JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN, J. 1. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant writ petitioner, challenging the order date 14.1.2016, passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 4219 of 2015, whereby, the writ application seeking quashing of sale notice dated 08.07.2015, auction sale dated 20.8.2015 and the letters dated 6.7.2015 and 26.8.2015 issued by the respondent Allahabad Bank, has been dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that M/s Eastern India Cements Private Limited caries on business of manufacture and supply of cement. The Company approached the respondent Allahabad Bank for financial assistance and the Bank sanctioned the Cash Credit Limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- and term Loan of Rs. 2.00 crores. Subsequently, Cash Credit Limit was enhanced to Rs. 60,00,000/-. The appellant is one of the Directors of M/s Eastern India Cements Private Limited, and she is a guarantor for the loan extended to the Company by the respondent Allahabad Bank. Subsequently, the loan account was declared N.P.A. and the respondent Bank served the notice under Section 13(2) of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (herein after to be referred as ‘SARFAESI Act’) on 22.9.2014 and demanded payment of Rs. 3,26,70,716.00/- asking the appellant to repay the amount within 60 days. As the amount could not be deposited, the possession of the property was taken by the Bank on 14.1.2015. Sale Notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI act was issued on 8.7.2015, by the respondent Bank, fixing the date of auction on 20.8.2015. The appellant writ petition offered Rs. 40,00,000/- which was the reserve price for one of the properties, for release of collateral security. However, the respondent Bank demanded Rs. 60.37 lakhs for release of the property in question. In the auction which took place on 20.8.2015, the single bid of the respondent No. 4 for Rs. 40.10 lakhs were accepted. Thereafter the appellant writ petitioner offered to Pay Rs. 45 lakhs against the auction sale price of Rs. 40.10 lakhs, whereupon the respondent Bank, by letter dated 26.8.2015, asked the petitioner to liquidate the entire loan amount of Rs. 3,57,48,250.00/- with costs and charges before issuance of sale certificate, in which case the cancellation of the sale process could be considered by the Bank. 45 lakhs against the auction sale price of Rs. 40.10 lakhs, whereupon the respondent Bank, by letter dated 26.8.2015, asked the petitioner to liquidate the entire loan amount of Rs. 3,57,48,250.00/- with costs and charges before issuance of sale certificate, in which case the cancellation of the sale process could be considered by the Bank. It is an admitted position that pursuant to the auction sale, which took place on 20.8.2015, the property in question has been registered in the name of respondent No. 4, the mutation has been done in favour of the respondent No. 4 and the revenue rent receipts have also been issue in his favour, but the actual physical possession of the property has not been handed over to the respondent No. 4 and the property is still in the physical possession of the appellant. 3. The appellant challenged the sale notice dated 8.7.205, the auction sale which took place on 20.8.2015, and the letters dated 6.7.2015 and 26.8.2015 in this Court, in W.P. (C) No. 4219 of 2015, which was dismissed by the Writ Court. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been preferred. Pursuant to an ad-interim order passed in this appeal on 5.12.2016, after the appellant deposited Rs. 48 lakhs, by way of Bank Draft issued in favour of the Registrar General of this Court, which has been deposited in short term deposit, as directed by this Court, the appellant continues to be in the possession of the property. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has entered into a compromise with the respondent Bank, and all the dues of the Bank have been settled to the satisfaction of the Bank for Rs. 237.10 lacs, which have been deposited with the Bank. Learned counsel has submitted that the appellant had offered to Pay Rs. 45 lakhs against the auction sale price of Rs. 40.10 lakhs, to the respondent Bank, which offer was refused by the Bank, by letter dated 26.8.2015, asking the appellant to liquidate the entire loan amount of Rs. 3,57,48,250.00/- plus, costs, but subsequently, the entire dues have been settled to the satisfaction of the Bank for Rs. 237.10 lacs. 45 lakhs against the auction sale price of Rs. 40.10 lakhs, to the respondent Bank, which offer was refused by the Bank, by letter dated 26.8.2015, asking the appellant to liquidate the entire loan amount of Rs. 3,57,48,250.00/- plus, costs, but subsequently, the entire dues have been settled to the satisfaction of the Bank for Rs. 237.10 lacs. The appellant is also ready to compensate the respondent No. 4, by making the payment of the entire auction amount with due interest, along with registration and other expenses incurred by him, and for that purpose, the deposit of Rs. 48 lakhs has been made by the appellant before the Registrar General of the Court. He further submits that this Hon'ble Court tried to mediate the issue, but respondent No. 4 refused to accept the amount and/or the compromise with ulterior motive. Learned counsel also submitted that the respondent Bank and the private respondent No. 4 are hands in gloves with each other, inasmuch as, the minimum reserve price for the property put to auction was Rs. 40 lakhs, and the respondent No. 4 purchased the same for only Rs. 40.10 lakhs, and even though the appellant-writ petitioner offered to pay Rs. 45 lakhs for the said property, but it was denied to her. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the actual value of the property is mach more, but in the sheer misuse of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the property has been sold for a song to the respondent No. 4, and accordingly, this is a fit case for setting aside the auction sale. In this connection, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in J. Rajiv Subramaniyan and Another vs. Pandiyas and Others, (2014) 5 SCC 651 , wherein the law is laid down as follows:- “18. It must be emphasized that generally proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 against the borrowers are initiated only when the borrower is in dire straits. The provisions of the SARFAESI act, 2002 and the 2002 Rules have been enacted to ensure that the secured asset is not sold for a song. It must be emphasized that generally proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 against the borrowers are initiated only when the borrower is in dire straits. The provisions of the SARFAESI act, 2002 and the 2002 Rules have been enacted to ensure that the secured asset is not sold for a song. It is expected that all the banks and financial institutions which resort to the extreme measures under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 for sale of the secured assets to ensure that such sale of the asset provides maximum benefit to the borrower by the sale of such asset. Therefore, the secured creditors are expected to take bona fide measures to ensure that there is maximum yield from such secured assets for the borrowers.........” 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has further placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Kishun and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2012) 11 SCC 511 , laying down as follows:- “13. Undoubtedly, public money should be recovered and recovery should be made expediously. But it does not mean that the financial institutions which are concerned only with the recovery of their loans, may be permitted to behave like property dealers and be permitted further to dispose of the secured assets in any unreasonable or arbitrary manner in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions. ................ 15. In case the property is disposed of by private treaty without adopting any other mode provided under the statutory rules, etc. there may be a possibility of collusion/fraud and even when public auction is held. the possibility of collusion among the bidders cannot be ruled out. In State of Orissa vs. Harinarayan Jaiswal the Court held that a highest bidder in public auction cannot have a right to get the property or any privilege, unless the guthority confirms the auction-sale, being fully satisfied that the property has fetched the appropriate price and there has been no collusion between the bidders. *** *** *** 17. Therefore, it becomes a legal obligation on the part of the authority that property be sold in such a manner that it may fetch the best price. *** *** *** 17. Therefore, it becomes a legal obligation on the part of the authority that property be sold in such a manner that it may fetch the best price. Thus essential ingredients of such sale remain a correct valuation report and fixing the reserve price in case proper valuation has not been made and the reserve price is fixed taking into consideration the inaccurate valuation report, the intending buyers may not come forward treating the property as not worth purchase by them, as a moneyed person or a big businessman may not like to involve himself in small sales/deals.” 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the auction sale took place on 20.8.2015, auction sale price of the property was only Rs. 40.10 lakhs, and thereafter the appellant-writ petitioner offered to Pay Rs. 45 lakhs against the auction sale price of Rs. 40.10 lakhs, whereupon the respondent Bank, by letter dated 26.8.2015, refused the offer, i.e., within the period of 30 days, which was in contravention of Rule 60 to the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, which stipulates that if the defaulter borrower deposits the auction sale price within 30 days of the date of auction sale, then the property ought to have been released in favour of the defaulter borrower. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Mathew Varghese vs. M. Amritha Kumar and Others, (2014) 5 SCC 610 . 7. Pre-contra, learned counsel for the respondent Allahabad Bank submits that in terms of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the borrower was required to deposit the entire loan amount within 30 days of the sale or transfer as the case may be, which the appellant-writ petitioner has failed to do. It has been further contended that under Rule 60 to the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, the defaulter is required to pay the amount specified in the proclamation of sale within 30 days from the date of sale, but she did not do so. He further submits that even the appellant writ petitioner could have participated in the auction sale, but she did not participate. He further submits that even the appellant writ petitioner could have participated in the auction sale, but she did not participate. The compromise between the appellant and the Bank is with respect to the dues of the Bank only, which shall not affect the auction sale in any manner, and as now, even the registration of sale has been completed and the mutation of the property has also been done in favour of the auction purchaser respondent No. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent Bank submitted that the auction sale of the property cannot be annulled, and there is no error in the order of Hon'ble Single Judge. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 submits that several developments have already taken place. After the auction of the property, even the sale certificate has been issued in favour of the respondent No. 4 on 16.1.2016 by the respondent Bank, and sale deed has also been executed in favour of respondent No. 4 on 6.2.2016. The mutation has taken place and the rent receipt are being issued in favour of the respondent No. 4, after his name has been mutated in revenue records. He further submits that there is no error either in the action of the respondent Bank in selling the property in question in favour of respondent No. 4, or in the impugned judgment passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, and the compromise, if any, between the Bank and the appellant, shall neither bind this respondent, nor affect the rights of this respondent to hold the property. Learned counsel has made the stand of the respondent No. 4 clear, that there can be no compromise with the appellant writ petition, and this respondent shall not part with the property duly purchased by him. 9. Having heard learned counsels for the parties, and upon going through the record, we find that the case of the appellant is covered by Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. which is a complete Code in itself with regard to enforcement of security interests. 9. Having heard learned counsels for the parties, and upon going through the record, we find that the case of the appellant is covered by Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. which is a complete Code in itself with regard to enforcement of security interests. Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act categorically states that where the amount of dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him is tendered to the secured creditor at any time before the date of publication of notice for public-auction or inviting quotations or tender from public or private treaty for transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of the secured assets, the secured assets shall not be transferred by the secured creditor. For better appreciation of this case Section 13(2)(4) and (8) of the SARFAESI Act is quoted herein-below: “13. Enforcement of security interest:- (1)................ (2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment of secured debt or any installment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is classified by the secured creditor as non-performing asset, then, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under sub-section (4). Provided that: *** *** *** (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely:- (a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realizing the secured asset. *** *** *** (8) Where the amount of dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him is tendered to the secured creditor at any time before the date of publication of notice for public auction or inviting quotations or tender from public or private treaty for transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of the secured assets: (i) the secured assets shall not be transferred by way of lease assignment or sale by the secured creditor. (ii) in case any step has been taken by the secured creditor for transfer by way of lease or assignment or sale of the assets before tendering of such amount under this sub-section, no further step shall be taken by such secured creditor for transfer by way of lease or assignment or sale of such secured assets.” 10. In the instant case, the petitioner has failed to pay the dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by respondent-Bank as per the requirement under section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. 11. Much has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that Rule 60 of the 2nd Schedule of the Income Tax Act has not been complied with and on this score alone the entire sale should be declared null and void. He further contended that the moment, he was ready to deposit the amount of sale price, the further proceeding of sale should have been stayed. Rule 60 of the 2nd Schedule of Income Tax act, is reproduced herein-below: “60. Application to set aside sale of immovable property on deposit - (1) Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a certificate the defaulter, or any person whose interests are affected by the sale, may at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the sale, on his depositing: (a) the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, with interest thereon at the rate of one and one-fourth per cent for every month or part of a month calculated from the date of the proclamation of sale to the date when the deposit is made. (b) for payment to the purchaser, as penalty, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money, but not less than one rupee. (2) Where a person makes an application under rule 61 for setting aside the sale of his immovable property he shall not, unless he withdraws that application, be entitled to make or prosecute an application under this rule.” 12. We are not in agreement with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Rule-60 of the 2nd Schedule of the Income tax Act has not been complied with. It is rather the other way around. We are not in agreement with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Rule-60 of the 2nd Schedule of the Income tax Act has not been complied with. It is rather the other way around. It is the appellant who had not cleared the dues of the Bankin spite of letter dated 26.8.2015, asking the appellant to