JUDGMENT/ORDER : 1. The petitioners who are 45 in number have been working in the LIC ever since their appointment on various dates between 1997 and 2009 filed this writ petition aggrieved by the rejection of their request for regularisation. 2. Petitioners were appointed as Assistants in the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) as per orders like Ext.P1, through Employment Exchange. In Ext.P1 order, the offer for appointment was for a period of 30 days in the temporary vacancy that had arisen on account of pending recruitment vacancy. It was stated that employment on temporary basis would be governed by the provisions of LIC (Employment of Temporary Staff) Instructions 1993 ('1993 Instructions'). It was further stated that none of the provisions in LIC of India (Staff) Regulations 1960 except Regulation 8 would apply to them during the period of their temporary employment. However it was ordered that they shall obey all such orders and instructions that would be given to them. It also provided that during the period of 30 days of their employment they would be eligible for casual leave at the rate of the day for each completed month of employment and privilege leave at the rate of one day at the rate of every day one actually worked. It was stated that they would not be entitled to any benefits on account of employment on temporary basis. Despite the fact that their appointments were for 30 days they continued in service without any further orders. During the pendency of this Writ Petition one of the petitioners retired from service. 3. It is stated that the petitioners had approached this Court in W.P(C) No.5843/2009 seeking regularisation of their services along with two others, which was disposed of as per Ext.P2 judgment. Seeing that petitioners continued in service for the last more than 18 to 20 years this court in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment observed as follows: 15. I, therefore, find substantial force in the submissions of Sri.S.Eswaran that it may not be possible for the LIC to absorb the petitioners herein on the basis of the scheme presented by them before the Honble Supreme court. I, therefore, find substantial force in the submissions of Sri.S.Eswaran that it may not be possible for the LIC to absorb the petitioners herein on the basis of the scheme presented by them before the Honble Supreme court. I also notice his specific assertion that even an exercise under the mandate of paragraph 53 of Umadevis case (supra) may not be possible in this case because the appointments of the petitioners cannot be seen to be irregular, since they were appointed under the specific provisions of 1993 Rules. He vehemently asserts that the directions in paragraph 53 if Umadevis case (supra) would apply only if the appointments are irregular but not in this case wherein appointments were made regularly and validly. In effect, the submission of Sri.Eswaran is that since the petitioners were appointed under the 1993 Rules, which were created specifically for the purpose of effecting appointments of temporary staff, the ratio of Umadevis case (supra) cannot be applied into the facts of this case. 16. Even though I have heard Sri.Eswaran as above, the fact remains that the petitioners have been in service continuously for more than 18 to 20 years without any break, though the LIC asserts that this was only because they were interdicted from terminating the petitioners services on account of the various judgments of this Court and that of the Honble Supreme Court, particularly, State of Haryana v. Piara Singh [ (1992) 4 SCC 118 ]. The LIC thus maintains that it was only by way of an indulgence that the petitioners were allowed to continue in service but that they can do so only until such time as regular recruitment is done by the LIC. According to Sri.Eswaran, it is solely because regular recruitment has been delayed that the petitioners have fortuitously been able to continue in service without being thrown out. 4. The Writ Petition was disposed of directing the competent authority of LIC to consider whether the petitioners could be absorbed in service on the strength of directions in paragraph 53 of the judgment in Secretary, State of Karnataka & others v. Umadevi & others : (2006) 4 SCC 1 and if it was found otherwise, to allow them to continue in service till such time a new recruitment process is initiated and concluded. It was further clarified that consideration of the petitioners for regularization under Umadevis case would be completely within the discretion of the competent authority of LIC. 5. The LIC has thereafter issued Exts.P3 to P45 orders rejecting the request of the petitioners for regularisation. It was stated that LIC had already formulated a scheme of regularization as directed by the Honourable Supreme Court on 06.10.1992 in E.Prabhavati & others v. LIC of India & others (CA 4564 to 4584/1992) pursuant to the undertaking given by the Corporation. Accordingly, the LIC of India (Employment of Temporary Staff) Instructions were framed on 