1. The petitioner before this Court has filed this present petition for quashment of Annexure P-18 and Annexure P-20 by which his services have been put to an end as well as the order rejecting the appeal/revision. 2. The facts as stated in the writ petition reveal that the petitioner was appointed as a cook vide order dated 09.08.2002 in the pay-scale of Rs.2610-7040/-and while he was in the services of Central Reserve Police Force, a charge-sheet was issued on 10.03.2014. The petitioner did submit a reply to the charges and thereafter, a departmental enquiry was held against the petitioner. The inquiry officer held the petitioner guilty of charge No.1 and held the petitioner partially guilty in respect of charge No.2. 3. The following charges were levelled against the petitioner as per the imputation of misconduct:- (1) that, on 14.02.2014 (after noon) without obtaining prior permission of the competent authority, the delinquent has gone out of the camp and consumed liquor. Same is a misconduct keeping in view Rule 11(1) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949. (2) that, on 14.02.2014, without obtaining permission i.e. on the same day, he had visited the house of Gopal S/o Bhanwarlal and in his absence he went to the roof top and certain clothes were set on fire. 4. In the departmental enquiry, the charge No.2 was proved partially, meaning thereby, he went out of the camp without permission, however, the factum of putting clothes on fire was not established. So far as charge No.1 is concerned, it was established on the basis of evidence of the witnesses that he went out of the camp without obtaining prior permission from the authorities. 5. The inquiry report, which is on record reflects that the petitioner went out of the camp on a motorcycle and he met with an accident and sustained injuries and was brought back on the next day. Otherwise also, the charge No.1 has been proved against the present petitioner. 6. The respondents have filed a reply and they have stated that the petitioner was given a fair opportunity to defend himself and the principles of natural justice and fair play were observed and in case of a departmental enquiry the misconduct has to be proved on the basis of preponderance of probability and it is not like a criminal case where misconduct has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 7. 7. Learned Additional Solicitor General has argued before this Court that in absence of any perversity in respect of the inquiry report, the question of interference by this Court does not arise. He has stated that even if the charge No.1 has been proved, it is good enough for his dismissal as no legal permission was obtained to leave the camp. 8. This Court has carefully gone through the inquiry report, the charge sheet, the order of punishment as well as the order rejecting the appeal/revision. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before this Court that the charge-sheet was issued under Section 11(1) of Central Reserve Police Force, 1949. Section 11 of the Act reads as under:- “Section 11 in the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949. 11. Minor punishments.— (1) The Commandant or any other authority or officer as may be prescribed, may, subject to any rules made under this Act, award in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal any one or more of the following punishments to any member of the Force whom he considers to be guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, or remissness in the discharge of any duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force, that is to say,— (a) reduction in rank; (b) fine of any amount not exceeding one month’s pay and allowances; (c) confinement to quarters, lines or camp for a term not exceeding one month; (d) confinement in the quarter-guard for not more than twenty-eight days, with or without punishment drill or extra guard, fatigue or other duty; and (e) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the Force. (2) Any punishment specified in clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1) may be awarded by any gazetted officer when in command of any detachment of the Force away from headquarters, provided he is specially authorized in this behalf by the commandant. (2) Any punishment specified in clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1) may be awarded by any gazetted officer when in command of any detachment of the Force away from headquarters, provided he is specially authorized in this behalf by the commandant. (3) The assistant commandant, a company officer or a subordinate officer, not being below the rank of subedar or inspector, commanding a separate detachment or an outpost, or in temporary command at the headquarters of the Force, may, without a formal trial, award to any member of the Force who is for the time being subject to his authority any one or more of the following punishment for the commission of any petty offence against discipline which is not otherwise provided for in this Act, or which is not of a sufficiently serious nature to require prosecution before a criminal court, that is to say,— (a) confinement for not more than seven days in the quarter-guard or such other place as may be considered suitable, with forfeiture of all pay and allowances during its continuance; (b) punishment drill, or extra guard, fatigue or other duty, for not more than thirty days with or without confinement to quarters, lines or camp; (c) censure or severe censure: Provided that this punishment may be awarded to a subordinate officer only by the Commandant. (4) A jemadar or sub-inspector who is temporarily in command of a detachment or an outpost may, in like manner and for the commission of any like offence, award to any member of the Force for the time being subject to his authority any of the punishments specified in clause (b) of sub-section (3) for not more than fifteen days.” 10. The learned counsel has contended that Section 11 does not deal with the termination or dismissal and therefore, once charge-sheet was issued under Section 11 of the Act, 1949, the major punishment of dismissal from the service could not have been awarded. 