ORDER : 1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 23.11.2019, whereby the application for interim relief filed by the plaintiff/appellant has been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated, material facts are as under: 3. A suit for declaration was preferred by the plaintiff/appellant herein in the Court of Additional District Judge, Srinagar, in which it was asserted that the plaintiff was the owner in possession of a parcel of land measuring 1 Kanal and 10 Marlas, i.e., 1 Kanal 5 marlas falling under survey No. 1176/678 and 5 marlas falling under survey No. 1407/1116/679 situated in estate Bhaghat Burzulla. It was asserted that the property in question was described in the site plan and the revenue record annexed with the sale deed. The land in question was stated to have been purchased from one Mst. Rukhsana vide sale deed dated 11th September, 2009. It was further asserted that the vendor Mst. Rukhsana had purchased the said land from the defendant No. 2. It was alleged that the defendant No.1 had started interfering in the peaceful possession of the suit propriety and hence an interim injunction was sought restraining the defendants from interfering with the property in question. 4. The defendants in the written statement, however, took a stand that the suit land actually fell under survey No. 621 and 622 min and that the land in question was purchased by defendant No.1. It was denied that the suit land was falling under survey Nos. 1176/678 and 1407/1116/679. It was also stated that the defendant No.1 had after purchasing the land, got it mutated in the revenue records vide mutation No. 172 and also claimed exclusive possession over the same. It was also stated that the land in question in possession of defendant No.1 was properly demarcated by the revenue authorities after spot inspection in which revenue authorities recorded a categorical finding that the suit land fell under Khasra No.621 and 622 and not Khasra Nos.1176/678 and 1407/1116/679, as claimed by the plaintiff, and that the land claimed by the plaintiff was about 1800 feet away from the land occupied and possessed by the said defendant. 5. 5. The court below upon consideration of the matter, in the light of established principles for grant of temporary injunction, held that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case and further held that even the balance of convenience was not in favour of the plaintiff. On the issue of prima facie case, the court below recorded that the parties to the suit were both claiming ownership and possession of the suit land and that the plaintiff had not placed any document on record to establish the identity of the suit land which had been described by him in the site plan annexed with the sale deed. On the other hand, the court below held that the defendant No. 1 had placed on record a copy of report of the Tehsildar dated 5th February, 2013, whereby the land had been demarcated which suggested that the land falling under khasra No 621 min measuring 8 Vi marlas and land falling under khasra No. 622 min measuring 1 Kanal was purchased by the defendant No. 1 and it also stood mutated in his name under mutation No. 177. The Court below also held that from the documents placed on record it was prima facie established that the land claimed by plaintiff as suit land, was actually land falling under Khasra Nos. 621 min and 622 min which had been purchased by the defendant No. 1 and the same was also in possession of the defendant No. 1. It was also held that the plaintiff had not at all applied for demarcation of his land to establish its actual location and identity neither had he placed any material on record to support the location of the land claimed by him. Besides this, the court below also held that the plaintiff had concealed the fact that he had earlier filed a suit for injunction against the defendant No. 1 which had been dismissed and that having suffered dismissal he had raised a similar issue in the suit before it. The order further holds that the plaintiff had also concealed the fact that he had challenged the order of dismissal by way of an appeal before the High Court which was also dismissed and hence it held that having suppressed the material facts, the plaintiff was not entitled to any discretionary relief. 6. The order further holds that the plaintiff had also concealed the fact that he had challenged the order of dismissal by way of an appeal before the High Court which was also dismissed and hence it held that having suppressed the material facts, the plaintiff was not entitled to any discretionary relief. 6. I have gone through the order impugned and heard learned counsel for the parties at length. In my opinion, the order impugned is a speaking order which correctly deals with each and every material aspect of the case when tested on the touchstone of principles laid down for grant of interim injunctions. The court below has not found any prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff referred above. The principles governing appeals against granting or refusal of temporary injunction has been dealt by the Apex Court in "Wander Limited and Anr. Vs. Antox India P. Ltd., reported in 1990 Supp. SCC 727", wherein it was held that the appellate court ought not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely. What was also held in the said judgment in paragraph 14 is reproduced herein below: "14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: (SCR 721) .........These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton, a Judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case." The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle." 7. Testing the facts of the present case on the touchstone of the law discussed herein above, in my opinion the order impugned does not warrant any interference. 8. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal is found to be without any merit and is accordingly dismissed along with connected MP(s).