28.06.1993. The Apex court approved that scheme. It is stated that in the judgment in LIC of India v. Sudhakar (C.A.2104/2000) the Apex court re-affirmed the scheme and held that absorption of any adhoc workmen in LIC in the country shall be governed by the scheme framed in E.Prabhavatis case. It was also held that it would not be necessary to evolve any fresh scheme for another group of employees, in view of the existing scheme framed in Prabhavatis case. The respondents found that in Umadevi v. State of Karnataka: (2006) 4 SCC 1 , the direction of the apex court was to frame the scheme as a one time measure only and that it was applicable only to irregular appointments of those having 10 years service. It was stated that in the case of petitioners, their appointments were not irregular as they were appointed in terms of LIC of India (Employment of Temporary Staff) Instructions 1993 and they have not completed 10 years of continuous service as on 10.04.2006. It was further stated that they were allowed to continue giving them the benefit of assurance given by the Counsel for the LIC before the Supreme Court on 26.09.2008 in C.A. 6950/2009; though they could have been disengaged, it was not done because there was vacancy and they cannot be replaced with another set of temporary employees in terms of 1993 Instructions. It was stated that it was not feasible to frame a new scheme for their regularisation. It was stated that it was not feasible to frame a new scheme for their regularisation. Stating the aforesaid reasons it was ordered that it was not possible to absorb the petitioners on lines of Umadevis case; they would be continued till the age of superannuation or till the next recruitment process is initiated, whichever is earlier; they would be eligible for age relaxation in the next round of recruitment as and when it is initiated in terms of LIC of India (Employment of Temporary Staff) Instructions 1993; once the recruitment exercise is initiated and concluded, they would be disengaged if they were not able to succeed in the recruitment test. This Writ Petition is filed challenging Exts.P3 to P45 orders rejecting their request for regularization. 6. Petitioners point out that their appointments were not made against any casual vacancies; but against regular substantive vacancies; the respondents allowed them to continue contrary to the 1993 Instructions; the reasons stated by the respondents is in violation of para.53 of Umadevis case; when this court directed consideration of their case in the light of Umadevis case, the respondents cannot be heard to deny them absorption on the ground of the 1993 Instructions. The petitioners rely on Ext.P48 judgment dated 09.02.2012 rendered by a learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in which Assistants/Typists appointed in LIC on temporary basis between 1995 and 1998 sought for regularization. Seeing that the petitioners therein were appointed through Employment Exchange and they had completed 13 to 17 years in their respective posts, directions were issued to consider their case for regularisation meaningfully. The contention of the petitioners was that their engagement itself was contrary to the 1993 Instructions, without specifying the duration of appointment as well as the circumstances for offering temporary appointment; they sought regularisation in the light of paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevis case, pointing out that they were appointed through the regular process. They had also relied on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court which distinguished the temporary appointments made through Employment Exchange and otherwise. The contention of the LIC was that regularization was not possible in the light of the provisions contained in Regulations 8(1) and (2) of the LIC (Staff) Regulations, 1960. They had also relied on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court which distinguished the temporary appointments made through Employment Exchange and otherwise. The contention of the LIC was that regularization was not possible in the light of the provisions contained in Regulations 8(1) and (2) of the LIC (Staff) Regulations, 1960. They had also pointed out that opportunity was given to the petitioners therein to participate in the regular process of recruitment giving them relaxation in age; after participating in the process of selection and on being unsuccessful in that process petitioners therein were estopped from questioning the selection. Taking note of the process of their selection through Employment Exchange, their unblemished continuous service for 13 to 17 years without any break, it was found that their claim was liable to be considered in the light of para. 53 of the judgment in Umadevis case (supra). It was found that failure in the recruitment test which was conducted in common to those like petitioners in their forties and the youngsters in their twenties cannot stand in the way of consideration of petitioners for regularisation in the light of the judgment in