JUDGMENT: 1. The defendants in the suit are the appellants in the present appeal which is filed against the Judgment and Decree dated 26.09.2003 in O.S.No.152 of 1999 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Vizayawada. 2. The plaintiff, which is a Chit Fund Company, filed the present suit claiming that appellant No.1, who is the subscriber to Chit Series CCR-4, which was for a value of Rs.3,00,000/-payable @ Rs.7,500/-per month in 40 monthly installments, was the successful bidder in the 8th auction agreeing to forego Rs.1,20,000/-and received Rs.1,80,000/-on 28.05.1997 under a Cash Voucher. 1st defendant having paid only Eight installments by the time he was the successful bidder stopped paying all further installments, due to which, Notice was issued 1st on 24.09.1998 calling upon the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.2,40,000/-along with interest and the 2nd defendant was also called upon to pay the said sum as he was the guarantor for the said amount. 3. The defendants replied to the Legal Notice on 24.09.1998 by way of reply notice dated 21.10.1998 wherein the defendants claimed that they had never subscribed to any chit, nor paid any installments for the said chit nor being declared as successful subscribers or received Rs.1,80,000/-. The claim of the defendants was that they had business dealings with one Mr. Narayanarao, to whom they owed money, because of which, Mr. Narayanarao pressurized the defendants to sign some printed documents and promissory notes, which are now being pressed into the service on account of the fact that Mr. Narayanarao’s brother was the Manager of the Plaintiff company. 4. The plaintiff claimed that as there was total denial by the Defendants, it was forced to approach the trial Court for recovery of the aforesaid amount. 5. The defendants upon notice of the suit filed their Written Statement essentially reiterating the facts set out in the reply notice. It may also be noted that the plaintiff took the stand that the said amount of Rs.1,80,000/-was paid under a Cheque bearing No. 571234 dated 24.05.1997. This was specifically denied by the defendants in the Written Statement. 6. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the suit documents were brought into existence as disclosed by the defendant in the Written Statement ? This was specifically denied by the defendants in the Written Statement. 6. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the suit documents were brought into existence as disclosed by the defendant in the Written Statement ? (ii) Whether the suit is filed at the instance of one Narayanarao in collusion with the manager of the plaintiff company to obtain wrongfully ? (iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the suit amount ? (iv) To what relief ? 7. In the course of the trial, the plaintiff marked Ex.A.1, which was the Chit Agreement, Ex.A.2 which was Agreement of Guarantee, Ex.A.3 which was the demand promissory note and Ex.A.4-Cash Voucher showing receipt of Rs.1,80,000/-. The signatures on these exhibits was admitted by the defendant No.1, who was examined as DW1. However, the defendants case was that the signatures on these documents were taken in blank on account of the pressure by Mr. Narayanarao and no money was received by defendant No.1 under Ex.A.4-Cash Voucher. A perusal of Ex.A.4 shows that a sum of Rs.1,80,000/-is said to have been received by Defendant No.1 through cheque No.571234 and is dated 28.05.1997. 8. The defendants to demonstrate that they had not received the said amount took steps by way of filing I.A.No.584 of 2003, to get the cheque bearing No. 571234, dated 24.05.1997 to be produced in Court and the said cheque was marked as Ex.X.1 through the Manager of the Bank. A perusal of this document shows that the cheque was issued for a sum of Rs.1,70,000/-in favour of one Naga Bhairava Ice Cold Storage and was encashed on 04.06.1997 in the account of that entity. Apart from this, the account copy of the plaintiff was also marked as Ex.X2. This account statement also does not show any payment being made to the defendants. The plaintiff had filed Counter in I.A.No.584 of 2003 and took the stand that the cheque number was wrongly mentioned as “571237 and the correct cheque number was 571234. However, the plaintiff did not take any steps to produce this cheque and the said cheque bearing No.571234 was not produced or marked as an exhibit in the trial. 9. The plaintiff had filed Counter in I.A.No.584 of 2003 and took the stand that the cheque number was wrongly mentioned as “571237 and the correct cheque number was 571234. However, the plaintiff did not take any steps to produce this cheque and the said cheque bearing No.571234 was not produced or marked as an exhibit in the trial. 