JUDGMENT Sanjay Yadav, J. - This Appeal under Section 2(1) of the M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 is directed against order dated 11.09.2015 passed in Writ petitioin No.12027/2010 and order dated 10.02.2016 passed in Review Petition No.810/2015. 2. In Writ Petition, controversy related to appointment of Anganwadi worker at Anganwadi Centre, Kherua Ki Tapariyan, Gram Panchayat Achatt. The respondent No.6 was at serial No.1 in the select list; however, because of certain objection qua her (respondent No.6) bonafide resident, her candidature was cancelled on 29.09.2007 on the ground that she was not bonafide resident of Gram Panchayat Achatt. Consequently, entire selection process was cancelled; whereagainst the respondent No.6 filed an appeal which was allowed on 04.12.2008 with the direction to the Project Officer, Integrated Child Development Project to issue appointment order in her favour. This order was, however, set aside by the Commissioner on 02.08.2010, who gave the finding that she was resident of village Tapariyan, Gram Panchayat Kude. Commissioner found: 3. On its challenge in Writ Petition No.12027/2010, the order passed by Commissioner was set-aside. Learned Single Judge held that the respondent No.6 was resident of village Kherua Ki Tapariyan which is part of Gram Panchayat Achatt. Learned Single Judge relied on the certificate issued by Sarpanch and that the husband of respondent No.6 was living in Achatt. 4. These findings are being challenged by the Appellant who was respondent No.6 in Writ Petition. 5. The relevant Clause which lays down the condition of being a bonafide resident is sub-Clause (2) of Clause v-1 of the Policy dated 10.07.2007 which stipulates: 6. Thus, incumbent it is for the candidate to be a resident of Gram Panchayat within which the concerned Anganwadi Centre is located. In the present case the Anganwadi Centre was a Kherua Ki Tapariyan, Gram Panchayat Achatt. 7. The question is whether the respondent No.6 was resident of village Kherua Ki Tapariyan which is located in Gram Panchayat Achatt or of village Tapariyan which is situated in Gram Panchayat Kude. In the present case the Anganwadi Centre was a Kherua Ki Tapariyan, Gram Panchayat Achatt. 7. The question is whether the respondent No.6 was resident of village Kherua Ki Tapariyan which is located in Gram Panchayat Achatt or of village Tapariyan which is situated in Gram Panchayat Kude. Certain documents are on record which include a birth certificate of respondent No.6's daughter, permanent resident certificate dated 28.06.2003 issued by Naib Tehsildar Maheba, Chhatarpur showing petitioner's husband to be resident of village Tapariyan and not Kherua Ki Tapariyan and the list of the applicants wherein the respondent No.6 who happens to be a resident of village Tapariyan is shown to be located in Gram Panchayat Kude at Serial No.371. 8. Though an attempt is made to establish that the petitioner is resident of village Achatt by referring to Serial 434, however, the candidate at serial No.434 is shown to be a resident of Kherua Ki Tapariyan which is in Gram Panchayat Achatt, where the Anganwadi Centre is situated. 9. These vital facts having been glossed over by learned Single Judge vitiates the findings. 10. As regard to findings that respondent No.6's husband resides in village Panchayat Achatt, it is submitted by learned counsel for the Appellant that the certificate issued in his favour was cancelled by the Sub-Divisional Officer which is affirmed in M.P.No.815/2019 decided on 07.01.2020, the copy whereof is brought on record; wherein, learned Single Judge held: "6. In view of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record available, I do not find any substance in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner because the Collector in its order has relied upon a certificate issued in favour of the wife of the petitioner in the year 2004 but that certificate has been misread by the Collector because the said certificate was in respect of the Village Tapariya which is available on record. Even otherwise, the order of Collector was in respect of some other issue and that was also set aside by the Commissioner in an appeal preferred by the respondents. Even otherwise, the order of Collector was in respect of some other issue and that was also set aside by the Commissioner in an appeal preferred by the respondents. So far as the finding given by the writ Court is concerned, it is pertinent to mention that the writ Court has nowhere observed that the wife of the petitioner is a resident of Village Achatt but the writ Court on the basis of the findings given by the Collector has decided the said writ petition. However, in view of the documents filed by the respondents, it is clear that the petitioner was basically residing in Village Tapariya and the certificate issued in his favour also shows him to be a resident of Village Tapariya. Even otherwise, a fact finding enquiry was conducted by the Sub-Divisional Officer and after taking note of all the documents, arrived at a conclusion that the certificate issued by the Naib Tahsildar in favour of the petitioner showing him to be a resident of Village Achatt was not proper because as per the documents, he was a resident of Village Tapariya and as such, the certificate issued by the Naib Tahsildar was illegal. 