ORDER : 1. The petitioner has preferred the present petition for the following main reliefs :- “12(a). Your Lordships be pleased to issue writ of mandamus, or any writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction, directing the award and order dated 11/09/2019 passed by the learned Labour Court, Jamnagar in Reference No.32 of 2015, is illegal, improper, arbitrary and contrary to the settled proposition of law and be further pleased to quash and set aside the same. (b). Your Lordship be pleased to issue writ of mandamus, or writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction, directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner on his original post along with continuity of service and reasonable amount of back-wages. 2. The petitioner workman has challenged the judgment and Award passed by the Labour Court, Jamnagar in Reference No.32 of 2015 dated 11/9/2019. The Labour Court has rejected the reference essentially and predominantly on the ground of delay of 14 years in raising the dispute. 3. As per the case of the workman, he was working with the respondent since last two years as Helper (in Boring Department) and his service came to be terminated orally on and from 30/5/2000. He met the officer of the respondent, however, no heed was paid. Thereafter, he issued notice on 25/11/2014, yet he was not taken back in service. Hence, he raised dispute in the year 2015 alleging breach of section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter shall be referred to as “I.D. Act” for short). The Labour Court rejected the reference on the ground of delay of 14 years. Hence, the petitioner has preferred the present petition seeking the reliefs, as noted hereinabove. 4. This Court has heard extensively Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate for the petitioner workman. He urged that the petitioner has worked for 2 years and therefore, the Labour Court ought to have granted some lump-sum compensation and could not have non-suited the workman on the ground of delay. 5. It appears and emerges from the record that the petitioner was working as a Helper and has worked for nearly two years and he was terminated orally on 30/5/2000 and he had requested the respondent orally to reinstate him, but the same has not been done and on 25/11/2014, a notice had been issued to the respondent requesting to reinstate him. According to the petitioner, the respondent has created many new posts. 6. This Court noticed that on merits as well as on valid technical ground, the Labour Court has rejected the reference on the ground of delay of 14 years and in absence of any explanation on the part of the workman - employee. 7. It is true that generally the party should not be non-suited merely on the ground of delay, as no period of limitation is prescribed under the I.D. Act for raising the dispute, however, that does not mean that the delay is not required to be explained at all. Even huge delay can be condoned, provided there is reasonable and plausible explanation. In the present case, there is no explanation of delay of 14 years in raising the dispute. As per settled legal position, while considering the delay in raising industrial disputes, Courts can exercise their powers to condone the same provided if there is satisfactory explanation and sustainable reasons to so do it. 8. Even otherwise, the scope of inquiry by this Court is also limited under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court in the decision rendered case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Versus Rajendra Shankar Patil, rendered in Civil Appeal No.5896 of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.7445 of 2009), while considering the powers of superintendence and occasions of interference with the order of the tribunals and courts, has held and observed as under :- “62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 9. In absence of any explanation of huge delay of 14 years in raising the dispute, much less satisfactorily and convincing grounds of explanation, this Court is not inclined to interfere. Hence, the present petition stands dismissed in limine. The Labour Court has not acted in manifest failure of justice nor declined to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it or acted manifest jurisdiction. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.