Umadevis case. Seeing that LIC did not take any action in tune with para 53 of the judgment in Umadevis case and the direction contained therein; that the order of appointment did not contain the duration of their appointments except in the case of 2, when clause VI of the 1993 Instructions, provides that an appointment for a period beyond 120 days is issued only for those who are awaiting regular appointment; the regulations provide that duration of temporary appointment and the circumstances for making such appointment shall be specified and those conditions were not fulfilled, directions were issued to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners therein meaningfully. Ext.P48 judgment was affirmed by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Ext.P49 judgment dated 28.10.2015 in W.A.No.50414/2012 and 50445-476 of 2012. 7. Pointing out Ext.P50 affidavit filed by LIC before the Apex court in Civil Appeal No.2268/2011 and connected cases, petitioners claimed that LIC has regularised similarly appointed Assistants and Typists in Varanasi, Kanpur, etc and therefore the respondents are adopting a discriminatory attitude towards them. 8. 7. Pointing out Ext.P50 affidavit filed by LIC before the Apex court in Civil Appeal No.2268/2011 and connected cases, petitioners claimed that LIC has regularised similarly appointed Assistants and Typists in Varanasi, Kanpur, etc and therefore the respondents are adopting a discriminatory attitude towards them. 8. The respondents have filed a counter affidavit producing Ext.R1(a) judgment dated 01.12.1999 in O.P.No.2009/1999 filed by 1st petitioner and others, stating that he suppressed the same while filing this writ petition. It is stated that he had already approached this Court in December 1999 apprehending termination on expiry of the period of appointment. 9. Producing the judgments Ext.R1(a) in OP No.2009/1999 and Ext.R1(b) judgment dated 5.1.2000 in W.A. No.2773/1999 and also Ext.R1(c) judgment dated 11.01.2000 in OP No.14277/1999 the respondents pointed out that several of the petitioners had approached this Court challenging the proposed termination of their service and this Court had rejected their claim taking note of the terms and conditions of their appointment. Contention of the respondents is that the petitioners have suppressed these material facts while presenting the writ petition. It is also pointed out that as against the judgment Ext.R1(b) in W.A.No.2773/1999 they had also approached the Supreme Court in SLP No.3298/2000. While Ext.R1(b) judgment was at the instance of the 1st petitioner along with others Ext.R1(c) judgment was at the instance of the 2nd petitioner along with others. The judgment Ext.R1(c) was affirmed in Ext.R1(d) judgment dated 01.06.2000 in W.A.No.818/2000 and by the apex court in Ext.R1(e) order. It is their further contention that the petitioners continued thereafter since the regular recruitment was not made by the LIC. It is stated that though they participated in the regular recruitment conducted by LIC for class III posts in the year 2008-09, none of the petitioners came out successful. It is stated that petitioner nos.28 and 29 filed WP(C) No.6739/2009 which resulted in Ext.R1(f) judgment dated 02.12.2016. Petitioner No.17 filed WP(C) No.31799/2013 which resulted in Ext.P2 judgment, after she was unsuccessful in the regular selection. Therefore according to the respondents a 2nd writ petition will not lie for the very same relief and this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground itself. 10. Petitioner No.17 filed WP(C) No.31799/2013 which resulted in Ext.P2 judgment, after she was unsuccessful in the regular selection. Therefore according to the respondents a 2nd writ petition will not lie for the very same relief and this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground itself. 10. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the present Writ Petition is on the basis of the orders passed pursuant to Ext.P2 judgment and they are claiming regularization on the basis of the service rendered by them even after the disposal of those writ petitions in the light of paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevis case. It is also pointed out that even while dismissing the writ appeal filed by the employees this Court had in Ext.R1(b) judgment directed that the case of the appellant shall be given due priority in case there is temporary engagement. The apex court had in Ext.R1(e) judgment dismissed the SLP observing that petitioners were appointed for a limited period of time which automatically came to an end on expiry of the said period. In the judgment in WP(C) No.6738/2009 the complaint of the petitioners was against conducting the very same examination for those who were continuing on temporary appointments and for the fresh candidates from open market. Allegations were also raised as against malpractice in the conduct of the selection process. In that case it was found that petitioners therein were continuing on the strength of the interim order