ORDER : The present revision petitioner was the accused in the Court of the learned JMFC at Manvi (hereinafter for brevity referred to as the ‘trial Court’) against whom the present respondent, as a complainant, had instituted a private complaint under section 200 of Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’) alleging the offences punishable under section 138 read with section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘N.I. Act’). The summary of the case of the complainant in the trial Court was that the accused had availed hand loan of a sum of Rs. 1,06,710/from him in order to discharge his personal liabilities and had issued a cheque bearing No. 020443 dated 03.02.2009 drawn in favour of the complainant on State Bank of Hyderabad, Raichur. When the said cheque was presented for realisation, the same came to be dishonoured with the endorsement ‘payment stopped by the drawer’. Thereafter, the complainant got issued a legal notice to the accused on 11.03.2009 demanding from him the cheque amount. However, despite the receipt of the legal notice, the accused did not meet the demand made in the notice. As such, the complainant was constrained to institute the complaint. 2. After institution of the complaint, cognizance was taken by the trial Court for the offences punishable under sections 138 and 142 of N.I. Act. Thereafter, the sworn statement of the complainant was recorded wherein the complainant in support of his statement, produced seven documents and marked them as Ex.P1 to Ex.P7. Summons was issued to the accused, who appeared through his counsel. The plea of the accused was recorded, wherein he denied the plea and claimed to be tried. After the evidence, the statement of the accused was recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C. Accused did not lead defence evidence even though an opportunity was given. After hearing both side, the trial Court, by its impugned judgment and order on sentence dated 30.07.2013 under section 255 (2) of Cr.P.C. convicted the accused for the offence punishable under section 138 of N.I. Act. The accused was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.1,54,955.04/and in default to pay the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for four months. After hearing both side, the trial Court, by its impugned judgment and order on sentence dated 30.07.2013 under section 255 (2) of Cr.P.C. convicted the accused for the offence punishable under section 138 of N.I. Act. The accused was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.1,54,955.04/and in default to pay the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for four months. Challenging the said judgment of conviction and order on sentence, the accused preferred an appeal under section 374 of Cr.P.C. before the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Raichur (hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘Sessions Court’) in Criminal Appeal No.27/2013, which after contest, dismissed the appeal by its judgment dated 25.02.2015. It is against the said judgments, the accused has preferred this appeal. 3. In response to the notice, the respondent is appearing through his counsel. Lower Court records are called for and the same are placed before this Court. Heard the arguments from both side. Perused the materials placed before this Court including the impugned judgments and the entire lower court records. The points that arises for my consideration are: (i) Whether the complainant has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed an offence punishable under section 138 of N.I. Act? (ii) Whether the impugned judgments of conviction and order on sentence warrant any interference at the hands of this Court? 4. The complainant got himself examined as PW1, who in his examination in chief, has reiterated the contentions taken up by him in his complaint. He has stated that the accused who was working in the office of the Life Insurance Corporation was known to him and that he availed hand loan of a sum of Rs. 1,06,710/from him on 03.02.2009 and in return issued a cheque bearing No.020443 dated 03.02.2009 drawn on State Bank of Hyderabad, Raichur branch. He presented the said cheque for realisation which came to be dishonoured with the banker’s endorsement that the payment was stopped by the drawer. The cheque was returned on 17.02.2009. Thereafter, he issued a legal notice through his counsel to the accused demanding from him the cheque amount. Despite the receipt of the notice, the accused failed to meet the demand made in the notice, as such complaint was filed. The cheque was returned on 17.02.2009. Thereafter, he issued a legal notice through his counsel to the accused demanding from him the cheque amount. Despite the receipt of the notice, the accused failed to meet the demand made in the notice, as such complaint was filed. PW1 got produced and marked the alleged returned cheque at Ex.P1, the banker’s cheque return endorsement at Ex.P2, a copy of the legal notice issued by him at Ex.P3, the postal receipts at Ex.P4 and Ex.P5, certificate of posting at Ex.P6, the postal acknowledgement card at Ex.P7. 