JUDGMENT : Ravi Nath Tilhari, J. 1. We have heard Sri Nand Kishor Mishra learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and have perused the material on record. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition for the following reliefs: "(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 17.10.2018 passed by the Respondent No. 3 and order dated 13.7.2018 as well as notice dated 27.10.2018 issued by the District Magistrate, Mahoba (Annexures 1, 2 and 3 to the writ petition). (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents not to realize/recover the amount Rs. 57,36,750/- mineral cost (Khaniz Mutya) as well as penalty sum of Rs. 50,000/- from the petitioner on the basis of the notice dated 27.10.2018. (c) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to restore the mining permit of the petitioner and issue Form MM-11 for the remaining quantity by extending the time period which has been lapsed due to passing of the impugned order dated 13.7.2018, cancelling the mining permit. (d) Issue any other suitable writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (e) Award cost of the petition in favour of the petitioner." 2. By order/notice dated 13.7.2018 the District Magistrate, Mahoba had cancelled the petitioner's mining permit and after determining the petitioner's liability for payment, directed for recovery of the said amount from the petitioner. By order dated 17.10.2018 the petitioner's revision was dismissed by the Additional Chief Secretary/Special Secretary, Department of Geology and Mining Government of U.P., Lucknow. By notice dated 27.10.2018 the petitioner was directed to make the payment failing which, it was provided that the same shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue. 3. The facts of the case are that the petitioner was granted mining permit on 12.5.2018 for removal of 12350 cubic meter of sand/maurram from her agricultural field of Gata No. 39 kha having an area of 1.235 hectares situated in village Barano, Tehsil Kulpahar, District Mahoba, for a period of three months w.e.f. 12.5.2018 upto 11.8.2018 and in pursuance thereof petitioner deposited an amount of Rs. 25,00,876/- in total under different heads on 12.5.2018 itself, whereupon the mining plan was approved by the competent authority and after getting the mining permission the petitioner started excavation work for removal of the mineral/sands/mauram from her agricultural gata. 4. On 13.7.2018 the Respondent No. 4/ District Magistrate, Mahoba passed the impugned order (Annexure 2) according to which, as per the inspection/survey report dated 13.7.2018 of the inspecting team, there were following irregularities found at the time of inspection;- "(a) that as per the inspection and survey made by the inspection team petitioner had mined total 13,976 cubic meter of mineral whereas till date of inspection for only 6,327 cubic meter of mineral e-MM-11 has been issued hence petitioner has done 7,649 cubic meter of illegal mining. (b) That in the area petitioner has done the mining for 13,976 cubic meter of mineral which is more than the approved quantity of 12,350 cubic meter of mineral. (c) The petitioner has used the machines in the area. (d) Approach roads of the villages have "been damaged. (e) Adjoining land has damaged. (f) Mining has been done beyond the approved depth. (g) Unsafe and undercut mining work has been done. (h) Mining permit has been granted for making the land cultivable but petitioner has made the land unlevel with pits." 5. Consequently, the mining permit was cancelled with direction to the petitioner to deposit the amount of royalty, mineral cost and penalty, failing which it was provided that the said amount shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue. The petitioner was also directed by order/notice dated 13.7.2018 to submit explanation with respect to the irregularities mentioned above and as to why legal proceedings be not initiated against her and she not be blacklisted. The petitioner's Revision No. 136 (R)/ACS/M of 2018 under Rule 78 of the U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 (in short 'the Rules 1963') was dismissed by the Respondent No. 3 and a notice dated 27.10.2018 (Annexure 3) was issued to the petitioner for recovery of the amount determined by order/notice dated 13.7.2018. 6. The State-Respondents, inspite of time having been granted, did not file any counter-affidavit. 7. 6. The State-Respondents, inspite of time having been granted, did not file any counter-affidavit. 