passed on 24.03.2006. While repelling the contentions as against the selection process the petitioners therein were allowed to continue on temporary basis though they failed in the examination. The respondents also stated that Exts.P3 to P45 orders were passed after examining the case of the petitioners in accordance with the rules and instructions applicable to LIC in the matter of appointments. According to them as the apex court has already found in the judgment in LIC of India v. G. Sudhakar in C.A.2104/2000: 2001(2) Supple JT 143, that no fresh scheme for regularization was to be framed by the LIC in view of Ext.P46 scheme already formulated in E.Prabhavatis case, a different conclusion is not possible in the case of petitioners and there is nothing wrong in the orders Exts.P3 to P45. It is stated that LIC has issued a fresh notification for recruitment of Assistants on 17.9.2019 and petitioners were eligible to appear in that process of recruitment in case they had submitted applications, as they are eligible for age relaxation. 11. The learned Standing Counsel for the LIC pointed out that in paragraph 6 of the judgment in G.Sudhakars case apex court had on 22.11.2001 made it clear that the case of regularization of the employees of the Corporation could be dealt with in accordance with the said scheme and it would not be necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for a group of employees and the scheme would be applicable equally to the employees of all divisions. Pointing out the leave granted against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court the learned Standing Counsel submits that the judgment of the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court will not and cannot be applied to the circumstances of the case. 12. Relying on the judgments in Narendra Kumar Tiwari & others v. State of Jharkhand: (2018) 8 SCC 238 , State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1 and State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 the learned Counsel for the petitioners argued that the petitioners are entitled to be regularised. 13. Relying on the judgments in Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen, Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd : (2007) 1 SCC 408 and Indian Railway Contruction Co.Ltd v. Ajay Kumar : (2003) 4 SCC 579 , Sri.Easwaran argued that the petitioners do not have any right to be regularised just because of they continued 15 to 18 years and that when the employer has examined the case and exercised its discretion after due application of mind, by rejecting it, he cannot be directed to exercise his discretion in any particular manner. It was argued that the Allahabad High Court dismissed a similar claim in Hashmuddin and others v. LIC of India and Ors : 2011 (84) ALR 836 and that Civil Appeal No.7677/2019 filed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court was dismissed by judgment dated 01.10.2019. It was argued that in the light of the judgment in Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala and another : 2000 (6) SCC 359 , no direction can be issued to the respondents for regularisation. 14. It was argued that in the light of the judgment in Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala and another : 2000 (6) SCC 359 , no direction can be issued to the respondents for regularisation. 14. Heard Sri.Kaleeswaram Raj, the learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri.Eswaran, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 15. First of all I shall deal with the contentions of the respondents in the light of Exts.R1(a) to (f) judgments. It is seen that all the petitioners were parties to Ext.P2 judgment. The contentions as to suppression of material facts are not seen to have raised in the previous writ petition; if at all it was raised it did not stand in the way of the judgment in Ext.P2 by which the respondents were directed to consider the claim of petitioners. Though it would have been only proper for the petitioners to disclose the filing of earlier writ petitions, I am of the view that the same cannot non-suit the petitioners on that ground. Those were writ petitions filed apprehending termination of the services of those petitioners on completion of the period fixed in the order of appointment. Even after the dismissal of those writ petitions the respondents chose to retain the petitioners in service. The respondents allowed them to continue all these years i.e for about 18 to 19 years, even in the absence of any orders of the court. According to the respondents their appointments were made in tune with the 1993 Instructions against temporary vacancies. The judgments Ext.R1(a) to R1(f) would not stand in the way of claiming regularisation at a time when they completed 15 to 18 years far beyond the 30 days period fixed in the offer/order of their appointments. It cannot be said that a claim for regularisation and writ petition based on such claim which was not even envisaged at the time of filing original petitions in the year 2000, 2001, etc