9. The trial Court took the view that as defendants admitted their signatures on the chit agreement, Cash Voucher and promissory note, the burden of proving that the defendants had nothing to do with Naga Bhairava Ice Cold Storage would be on the defendants and since the said burden was not discharged by the defendants, it would have to be taken that Ex.A.4-Cash Voucher and Ex.A.3-Promissory Note are supported by consideration. The trial Court also held, while discussing Issue No.2, that 1st defendant failed to prove that he did not receive the cheque bearing No. 571234 under Ex.A.4 and that he has not encashed the same. On the basis of these findings, the trial Court decreed the suit. 10. Sri Y.V.Anil Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants, assailed the judgment of the trial Court on the ground that the trial Court mis-directed itself on the question of burden of proof. 11. It is the contention of Mr. Y. V. Anil Kumar that the defendants had discharged the initial burden of proof by demonstrating that the cheque said to have been issued to the defendants under Ex.A.4-Cash Voucher was not a cheque issued in favour of 1st defendant nor did the 1st defendant encash the same as it was encashed in the account of Naga Bhairava Ice Cold Storage. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants, contends that once the initial burden of proof has been discharged by the defendant No.1 that he did not receive consideration, burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to show that the promissory note or Cash Voucher are supported by consideration. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants, contends that once the initial burden of proof has been discharged by the defendant No.1 that he did not receive consideration, burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to show that the promissory note or Cash Voucher are supported by consideration. Since, the plaintiff took the specific stand in the Counter in I.A.No.584 of 2003 that the number of the cheque was wrongly mentioned and that it was another cheque bearing No. 571234, which was the cheque under which payment was made, the burden of proving the said change in the cheque number would shift to the plaintiff and that the burden was not discharged by the plaintiff as the said cheque bearing No. 571234 was neither produced nor did the plaintiff show proof of payment through the statement of account of the plaintiff. To support his contention Sri Anil Kumar relied on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1316 ; A. Raghavamma and anr. V. A. Chenchamma and anr. AIR 1964 SC 136 ; Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009)2 SCC 513 ; Rangammal v. Kuppuswami and anr., (2011) 12 SCC 220 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ushadevi, (2015) 8 SCC 672 . 12. The suit of the plaintiff is based on the claim that the defendant No.1 having received Rs.1,80,000/-as the successful auction bidder in a chit run by the plaintiff, did not pay the subsequent installments and was liable to pay the suit amount. 13. To discharge the burden of proof of the said claim, the plaintiff marked the chit agreement, the agreement of guarantee, the demand promissory note as well as the cash voucher showing receipt of Rs.1,80,000/-by defendant No.1 under cheque No.571237. Upon such discharge of proof, the defendants demonstrated that cheque No.571237 was not issued to defendant No.1 and was issued to some other party for a sum of Rs.1,70,000/-and not for a sum of Rs.1,80,000/-. Thereupon, the plaintiff which had already taken the plea that the cheque number was wrongly mentioned in the cash receipt voucher and the correct cheque number was 571234, did not take any steps to produce the said cheque or to mark it as evidence in the trial. Thereupon, the plaintiff which had already taken the plea that the cheque number was wrongly mentioned in the cash receipt voucher and the correct cheque number was 571234, did not take any steps to produce the said cheque or to mark it as evidence in the trial. The statement of the bank account of the plaintiff which was summoned by the defendants also did not show any payment made to the defendant No.1 from April, 1997 to September, 1997. Here again, the plaintiff did not take any steps to produce or mark any statement of account of his bank account showing payment of Rs.1,80,000/-under the cheque bearing No.571234 to the 1st defendant. 14. The judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian Evacuee Property, Bombay(1 supra) and Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets(3 supra) would be relevant for the present case. 15. Paragraph 20 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets case (3 supra) would be relevant for the purpose of this case, which is extracted as under: “The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their nonexistence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act.” 16. Even though, said judgment relates to a criminal case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the principle laid down therein would apply in the present case, as the question of burden of proof and the manner in which such burden of proof would shift between the parties to a suit, is clearly explained. 