JUDGMENT : Aggrieved by the order dated 13.07.2017, passed by the learned Single Judge, in dismissing writ petition Nos.5768057682 of 2014, the writ petitioners therein are in appeal. 2. The parties shall be referred to herein as per their ranking before the learned Single Judge. 3. The writ petitioners claim that they are the land owners of lands bearing Survey No.60 measuring 23 guntas, Survey No.38/12 measuring 18 guntas, Survey No.44/1 measuring 24 guntas and Survey No.38/11 measuring 22 guntas situated in Dasanpura Village, Dasanpura Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk. The lands of the petitioners along with other lands were sought to be acquired for the purpose of constructing a terminal namely, ‘D.Devraj Urs Truck Terminal’. A preliminary notification under Section 4(1) read with Sections 17(1) & (4) of the Land Acquisition Act (‘the Act’ for short) was issued on 27.10.2010 which was followed by a final notification issued under Section 6(1) of the Act on 08.11.2011. The urgency clause was invoked in order to immediately attend to traffic congestion for the movement of trucks. Consequently, an award was passed on 30.4.2012 determining the compensation payable for the acquired lands. Questioning the acquisition, the writ petitioners filed the instant writ petitions. They contended that the urgency clause sought for in fact has not been utilized by the State and that there was no urgency involved. That the right to file objections to the preliminary notification has since been done away by the notifications issued under Section 17 of the Act which affects the legal rights. That neither the award has been passed nor deposited with the Court. Hence, it was pleaded that the petitions be allowed by setting aside the impugned notifications. 4. The same was disputed by the State. It was contended that, the urgency clause has since been answered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in a similarly filed writ petition No.3374 of 2013 challenging the very acquisition proceedings, which was dismissed on 19.03.2014, wherein the learned Single Judge went into the validity of the acquisition proceedings including that of the exercise of powers under Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, the contention with regard to the urgency clause cannot be pleaded once again when the State have established and the Courts have accepted the existence of urgency. Therefore, the contention with regard to the urgency clause cannot be pleaded once again when the State have established and the Courts have accepted the existence of urgency. The order of the learned Single Judge was challenged by the unsuccessful writ petitioners in W.A.No.1041 of 2014 which was dismissed by the judgment dated 28.10.2015. Therefore, this petition is merely a repetition of what the Court had earlier considered. 5. It is further contended that the award has been passed on 30.04.2012, that notices dated 13.12.2012 were issued under Section 12(2) of the Act and since the claimants refused to accept the amounts, the same has been deposited before the trial court. In support of their case, the State have filed a memo in the Court today enclosing eight documents and photographs. The documents pertain to the acquisition notifications including one under Section 17 of the Act, the notices under Sections 9, 10 and 12(2) of the Act and the copy of the award dated 30.04.2012. 6. Heard learned counsels. 7. The earlier writ petition is not disputed. Writ petition No.3374 of 2013 was filed seeking to set aside the very notifications sought to be challenged herein. The contention of urgency was considered by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge was of the view that construction of a truck terminal is an Act of urgency as decided by the State and there is nothing to disbelieve it. That the extent of land required for such a purpose was also not in dispute. The land was intended for the formation of a road to accommodate a larger project namely, that of the truck terminal. Even as on date, photographs have been produced by the State which indicates the construction of the truck terminal. The access to the said terminal is blocked in view of the instant writ appeal. The lands involved herein were part of the land that was required to construct a road to approach the truck terminal. Therefore, so far as the contention of urgency and public need is concerned, the same has since been answered by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid matter which has also been affirmed in an appeal. Therefore, we are of the view that the same contention cannot be permitted to be urged once again in a second writ petition. Issues of fact has since been decided by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, we are of the view that the same contention cannot be permitted to be urged once again in a second writ petition. Issues of fact has since been decided by the learned Single Judge. It is not appropriate to consider the very same issue again and again even though the petitions have been filed by other land losers. The finding of the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.3374 of 2013 dated 19.03.2014 is applicable on fours so far as Sections 4, 6 & 17 of the Act is concerned. 8. A further contention sought to be advanced is the absence of tendering the amount in terms of the award. Reliance is therefore placed on Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (‘the Act, 2013’ for short) which reads as follows: “24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.– (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No.1 of 1894) (a) where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No.1 of 1894), where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 9. However, the same is opposed by Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned Additional Advocate General on the ground that the same is inapplicable to the case on hand. That the acquisition herein was of the year 2010, the final notification was of the year 2011 and that the award passed in 2012 itself. Therefore, even a bare reading of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 would indicate that it has no application to the facts of the case. Hence, the said contention is rejected. 10. It is further contended by the State that but for the pending proceedings, the entire project has come to a stand still. That the entire scheme of acquisition has been frustrated in view of the interim order granted herein. 11. On considering all the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge, as well as the facts and circumstances, we are of the considered view that there is no merit in this appeal. The proceedings have been unnecessarily stalled and the public interests have suffered. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly considered every contention of the petitioners on facts and on law. We find no error in the order of the learned Single Judge that calls for interference. The appeal is devoid of merits. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed.