.1998, which was valid w.e.f. 1.4.1998 to 31.3.1999. Learned Sessions Judge also held that the accused was not having a valid license to run the shop. Since he set aside the conviction on the ground of invalid sanction, he did not pass any orders on this score. Thus, prosecuting the shopkeeper for not having a license was wrong in law. 20. It is not a case where the accused had no license at all. The only allegation is that the license stood expired on 18.4.1998. In almost every renewal of the license, there is a grace period, be it insurance policy or driving license, to mention a few. 20. It is not a case where the accused had no license at all. The only allegation is that the license stood expired on 18.4.1998. In almost every renewal of the license, there is a grace period, be it insurance policy or driving license, to mention a few. Even otherwise, the bureaucratic set up of the licensing authority those days was not online but was manual. It was common knowledge that to get it renewed would need efforts other than the renewal fee. 21. It would be challenging for petty shopkeepers like the accused to have closed his shop for several days that too on working days, and stand in a queue, for renewal of the license. The accused, later on, renewed the license on 24.4.1998, which was valid w.e.f. 1.4.1998 to 31.3.1999. Therefore, the finding of learned Sessions Judge that there was no license at all would be contrary to the ground reality. Based on the above facts, the Sessions Judge should have given the benefit of the doubt to the shopkeeper on the reasoning that the factors for renewal were not in his control, and non- renewal was unintentional. 22. There is another aspect of the matter, which escaped the scrutiny of the learned Sessions Judge. PW-1, the Peon of the Food Inspector, contradicted the Food Inspector. In his examination-in-chief, he deposed that the total Haldi was 20 kgs, whereas the stand of the Food Inspector is that the total Haldi was 15 kgs. It assumes importance because the plea taken by the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC is that he was not selling loose Haldi, but sold the Haldi in the packet to the Food Inspector. Resultantly, this contradiction creates doubt about the case set-up by the Food Inspector. 23. The most material deficiency in the case set up by the Food Inspector is the time when he had taken the samples, i.e., 4.30 p.m., and the shop was not situated in an isolated place but was in the market. Despite that, there is no evidence about the efforts that he made to associate the independent witness. He only stated in his complaint that he requested several persons to cooperate, but they declined. It is neither a plausible explanation nor a valid ground. Despite that, there is no evidence about the efforts that he made to associate the independent witness. He only stated in his complaint that he requested several persons to cooperate, but they declined. It is neither a plausible explanation nor a valid ground. The Food Inspector could have associated some Government Official from nearby offices, or a Teacher, or Member of Panchyat or Panchyat Secretary. The absence of efforts made to associate independent witnesses leads to an inference that the Food Inspector never wanted the corroboration of the procedure, taken place at the spot. In the light of the stand of the accused that he had not sold the Haldi in loose, but was in packets, coupled with the contradiction in the statements of Food Inspector, and his Peon PW-1 Krishan Lal, regarding the weight of the Haldi, the sole testimony of the Food Inspector, supported by his Peon is not sufficient to prove the case set up by him against the accused. Therefore, in the given facts, it was obligatory upon the Food Inspector to have associated independent witness and failure to do so caused severe prejudice to the accused, which vitiated the entire procedure of taking samples. 24. Given the above discussions, the complainant failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. Even otherwise, the judgment passed by learned Sessions Judge is well reasoned and calls for no interference. Resultantly, there is no merit in the present appeal and stands dismissed. All pending applications, if any, stand closed.