ORDER : 1. Since, all these matters involve identical question of law and facts, they are heard together and being disposed off by this common order. 2. The facts are drawn from Special Civil Application No. 22098 of 2019. 2.1 The petitioner-State is aggrieved by the judgment and award passed by the learned Labour Court, Junagadh, Dated: 07.05.2019, in Reference (LCJ) No. 62 of 2015, whereby, it directed the reinstatement of the respondent-workman with continuity of service, but, without backwages. 2.2 The petitioner is a department of the Government of Gujarat, which is the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The respondent-workman raised a dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Junagadh, who referred the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication, vide order dated 14.09.2015, as to whether the respondent-workman should be reinstated on this original post or not. 2.3 The respondent-workman filed his Statement of Claim, whereby, he claimed that he had worked with the petitioner continuously for the period of four years, i.e. from 09.03.2020 to 05.05.2014. It was also urged that, while terminating his services orally, he was neither given notice nor notice pay nor any retrenchment compensation by the petitioner, as is required under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in brief, ‘the ID Act’). It was also alleged that, while terminating the services of the respondent-workman, the persons, who were junior to him, were continued in service. 2.4 The petitioner also filed its written statement, denying all the averments and allegations made by the respondent-workman. It was urged that the respondent-workman was engaged on a contract, which was entered into by the parties, upon an advertisement issued by the petitioner-Department on 23.06.2010. It was also urged that for various ancillary works, which were required to be carried out in the zoo, the petitioner-Department had issued a public notice, whereupon, the respondent-workman was engaged. 2.5 Both the sides adduced evidence before the Labour Court and on the strength of the same, the Labour Court held that there was clear breach of the provisions of the ID Act, and therefore, it granted reinstatement to the respondent-workman with continuity of service, but, without backwages. 3. The aggrieved petitioner-Department is, therefore, before this Court, seeking following reliefs: “8. 3. The aggrieved petitioner-Department is, therefore, before this Court, seeking following reliefs: “8. … A. YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to admit and allow this writ petition; B. YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction of certiorari and/or any other writ in the nature of certiorari to quash and set aside the judgment and common award dated 07.05.2019 passed in Reference (LCJ) No. 62 of 2015 passed by the Ld. Labour Court, Junagadh. C. Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition, YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to stay implementation, operation and execution of the judgment and common award dated 07.05.2019 passed in Reference (LCJ) No. 62 of 2015 passed by the Ld. Labour Court, Junagadh; D. …” 4. This Court has heard the learned AGP, Mr. Kanara, for the petitioner-Department, at length, who has urged that the respondents-workmen never worked for four years continuously. It is, further, urged that the work of the petitioner-Department is of seasonal nature and therefore, there is no concept of senior or junior, since, the work is purely temporary. 4.1 He also argued before this Court, at length, that in case of the respondent-workman in Special Civil Application No. 22098 of 2019, he has not completed 240 days in any of the year of his service. It is, further, urged that in the year 2013, he worked for ‘0’ days. The respondent-workman in Special Civil Application No. 22538 of 2019, completed 240 days in the year 2011, whereas, the respondent-workman in Special Civil Application No. 22104 of 2019 completed 240 days in the year 2005 and 300 days in the years, 2008 and 2009. 4.2 According to the learned AGP, Mr. Kanara, the delay has not been explained by any of the respondents-workmen. He also urged that the Labour Court has overlooked many vital aspects. According to him, there is no post, on which the respondents-workmen can be reinstated. Since, their appointment was purely contractual in nature, the same will not attract the provisions of the ID Act, and therefore, there was no requirement for the petitioner to either issue notice or to give notice pay or retrenchment compensation to the respondents-workmen. 5. Having heard the learned AGP, Mr. Kanara, for the respondent- State, at the outset, this Court needs to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in ‘SHALINI SHYAM SHETTY AND ANOTHER VS. 5. Having heard the learned AGP, Mr. Kanara, for the respondent- State, at the outset, this Court needs to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in ‘SHALINI SHYAM SHETTY AND ANOTHER VS. RAJENDRA SHANKAR PATIL’ (2010) 8 SCC 329 , where, the Apex Court has considered at length the scope of interference by this Court to hold and observe that Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. The relevant observations of the Apex Courts runs as under: “Articles 226 and 227 stand on substantially different footing. As noted above, prior to the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could issue prerogative writs in exercise of their original jurisdiction. [See 1986 (suppl.) SCC 401 at page 469)]. 58. However, after the Constitution every High Court has been conferred with the power to issue writs under Article 226 and these are original proceeding. [State of U.P. and others vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj - AIR 1963 SC 946 , page 951]. 59. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. 60. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226, High Court normally annuls or quashes an order or proceeding but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. {See Surya Dev Rai (supra), para 25 page 690 and also the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others - [ AIR 1955 SC 233 , para 20 page 243]}. 61. Jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. 61. Jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a Letters Patent Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform.” 5.1 In the case on hand, what this Court needs to examine is, as to whether, while passing the impugned judgment and award, the Labour Court has exceeded its jurisdiction or not or has committed manifest illegality or has not acted within the bounds of its authority. 5.2 From the perusal of the impugned common judgment and award passed by the Labour Court, what can be found is that there is extensive and elaborate discussion on each point and in the end, it has held in favour of the respondents-workmen. This Court, further, notices that there is completion of 240 days of work, and therefore, it is not correct on the part of the petitioner-Department to state that there was no completion of 240 days. It was the petitioner-Department, which continued the respondent-workman in the service and then, abruptly, terminated their service without giving any notice, notice pay or retrenchment compensation. From the evidence, as discussed by the Labour Court, this Court does not find that the trial Court has committed any error, while passing judgment and award, deserving any indulgence. 6. Resultantly, all these petitions fail and are DISMISSED, accordingly. No order as to costs.