JUDGMENT : A.S. CHANDURKAR, J. 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally with consent of the counsel for the parties. 2. The challenge raised in the present writ petition is to the order dated 14.06.2019 passed by the Hon'ble Minister of Co-operation, Marketing and Textiles in the proceedings under Rule 41(5) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Rules, 1967 (for short, 'the Rules of 1967'). By the said order, the appeal preferred by the petitioners has been dismissed and the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the District Deputy Registrar disqualifying the petitioners from continuing as Members of the Market Committee has been confirmed. 3. The facts in brief are that all the petitioners were elected Members of the Market Committee constituted under the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 1963 (for short, 'the said Act'). The term for which the petitioners were elected ended on 20.10.2015. In the subsequent elections the petitioners were again elected as Members of the Market Committee. After the petitioners were elected for the subsequent term, an application under Rule 41(1)(i) and (k) of the Rules of 1967 was moved by one Wasimoddin Matinoddin on 25.07.2017. In that application a grievance was made with regard to the appointment of two employees in a manner contrary to the provisions of Rule 100(5) of the Rules of 1967. It was prayed that the petitioners be held to be disqualified from continuing as Members of the Market Committee. A similar application under the very same provisions seeking identical relief was earlier moved by one Atish Bidwe on 12.06.2017. The petitioners submitted their reply to the aforesaid proceedings. In the said proceedings, the third respondent moved an application praying that he be added as a party in the said proceedings as applicant no.3. The said application came to be allowed. The District Deputy Registrar by his order dated 22.12.2017 was pleased to hold that though the grievance as made in the applications related to the earlier term of the petitioners as Members, since the employees in question continued in employment and the petitioners were re-elected as Members they were liable to be disqualified under the provisions of Section 45(1) of the said Act read with Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1967. The order passed by the District Deputy Registrar was challenged by the petitioners in this Court and by the judgment dated 08.01.2018 in Writ Petition No.8283 of 2017 [Shankarrao Gajanan Choudhary & Others Versus The State of Maharashtra & Others] the said order was set aside observing that no notice seeking their disqualification/removal under Section 45 of the said Act had been given to them. The proceedings were therefore remanded to the District Deputy Registrar for fresh consideration. 4. In the meanwhile, the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 came to be deleted on 16.12.2017. Simultaneously, on 18.12.2017 the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Market Committee (Election to Committee) Rules, 2017 (for short, 'the Rules of 2017') came into force. Rule 10 provided for disqualification of a Committee Member on the same lines as was provided earlier under Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967. After remand of the proceedings, the District Deputy Registrar by his order dated 05.03.2018 held that the petitioners were not eligible to contest the election for the post of Member of the Market Committee in view of the fact they had incurred disqualification under Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017. On that basis it was held that the petitioners were disqualified from continuing as Members of the Market Committee. The petitioners being aggrieved filed an appeal before the State Government. By the impugned order, the Hon'ble Minister was pleased to dismiss the said appeal and confirm the order of disqualification as passed by the District Deputy Registrar. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have challenged the aforesaid orders. 5. Shri M.V. Samarth, learned counsel for the petitioners while challenging the impugned orders made the following submissions:- (a) The petitioners had been given notice pursuant to the proceedings that had been initiated by invoking the provisions of Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1967. After the said proceedings were initiated and were pending, Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1967 came to be deleted on 16.12.2017 and the Rules of 2017 came into force. It was not permissible for the District Deputy Registrar to have proceeded with the adjudication by invoking the provisions of the Rules of 2017 as the proceedings initiated under the Rules of 1967 had not been saved. It was not permissible for the District Deputy Registrar to have proceeded with the adjudication by invoking the provisions of the Rules of 2017 as the proceedings initiated under the Rules of 1967 had not been saved. It was submitted that there was no notice to the petitioners that they were liable to be disqualified under Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017. (b) Under the provisions of Rule 10(3) of the Rules of 2017 the jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether any Member had incurred any of the disqualifications mentioned in Rule 10(1) had to be decided by the Director. There was no delegation of the said power by the Director in favour of