7. Sri Nand Kishore Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order/notice dated 13.7.2018 has been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice of affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before cancelling her mining permit. On the one hand the petitioner was issued the show-cause notice but at the same time by the same notice/order the petitioner's mining permit was also cancelled. He has further submitted that the inspection report dated 13.7.2018, which is the very basis of the order of cancellation, was not provided to the petitioner and she was also not associated in the said inspection which was conducted, if conducted at all, behind the back of the petitioner without any notice of such inspection. The liability for payment has been fastened on the petitioner in gross violation of principles of natural justice. He next submitted that the above aspects were raised before the revisional authority, but without considering the same the petitioner's revision was dismissed, mechanically, affirming the order dated 13.7.2018 and demand notice dated 27.10.2018 was also issued. 8. The learned Standing Counsel has sub-milted that the order/notice dated 13.7.2018 has been passed in view of the illegal mining being done by the petitioner and the grave irregularities committed by her which are evident from the inspection report dated 13.7.2018, and, as such, the impugned orders and the demand notice are perfectly justified. 9. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. 10. 9. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. 10. The order dated 13.7.2018 is being reproduced as under: ^^ÁkIr f'kdk;rksa ds n`f"Vxr ck<+ ls ,df=r ckyw@eksje dks gVkus ds fy, m0Á0 mi&[kfut ¼ifjgkj½ fu;ekoyh 1963 ds fu;e 52 d ds vUrxZr Lohd`r [kuu vuqKk {ks=ksa dh tkap ds fy, dk;kZy; vkns'k la[;k 4340@,e0,e0lh-30 fnukad 03-07-2018 }kjk tkap ny dk xBu fd;k x;kA mDr tkap ny }kjk ÁLrqr fujh{k.k@losZ{k.k vk[;k fnukad 13-07-2018 esa ;g voxr djk;k x;k fd vkids }kjk dk;kZy; vkns'k la[;k 3694,@,e0,e0lh0-30 fnukad 18-05-2018 }kjk vkids i{k esa Lohd`r [kuu vuqKk {ks= xzke&cjkuksa ds xkVk la[;k 39 [k jdok 1-235 gs0 esa fufj{k.k@losZ{k.k mijkUr fuEukuqlkj vfu;ferrka, ik;h x;h %& 1- tkap ny dh iSekb'k ds vuqlkj Lohd`r {ks= esa 13]976 ?kuehVj [kuu fd;k x;k gS tcfd vkids }kjk fujh{k.k fnukad rd 6]327 ?kuehVj Ái= bZ&,e0,e0&11 dk gh fuxZeu fd;k x;k gS] bl Ádkj vki }kjk 7]649 ?kuehVj dk voS/k [kuu@fcuk jk;YVh dk ifjogu fd;k x;k gSA 2- {ks= esa vuqKk i= esa Lohd`r ek=k 12]350 ?kuehVj ls Hkh vf/kd 13]976 ?kuehVj [kuu dj fy;k x;k gSA 3- {ks= esa e'khuksa dk Á;ksx fd;k x;k gSA 4- xzkeh.k lEidZ ekxksZa dks {kfrxzLr fd;k x;k gSA 5- vkl&ikl dh Hkwfe dks uqdlku igqWapk;k x;k gSA 6- Lohd`r xgjkbZ ls vf/kd xgjkbZ esa [kuu fd;k x;k gSA 7- vlqjf{kr ,ao vUMjdV [kuu dk;Z fd;k x;k gSA 8- [kuu vuqKk i= ck<+ ls ,df=r ckyw@eksje dks gVkdj [ksrh ;ksX; cukus ds fy, fn;k x;k gS ijUrq {ks= dks vlery rFkk xM~ vr% vki }kjk Lohd`r lhek ls vf/kd [kuu dk;Z dj fy, tkus] voS/kkfud e'khuksa dks mi;ksx fd;s tkus] xzkeh.k lEidZ ekxksZa dks {kfrxzLr fd;s tkus] vkl&ikl ds [ksrksa dks uqdlku igqWapk;s tkus] Lohd`r xgjkbZ ls vf/kd [kuu fd;s tkus ,oa vlqjf{kr ,ao vUMjdV [kuu dk;Z fd;s tkus ds dkj.k vkt fnukad 13-07-2018 ls vkidk [kuu vuqKk i= fujLr fd;k tkrk gS vr% vki rRdky [kuu ,oa ifjogu dk;Z jksd ns ,oa voS/k [kuu dh ek=k 7]649 ?kuehVj ds fy, [kku ,oa [kfut ¼fodkl ,oa fofu;eu½ vf/kfu;e 1957 dh /kkjk 4 o 21 ds vUrZxr jk;YVh #0 11]47]350-00 ,ao mldk [kfueq[k ewY; #0 57]36]750-00 dh /kujkf'k 15 fnu ds vUnj fu/kkZfjr ys[kk 'kh"kZd esa tek djk;k tkuk lqfuf'pr djs rFkk e'khuksa ds Á;ksx ds lEcU/k esa m0Á0 mi[kfut ¼ifjgkj½ fu;ekoyh 1963 ds fu;e&59 ¼la'kksf/kr½ ds vUrxZr #0 50]000 dh /kujkf'k fu/kkZfjr ys[kk 'kh"kZd esa tek djk;k tkuk lqfuf'pr djs vU;Fkk leLr /kujkf'k e; C;kt ds Hkw&jktLo dh HkkWafr olwy dj yh tk;sxhA vkidks ;g Hkh lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr vfu;ferrkvksa ds vUrxZr viuk Li"Vhdj.k ,d lIrkg ds vUnj dk;kZy; esa ÁLrqr djs fd D;ksa u vkids fo#) fu;ekuqlkj dkuwuh dk;Zokgh laLrqr dh tk;s ,oa vkidk uke dkyh lwph esa ntZ dj fy;k tk;A vkidks iqu% lpsr fd;k tkrk gS fd {ks= esa dksbZ [kuu dk;Z ik;k tkrk gS rks vkids fo#) fu;ekuqlkj dBksj dk;Zokgh dh tk;sxhA** 11. A perusal of the impugned order/notice dated 13.7.2018 shows that on the one had the petitioner's mining permit was cancelled and the liability for payment of royalty etc. was imposed and at the same time, the petitioner was also directed to show-cause against the irregularities mentioned therein pointed by the report of the inspection team, as well as to show-cause as to why legal proceedings be not initiated against the petitioner and she be not black listed. It is evident that the order/notice dated 13.7.2018 was issued as some complaints were made and in view thereof an inspection team was constituted by office order dated 4340/MMC-2018 which submitted its report dated 13.7.2018 pointing out so many irregularities and illegalities committed by the petitioner in her mining permit area. 12. We find that there is nothing on record to show that the inspection was made after notice to the petitioner or the petitioner was given any opportunity to show-cause against the inspection report dated 13.7.2018, serving a copy thereof to the petitioner. There is also nothing on record to show that any show-cause notice for the proposed cancellation of mining permit was issued to the petitioner after submission of the inspection report. The date of the inspection report and the impugned order/notice is the same i.e. 13.7.2018 whereby mining permit was also cancelled and the liability was determined ex parte, on the basis of the inspection report. After doing that, the respondent No. 2 by the same order directed the petitioner to submit explanation as to why legal proceedings be not taken against the petitioner and she be not black listed. 