11. In the considered opinion of this Court, the arguments canvased by the learned counsel are misplaced. Rule 11 provides that Commandant or any other authority as prescribed under the Act may award in lieu of dismissal any of the punishment mentioned under Rule 11 (1). Meaning thereby, the Commandant in place of dismissal can award reduction in rank and other minor punishment. Rule 11 provides that Commandant or any other authority as prescribed under the Act may award in lieu of dismissal any of the punishment mentioned under Rule 11 (1). Meaning thereby, the Commandant in place of dismissal can award reduction in rank and other minor punishment. However, in the present case, a minor charge was proved against the present applicant. It is not a case where the petitioner was habitual of committing misconduct. There is no other punishment order brought to the notice of this Court inflicted upon the petitioner during his entire service period. The punishment is certainly disproportionate to the guilt of the delinquent. He has been held guilty of going out of the camp for few hours. He has not committed the similar misconduct in the past also. 12. The Apex Court in the case of B. C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 in paragraphs No.22 to 26 has held as under:- “22. The aforesaid has, therefore, to be avoided and I have no doubt that a High Court would be within its jurisdiction to modify the punishment/penalty by moulding the relief, which power it undoubtedly has, in view of long line of decisions of this Court, to which reference is not deemed necessary, as the position is well settled in law. It may, however, be stated that this power of moulding relief in cases of the present nature can be invoked by a High Court only when the punishment/penalty awarded shocks the judicial conscience. 23. It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High Courts, can be no ground to think that they have not to do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot be ordered. Absence of provision like Article 142 is not material, according to me. This may be illustrated by pointing out that despite there being no provision in the Constitution parallel to Article 137 conferring power of review on the High Court, this Court held as early as 1961 in Shivdeo Singh's case, AIR 1963 SC 1909 , that the High Courts too can exercise power of review, which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction. I would say that power to do complete justice also inheres in every court, not to speak of a court of plenary jurisdiction like a High Court. of course, this power is not as wide which this Court has under Article 142. That, however, is a different matter. 24. What has been stated above may be buttressed by putting the matter a little differently. The same is that in a case of dismissal, Article 21 gets attracted. And, in view of the inter-dependence of fundamental rights, which concept was first accepted in the case commonly known as Bank Nationalisation case, 1970 (3) SCR 530 , which thinking was extended to cases attracting Article 21 in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India. AIR 1978 SC 597 , the punishment/penalty awarded has to be reasonable; and if it be unreasonable, Article 14 would be violated. That Article 14 gets attracted in a case of disproportionate punishment was the view of this Court in Bhagat Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1983 (2) SCC 442 also. Now if Article 14 were to be violated, it cannot be doubted that a High Court can take care of the same by substituting, in appropriate cases, a punishment deemed reasonable by it. 25. No doubt, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in exercising power of judicial review. It is because of this that substitution of High Court's view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. But for this constraint, I would have thought that the law makers do desire application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of punishment/penalty. I have said so because the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was amended to insert section 11A in it to confer this power even on a Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. It may be that this power was conferred on these adjudicating authorities because of the prevalence of unfair labour practice or victimisation by the management. Even so, the power under section 11A is available to be exercised, even if there be no victimisation or taking recourse to unfair labour practice. In this background, I do not think if we would be justified in giving much weight to the decision of the employer on the question of appropriate punishment in service matters relating to Government employees or employees of the public corporations. In this background, I do not think if we would be justified in giving much weight to the decision of the employer on the question of appropriate punishment in service matters relating to Government employees or employees of the public corporations. I have said so because if need for maintenance of office discipline be the reason of our adopting a strict attitude qua the public servants,discipline has to be maintained in the industrial sector also. The availability of appeal etc. to public servants does not make a real difference, as the appellate/revisional authority is known to have taken a different view on the question of sentence only rarely. I would, therefore, think that but for the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no inherent reason to disallow application of judicial mind to the question of proportionately of punishment/penalty. But then, while seized with this question as a writ court interference is permissible only when the punishment/penalty is shockingly disproportionate. 26. I had expressed my unhappiness qua the first facet of the case, as Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court in paras 20 and 21 of Krishna Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1992 Orissa 261 (FB), by asking why the power of doing complete justice has been denied to the High Courts ? I feel happy that I have been able to state, as a Judge of the Apex Court, that the High Courts too are to do complete justice. This is also the result of what has been held in the leading judgment.” 13. In light of the aforesaid judgment, as the dismissal is of the year 2014, no purpose is going to be served by remanding the matter back to the disciplinary authority for awarding lessor punishment, the interest of justice would be sub-served by reinstating the petitioner without back-wages and by awarding a minor punishment of stoppage of two increments for a period of two years. 14. The punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority i.e. the dismissal from service is set aside and the order of punishment is modified to the extent stated above. The petitioner shall be entitled for reinstatement with all consequential benefits without back-wages. The petition is partly allowed. No orders as to cots.