the District Deputy Registrar. Hence, after the provisions of the Rules of 2017 came into force the District Deputy Registrar without any such delegation had exercised the powers conferred on the Director. The impugned orders as passed were in absence of any such delegation and hence were without jurisdiction. (c) Though the provisions of Section 45 of the said Act had been invoked for justifying the disqualification of the petitioners no notice under Section 45 of the said Act was ever issued to the petitioners. The petitioners had been sought to be removed only by relying upon the provisions of Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1967. Thus in absence of the petitioners being put on notice that that they were liable to be removed by relying upon the provisions of Section 45(1) of the said Act they have been so removed without any opportunity being granted in that regard. (d) The original complainants who had initiated the proceedings under Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1967 had withdrawn their complaints. The proceedings were continued by the third respondent who had been subsequently added as an applicant in the said proceedings and therefore it was also not permissible for the third respondent to defend the said impunged orders. (e) That in any event the grounds on which the petitioners were sought to be removed pertained to the earlier tenure which ended in 2015. The petitioners had been subsequently re-elected and for the alleged acts during the earlier tenure the petitioners could not have been held to be disqualified after being re-elected in the subsequent tenure. (e) That in any event the grounds on which the petitioners were sought to be removed pertained to the earlier tenure which ended in 2015. The petitioners had been subsequently re-elected and for the alleged acts during the earlier tenure the petitioners could not have been held to be disqualified after being re-elected in the subsequent tenure. There is no basis whatsoever for disqualifying an elected Member on the ground of alleged acts done during his earlier tenure. On these counts, it was submitted that the impugned orders were liable to be set aside. In support of the said submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Versus District Collector, Raigad & Others, (2012) 4 SCC 407 , G.Ramegowda, Major & Others Versus Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142 , State of Madhya Pradesh & Others Versus Sanjay Nagayach & Others, (2013) 7 SCC 25 and Manohar Krishna Madhavi Versus Commissioner, Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation, (2013) 6 MhLJ 744 . 6. On the other hand, Shri A.M. Ghare, learned counsel for the third respondent in support of the impugned orders made following submissions:- (a) Even though the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 stood deleted on 16.12.2017 the very same provision was re-introduced as Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017. The provisions of Rule 41(1) were in pari materia with Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017. Hence, the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 being identical with Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017 the prayer for seeking disqualification of the petitioners was rightly considered by the District Deputy Registrar under the Rules of 2017. (b) For the very same reason that the powers under Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1967 had been delegated to the District Deputy Registrar, the said Authority was equally competent to adjudicate the proceedings under Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017. Though the jurisdiction to decide the aspect of disqualification being incurred vested with the Director it was clear that on the same lines as the power was delegated under Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 such delegation ought to be considered as having been made even for the purposes of Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017. Though the jurisdiction to decide the aspect of disqualification being incurred vested with the Director it was clear that on the same lines as the power was delegated under Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 such delegation ought to be considered as having been made even for the purposes of Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017. (c) The show cause notices alongwith the applications moved seeking disqualification of the petitioners clearly indicated that even a case under Section 45 of the said Act was sought to be made out against the petitioners. There was no need to specifically mention the provisions of Section 45 of the said Act for the purposes of seeking disqualification of the petitioners. Infact, no prejudice had been shown to have been caused to the petitioners on that count and the disqualification had been rightly ordered. (d) Even though the original complainants who had initiated the proceedings under Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 had withdrawn their complaints, the third respondent had been permitted to be joined as an applicant in those proceedings. It was therefore permissible for the third respondent to have continued with the proceedings in question. In any event what was required to be seen was whether the petitioners had incurred disqualification or not. Hence there was no reason to hold that the third respondent was not entitled to defend the impugned orders. (e) The mere fact that the acts relied upon for seeking disqualification of the petitioners pertained to the earlier tenure which ended in 2015 the same could not be a ground to ignore the same in the subsequent tenure. All the petitioners were the members of the Market Committee till 2015 and they had been re-elected thereafter. The Authorities rightly interpreted the relevant provisions and on finding that the petitioners had incurred disqualification by virtue of the acts committed in the earlier tenure were rightly held to be disqualified after their re-election. It was thus submitted that the impugned orders did not deserve to be interfered with. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in Amarjeet Singh & Others Versus Devi Ratan & Others, (2010) 1 SCC 417 as well as the judgment dated 05.05.2018 in Writ Petition No.2355 of 2018 [Arjun S/o Sheshrao Dandge Versus The District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Buldana]. 7. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in Amarjeet Singh & Others Versus Devi Ratan & Others, (2010) 1 SCC 417 as well as the judgment dated 05.05.2018 in Writ Petition No.2355 of 2018 [Arjun S/o Sheshrao Dandge Versus The District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Buldana]. 7. It may be stated that this Court on 05.09.2019 had passed an interim order and had permitted the petitioners to continue in office during pendency of the writ petition. The fourth petitioner in the meanwhile resigned from the post of Chairman. It was pointed out on behalf of the third respondent that since the post of Chairman and Vice Chairman in the Market Committee had become vacant the elections were scheduled on 09.09.2019. This Court therefore directed that the votes of the petitioners be kept in a separate sealed cover and the results were not to be declared until further orders. In view thereof by the subsequent order dated 26.09.2019 the results of the said election were permitted to be declared but the first petitioner who was holding the post of Vice Chairman was permitted to hold the same until further orders. 8. The factual aspects gave rise to the passing of the impugned orders as regards initiation of the proceedings and the subsequent deletion/introduction of the statutory provisions is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners were elected as Members of the Market Committee for the tenure that ended in the year 2015. The petitioners were re-elected in the subsequent elections again as Members of the Market Committee. The disqualification of the petitioners was sought by virtue of two applications dated 12.06.2017 and 25.07.2017. The instances relied upon for seeking the disqualification of the petitioners pertained to the earlier tenure which ended in the year 2015. It can also be seen from the record that pursuant to the two applications moved seeking disqualification of the petitioners, show cause notices dated 21.09.2017 came to be issued to them. These notices were issued by the District Deputy Registrar who at the given time was delegated with the powers to conduct the proceedings under Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1967. When the said proceedings were pending the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 came to be deleted by virtue of notification dated 16.12.2017. These notices were issued by the District Deputy Registrar who at the given time was delegated with the powers to conduct the proceedings under Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1967. When the said proceedings were pending the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 came to be deleted by virtue of notification dated 16.12.2017. Thereafter by virtue of another notification dated 18.12.2017 the Rules of 2017 were brought into force. The petitioners before the District Deputy Registrar therefore raised a contention that in view of deletion of Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 1967 the proceedings initiated against they were untenable. That contention was not accepted by the District Deputy Registrar and on that count, the impugned order passed by the said Authority was set aside by this Court in Writ Petition No.8283 of 2017. The fact of deletion of Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 on 16.12.2017 and the subsequent introduction of the Rules of 2017 on 18.12.2017 therefore goes to the root of the matter and its effect is thus required to be considered at the outset. 9. In this regard the provisions of Section 58 of the said Act are required to be taken into consideration. By virtue of Section 58 of the said Act, the State Government may by notification in the official gazette delegate all or any of the powers that have been conferred on the Director to any other Officer or person specified in the notification. It is not in dispute that as regard proceedings under Section 45 of the said Act as well as under Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 the jurisdiction to exercise those powers was vested in the Director. However by issuing a notification in that regard such powers have been delegated to the District Deputy Registrar. Rule 10(3) of the Rules of 2017 also empower the Director to decide the question whether a person had become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Rule 10(1) thereof. In the present case, the adjudication in that regard has been undertaken by the District Deputy Registrar. There is however no notification pointed