13. Anything contrary to the above mentioned could not be brought to our notice by the learned standing counsel. 14. We thus find that the order dated 13.7.2018 to the extent of cancellation of the petitioner's mining permit and a direction to deposit the amount determined thereunder, has been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, although the same adversely affects the petitioner and has civil consequences. 15. It is settled in law that any order or any action having civil consequences has to be passed/taken after affording opportunity of hearing to the person concerned, in consonance with the principles of natural justice. If this requirement is not fulfilled, the order or the action cannot be sustained. 15. It is settled in law that any order or any action having civil consequences has to be passed/taken after affording opportunity of hearing to the person concerned, in consonance with the principles of natural justice. If this requirement is not fulfilled, the order or the action cannot be sustained. The person has a right to show-cause against the proposed action which, if taken, would adversely affect his rights or impose some liability on him/her. 16. In the case of Nisha Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2014) 16 SCC 392, wherein the income certificate of the appellant therein was cancelled on the report of Tehsildar, which was itself predicated only on the revenue records and it was admitted that the appellant was not afforded any opportunity of being heard before cancellation, inasmuch as the report of the tehsildar being based on revenue records, was presumed to be correct, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "4. In the course of arguments addressed before us, the fervent submission of counsel of the Appellant that she was not afforded any opportunity of being heard has not been controverted, inasmuch as it has been contended that the Report of the Tehsildar was based on revenue records, which, therefore, was presumed to be correct. The High Court has acted upon this one sided or unilateral Report of the Tehsildar in arriving at the conclusion that the Appellant indeed had an income in excess of Rupees twelve thousand per annum and, accordingly, was ineligible for appointment as an Anganwadi Worker. 5. Trite though it is, we may yet again reiterate that the principle of audi alteram partem admits of no exception, and demands to be adhered to in all circumstances. In other words, before arriving at any decision which has serious implications and consequences to any person, such person must be heard in his defence. We find that the High Court did not notice the violation and infraction of this salutary principle of law. Accordingly, on-this short ground, the impugned Judgments and Orders require to be set aside, and are so done. The matter is remanded back to the Divisional Commissioner for taking a fresh decision after giving due notice to the Appellant and affording her an opportunity of being heard. Accordingly, on-this short ground, the impugned Judgments and Orders require to be set aside, and are so done. The matter is remanded back to the Divisional Commissioner for taking a fresh decision after giving due notice to the Appellant and affording her an opportunity of being heard. The Divisional Magistrate, Kullu, shall complete the proceedings expeditiously, and not later than six months from the date on which a copy of this Order is served on him." 17. In the case of Dharampal Satyapal v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise and others, (2015) 8 SCC 519 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has elaborately discussed the rule of audi alteram partem, its origin, scope and the consequences of its non-observance. We consider it appropriate to reproduce relevant paragraphs of Dharampal's case (supra) as under: "18. Natural justice is an expression of English Common Law. Natural justice is not a single theory-it is a family of views. In one sense administering justice itself is treated as natural virtue and, therefore, a part of natural justice. It is also called 'naturalist' approach to the phrase 'natural justice' and is related to 'moral naturalism'. Moral naturalism captures the essence of commonsense morality-that good and evil, right and wrong, are the real features of the natural world that human reason can comprehend. In this sense, it may comprehend virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence in relation to justice as all these are attributes of natural justice. We are not addressing ourselves with this connotation of natural justice here. 19. In Common Law, the concept and doctrine of natural justice, particularly which is made applicable in the decision making by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, has assumed different connotation. It is developed with this fundamental in mind that those whose duty is to decide, must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred both without bias and they must given to each of the parties to adequately present the case made. It is perceived that the practice of aforesaid attributes in mind only would lead to doing justice. Since these attributes are treated as natural or fundamental, it is known as 'natural justice'. They must deal with the question referred both without bias and they must given to each of the parties to adequately present the case made. It is perceived that the practice of aforesaid attributes in mind only would lead to doing justice. Since these attributes are treated as natural or fundamental, it is known as 'natural justice'. The principles of natural justice developed over a period of time and which is still in vogue and valid even today were: (i) rule against bias, i.e. nemo judex in causa sua; and (ii) opportunity of being heard to the concerned party, i.e. audi alteram partem. These are known as principles of natural justice. To these principles a third principle is added, which is of recent origin. It is duty to give reasons in support of decision, namely, passing of a 'reasoned order'. 20. Though the aforesaid principles of natural justice are known to have their origin in Common Law, even in India the principle is prevalent from ancient times, which was even invoked in Kautilya's 'Arthashastra'. This Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, (1978)1 SCC 405 : AIR 1978 SC 851 , explained the Indian origin of these principles in the following words: Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes, it applies when people are affected by acts of authority. It is the bone of healthy Government, recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of judge-made law. Indeed from the legendary days of Adam-and of Kautilya's Arthashastra-the rule of law has had this stamp of natural justice, which makes it social justice. We need not go into these deeps for the present except to indicate that the roots of natural justice and its foliage are noble and not new-fangled. Today its application must be sustained by current legislation, case law or other extant principle, not the hoary chords of legend and history. Our jurisprudence has sanctioned its prevalence even like the Anglo-American system. 21. Aristotle, before the era of Christ, spoke of such principles calling it as universal law. Today its application must be sustained by current legislation, case law or other extant principle, not the hoary chords of legend and history. Our jurisprudence has sanctioned its prevalence even like the Anglo-American system. 21. Aristotle, before the era of Christ, spoke of such principles calling it as universal law. Justinian in the fifth and sixth Centuries A.D. called it 'juranaturalia', i.e. natural law. 22. The principles have sound jurisprudential basis. Since the function of the judicial and quasi-judicial authorities is to secure justice with fairness, these principles provide great humanising factor intended to invest law with fairness to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. The principles are extended even to those who have to take administrative decision and who are not necessarily discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They are a kind of code of fair administrative procedure. In this context, procedure is not a matter of secondary importance as it is only by procedural fairness shown in the decision making that decision becomes acceptable. In its proper sense, thus, natural justice would mean the natural sense of what is right and wrong. 23. This aspect of procedural fairness, namely, right to a fair hearing, would mandate what is literally known as 'hearing the other side'. Prof. D.J. Galliganl attempts to provide what he calls 'a general theory of fair treatment' by exploring what it is that legal rules requiring procedural fairness might seek to achieve. I le underlines the importance of arriving at correct decisions, which is not possible without adopting the aforesaid procedural fairness, by emphasizing that taking of correct decisions would demonstrate that the system is working well. On the other hand, if mistakes are committed leading to incorrect decisions, it would mean that the system is not working well and the social good is to that extent diminished. The rule of procedure is to see that the law is applied accurately and, as a consequence, that the social good is realised. For taking this view, Galligan took support from Bentham2, who wrote at length about the need to follow such principles of natural justice in civil and criminal trials and insisted that the said