JUDGMENT : T. RAJA, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal has been filed by PW-6 Rajendran, challenging the correctness of the Judgment of acquittal dated 06.09.2010, made in S.C. No. 73 of 2010, by the file of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Madurai, acquitting accused Nos. 1 to 6/respondents 1 to 6 herein. 2. Facts leading to the filing of this Criminal Appeal, relevant for the purpose of disposal of this case, briefly narrated, are as follows: 2.1. It is the case of the prosecution that PW-6 is the father of the deceased Vallarasu, who was working as a load man. On 27.10.2008, at 11.00 a.m. while the deceased walking on the Yanaikal Bridge (Yanaikal Kalpalam), Madurai, he was hit by A1, due to which, there was a quarrel between them. Pursuant to which, A1 threatened the deceased saying that he could see what he is going to do by bringing persons. On the same day, at 1.00 p.m. A1 brought A2 to A6 in an auto driven by PW-5 Jeyapaul and indiscriminately cut the deceased and after the commission of the offence, they fled away from the place of occurrence in the same auto. 2.2. PW-1 Suresh, friend of the deceased went to Villakuthoon Police Station, Madurai at 3.00 p.m. and lodged a complaint (Ex.P15), based on which, PW-18 Jeyaraman, Sub-Inspector of Police has registered a case in Crime No. 1163 of 2008 under Sections 147, 148 and 302 I.P.C. on 27.10.2008. The printed F.I.R. was marked as Ex.P16. 2.3. PW-18 despatched the original F.I.R. and the original complaint to the Court of jurisdictional Magistrate and copy of the same to the higher officials. PW-22 Jegadeshkumar, Inspector of Police, Vilakuthoon Police Station, took up the case for investigation and went to the occurrence place at 4.15 p.m. prepared Ex.P.10-Observation Mahazar and Ex.P.22-rough sketch and recovered M.O. 1 series-Blood stained Cement Concrete pieces and M.O. 2 series-Ordinary Cement Concrete Pieces in the presence of PW-11-Pandi and one Raja. Then, he conducted inquest over the body of the deceased and prepared Ex.P.23-Inquest report. He made arrangement to take photographs in the scene of occurrence through PW-17 Murugiah, Photographer working in Madurai City Police Photography Section. Thereafter, he sent the body of the deceased for conducting postmortem through PW-15 Veerapathiran, Head Constable. 2.4. PW-14 Dr. Then, he conducted inquest over the body of the deceased and prepared Ex.P.23-Inquest report. He made arrangement to take photographs in the scene of occurrence through PW-17 Murugiah, Photographer working in Madurai City Police Photography Section. Thereafter, he sent the body of the deceased for conducting postmortem through PW-15 Veerapathiran, Head Constable. 2.4. PW-14 Dr. Vanitha, Tutor in Government Rajaji Hospital examined the body of the deceased and confirmed his death. The copy of the Accident Register recorded by her was marked as Ex.P.12. 2.5. PW-21 Dr. M. Alavutheen, was a Tutor in Forensic Medicine, Madurai Medical College, Madurai, who conducted postmortem on 28.10.2010 at 10.15 a.m. and noted the following antemortem injuries: “1. A transverse oblique cut injury on the base of the lower jaw measuring 5 x 0.5 cm x bone depth. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely towards right cutting the underlying muscles and bone partially. 2. A transverse oblique cut injury below the lower jaw measuring 6 x 0.5 cm x bone depth. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely towards right cutting the underlying muscles, vessels, nerves and bone partially. 3. A transverse oblique cut injury below the right ear measuring 5.5 x 0.5 cm x bone depth. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely downwards cutting the underlying muscles and bones partially. 4. A transverse oblique cut injury on the back of head right side near right ear, size 5 cms x 0.5 cm x bone depth. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely towards left cutting the underlying muscles and bone partially. 5. A transverse oblique cut injury on the middle of back of head, size 6 cms x 0.5 cm x bone depth. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely downwards cutting the underlying muscles and bones partially. 6. A transverse oblique cut injury on the back of right shoulder 6 x 0.5 cm x bone depth. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely downwards cutting the underlying muscles and bone partially. 7. A transverse oblique stab injury on the middle of frontal region 3 x 0.5 cm x bone depth. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely backwards and ends on the bone. 8. A transverse oblique stab injury on the left hip 4 x 0.5 cm x bone depth. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely downwards ends on the bone. 9. A transverse oblique stab injury 2 cms above the injury no. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely backwards and ends on the bone. 8. A transverse oblique stab injury on the left hip 4 x 0.5 cm x bone depth. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely downwards ends on the bone. 9. A transverse oblique stab injury 2 cms above the injury no. 8, 3 x 0.5 cm x cavity deep. On dissection, the wound passes obliquely backwards and ends on the peritoneum.” 2.6. The postmortem report was marked as Ex.P.21. PW-21 opined that the deceased would appear to have died of shock and Haemorrhage due to multiple cut and stab injuries 14 to 16 hours prior to autopsy. 2.7. After postmortem PW-22 Inspector of Police recovered M.Os. 3 and 4 blood stained cloths of the deceased through PW-15. He examined the witnesses and recorded their statements. On 28.10.2008, accused surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai. On 12.11.2008, he took police custody of the accused and at 5.00 p.m., and on enquiry, A1 voluntarily gave the confession statement and the same was recorded in the presence of PW-7 Sankar and one Prakash. He also recorded the confession statements of other accused also. Ex.P.24 is the admissible portion of the confession statement of A1. Pursuant to the same, on 13.11.2008 at 11.30 a.m. he recovered M.Os. 6 to 11-Four sickles and two knifes under a cover of Mahazar Ex.P.25 from a push on the western side of Northern side Yanaikal Kalpalam. Then, he remanded all the accused to judicial custody and handed over the Material Objects to the concerned Court under Form 95. On 14.11.2008 he examined PW-5 and recorded his statement. On 17.11.2008, he recovered the auto TN-59-A-9412 used for the occurrence in the presence of PWs. 9 and 10 under a cover of mahazar Ex.26 and remanded the auto to judicial custody. He produced PW-5 before PW-20-J. Venkatesan, learned Judicial Magistrate No. 4, Madurai and recorded PW-5's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. On 28.11.2008 he examined the witnesses and the doctors and recorded their statements. 2.8. After PW-22's transfer, PW-23 Jeyaram, Inspector of Police continued the investigation and he had filed the Charge-Sheet on the file of the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. 4, Madurai, charging the appellant/accused for the aforesaid offences, who took it on file in P.R.C. No. 29 of 2009. 2.9. 2.8. After PW-22's transfer, PW-23 Jeyaram, Inspector of Police continued the investigation and he had filed the Charge-Sheet on the file of the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. 4, Madurai, charging the appellant/accused for the aforesaid offences, who took it on file in P.R.C. No. 29 of 2009. 2.9. Pursuant thereto, the Committal Court issued summons to the accused and on their appearance, furnished him copies of documents under Section 207 Cr.P.C. and having found that the case is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, had committed the same to the Principal District Court. Madurai, which in turn made over the same to the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Madurai, which took it on file in S.C. No. 73 of 2010. Thereupon, the respondents/accused were issued with summons and on their appearance, charges under Sections 148 and 302 IPC have been framed. 2.10. The prosecution, in order to sustain its case, examined PWs. 1 to 23, marked Exs.P1 to P26 and also marked M.Os.1 to 11. The respondents/accused were questioned under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. with regard to the incriminating circumstances made out against them and they denied it as false. The respondents 1 to 6/accused 1 to 6 did not examine any witness or marked any document. 2.11. PW-1, the friend of the deceased has admitted his signature (Ex.P.1) in the complaint and the evidence of PW-1 has also been supported by the evidence of PW-2, who is also the friend of the deceased, deposed that the complaint was given by PW-1 to PW-18. The eyewitnesses PWs. 1 to 5 turned hostile. 2.12. The learned Trial Court, on a consideration of oral and documentary evidence and other materials, acquitted the accused on the ground that the charges framed against them are not proved beyond reasonable doubt, vide impugned judgment dated 06.09.2010 and challenging the same, the present Criminal Appeal is filed by PW-6, father of the deceased. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/PW-6/father of the deceased, assailing the approach and the findings recorded by the trial Court, heavily contended that it is a clear case of conviction to be awarded against all the accused on the basis of the evidence of PWs. 2 and 5. But the trial Court completely misreading the evidence of PWs. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/PW-6/father of the deceased, assailing the approach and the findings recorded by the trial Court, heavily contended that it is a clear case of conviction to be awarded against all the accused on the basis of the evidence of PWs. 2 and 5. But the trial Court completely misreading the evidence of PWs. 2 and 5 and erroneously gave the benefit of doubt to the accused, as a result, there is miscarriage of justice. He would further submit that PW-2, who is a friend of the deceased clearly deposed before the trial Court as to how the occurrence has taken place, in which the deceased was indiscriminately cut by the accused A1 to A6/respondents 1 to 6 by travelling in the auto driven by PW-5. 4. He would further submit that ironically, the learned trial Court instead of carrying forward the cross-examination of PW-8 either on the same day i.e. 03.05.2010 or on the next day or on a reasonable gap, wrongly adjourned the case to three months on 05.08.2010. In the meanwhile, the accused by taking advantage of the long gap from the date of chief-examination of the witnesses has overpowered PW-2. In view of the long gap that has happened, the evidence of PW-2 could not be effectively made use of. Moreover, PW-5-auto driver, who has all along witnessed A1 to A6/respondents 1 to 6 herein while carrying them from Palam Station Road to the place of occurrence and during the transit he has overheard the conspiracy of the accused while sitting in the auto till they reached the place of occurrence, has clearly spoken about the occurrence A1 to A6 before the trial Court that he has seen all the accused and they are known to him and they have also carried the deadly weapons with them in his auto for killing the deceased. Moreover, when he has further spoken before the trial Court that all the accused after getting down from the auto indiscriminately cut the deceased and before going to the place, where the deceased was standing, A1 warned him that he should wait till they come back after commission of offence, for no reason, the learned trial Court has wrongly disbelieved the evidence of PW-5. Ironically, in the present case, treating PW-5 as a hostile witness, the trial Court wrongly failed to make use of the evidence of PW-5. 5. Explaining further, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that even before the trial Court treats the PW-5 as a hostile witness because he has taken a contra stand in the cross-examination, as per the well settled legal position, the learned trial Court should have seen whether his evidence can be separated. Because, it is the duty of the trial Court to separate the chaff from the grain as laid by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rizan vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2003) 2 SCC 661 , wherein it is clearly held that it is the duty of the court to separate the chaff from the grain. Where the chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the court to convict the accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. The reason being that when PW-5 deposed in the cross-examination that he has known all the accused and they only hired his vehicle often and also spoken clearly that all the accused travelled in his auto and indiscriminately cut the deceased, such an eyewitness cannot be branded as a liar. Since the trial Court has committed a grave error in throwing the evidence of witnesses and giving benefit of doubt to the accused, the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside. 6. The learned counsel would further add that the overt acts and the roles of A1 to A6 have been specifically spoken by the eyewitness PW-5, who has been supported by PW-21, the postmortem doctor, the recovery of weapons pursuant to the admissible portion of the confession leading to recovery and also Ex.P.14-Serological report, which shows that the blood of the deceased found in his cloths tallied with the blood found in the weapons used by the accused. Hence, the trial Court ought not to have given the benefit of doubt to the accused. 7. Hence, the trial Court ought not to have given the benefit of doubt to the accused. 7. The learned Counsel would further submit that the trial Court has committed a grave error in adjourning the case from 03.05.2010 to 05.08.2010 beyond three months for taking the evidence of PW-2, by relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vinod Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220 , wherein it has been held that it is the duty of the Court to conduct the trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel. In the present case, the learned counsel for the defence in the trial Court went on delaying the case when PWs. 2 and 5 were giving evidence against the accused. The learned trial Court has adjourned the case giving three months time. Taking advantage of the long gap of three months, the accused 1 to 6/respondents 1 to 6 have overpowered the witness PW-2, as a result, he took a contra stand that he never seen the accused. Therefore, for these reasons, the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court acquitting all the accused should be set aside and the accused should be convicted for the offences under Sections 148 and 302 I.P.C. In support of his submission, he relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shankar Kerba Jadhav and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 793 , wherein it is held that in disposing of an appeal, from an order of acquittal, the High Court is competent to pass a sentence which the trial Court was empowered to pass. 8. When the matter was repeatedly taken adjournments and when there was no one to conduct the case of the respondents 1 to 6/accused 1 to 6, considering the fact that there was an order of acquittal and a reasonable opportunity should be granted to the accused, we deem it fit to appoint Mrs. S. Prabha, who was the Government Advocate (Criminal side) for considerable long time and put in 14 years of standing in the Bar on the criminal side, as a legal aid counsel for the respondents 1 to 6/accused 1 to 6. 9. Mrs. S. Prabha, who was the Government Advocate (Criminal side) for considerable long time and put in 14 years of standing in the Bar on the criminal side, as a legal aid counsel for the respondents 1 to 6/accused 1 to 6. 9. Mrs. S. Prabha, learned legal aid counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 6 urged this Court to dismiss the appeal by raising several points. Firstly, Mrs. S. Prabha, learned counsel argued that all the eyewitnesses PWs. 1 to 5 turned hostile, therefore, the trial Court finding huge flaw in the evidence furnished by PWs. 2 and 5, who also turned hostile, finding no other way to fix the accused 1 to 6/respondents 1 to 6 has rightly disbelieved the case of the prosecution. Though PW-2 supported the case of the prosecution in the chief examination, he spoke in the cross-examination that he never seen the accused. Even if we take the evidence of PW-5, who is an auto driver. He has committed three significant errors before the trial Court while speaking for the prosecution. Firstly, he spoke that the auto belongs to him. On the other hand it was not and he was the hirer of the auto. He has spoken that he only carrying them to the place of occurrence. But he was not able to say who has given which below and which blow was responsible for the cause of death. When the prosecution also not able to segregate the overt acts made by each accused, it would be highly unsafe to convict them. PW-5 auto driver has spoken in the chief examination that he has not seen the accused. The prosecution has miserably failed to elicit any particular overt act of the accused. Therefore, the trial Court disbelieved PWs. 2 and 5 along with other witnesses and passed an order of acquittal, that does not call for interference. 