ORDER : 1. This is a petition preferred by the petitioner – employer seeking for the following main relief :- “(A). Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus and further be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 3/4/2010 passed by the Labour Court, Jamnagar in LCJ No.97 OF 2004 (Annexure-A) to the present petition.” 2. This Court, vide order dated 26/07/2010, issued Rule and stayed the impugned Award qua back-wagers only. 3. It appears that the respondent workman has already been instated on and from 20/9/2010 and therefore, the dispute is only with regard to 20% back-wages, although challenge is made by the petitioners to the entire Judgment and Award. 4. The respondent workman was appointed by the petitioner Board as a Pump Operator on 1/7/2002 on temporary basis and was called upon to serve as per the requirement of the project and he was not called to serve as his services were no longer required. His termination gave rise to an industrial dispute being Reference No.97 of 2004 and the Labour Court, after affording an opportunity to both the sides, allowed the reference and held the termination illegal and directed the petitioners Board to reinstate the respondent workman on his original post with 20% back-wages from the date of termination till actual reinstatement. Against the said Judgment and Award, the petitioners Board has preferred the present petition. 5. Heard Mr.Meena, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners – Board and Mr.Mishra, learned advocate appearing for the respondent workman. 6. Mr.Meena, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners – Board submitted that the Labour Court has not appreciated the provisions of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the I.D. Act. The Labour Court also failed to appreciate the evidence which has been adduced oral as well as documentary. The Labour Court could not have held that there is breach of provisions of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the I.D. Act. He further urged that he respondent workman is already reinstated and he is in service. 7. As admitted by the learned advocate for the respondent workman, the workman is already reinstated w.e.f. 20/9/2010 and there is no challenge by the petitioner with respect to back-wages. 8. He further urged that he respondent workman is already reinstated and he is in service. 7. As admitted by the learned advocate for the respondent workman, the workman is already reinstated w.e.f. 20/9/2010 and there is no challenge by the petitioner with respect to back-wages. 8. Mr.Mishra, learned advocate for the workman has urged that almost 10 years have been passed since the implementation of the Award in part. He under the instructions of his client, states that the respondent workman is forgoing 20% back-wages granted by the Labour Court in the impugned Award. 9. Mr.Mishra, learned advocate for the workman submitted that there is no jurisdictional error and there is nothing to indicate that the Labour Court acted beyond its powers. What is required for this Court is to see whether the Labour Court has acted within its bounds. 10. Having heard both the sides, at the outset, two aspects are needed to be mentioned. Firstly, that after the order of reinstatement in the Judgment and Award in Reference No.97 of 2004 dated 3/4/2010, the workman is reinstated on 20/9/2010 and he has continued to work uninterruptedly since then. Secondly, as per statement made by Mr.Mishra, learned advocate for the respondent workman, the workman is forgoing 20% back-wages granted by the Labour Court. With these two aspects, this Court has to examine the Judgment and Award. 11. The scope of inquiry by this Court is also limited under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. This court has limited role to play whether the Labour Court has acted within its jurisdiction. The Apex Court in the decision rendered case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Versus Rajendra Shankar Patil, rendered in Civil Appeal No.5896 of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.7445 of 2009) in para 62 has observed and held as under :- “62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 12. After hearing the parties and considering the Statement of Claim and the Written Statement and the evidence on record, the Labour Court held that there had been completion of 240 days in a particular year by the respondent workman and the petitioners employer without issuance of any notice or without making payment in lieu of the notice or payment of retrenchment compensation, has terminated the services of the respondent workman. It is also not in dispute that no seniority list had been produced before the Labour Court. In the cross-examination, it had been carved out that there are others who have been engaged after retrenching the respondent workman which was meant for the very project for which the respondent workman had been hired. 13. It is a settled law that if it is mandatory and obligatory on the part of the employer to issue one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment, notice pay and retrenchment compensation, as well as one month wages. This is, if has not been complied with, there is breach of section 25F of the I.D. Act. The Labour Court also specifically held that the petitioners have failed to discharge their obligation and there is breach of provisions of section 25F of the I.D. Act. This is, if has not been complied with, there is breach of section 25F of the I.D. Act. The Labour Court also specifically held that the petitioners have failed to discharge their obligation and there is breach of provisions of section 25F of the I.D. Act. If the employer fails to maintain seniority list, as is apparent in the present case from the record. The Labour Court held that there is also breach of section 25H of the I.D. Act. This Court finds absolutely no manifest illegality nor patent error on the part of the Labour Court in holding that there is breach of Sections 25G and 25H of the I.D. Act. So far as Award of 20% back-wages is concerned, in wake of forgoing of the 20% of the back-wages by the workman in view of reinstatement, no further discussion or order in that regard is required. This court is in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the Labour Court and finds no reason to interfere with the Judgment and Award impugned in the present petition. 14. Resultantly, present petition fails and same is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.