theory developed by Bentham can be transposed to other forms of decision making as well. For taking this view, Galligan took support from Bentham2, who wrote at length about the need to follow such principles of natural justice in civil and criminal trials and insisted that the said theory developed by Bentham can be transposed to other forms of decision making as well. This jurisprudence of advancing social good by adhering to the principles of natural justice and arriving at correct decisions is explained by Galligan in the following words: On this approach, the value of legal procedures is judged according to their contribution to general social goals. The object is to advance certain social goals, whether through administrative processes, or through the civil or criminal trial. The law and its processes are simply instruments for achieving some social good as determined from time to time by the law makers of the society. Each case is an instance in achieving the general goal, and a mistaken decision, whether to the benefit or the detriment of a particular person, is simply a failure to achieve the general good in that case. At this level of understanding, judgments of fairness have no place, for all that matters is whether the social good, as expressed through laws, is effectively achieved. Galligan also takes the idea of fair treatment to a second level of understanding, namely, pursuit of common good involves the distribution of benefits and burdens, advantages and disadvantages to individuals (or groups). According to him, principles of justice are the subject-matter of fair treatment. However, that aspect need not be dilated. 24. Allan, on the other hand, justifies the procedural fairness by following the aforesaid principles of natural justice as rooted in rule of law leading to good governance. He supports Galligan in this respect and goes to the extent by saying that it is same as ensuring dignity of individuals, in respect of whom or against whom the decision is taken, in the following words: The instrumental value of procedures should not be underestimated; the accurate application of authoritative standards is, as Galligan clearly explains, an important aspect of treating someone with respect. But procedures also have intrinsic value in acknowledging a person's right to understand his treatment, and thereby to determine his response as a conscientious citizen, willing to make reasonable sacrifices for the public good. But procedures also have intrinsic value in acknowledging a person's right to understand his treatment, and thereby to determine his response as a conscientious citizen, willing to make reasonable sacrifices for the public good. If obedience to law ideally entails a recognition of its morally obligatory character, there must be suitable opportunities to test its moral credentials. Procedures may also be though to have intrinsic value in so far as they constitute a fair balance between the demands of accuracy and other social needs: where the moral harm entailed by erroneous decisions is reasonably assessed and fairly distributed, procedures express society's commitment to equal concern and respect for all. It, thus, cannot be denied that principles of natural justice are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures taking of correct decision and procedural fairness is fundamentally an instrumental good, in the sense that procedure should be designed to ensure accurate or appropriate outcomes. In fact, procedural fairness is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental terms. 25. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. It is for this reason that the Courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken. In many statutes, provisions are made ensuring that a notice is given to a person against whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision is made, but there may be instances where though an authority is vested with the powers to pass such orders, which affect the liberty or property of an individual but the statute may not contain a provision for prior hearing. But what is important to be noted is that the applicability of principles of natural justice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not. De Smith captures the essence thus-"Where a statute authorises interference with properties or other rights and is silent on the question of hearing, the Courts would apply rule of universal application and founded on plainest principles of natural justice". Wade also emphasizes that principles of natural justice operate as implied mandatory requirements, non-observance of which invalidates the exercise of power. De Smith captures the essence thus-"Where a statute authorises interference with properties or other rights and is silent on the question of hearing, the Courts would apply rule of universal application and founded on plainest principles of natural justice". Wade also emphasizes that principles of natural justice operate