7. Accordingly, I do not find any infirmity in the order dated 16.11.2016 (Annexure-P/6) passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, District Chhatarpur." 11. When the impugned order is tested on the anvil of above analysis cannot be given the stamp of approval. Consequently, it is set-aside. The order passed by the Commissioner passed on 02.08.2010 is restored. 12. Appeal is allowed to the extent above. 13. However, before parting with the matter it needs a mention that with the close of submissions, learned counsel for the respondent No.6 placing reliance on the decision in Savitri Singh vs. State of M.P., 2016 3 MPWN 5 and Smt Ramkali Pawaiya vs. State of M.P. & Others 2016,MPWN 3 5 to substantiate the contention that the entire selection based on seat being reserved for a local resident is vitiated being violation of Article 16(2) & 16(3) of the Constitution. 14. In Savitri Singh (supra), it is held: "(3) Recently in Kailash Chand Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan, 2002 AIR(SC) 2877 , it has been held by the supreme court that residence within a district or rural areas of that district could not be a valid basis for classification for the purpose of public employment. 14. In Savitri Singh (supra), it is held: "(3) Recently in Kailash Chand Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan, 2002 AIR(SC) 2877 , it has been held by the supreme court that residence within a district or rural areas of that district could not be a valid basis for classification for the purpose of public employment. The argument in favour of such reservation which has the overtones of parochialism is liable to be rejected on the plain terms of art. 16 (2) and in the light of art. 16 (3). An argument of this nature lies in the face of the peremptory language of article 16 (2) and runs counter to our constitutional ethos founded on unity and integrity of the nation. Residence by itself - be it be within a state, region, district or lesser area within a district - cannot be a ground to accord preferential treatment or reservation save as provided in art. 16 (3). It is not possible to compartmentalise the state into districts with a view to offer employment to the residents of that district on a preferential basis. (4) In view of the above legal position, the circular dated 27-5-1996 on which reliance has been placed by the commissioner, suffers from constitutional infirmity. The instructions contained in this circular that a person of the same village should be appointed as Aanganwadi worker is legally not sustainable. It is against the provision in art. 16 (2) of the constitution of India. The petitioner could not be discriminated on the ground that she is resident of village Bharhut and not of village Dadari. As far as public employment is concerned, the classification on the basis of residence in a region or locality or village is constitutionally impermissible." 15. In Smt. Ramkali Pawaiya (supra), it is observed: "8. True it is that the guidelines issued laying down the procedure for recruitment, service conditions, termination and remedies available for an Anganwadi worker provide local residence as one of the prerequisite and eligibility conditions for appointment to the post of Anganwadi worker. But the fact remains that the said condition runs contrary to the Constitutional mandate under Article 16(1)(2) of the Constitution of India, which for ready reference and convenience is reproduced below: 16. But the fact remains that the said condition runs contrary to the Constitutional mandate under Article 16(1)(2) of the Constitution of India, which for ready reference and convenience is reproduced below: 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employemnt or appointment to any office under the State. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or nay of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment of office under the State. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State of Union territory, any requirement as to resident within the State or Union Territory] prior to such employment or appointment. 9. The above said fundamental right prohibits any discrimination to any citizen of the country inter-alia on the ground of residence in respect of any employment or office under the State. 10. This Court need not dwell into this aspect any further since the issue involved herein when viewed from the context of the Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India is no more res-integra in view of Single Bench decision of this Court in case of Lalita Tomar Vs. State of M.P. passed in W.P. No.2542/2008(S) wherein in similar circumstances, appointment of Anganwadi worker was successfully challenged by another person who had been denied the said benefit on the ground that the same violated the mandate of Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India. 