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2020 DIGILAW 265 (ALL)

Naresh Kumar v. Chawli

2020-01-23

J.J.MUNIR

body2020
JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1. This is a defendants' Second Appeal from a decree of possession passed by the Lower Appellate Court, reversing the Trial Court. 2. Nanu Singh brought Original Suit No. 101 of 1971 against Bhupeshwar Prasad, Rajeshwar Prasad, Ishwar Prasad, Rameshwar Prasad, all sons of late Hari Kishan Das and Smt. Shashi Prabha, daughter of late Hari Kishan Das for possession of land, part of Khasra no. 113, situate at Mauza Khan Alampur, Saharanpur, as detailed and bounded at the foot of the plaint. The Suit was instituted on 27.01.1971. Pending Suit, the Appeal from the Original Decree and the present Appeal, the plaintiffs have grown to a figure of nine on account of exiting this mortal world. The defendants, likewise, who were five before the Trial Court, have grown to a figure of eighteen, with legal representatives being substituted for the deceased defendants, pendente lite. 3. Sri Shamsher Bahadur Singh, the then Munsif City, Saharanpur, who tried the Suit, dismissed it with costs by his judgment and decree dated 11.07.1989. The plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge, Saharanpur, where the Appeal was registered on the file of the learned District Judge as Civil Appeal no. 70 of 1989. The Appeal on assignment came up for determination before Sri Naresh Kumar Bahal, the then IVth Additional Civil Judge, Saharanpur on 26.03.1993. The learned Additional Civil Judge by his judgment and decree of the date last mentioned, allowed the Appeal with costs, set aside and reversed the decree of the learned Munsif, ordering the Suit to be decreed with costs. It is ordered by the Appellate Decree that the defendants shall hand over the plaintiffs possession of the suit property within a month of the judgment. 4. Aggrieved, the defendants have brought this Second Appeal. 5. To clarify reference to parties in this judgment, the plaintiff-respondents, who are now nine in number, all heirs and legal representatives of the original and sole plaintiff, Nanu Singh, shall be hereinafter referred to as the 'plaintiff'. The defendant-appellants, multiple in number, as they are from the institution of the Suit, shall be hereinafter referred to as the defendants. 6. The Suit was brought on facts that the suit property is part of Khasra no. 113, formally numbered as Khasra no. 126, part of Mahaal Asha Ram, situate at Village Khan Alampura, Saharanpur, of which the plaintiff is owner in possession. 6. The Suit was brought on facts that the suit property is part of Khasra no. 113, formally numbered as Khasra no. 126, part of Mahaal Asha Ram, situate at Village Khan Alampura, Saharanpur, of which the plaintiff is owner in possession. The defendants have no right, title or interest in the suit property. The suit property, that is part of Khasra no. 113, has been detailed at the foot of the plaint. Towards the East of Khasra no. 113, there is a house (kothi) and quarters located in Khasra no. 111, that are the defendants' ownership. Also, a Mosque and Madarsa annexed to the Mosque Shahjahani, besides a Temple (Mandir) etc. are also located in Khasra no. 111. The suit property lies within the local limits of Municipal Board, Saharanpur, which is in possession of the plaintiff since 20 years past. The plaintiff has planted and nurtured two trees over the suit property, a Bel and another Barna, the fruits and shade whereof the plaintiff utilises to his benefit. The plaintiff also utilises the suit property for the purposes of processing his dung based fuel (Uple), stacking firewood and manure, besides using it to bask in the Sun and tether cattle. The plaintiff also exploits the suit property for agriculture, which is a part of the plaintiff's Khasra no. 113. 7. The defendants since a long time have been harassing and troubling the plaintiff. To the West of the defendants' Kothi and quarters, there is no land in the title and possession of the defendants, or do they have any drain, window, ventilator or door opening into the suit property. The defendants never had or have any connection or possession of the suit property since 12 years past. 8. It is then pleaded by the plaintiff that in Khasra no. 112, there was formerly a way (rasta), which terminated at the western end of Khasra no. 115 and the eastern and southern ends of Khasra no. 113. This terminus of the way, that was an avenue for natives of the village to proceed to the river, Dhamola, located towards the north of Khasra no. 113, caused inconvenience to the local populace in accessing the river themselves and with their cattle. It is pleaded that some respectable natives of the village requested the plaintiff to give passage across Khasra no. 113, caused inconvenience to the local populace in accessing the river themselves and with their cattle. It is pleaded that some respectable natives of the village requested the plaintiff to give passage across Khasra no. 113, that was his