10. Again in support of the impugned judgment she argued that when PW-5 has brought to the notice of the trial Court that he has seen A1 to A6 nothing prevented the prosecution to come for holding identification parade. But in the present case the prosecution also has miserably failed to make arrangements even for holding an identification parade. Considering the said lapses as a fatal to the prosecution, the trial Court has no other option except to disbelieve the case of the prosecution. But in the present case the prosecution also has miserably failed to make arrangements even for holding an identification parade. Considering the said lapses as a fatal to the prosecution, the trial Court has no other option except to disbelieve the case of the prosecution. Moreover, when the investigation officer deposed that there was no identification parade and there were three criminal cases pending against the deceased, it could be presumed that some other person could have caused the death of the deceased. Therefore, it is highly unsafe to convict the accused as responsible for the death of deceased. 11. Finally, taking support from Sampat Babso Kale vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 4 SCC 739 , the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 6 would submit that in the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition regarding appeal against acquittal that the appellate Court must bear in mind that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Moreover, in the case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Therefore, applying the principles laid down in the afore said judgment, the trial Court has rightly disbelieved the evidence of PWs. 2 and 5. PW-5, an auto driver, who in all fairness should also be impleaded as one of the accused, which has not been done, therefore, the Criminal Appeal deserves to be rejected. 12. Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the 7th respondent/complainant also agreed with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant with regard to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Rizan vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2003) 2 SCC 661 . 12. Mr. K.K. Ramakrishnan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the 7th respondent/complainant also agreed with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant with regard to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Rizan vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2003) 2 SCC 661 . In the said case it is stated that it is the duty of the trial Court to remove the chaff from the grain and hence if the trial Court had separated the unwanted evidence adduced by PW-5, the charge against Accused could have been easily proved. That has not been done by the trial Court and an error has been committed by the trial Court. Moreover, in view of the grave error committed, it is always open to the appellate Court to pass a sentence, which the trial Court was empowered to pass. 13. This Court paid its anxious consideration to the rival submissions made and also perused the oral and documentary evidences and other materials placed on record including the impugned Judgment as well as the original records. 14. The following questions arise for consideration:- (i) Whether the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court holding that the respondents 1 to 6/accused 1 to 6 are not guilty of the charges is sustainable? (ii) Whether the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be reversed? Question No. (i): 15. Having heard the counsel appearing on either side, we think, at the outset it may be mentioned that the trial Court in paragraph 20 of the three page judgment giving the benefit of doubt to the accused, erroneously reached the conclusion that PW-2 was not considered as a hostile witness. But he was treated as a hostile witness. When PW-2 was treated as a hostile witness, it is not known how the trial Court held that PW-2 was not treated as a hostile witness. But he was treated as a hostile witness. When PW-2 was treated as a hostile witness, it is not known how the trial Court held that PW-2 was not treated as a hostile witness. If the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court is correct, the trial Court could have convicted the accused based on the evidence of PW-2, which has been supported by PW-5, who spoke right from the date of coming to the Court that he has spoken to the investigation officer and also before the learned Judicial Magistrate, who recorded his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. that he has carried all the accused in his auto rickshaw and the accused after coming out of the auto went to the deceased and indiscriminately cut him till he fell down, which was not cross-examined. For no reason, this evidence can be disbelieved. The reason being that he has specifically mentioned