11. Accordingly, since no other ground is raised and the said ground of Article 16(2) of Constitution of India is made out, this Court is inclined to allow this petition." 16. These decisions by the learned Single Judges are no more a good law in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka vs. Ameerbi, 2007 11 SCC 681 ; wherein it is held: "20. Anganwadi workers, however, do not carry on any function of the State. They do not hold post under a statute. Their posts are not created. Recruitment rules ordinarily applicable to the employees of the State are not applicable in their case. Anganwadi workers, however, do not carry on any function of the State. They do not hold post under a statute. Their posts are not created. Recruitment rules ordinarily applicable to the employees of the State are not applicable in their case. The State is not required to comply with the constitution scheme of equality as adumbrated under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. No process of selection for the purpose of their appointment within the constitutional scheme exists. We do not think that the said decision has any application in the instant case." 17. Similar issue came up for consideration in W.P.No.17646/2013 decided on 07.01.2016, wherein, it was held: "Firstly, the petitioner seeks quashment of Clause 2 contained in the Circular No.F-3-2/06/50-2 Women and Child Development Department dated 10.07.2007, which lays down one of essential qualification, for appointment of Anaganwadi Karyakarta; that, they must be resident of local area where the Anganwadi Centre is situated. The Clause in question stipulates- Though it is urged that the impugned clause violates the Constitutional provisions contained under Article 16 (2) and 16(3) of the Constitution which prohibits reservation on the ground that residence within a district or rural areas of that district cannot be a valid basis for reservation. Reliance is placed on the decision by Supreme Court in Kailash Chandra Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and others, 2002 AIR(SC) 2877 and in Jay Prakash Batham v. State of M. P. (W. A. No.247/2011) and Lalita Tomar v. State of M.P. And others,2009 MP(ILR) 3302 . Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of M.P. however has to submit that the provisions contained under Article 16 (2) & 16 (3) of the Constitution of India are not applicable in respect of the post of Anganwadi Karyakarta/Sahayika as the same is not Civil Post and the Anganwadi workers are not Civil Post holders. Reliance is placed on a decision by Supreme Court in State of Karnataka and others v. Ameerbi and others, 2007 11 SCC 681 ; and a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Neelam Singh Sikarwar v. State of M. P. and others, 2015 1 MPLJ 297 . In the case of State of Karnataka v. Ameerbai (supra) it is observed by their Lordships: "13- The posts of Anganwadi workers are not statutory posts. They have been created in terms of the scheme. In the case of State of Karnataka v. Ameerbai (supra) it is observed by their Lordships: "13- The posts of Anganwadi workers are not statutory posts. They have been created in terms of the scheme. It is one thing to say that there exists a relationship of employer and employee by and between the State and Anganwadi workers but it is another thing to say that they are holders of civil post. 20- Anganwadi workers, however, do not carry on any function of the State. They do not hold post under a statute. Their posts are not created. Recruitment rules ordinarily applicable to the employees of the State are not applicable in their case. The State is not required to comply with the constitutional scheme of equality as adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. No process of selection for the purpose of their appointment within the constitutional scheme existed. We do not think that the said decision has any application in the instant case." Similarly Division Bench of this Court in Neelam Singh Sikarwar (Supra) while relying on earlier decision of this Court in Smt. Balmati Suryawanshi v. State of M. P. and others, 2012 2 MPLJ 331 has held: "7-. In view of the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the requirement of residence in a particular village where the Anganwadi is situated, in unconstitutional. Thus, the order of learned Single Judge holding that for appointment of Anganwadi worker, requirement of his/her having residence in a specific village is contrary to Article 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India cannot be upheld for the simple reason that requirement of such person would depend upon the residence of the applicant in a village where, there is requirement of Anganwadi Worker." With these judgments in vogue, it being no more res integra that the provisions contained in Clause 2 of the Policy dated 21.05.2012 is not unconstitutional the challenge to the same fails. The first contention as to Clause (2) being violation of Article 16 of the Constitution fails." 18. In view whereof, the contention that Clause v-1(2) of the Policy is violative of Article 16 of the Constitution fails. No costs.