ownership in order to enable the existing passage terminating there to be extended to the river, to the North. For the purpose, the plaintiff's permission was requested to lay a brick-worked road (kharanja) across his property. The plaintiff permitted construction of a brick-worked road across Khasra no. 113, licensing the Municipal Board to lay out that road as a straight stretch across his land. Since the road that was laid out was a straight stretch, the brick-worked road divided the plaintiff's Khasra no. 113 in the manner that some part of it towards the North and East was cut-off from the main part of 113. It is this land lying to the East and North of the road permitted by the plaintiff to be laid across Khasra no. 113, that is the suit property. This suit property has been pleaded to be in the plaintiff's use and occupation for the purposes hereinbefore detailed. 9. It is, in particular, pleaded on behalf of the plaintiff that through an order dated 13.01.1971 passed by the City Magistrate, Saharanpur in Case no. 26 of 1969, under Section 145 Cr.P.C. possession of the suit property was delivered to defendant no. 1, which the plaintiff says is in derogation of his title. 10. Defendant nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 filed a single written statement traversing the plaintiff's case. The crux of the defendants' case is that the suit property is located to the East of the Road that divides Khasra no. 111 and Khasra no. 113. Khasra no. 111 is the defendants' property, lawfully acquired through a consistent chain of title passed on from the previous recorded owners. It is asserted that the suit property located to the East of the Road is part of Khasra no. 111 and, therefore, in the defendants' title, of which they have been lawfully entrusted possession by the Magistrate, upon a sham dispute being raised by the plaintiff about it. 11. It is the defendants' case that their property located in Khasra no. 111 comprises a house (kothi) together with its appurtenant land and outhouses, including servant quarters. 111 and, therefore, in the defendants' title, of which they have been lawfully entrusted possession by the Magistrate, upon a sham dispute being raised by the plaintiff about it. 11. It is the defendants' case that their property located in Khasra no. 111 comprises a house (kothi) together with its appurtenant land and outhouses, including servant quarters. The aforesaid property was purchased by one Jyoti Prasad from a certain Lala Ganga Ram through sale deeds dated 03.08.1896 and 04.06.1896, paper nos. 78(c) and 79(c), respectively. The said property, together with the House and its appurtenant land, was purchased by Hari Kishan Das, father of defendant nos.1 to 5 through a sale deed dated 26.03.1920, paper no. 262(c). The crux of the defendants' case is that all property to the East of the Road, hereinabove referred, is theirs and part of Khasra no. 111 and that the Road is located in Khasra no. 112, that divides Khasra no. 111 from Khasra no. 113, that is the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff purchased Khasra no. 113 through two sale deeds. First of these is from one Chameli, dated 07.08.1946, paper no. 28(c) and the other was executed in his favour by Abdul Aziz, dated 07.01.1949. 12. The Trial Court framed the following issues, on which the parties went to trial: “1. Whether khasara abadi No. 113 is the disputed property? 2. Whether the plaintiff is owner of the disputed property? 3. Whether the suit is undervalued and Court fees paid is insufficient? 4. Whether the suit is barred by Section 41 of Specific Relief Act? 5. Whether the defendant no. 2 Sri Rajeshwar Prasad is an unnecessary party? 6. To what relief if any is the plaintiff entitled?” 13. The varying events in the Trial Court and the Appellate Court have already been detailed hereinbefore. It must be mentioned here, however, that issue no. 1 that was dealt with in Appeal was corrected to read, on basis of reasons recorded by the Lower Appellate Court, Khasra no. 113 for Khasra no. 111 there. The first issue considered by the Appellate Court, rendered in Hindi from the original in English, reads as follows: Hindi 14. The Appellate Court has examined the matter in great detail to opine that in fact the Trial Court, while framing issues, mentioned Khasra no. 113 as the suit property in issue no. 113 for Khasra no. 111 there. The first issue considered by the Appellate Court, rendered in Hindi from the original in English, reads as follows: Hindi 14. The Appellate Court has examined the matter in great detail to opine that in fact the Trial Court, while framing issues, mentioned Khasra no. 113 as the suit property in issue no. 1, and not 111, as appears from the judgment of the Trial Court. He has recorded his reasons to conclude about the correct contents of issue no. 1, with reference to the Khasra number of the suit property mentioned there, in the following words: Hindi 15. It must be remarked here that the lower Appellate Court has done a very meticulous exercise, to set the record straight about the plot number of the suit property, mentioned in issue no. 1. This Court must record straight away that the reasoning of the lower Appellate Court about the contents of issue no. 1, particularly, the Khasra number of the suit property is based on flawless reasoning, that is self-evident. This Court approves the same and proceeds on the basis that it was Khasra no. 113, which is the subject matter of issue no. 1, as it is that Khasra number, a part of which is claimed to be the suit property by the plaintiff. 