that A1 to A6 were known to him as they were regularly hiring him, therefore, when PW-5 know the accused there is no need to hold identification parade, hence, in our considered view, the trial Court ought not to have disbelieved the evidence of PW-5. Our view is further fortified on the basis of the evidence given by PW-21, doctor, who also specifically spoke about the 9 injuries caused by all the 6 accused. When PW-5-auto driver, witnessed the occurrence has clearly spoken that all the six accused indiscriminately cut the deceased, it goes without saying that all the nine injuries have been caused by the accused only. Moreover, the recovery of the weapons, pursuant to the confession leading to recovery and Ex.P.14-Serological Report, which also shows that the presence of the blood of the deceased clearly tallying with the blood stains found in the weapons used by the accused, again proves the guilt of the accused. 16. In addition thereto, we may also mention as a abundant caution that it may be argued that even the registration number of the auto was not mentioned anywhere. However, the evidence of the investigation officer while deposing before the trial Court has clearly mentioned the auto number as TN-59-A-9412. Therefore, it cannot be argued that there was no evidence about the registration number of the auto, hence, we hold that the findings recorded by the trial Court suffer from infirmity. 17. However, the evidence of the investigation officer while deposing before the trial Court has clearly mentioned the auto number as TN-59-A-9412. Therefore, it cannot be argued that there was no evidence about the registration number of the auto, hence, we hold that the findings recorded by the trial Court suffer from infirmity. 17. As highlighted by us above, in paragraph No. 20 of the judgment it is held as follows: Other Language A reading of the above observation shows that when PW-2 was already held as a hostile witness, the trial Court has approached as though PW-2 was not a hostile witness. When PW-2 was not a hostile witness, then the evidence of PW-2 should have been appreciated, in view of the clear evidence given by PW-5 separating the grain from the chaff i.e. truth from falsehood. 18. Further, the evidence of PW-5 elicited in favour of the prosecution during the cross-examination has not been put to cross by the defence side. For the reason that he has not been cross-examined by the respondents 1 to 6/accused 1 to 6, his evidence, which stood the rigour of the cross-examination clearly supports the prosecution version and establishes the guilt of the accused. 19. The two infirmities committed by the trial Court are improbable and inexcusable in law. Firstly, when PW-2 was examined on 03.05.2010, the trial Court ignoring the vital aspect that after chief examination was over, the witness cannot be cross-examined after three months, on 05.08.2010 for cross-examination, overlooking the fact that due to passage of long time of gap he could be overpowered by the other side. Secondly, it is common knowledge that anyone who speaks in the chief examination cannot be expected to remember the same thing after three months, because there may be error of memory due to lapse of time. In this context, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rizan vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2003) 2 SCC 661 , has held that it is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove the guilt of the accused person. The relevant paragraph No. 12 of the said decision is given as under: “12. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove the guilt of the accused person. The relevant paragraph No. 12 of the said decision is given as under: “12. Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out the entire prosecution case. In essence, prayer is to apply the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of a number of other co-accused persons his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the court to separate the grain from the chaff. Where the chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be open to the court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of a particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence.” Nisar Ali vs. State of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 366 : 1957 Cri. L.J. 550. Merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. It is always open to a court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. Gurcharan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 : 1956 Cri. L.J. 827. The doctrine is a dangerous one, specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. Sohrab vs. State of M.P. (1972) 3 SCC 751 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 819 and Ugar Ahir vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277 : (1965) 1 Cri. L.J. 256. An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of the felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because the grain and the chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. Zwinglee Ariel vs. State of M.P. AIR 1954 SC 15 : 1954 Cri. L.J. 230 and Balaka Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 511 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 601 : AIR 1975 SC 1962 . Zwinglee Ariel vs. State of M.P. AIR 1954 SC 15 : 1954 Cri. L.J. 230 and Balaka Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 511 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 601 : AIR 1975 SC 1962 . As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593 : AIR 1981 SC 1390 , normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there, however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category into which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220 : JT (2002) 4 SC 186 and Gangadhar Behera vs. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 32 : (2002) 7 Supreme 276 . Accusations have been clearly established against the accused-appellants in the case at hand. The courts below have categorically indicated the distinguishing features in evidence so far as the acquitted and convicted accused are concerned.” In the said decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Court has a duty to see in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. In view of the settled legal position we are of the view that the trial Court has overlooked a vital aspect that due to long gap of 3 months from the date of Chief Examination 03.05.2010 till date of cross-examination 05.08.2010 error of memory due to lapse of time would occur and that would result in administration of criminal justice would go to dead spot. In the case on hand when PW-2, a friend of the deceased Vallarasu, came to the Court and deposed that PW-1 gave a complaint. After 3 months from the Chief Examination he has been overpowered and resultantly he has turned hostile. 20. The second infirmity committed by the trial Court is that when PW-5-auto driver has spoken clearly in the cross-examination that all the accused have hired out his auto rickshaw and reached the place of occurrence carrying deadly weapons with a conspiracy to kill the deceased and after reaching the place of occurrence of the accused went straight to the place of occurrence and cut the deceased indiscriminately till he fell down. The said evidence should not have been disbelieved. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Rizan case (supra) at paragraph 12 has held that even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of a number of other co-accused persons his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the court to separate the truth from falsehood. Where the chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be open to the court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. This is for the reason that falsity of a particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. Based on the said ratio as highlighted above. At the risk of repetition it may be mentioned that PW-5-auto rickshaw driver has deposed before the trial Court that the accused were known to him because they were regularly hiring his auto and his evidence that they only travelled through his auto to reach the place of occurrence cannot be brushed aside. 21. While coming to the power of the appellate Court against the order of acquittal, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , has laid down the following principles: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions on fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstance, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.” The above reading of the precedent of the Hon'ble Apex Court shows that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 put no limitation or restriction on the power of the Appellate Court to reach its own conclusion based on evidence both on questions of fact or on law. One of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in that decision is that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. One of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in that decision is that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. But in the present case there is no question of two reasonable conclusions, for the simple reason that when PW-5-auto driver has clearly spoken that only the accused A1 to A6 hired his auto and came to the place of the deceased and further spoken clearly that they only indiscriminately cut him till he collapsed, the trial Court which can very well separate the truth from falsehood has completely disbelieved the evidence of PW-5, causing miscarriage of justice, therefore, disagreeing with the unacceptable reasons and ill-findings given by the learned trial Court, we are of the view that the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court holding that the respondents 1 to 6/accused 1 to 6 are not guilty of the charges is not sustainable in law because they are against the available evidences. Question No. (ii): 22. In view of the reasons assigned above, while reviewing the evidence placed before the trial Court under Sections 378(1)(b) and 386 Cr.P.C. this Court of the considered view that the acquittal of A1 to A6 for the commission of offences under Sections 148 and 302 I.P.C. necessarily warrants interference. 23. Therefore, this Criminal Appeal is allowed by setting aside the judgment of acquittal dated 06.09.2010, made in S.C. No. 73 of 2010 by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Madurai and convicting the accused Nos. 1 to 6 for the commission of offences under Sections 148 and 302 I.P.C. The 7th respondent police is directed to produce respondents 1 to 6/Accused 1 to 6 before this Court on 12.02.2020 for questioning them regarding the sentence to be imposed on them under Section 235(2) Cr.P.C. 24. We place our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Mrs. S. Prabha, learned legal aid counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 6/accused 1 to 6. The Legal Aid Services committee attached to this Bench is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) for the service rendered by her as honorarium. Call the matter on 12.02.2020.