out by virtue of which the Director has delegated such authority of deciding the question with regard to disqualification on the District Deputy Registrar. In the present case, the adjudication in that regard has been undertaken by the District Deputy Registrar. There is however no notification pointed out by virtue of which the Director has delegated such authority of deciding the question with regard to disqualification on the District Deputy Registrar. It is thus found that in absence of there being any such delegation of authority in favour of the District Deputy Registrar, the adjudication as to whether the petitioners incurred disqualification under Rule 10(1) of the Rules of 2017 would be an exercise without jurisdiction. This contention had been specifically raised before the Authorities but the same has not been taken into consideration. 10. It can be seen from Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 that the same provides for disqualification of a person for being chosen as a Member of the Market Committee. The question as to whether a person has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in sub-Rule (1) of Rule 41 has to be decided by the Director. It is not in dispute that the powers in that regard were delegated to the District Deputy Registrar. However, after deletion of Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 on 16.12.2017 there is no fresh order of delegation brought to the notice of the Court by virtue of which the powers under Rule 10(3) of the Rules of 2017 were delegated by the Director in favour of the District Deputy Registrar. It cannot be lost sight of that while the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of 1967 were deleted on 16.12.2017, the Rules of 2017 came into force two days thereafter on 18.12.2017. It was therefore necessary for an order of delegation to be passed by the Director under the Rules of 2017 which would have empowered the District Deputy Registrar to exercise the same. In absence of any such delegation of power being pointed out, the proceedings as conducted by the District Deputy Registrar after 16.12.2017 would have to be treated as having been conducted without there being any such delegation of powers in his favour. This aspect goes to the root of the proceedings and affects the jurisdiction of the District Deputy Registrar to adjudicate the same. On this count, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 11. This aspect goes to the root of the proceedings and affects the jurisdiction of the District Deputy Registrar to adjudicate the same. On this count, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 11. As it has been found that the District Deputy Registrar has exercised the jurisdiction under the provisions of Rule 10(1) of the Rules of 2017 without there being any delegation of authority in that regard which has rendered the said adjudication non est, it is not necessary to go into other challenges as raised to the impugned order. The aspect whether the petitioners were liable to be disqualified for the alleged acts that were undertaken in their earlier tenure as well as the question whether the third respondent could have been permitted to prosecute the proceedings for disqualification when the original applicants had withdrawn the proceedings initiated by them are therefore not required to be adjudicated. The contentions in that regard are kept expressly open. 12. In view of the aforedsaid discussion, the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the District Deputy Registrar disqualifying the petitioners is set aside on the ground that the said Authority has exercised jurisdiction without there being any delegation in that regard under Section 58 of the said Act. Consequently, the order dated 14.06.2019 passed by the Hon'ble Minister of Co-operation, Marketing and Textiles is also liable to be set aside. It is thus held that the petitioners are entitled to continue as Members of the Market Committee. As noted above, elections were held on 09.09.2019 to fill in the post of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Market Committee which had become vacant. Insofar as the election for the post of Chairman is concerned, the same was held as the earlier Chairman had resigned from the said post. Hence, the Chairman now elected in the election conducted on 09.09.2019 is entitled to continue as such irrespective of the present adjudication. The election to the post of Vice Chairman was held on account of the order of disqualification passed by the District Deputy Registrar against the petitioner no.1. Since it has been found that the petitioner no.1 is entitled to continue as Member of the Market Committee, he would be further entitled to continue as Vice Chairman of the said Market Committee. Since it has been found that the petitioner no.1 is entitled to continue as Member of the Market Committee, he would be further entitled to continue as Vice Chairman of the said Market Committee. It is therefore necessary to declare that the post of Vice Chairman has not fallen vacant pursuant to the disqualification of the petitioner no.1 which order of disqualification has been set aside. It is also declared that the election held for the post of Vice Chairman is inconsequential and the petitioner no.1 is entitled to continue on the said post for the remainder of the elective term. The Writ Petition is thus allowed in aforesaid terms. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.