16. Both parties led evidence before the Trial Court, that includes a good number of documents, cited on both sides, that find detail in the judgments of the Courts below. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and two on behalf of the defendants. These include the plaintiff, Nanu Singh, who deposed as PW-1 and defendant no. 1, Bhupeshwar Prasad, who testified as DW-2. This evidence has been considered by both the Courts below, to reach discordant conclusions, already mentioned. 17. This appeal was admitted to hearing, vide order dated 16.04.1993, on the following substantial questions of law: “1. WHETHER the lower appellate court misinterpreted the sale deeds produced by the appellants? 2. WHETHER the lower appellate court illegally and wrongly discorded (sic discarded) a number of important documentary evidence by the appellants. 3. WHETHER plaintiffs having failed to locate the disputed land by survey report, even though several opportunities were provided by the court, the suit out to have been dismissed. 4. 2. WHETHER the lower appellate court illegally and wrongly discorded (sic discarded) a number of important documentary evidence by the appellants. 3. WHETHER plaintiffs having failed to locate the disputed land by survey report, even though several opportunities were provided by the court, the suit out to have been dismissed. 4. WHETHER the lower appellate (sic court) has omitted to consider that there was a (sic an) old road in Khasra no. 113 in the same place when (sic where) the new Kharanja road of the Nagarpalika exists? 5. WHETHER the lower appellate court has illegally reversed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif.” 18. At the hearing of this appeal, learned Counsel for the defendants confined his submissions to substantial question nos. 1 and 4. 19. Heard Sri B. Dayal, learned Counsel for the defendant-appellants and Sri Syed Wajid Ali, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents. 20. The first substantial question of law is about the correct interpretation of the sale deeds relied upon by the defendants, to establish that the suit property is not part of Khasra no. 113, but a part and parcel of Khasra no. 111. Learned Counsel for the defendants, Sri B. Dayal has urged that interpretation of the sale deeds produced by him and their impact on the rights of the parties, is a substantial question of law that merits adjudication in this second appeal. This submission has been advanced in answer to the contentions advanced by Sri S. Wajid Ali, learned Counsel for the plaintiff that this appeal is concluded by findings of fact, recorded by the lower Appellate Court. For one, it is not readily open to this Court to say that the substantial questions of law that this Court has approved to admit this appeal are not substantial questions of law, as envisaged under Section 100 CPC. But, that is one part of it and not much. Mr. B. Dayal is right in his submission that interpretation of a document and its impact on the rights of parties is indeed a substantial question of law, which has to be decided under Section 100(5) CPC, at the hearing of the Appeal. In this connection Sri Dayal has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Uma Pandey and Others vs. Munna Pandey and Others, AIR 2018 SC 1930 , where it has been held: “14. In this connection Sri Dayal has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Uma Pandey and Others vs. Munna Pandey and Others, AIR 2018 SC 1930 , where it has been held: “14. It is not in dispute that the defendants (respondents) filed one document (EX-A)-(Annexure-P-1 of SLP). This document was relied on and appreciated by the two Courts below for deciding the rights of the parties. The Trial Court decreed the suit and the First Appellate Court reversed it on appreciating the evidence including EX-A. 15. It is a settled principle of law that interpretation of any document including its contents or its admissibility in evidence or its effect on the rights of the parties to the Lis constitutes a substantial questions of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code. 16. Whenever such question arises in the second appeal at the instance of the appellant, it deserves admission on framing appropriate substantial questions on such questions to enable the High Court to decide the appeal on merits bi-party.” 