cannot be raised or filed after a period of more than 10-15 years, that too when they claim the benefit of a judgment rendered in 2006. In this case the respondents themselves chose to retain the petitioners all these years even contrary to the 1993 Instructions, beyond the period prescribed for temporary appointment. Therefore the objection raised on the basis of Exts.R1(a) to (f) judgments is only to be repelled. In this case the respondents themselves chose to retain the petitioners all these years even contrary to the 1993 Instructions, beyond the period prescribed for temporary appointment. Therefore the objection raised on the basis of Exts.R1(a) to (f) judgments is only to be repelled. It is relevant to note that the said objection which was not raised or even raised and not considered cannot also be allowed to be raised in this writ petition. 16. The respondents have stated that petitioners did not qualify themselves in the recruitment test which was held in 2009. But the respondents allowed them to continue in substantive vacancies even after appointments were made based on that recruitment test. Thereafter it is only in 2019 that a notification is issued for the recruitment. The contention of the respondents that petitioners cannot be regularised since they did not come out successful in the recruitment process held in 2009 cannot also be accepted in view of the interim orders passed by the Apex court in Ext.P57 and the subsequent orders directing the very same respondents to conduct the test exclusively for those who are continuing on temporary appointment in other States. No recruitment test was conducted in 2009 or in 2019, exclusively for petitioners who were working on temporary basis for such a long period. The petitioners who started working between 1997 and 2002 would not be able to compete with the freshers from open market, but they have gained rich experience by continuing in the respective posts for the last more than 17 to 20 years. In the cases considered by the apex court with the respondents on the party array with respect to regularization it is seen that a separate examination was directed to be conducted exclusively for the persons like petitioners without subjecting them to a competition with the freshers. Therefore the respondents ought to have conducted a separate test for them as directed in Exts.P48 and P57 orders. While rejecting the request of the petitioners, the respondents did not consider these aspects. In view of such circumstances arising in the case, the judgments relied on by Sri.Eswaran would not be applicable to the case of the petitioners. 17. Therefore the respondents ought to have conducted a separate test for them as directed in Exts.P48 and P57 orders. While rejecting the request of the petitioners, the respondents did not consider these aspects. In view of such circumstances arising in the case, the judgments relied on by Sri.Eswaran would not be applicable to the case of the petitioners. 17. Another ground for rejection of the request of petitioners is that there is already a scheme for regularisation formulated in Prabhavatis case and that in Sudhakarans case the apex court has held that no other scheme is necessary. But it is relevant to note that none of these schemes envisaged the retention of employees on temporary appointment for such a long period. It appears that the judgment in Sudhakarans case was rendered much before the judgment in Umadevis case. 18. In paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevis case the Apex Court directed the States and the Public Sector Undertakings to frame a scheme for regularisation, as a one time measure, of those who completed 10 years service on irregular appointments and not illegal appointments. In State of Karnataka and others v. M.L. Kesari and others : (2010) 9 SCC 247 the Apex court found that the object behind the direction in para.53 of the judgment in Umadevis case was two-fold; first to ensure that those who have put in more than 10 years of continuous service without protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision in Umadevis case was rendered, are considered for regularization in view of their long service; the second was to ensure that the departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the practice of employing persons on daily-wage/adhoc/casual basis for long periods and then periodically regularize them on the ground that they have served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the constitutional or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and appointment. According to the respondents petitioners are not entitled to be regularised in the light of para 53 of Umadevis case since their appointments were made regularly on temporary basis in accordance with 1993 Instructions and also because of the existing scheme Ext.P46. When even those who were irregularly appointed are directed to be regularised, the contention that persons like petitioners are not entitled to claim that benefit because of their regular appointment, is unsustainable. When even those who were irregularly appointed are directed to be regularised, the contention that persons like petitioners are not entitled to claim that benefit because of their regular appointment, is unsustainable. Irregular appointees cannot be put on a higher pedestal than those appointed regularly. 