liquidate the entire loan amount of Rs. 3,57,48,250.00/- plus, costs. The very words in sub-section (1) “on his depositing” clearly indicates that the Legislature had intended to give one opportunity to the defaulter or any person having interest over the property where immovable property has been sold in execution of a certificate, may at any time within 30 days from the date of sale apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the sale “on his depositing” the amount specified in proclamation of sale for which the sale was ordered, with interest thereon and also penalty. In the present case this has not been done by the appellant. In the instant case, the learned counsel for the appellant has failed to produce any document to the effect that he has actually deposited the amount as mentioned in the proclamation of sale of the property in question with interest and penalty etc., as stipulated in Rule 60 of 2nd schedule of the Income Tax Rules. Merely offering to pay more amount than the amount offered by the auction purchaser does not does not satisfy the requirements of the Rule. Simply giving an application to stay the sale proceeding or giving some amount will not be enough, rather the entire amount as mentioned in the proclamation for sale together with interest and penalty etc. as stipulated in Rule 60 of 2nd Schedule of Income Tax Rules has to be deposited before the secured creditor. Reference in this regard may be made to the Judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of Saurin Indubhai Patel vs. Karnavati Steel Industries Ltd. 2015 SCC Online Guj 4776. 13. It has been well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prakash Industries Ltd. vs. Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2020) 6 SCC 424, which has also been relied upon by the Hon'ble Single Judge, that the borrower-petitioner herein must participate at the proper time and cannot seek to interfere at stage of confirmation of sale. 14. 13. It has been well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prakash Industries Ltd. vs. Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2020) 6 SCC 424, which has also been relied upon by the Hon'ble Single Judge, that the borrower-petitioner herein must participate at the proper time and cannot seek to interfere at stage of confirmation of sale. 14. In the instant case, the requirements of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act have not been fulfilled by the appellant writ petitioner within the stipulated time. Further, the appellant could have participated in the auction sale itself. However, the fast remains that the appellant writ petitioner did not participate in the auction sale and after conclusion of the auction sale she came forward and offered Rs. 45 lakhs for the sold property. Further as per Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the borrower could have agitated his grievance, if any, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, but interestingly for the reason best known to her, she did not choose to adopt that procedure. 15. The appellant-writ petitioner also contended that the respondent-Bank has sold the property in question just above Rs. 10,000/- over the reserve price of Rs. 40 lakhs whereas the property was very costly much more than the reserve price. We are unable to accept this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner for the sole reason that the appellant-writ petitioner did not choose to approach the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal where factual aspect could have been adjudicated and the legislature has given this opportunity by incorporating Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 16. None of the judgments relied by the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner is applicable in the instant case for the sole reason that every judgment has its own facts but in the instant case the factual aspect could not be adjudicated under writ jurisdiction for which the competent forum is Debts Recovery Tribunal. 17. As a matter of fact, Section 13 of the SARFAESI act is a complete Code in itself in enforcement of security interest and as aforesaid the appellant writ petitioner missed the bus every time, inasmuch as, she did not participate in the auction sale. 17. As a matter of fact, Section 13 of the SARFAESI act is a complete Code in itself in enforcement of security interest and as aforesaid the appellant writ petitioner missed the bus every time, inasmuch as, she did not participate in the auction sale. Further, she also did not abide by the procedure under Section 13 (8) of the SARFAESI Act and also did not choose to file application under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act for redressal of her grievance on factual aspect before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, and also did not avail the opportunity under Rule 60 of 2nd schedule of the Income Tax Rules. 18. In view of the aforesaid discussions, and judicial pronouncements, the appellant writ petitioner has failed to point out any error in the impugned order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge so as to warrant any interference by this court. 19. As discussed above the appellant writ petitioner had deposited Rs. 48 lakhs before the Registrar General of this Court, who was directed to deposit the same in a term deposit. The Registrar General of the High Court is directed to refund the entire amount to the appellant writ petitioner with interest accrued in the said account. 20. For the foregoing discussions, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is accordingly, dismissed with the observations and directions, as above.