21. Learned Counsel for the defendants has placed further reliance on a decision of their Lordships in Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal vs. Smt. Ratna Ashok Muranjan, (2019) 3 SCC 378 , where it has been held thus: “10. It cannot be disputed that the interpretation of any terms and conditions of a document (such as the agreement dated 08.08.1984 in this case) constitutes a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code. It is more so when both the parties admit the document.” 22. The interpretation of a document and its impact on the valuable rights of parties has been always regarded as a substantial question of law, that merits consideration in an appeal from an appellate decree, under Section 100 CPC. The very recent decision of their Lordships in Uma Pandey and Others (supra) and Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal (supra) reinforces that principle beyond cavil. 23. The very recent decision of their Lordships in Uma Pandey and Others (supra) and Rajendra Lalitkumar Agrawal (supra) reinforces that principle beyond cavil. 23. This Court is, therefore, not in agreement with the contention of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that this appeal is concluded by findings of fact, in the sense that may prohibit this Court, within the confines of its jurisdiction in a second appeal, to pronounce upon the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions drawn by the Lower Appellate Court regarding rights of parties, based on interpretation of the title deeds, that the defendants have relied upon. 24. In order to persuade this Court that on a true construction of the title deeds relied upon by the defendants, the suit property would fall in Khasra No. 111 and not 113, as urged by the plaintiff, learned counsel for the defendant has drawn the attention of the Court to the boundaries of the suit property, as detailed at the foot of the plaint. These boundaries are extracted below:- East Quarters and Kothi of Defendant and Masjid Shah Jahani. West Kharanja and Arazi of Plaintiff of Khasra no. 113 North Patri Dhamola Nadi South Arazi talab and Rasta 25. Learned Counsel for the defendants has pointed out that the western boundary of the suit property shown in the plaint is of particular significance, as that is part of the plaintiff’s pleadings. It is indicated in the details of boundaries that to the west of the suit property lies a Kharanja and Arazi of plaintiff of Khasra No. 113. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that if to the west lies the Kharanja and Arazi of the plaintiff that is part of Khasra No. 113, the suit property would be located to the east of the Kharanja. 26. The case of the plaintiff specifically pleaded in paragraph 5 of the plaint by contrast is that upon the plaintiff permitting the construction of a brick worked road across Khasra No. 113, in order to provide access to natives of the village to river Dhamola, the straight stretch of the brick worked road divided the petitioner’s Khasra No. 113 in a manner that some part of it towards the East and North was cut off from the main part of Khasra No. 113. It is pointed out in this paragraph that it is this part of Khasra No. 113, which has been described to be the suit property. According to learned Counsel for the defendants, if this be the case of the plaintiff, the Western boundary of the suit property ought to have shown land of Khasra No. 111 and the Eastern boundary, the brick worked road (kharanja). 27. It is argued that this apparent contradiction in the plaintiff’s pleadings ex facie shows that his case is not consistent in his pleadings about the precise location of the suit property. It is pointed out that by contrast, in the two sale deeds of 1896, through which the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant acquired title to Khasra No. 111, that is to say, the two sale deeds executed by Gangaram in favour of Jyoti Prasad, Paper Nos. 78 Ga and 79 Ga, there is a clear mention of the western boundary of the Kothi that was purchased as Rasta Deh. Rasta Deh translates to “village road”. It is urged that it is the same Kothi and land transferred through sale deeds of 1896 to Jyoti Prasad that was purchased by Harikisan Das, the father of original defendants Nos. 1 to 5, through a registered sale deed of 26th March, 1920. 28. It is pointed out that it is common ground between parties that the Kothi stands on Khasra No. 111, the old number of which was 124. It is urged also that the plaintiff claims that he came into possession of the suit property some 20 years prior to institution of this suit. The suit was instituted in the year 1971, and, therefore, the plaintiff’s possession would date back to the year 1951. It is asserted that the plaintiff has not specifically disclosed when he was actually dispossessed from the suit property. It is emphasized by Sri Dayal, learned Counsel for the defendants, that the plaintiff claims purchase of the land comprising Khasra No. 113, of which the suit property is a part, through two sale deeds: one from Chameli dated 07.08.1946; and the other from Abdul Aziz, dated 07.01.1949. 29. It is emphasized by Sri Dayal, learned Counsel for the defendants, that the plaintiff claims purchase of the land comprising Khasra No. 113, of which the suit property is a part, through two sale deeds: one from Chameli dated 07.08.1946; and the other from Abdul Aziz, dated 07.01.1949. 29. Learned Counsel for the defendants endeavored to point out that these dates of acquisition of title on a comparison with the date when the plaintiff came into possession of Khasra No. 113, as reckoned hereinbefore, would show that he entered upon Khasra No. 113 after a few years of its purchase from Chameli and Abdul Aziz. 30. It is also emphasized that both Courts below have found for a fact that there was a village road between plot No. 111, whereon the defendants’ Kothi stands and plot No. 113, the land purchased by the plaintiff, of which the suit property is a part. It is pointed out that defendant No. 1, who was old enough to have witnessed the transactions leading to the cause of action has said in his dock evidence, that in place of the old village road between Khasra No. 111 and no. 113 (Kothi of defendant and land of the plaintiff) a brick worked road (kharanja) has been laid by the Municipal Board. It is also urged that the Trial Court relied upon the description of boundaries in the sale deed of 3rd June, 1896 and survey sheet of the Municipal Board 1914-1915, filed as paper No. 125-A and exhibited without any objection as exhibit 84A-1, to come to the conclusion that all land up to the site of the village road, over which the brick worked road (kharanja) has now been laid by the Municipal Board, is part of the defendants’ Kothi and not the plaintiff’s land. Learned counsel submits that on these findings, the Trial Court rightly dismissed the suit. It is also argued by learned Counsel for the defendants that the plaintiff’s case of possession has not been vindicated in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. a position which remained undisturbed in those proceedings up to this Court. 31. Learned counsel submits that on these findings, the Trial Court rightly dismissed the suit. It is also argued by learned Counsel for the defendants that the plaintiff’s case of possession has not been vindicated in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. a position which remained undisturbed in those proceedings up to this Court. 31. Sri Dayal, learned Counsel for the defendants urged that the Lower Appellate Court has done a misconstruction about the description of boundaries in the sale deeds of 1896, to conclude that there was land of the plaintiff between the Kothi of the defendants and its appurtenant land, and the old village road (Rasta Deh). It is also argued by Sri Dayal that the Lower Appellate Court has committed a substantial error of law in reversing findings of the Trial Court on the ground alone that neither the area or the Khasra number is mentioned in the two sale deeds of 1896, in favour of Jyoti Prasad executed by Lala Gangaram. His conclusions, drawn from the absence of dimensions and boundaries of land sold way back in the year 1896, to the effect that it is not proved that the Kothi and land of the defendant’s exists over khasra No. 111, although admitted to be so to the parties, is manifestly illegal. 32. Sri S. Wajid Ali, learned Counsel for the plaintiff on the other hand has played down the involvement of any substantial question of law as to interpretation of recitals in the two title deeds of 1896, or the subsequent deeds, relied upon by the defendants. He has pointed out that the plaintiff's case is based on a division of his land, comprised of Khasra no. 113, with one part of it towards the eastern side being separated from the rest of it, on account of the construction of a brick worked road, that the plaintiff himself lincenced the Municipal Board to construct across his land bearing no. 113, for convenience of natives of the village to access the River Dhamola. The part of Khasra no. 113 that went to the other side of the road, on account of the extension of the old village road with a brick worked Kharanja across Khasra no. 113, is the suit property, of which the defendants took possession through summary proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., that is not in accordance with rights of parties. 33. 113 that went to the other side of the road, on account of the extension of the old village road with a brick worked Kharanja across Khasra no. 113, is the suit property, of which the defendants took possession through summary proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., that is not in accordance with rights of parties. 33. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Gurnam Singh (D) by LRs. vs. Lehna Singh (D) by LRs. AIR 2019 SC 1441 . He has drawn the attention of this Court to paragraphs 14, 15 and 15.1 of the report in Gurunam Singh (supra), where it is held: “14. When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in the case of Ishwar Dass Jain AIR 2000 SC 426 (Supra). In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held: “Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise.” 15. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in re-appreciating the evidence on record in the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The High Court has materially erred in interfering with the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, which were on re-appreciation of evidence, which was permissible by the First Appellate Court in exercise of powers under Section 96 of the CPC. Cogent reasons, on appreciation of the evidence, were given by the First Appellate Court. The High Court has materially erred in interfering with the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, which were on re-appreciation of evidence, which was permissible by the First Appellate Court in exercise of powers under Section 96 of the CPC. Cogent reasons, on appreciation of the evidence, were given by the First Appellate Court. First Appellate Court dealt with, in detail, the so-called suspicious circumstance which weighed with the learned Trial Court and thereafter it came to the conclusion that the Will, which as such was a registered Will, was genuine and do not suffer from any suspicious circumstances. The findings recorded by the First Appellate Court are reproduced hereinabove. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC. 15.1. As observed hereinabove and as held by this Court in a catena of decisions and even as per Section 100 CPC, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the second appeal under Section 100 CPC is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law. On going through the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that the question of law framed by the High Court while deciding the second appeal, cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. The substantial questions of law framed by the High Court are as under: “(i) Whether the Appellate Court can reverse the findings recorded by the learned trial court without adverting to the specific finding of the trial Court? (ii) Whether the judgment passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is perverse and outcome of misreading of evidence?” The aforesaid cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. At this stage, decision of this Court in the case of Madamanchi Ramappa vs. Muthaluru Bojappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 , is required to be referred to. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. At this stage, decision of this Court in the case of Madamanchi Ramappa vs. Muthaluru Bojappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 , is required to be referred to. In the aforesaid decision, this Court has observed and held as under: “Whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by S.100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by Courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in Courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of S.100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid.” 34. This Court has keenly considered the submissions advanced on both sides. 35. A perusal of the findings recorded by the lower Appellate Court in reversal of the Trial Court do show that the lower Appellate Court has gone about the task of evaluating evidence in meticulous detail. But, that is not what the concern of this Court is while answering the substantial questions of law, under Section 100(5) CPC. The question in hand is about the interpretation of the sale deeds, relied upon by the defendants, to establish that the property is not part of Khasra no. 113 but a part and parcel of Khasra no. 111. 36. The lower Appellate Court in holding the suit property to be a subdivision that has come into existence on account of the laying of a brick-worked road, across Khasra no. 113 but a part and parcel of Khasra no. 111. 36. The lower Appellate Court in holding the suit property to be a subdivision that has come into existence on account of the laying of a brick-worked road, across Khasra no. 113, with permission of the defendants, has looked into evidence that brought about certain changes to the boundaries of Khasra nos.111 and 113, much later in point of time than execution of the defendants' sale deeds, dated 03.06.1896, 04.06.1896 and 26.03.1920. 37. It has been held for a fact by the lower Appellate Court on appreciation of evidence that the old village road located in Khasra no. 112, mentioned in the sale deeds conferring title on the defendants, terminated at Khasra no. 113. The plaintiff permitted laying of a brick-worked road (kharanja) extending the old village road across Khasra no. 113, in order to provide access to natives of the village to the River Dhamola. This event has been recorded for a fact by the lower Appellate Court to have happened in the year 1956 when on permission by the plaintiff, the Nagar Palika laid a 10 feet wide brick-worked road, extending the old village road through Khasra no. 113 to the River Dhamola. Now, in the face of this change in physical features that earlier demarcated Khasra no. 113 from 111, the description of boundaries in the sale deeds of the defendants, dated 03.06.1896, 04.06.1896 and 26.03.1920, would not be very relevant. 