19. It is also pertinent to note that temporary appointments could be made under the 1993 Instructions (1) during the pendency of the recruitment of staff on regular basis (2) against vacancies arising out of absence on maternity leave of a regular employee or on sickness of a regular employee for a period exceeding one month (3) against adhoc vacancies sanctioned by zonal manager to cope up with the works of seasonal nature. Despite all these, petitioners continued for the last more than 15-18 years based on the temporary appointments made in accordance with rules. To deny a benefit to those appointed in accordance with rules on temporary basis while granting benefits to those appointed otherwise than in accordance with rules would be only a premium for irregular appointments which would be arbitrary as well as discriminatory and negation of equality and equal protection before law. In this context it is relevant to note the judgment of the Apex court in Narendra Kumar Tiwari and others v. State of Jhharghand & others: (2018) 8 SCC 238 , where the apex court deprecated the practice of continuing employees on temporary basis for a long time stating that the same is not good governance. It was held that regularisation was denied to the employees on the ground that they had not completed 10 years as on the date of judgment in Umadevis case, was nothing but exploitation. After discussing the directions in para 53 of Umadevis judgment and its interpretation in M.L. Kesaris judgment, the Apex Court held as follows in paragraph 7 of the judgment: 7. The purpose and intent of the decision in Umadevi (3) was therefore twofold, namely, to prevent irregular or illegal appointments in the future and secondly, to confer a benefit on those who had been irregularly appointed in the past. The purpose and intent of the decision in Umadevi (3) was therefore twofold, namely, to prevent irregular or illegal appointments in the future and secondly, to confer a benefit on those who had been irregularly appointed in the past. The fact that the State of Jharkhand continued with the irregular appointments for almost a decade after the decision in Umadevi (3) is a clear indication that it believes that it was all right to continue with irregular appointments, and whenever required, terminate the services of the irregularly appointed employees on the ground that they were irregularly appointed. This is nothing but a form of exploitation of the employees by not giving them the benefits of regularisation and by placing the sword of Damocles over their head. This is precisely what Umadevi (3) and Kesari sought to avoid. 20. The Apex court found that the action of State of Jharkhand was to short circuit the process of regular appointments and to continue on irregular appointments which cannot be good governance. In this case the respondents have admitted that vacancies existed all along to retain the petitioners and that they did not seek termination of their service, as the LIC gave them the benefit of assurance made by the learned Standing Counsel before the Apex Court in some other cases. Therefore, it is clear that the continuance of the petitioners all these years was not on account of intervention of the orders of any court and that there were vacancies in sanctioned posts all along. It is also clear that their initial appointments were not through backdoor and was through Employment Exchange based on selection. The respondents do not have a case that petitioners do not have the prescribed qualification or that there are no sanctioned posts. They do not have any complaint against the performance of the petitioners. Therefore nothing stood in the way of their consideration for regularisation, based on a judgment rendered by the apex court subsequent to the judgment in Prabhakarans case or even by conducting a separate test exclusively for them. In these circumstances, it is only proper that the respondents re-consider the case of petitioners for regularisation either as a one time measure in the light of Umadevis case by conducting a separate test exclusively for the petitioners. Ordered accordingly. In these circumstances, it is only proper that the respondents re-consider the case of petitioners for regularisation either as a one time measure in the light of Umadevis case by conducting a separate test exclusively for the petitioners. Ordered accordingly. Respondents shall take appropriate action within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Till such time 44 vacancies of Assistants shall not be filled up by way of the recruitment conducted in 2019 based on Exts.P51 to 55 notifications or by any other process. Exts.P3 to P45 are set aside. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.