17. In the present case, the plaintiff having taken the stand that cheque number was wrongly mentioned and the cheque under which the 1st defendant received Rs.1,80,000/-was a different cheque, did not take any steps to produce either cheque bearing No.571234 or the statement of account of the bank account of the plaintiff, to show that the said amount of Rs.1,80,000/-was received by the 1st defendant. In the said circumstances, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian Evacuee Property, Bombay (1 supra) are relevant and are extracted below: “The same rule was reaffirmed in Rameshwar Singh v. Bajit Lal, AIR 1929 PC 95 and was approved by this Court in Hiralal v. Badkulal, AIR 1953 SC 22. In the said circumstances, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian Evacuee Property, Bombay (1 supra) are relevant and are extracted below: “The same rule was reaffirmed in Rameshwar Singh v. Bajit Lal, AIR 1929 PC 95 and was approved by this Court in Hiralal v. Badkulal, AIR 1953 SC 22. These three decisions lay down that it is the duty of a party to a suit in possession of important documents to produce them in court, and if that duty is not discharged the court may as well draw the presumption which it is entitled to do under S. 114 of the Evidence Act. A division bench of the Madras High court in Narayana Rao v. Venkatapayya, ILR (1937) Mad 299 : (AIR 1937 Mad 182) considered the interaction of the provisions of S. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and S.114 of the Evidence Act in the matter of rebuttal of the presumption under the former section. After considering the earlier decisions, including those of the Privy Council, Varadachariar, J., summarized the law at p.311 (of ILR Mad) “ (at p. 187 of AIR) thus: “It has to be borne in mind that, when evidence has been adduced on both sides, the question of onus Is a material or deciding factor only in exceptional circumstances, cl. Yellappa Ramappa Naik v. Tippanna, 56 Mad LJ 287 : (AIR 1929 Mad 8) and that even the onus under S. 118 of the Negotiable Instrument Act need not always be discharged by direct evidence adduced by the defendant; Muhammad Shafi Khan v. Muhammad Moazzam Ali Khan, 79 Ind Cas 464 : (AIR 1923 All 214), Singar Kunwar v. Basdeo Prasad, 124 Ind Cas 717 : ( AIR 1930 All 568 ) and Bishambar Das v. Ismail, AIR 1933 Lah 1029. Not merely can the Court base its conclusion on the effect of the evidence taken as a whole but it may also draw adverse inferences against a party who being in a position to adduce better evidence deliberately abstains from doing so; AIR 1917 PC 6 , Guruswami Nadan v. Goplaswami Odayar, ILR 42 Mad 629 : (AIR 1919 Mad 444) and Raghavendra Rao v. Venkataswami Naicken, 30 Mad LW 966 at p. 971 : ( AIR 1930 Mad 251 at p. 254). We respectfully accept the correctness of the said observations.” 18. We respectfully accept the correctness of the said observations.” 18. The said principles can be applied in the present case as the plaintiff in the face of the evidence produced by the defendants, did not choose to produce the cheque under which the 1st defendant is said to have received the sum of Rs.1,80,000/-. In the said circumstances, the stand of the defendants that all the documents produced by the plaintiff were the documents that were signed under duress cannot be brushed aside and an adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff. 19. Coming to the judgment of the trial Court, the trial Judge simply proceeded on the discharge of the initial burden of proof by the plaintiff and did not consider the aspect of shifting of burden of proof which was discharged by the defendants when they were able to demonstrate by cogent evidence that no money was received by the 1st defendant under the cash voucher receipt marked as Ex.A.4. The trial Judge ought to have considered this aspect and should have considered the fact that the burden of proof had shifted back to the plaintiff and the said burden of proof was not discharged by the plaintiff. In view of the non-consideration of this material issue, the judgment of the trial Judge cannot be sustained. 20. In the circumstances, the Appeal is allowed setting aside the decree and judgment dated 26.09.2003 passed in O.S.No.152 of 1999 by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Viajayawada. There shall be no order as to costs. 21. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. 22. After pronouncement of the judgment, Sri P. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent stated that he had informed the Court on 11.03.2020 that he had given up vakalat in the year 2015 and the parties have taken back their bundle. However, this submission has not been recorded in the docket proceedings on 11.03.2020. As Sri P. Durga Prasad had in fact informed the Court on that day, let the said statement be recorded here.