38. The mention in those boundaries of a village road (rasta deh) to the west of the kothi (Khasra no. 111), that is the defendants' property, would bear reference to a geographical subdivision of these two adjoining Khasra numbers on the premise that the village road ended at Khasra no. 112, at the time when the deeds under reference relied upon by the defendants were executed. There was no existence of the brick-worked road (kharanja), permitted by the plaintiff, later on to be constructed across Khasra no. 113. The description of boundaries, therefore, in these deeds would not have a decisive impact upon the rights of parties to the suit property, the suit property having come into existence subsequent in point of time, owing to the construction of a brick-worked road (kharanja) in the year 1956. 39. 113. The description of boundaries, therefore, in these deeds would not have a decisive impact upon the rights of parties to the suit property, the suit property having come into existence subsequent in point of time, owing to the construction of a brick-worked road (kharanja) in the year 1956. 39. The lower Appellate Court has, therefore, rightly looked into and done a comparison of the revenue records over a course of time, comparing the Khasra for the Fasli Years 1296 and 1324 and appreciated these together with the oral evidence of parties. The lower Appellate Court on the basis of a further comparison done with the Khasra Mauza Khan Alampura, Pargana, Tehsil and District Saharanpur for the year 1324F, concluded that the old number of Khasra no. 111 in 1297F was 124, the old Khasra number of the village road that now bears Khasra no. 112 was 125 and that of the plaintiff’s which is no. 113, used to be no. 126. He has recorded on the basis of these revenue records, a detailed measurement and dimensions of these adjoining Khasra numbers. 40. The lower Appellate Court has then concluded that when the old village road in Khasra no. 112 (old no. 125) was extended into 113 and laid as a brick-worked road (kharanja), across no. 113 by the Nagar Palika, it was a 10 feet wide passage. It was extended backwards across Khasra no. 112 to join a much wider road, accessing the Dehradun road, also part of Khasra no. 112, that is 33 feet wide. However, the extension in Khasra no. 113 was just 10 feet wide, that resulted in subdivision of no. 113, leaving some part of it on the eastern side of the brick-worked road, adjoining Khasra no. 111, owned by the defendants. 41. The findings of the lower Appellate Court, based on appreciation of documentary and oral evidence to conclude the precise manner in which Khasra no. 113 has been subdivided to leave a residue on the eastern side of the brick-worked road, laid with permission of the plaintiff, is a flawless finding of fact. It is not for this Court to interfere with that part of the finding. 113 has been subdivided to leave a residue on the eastern side of the brick-worked road, laid with permission of the plaintiff, is a flawless finding of fact. It is not for this Court to interfere with that part of the finding. This Court, however, has, within the limited scope of its scrutiny clearly indicated that on a true interpretation of the title deeds, dated 03.06.1896, 04.06.1896 and 26.03.1920, there is no interpretation to be done about identity of the suit property, where conclusions have been drawn by the lower Appellate Court from evidence based on subsequent changes to physical features, that are not contemporaneous to the sale deeds. It is held for a principle that though boundaries given in the deeds of title are the most reliable evidence about the identity of adjoining properties, but the rule may have slender or no application to a situation where physical features about the property suffer change in course of time. In this case that change happened in 1956. 42. Substantial question of law no. 1 is, therefore, stand answered in the negative. 43. The second substantial question of law that has been pressed is to the effect whether the lower Appellate Court has omitted to consider that there was an old road in Khasra no. 113 in the same place, where the new kharanja road laid by the Nagar Palika exists. 44. This Court while answering the first question had occasion to look into the very detailed evaluation of documentary and oral evidence done by the lower Appellate Court, with regard to the old village road existing in Khasra no. 112 (old no. 125) and the brick-worked road (kharanja) laid after permission of the plaintiff, in the year 1956 by the Nagar Palika. The issue which the question postulates, on a thorough consideration of the matter, is found to be concluded by well considered findings of facts recorded by the lower Appellate Court. 45. This Court does not think that on the evidence on record and its appreciation done by the lower Appellate Court, this question is really arises in this appeal. 46. In the result, this Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 47. Let a decree be drawn up, accordingly.