as implied mandatory requirements, non-observance of which invalidates the exercise of power. In Cooper v. Sandworth Board of Works, (1863) 14 GB (NS), the Court laid down that: '...although there is no positive word in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet justice of common law would supply the omission of Legislature". Exhaustive commentary explaining the varied contours of this principle can be traced to the judgment of this Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others, (1993)4 SCC 727 , wherein the Court discussed plenty of previous case law in restating the aforesaid principle, a glimpse whereof can be found in the following passages: 20. The origins of the law can also be traced to the principles of natural justice, as developed in the following cases: In A.K, Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969)2 SCC 262 : (1970) 1 SCR 457 , it was held that the rules of natural justice operate in areas not covered by any law. They do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. They are not embodied rules and their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. If that is their purpose, there is no reason why they should not be made applicable to administrative proceedings also especially when it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial ones. An unjust decision in an administrative inquiry may have a more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial inquiry. It was further observed that the concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or the body of persons appointed for that purpose. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or the body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice has been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. The rule that inquiry must be held in good faith and without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably is now included among the principles of natural justice.................." 27. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the Court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is how clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak's case (supra) that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another, (1978)1 SCC 248 , also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Suvarna Board Mills and another, (1994) 5 SCC 566 , this aspect was explained in the following manner: 3. It has been contended before us by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action Under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well-settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straight-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well-settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straight-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law: All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case. 28. In the case of East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta and another v. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1893 , this" Court held that whether the statute provides for notice or not, it is incumbent upon the quasi-judicial authority to issue a notice to the concerned persons disclosing the circumstances under which proceedings are sought to be initiated against them, failing which the conclusion would be that principle of natural justice are violated. To the same effect are the following judgments: (a) U.O.I, and others v. Madhumilan Syntex Pvt. Ltd. and another, (1988) 3 SCC 348 (b) Morarji Goculdas B and W Co. Ltd. and another v. U.O.I, and others, (1995) Supp 3 SCC 588 (c) Metal Forgings and another v. U. O.I. and others, (2003) 2 SCC 36 (d) U.O.I., and others v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. and another, 1988 (38) ELT 739 (SC) : 1988(19) ECR 569 (SC) 29. Therefore, we are inclined to hold that there was a requirement of issuance of show-cause notice by the Deputy Commissioner before passing the order of recovery, irrespective of the fact whether Section 11A of the Act is attracted in the instant case or not." 18. In the case of Union of India (UOI) v. Hanil Era Textiles Ltd., (2018) 13 SCC 219 , wherein the Development Commissioner had passed order in review but without issuing any show-cause notice to the assessee affected by the order of review, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "9. In the case of Union of India (UOI) v. Hanil Era Textiles Ltd., (2018) 13 SCC 219 , wherein the Development Commissioner had passed order in review but without issuing any show-cause notice to the assessee affected by the order of review, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "9. In the instant case, it is not in dispute nor it can be disputed by the Revenue that before passing the review order the Development Commissioner had not issued a show-cause notice to the Assessees inter alia asking it to show-cause as to why the order passed earlier should not be reviewed. In our view, the omission on the part of the Development Commissioner would go to the fundamentals in the sense that no order could be passed against a person without issuing a show-cause notice to him/it. This would be in violation of the principles of natural justice and also infringe Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Audi Alteram Partem, as the basic principle of natural justice ensures an opportunity of fair hearing to the parties. Issuance of a show-cause notice is a part and parcel of the aforesaid principle which provides that the parties are in a position to defend themselves adequately; after being aware of the exactness of the allegation against them. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula. The only essential point is that in the given facts of a case, if the person concerned has reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and if the administrative authority have acted fairly, impartially and reasonably. In the instant case, no show-cause notice has been issued to the Respondent before the review order was passed by the Development Commissioner which had put the Respondent No. 1 at a disadvantage by not allowing them to defend themselves. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice and therefore, this doctrine is the most paramount doctrine that goes to, the root of all laws and to the concept of justice. The order passed by the Development Commissioner is in contravention to the principles of natural justice and is therefore cannot be sustained. In that view of the matter, we set aside the order passed by the Appellant No. 2, dated 4-6-2003." 19. The order passed by the Development Commissioner is in contravention to the principles of natural justice and is therefore cannot be sustained. In that view of the matter, we set aside the order passed by the Appellant No. 2, dated 4-6-2003." 19. Thus, it is consistently held, that the principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures taking of correct decision. Before taking an action against a person, service of notice and giving of hearing to the person concerned is required. Even though there are no positive words in the statute, requiring that the party shall be heard, the principles of natural justice are to be mandatorily applied, unless their applicability is specifically barred/excluded. The opportunity to provide hearing before giving any decision has been considered to be a basic requirement in the Court proceedings and this principle has been applied to quasi judicial proceedings before tribunals etc. and to the administrative actions as well, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences. 20. Thus considered the order/notice dated 13.7.2018 to the extent it cancels the mining permit of the petitioner and imposes liability for payment of royalty etc. cannot be sustained having been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice of providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The very basis of the order of cancellation of permit was ex parte inspection report with which the petitioner was not confronted nor was granted any opportunity to rebut the same or submit explanation to the irregularities/illegalities mentioned in the inspection report. 21. The order/notice dated 13.7.2018 is composite one. It cancels the mining permit and imposes liability for payment of royalty etc. and also directs the petitioner to submit reply. We are of the considered view that the order/notice dated 13.7.2018 shall be treated only as a show-cause notice to the petitioner for (i) cancellation of petitioner's mining permit, (ii) for determination of petitioner's liability for payment of amount under different heads as mentioned therein and (iii) black listing on the grounds mentioned therein. The cancellation of mining permit and direction to deposit the amount determined in the order dated 13.7.2018 shall be treated only as the proposed actions against the petitioner. 22. The cancellation of mining permit and direction to deposit the amount determined in the order dated 13.7.2018 shall be treated only as the proposed actions against the petitioner. 22. We issue the following further directions: (i) The petitioner shall serve certified copy of this judgment to the District Magistrate Mahoba/Respondent No. 4, alongwith an application for providing a copy of the inspection report of the joint inspecting team dated 13.7.2018 upon which the same shall be provided to the petitioner within a period of next one week. (ii) The petitioner shall have three weeks thereafter to the reply/explanation to the notice dated 13.7.2018. (iii) The District Magistrate, Mahoba/Respondent No. 4 shall take final decision within a period of next two weeks. 23. the revisional order dated 17.10.2018 and the demand notice dated 27.10.2018 are hereby quashed. 24. We make it clear that we have not adjudicated the controversy on its merit either way. 25. The writ petition is allowed in pan with the aforesaid directions. No order as to costs.