5. PW1 was cross-examined from the accused side wherein the accused has not denied that the cheque in question pertains to him and it bears his signature. Though he suggested to the witness that there was no business relationship between them, but the witness has not admitted the said suggestion as true. It was also suggested to the witness that the cheque in question was lost by the accused which was taken by the complainant and has been presented in the bank, but the said suggestion also was not admitted as true by the witness. Barring the same, no material which could go to shake the evidence of PW1 or which could introduce some serious doubt in the case of the complainant was brought in the cross-examination of PW1. As already observed, the accused did not lead evidence from his side. 6. In the light of the above, it remains undisputed that, the accused has not denied that the cheque at Ex.P1 stands in the name of the complainant as the payee thereunder and the said cheque for the sum of Rs.1,06,710/which is at Ex.P1, bears the signature of the accused and the same was dishonoured when presented for realisation. As per the shara at Ex.P2, would go to show that the said cheque when presented for realisation by the complainant was dishonoured with the banker’s endorsement ‘payment stopped by the drawer’. It is also established that, thereafter the complainant issued a legal notice as per Ex.P3 which was sent to the accused under registered post as per Ex.P4, Ex.P5 and also as per Ex.P6. The said notice was served on the accused as evidenced in the postal acknowledgement at Ex.P7. Admittedly, the accused, even after receipt of the notice, has not responded to the said notice and did not even sent any reply notice. The said notice was served on the accused as evidenced in the postal acknowledgement at Ex.P7. Admittedly, the accused, even after receipt of the notice, has not responded to the said notice and did not even sent any reply notice. As such, at the earliest instance the accused has not taken any specific defence from his side. Thus, the evidence of PW1 which is further corroborated by Ex.P1 to Ex.P7 go to establish that the accused had issued a cheque for the sum of Rs. 1,06,710/to the complainant on 03.02.2009. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in his argument, submitted that the cheque amount at Ex.P1 being an odd amount creates a doubt regarding the genuinity of the transaction. Since the accused has not put any question to PW1 in his cross-examination in that regard and since there is no bar for issuance of cheque for an odd amount, the mere fact that the cheque is for an alleged odd amount by itself will not create any doubt in the case of the complainant. 8. The second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that there existed no legally enforceable debt. The said argument of the learned counsel is also not acceptable in view of section 139 of the N.I. Act which forms a presumption in favour of the complainant, once the complainant establishes that the cheque was issued by the accused in his favour. As already observed above, the complainant has clearly established that the accused has issued the cheque in his favour on 03.02.2009. He has also stated that the accused was a known person to him, as such, he has given hand loan to him, in return for the same the accused had issued the said cheque in his favour. Since the said evidence of PW1 could not be shaken in his cross-examination and also since the accused could not able to show that the alleged transaction is doubtful, a presumption which was formed in favour of the complainant though was rebuttable, has remained unrebutted from the side of the accused. As such, there is no material to suspect the alleged loan transaction said to have taken place between the complainant and the accused. 9. As such, there is no material to suspect the alleged loan transaction said to have taken place between the complainant and the accused. 9. The last point of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the trial of the case for the alleged offence being a summary trial, the evidence recorded by a previous Presiding Officer ought not to have been relied and acted upon by the subsequent Presiding Officer in the trial Court. In his support, learned counsel relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Nitinbhai Saevatilal Shah and another vs. Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal and another reported in 2011 (9) SCC 638 . In the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court had an occasion to consider the aspect of a matter becoming part heard due to transfer of case or transfer of Magistrate in a summary trial case and the subsequent Presiding Officer placing reliance on the evidence recorded by the predecessor Magistrate and about its permissibility under section 326 of Cr.P.C. In that case at para14 of the judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe as below: “14. The mandatory language in which Section 326 (3) is couched, leaves no manner of doubt that when a case is tried as a summary case a Magistrate, who succeeds the Magistrate who had recorded the part or whole of the evidence, cannot act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor. In summary proceedings, the successor Judge or Magistrate has no authority to proceed with the trial from a stage at which his predecessor has left it. The reason why the provisions of sub-Section (1) and (2) of Section 326 of the Code have not been made applicable to summary trials is that in summary trials only substance of evidence has to be recorded. The Court does not record the entire statement of witness. Therefore, the Judge or the Magistrate who has recorded such substance of evidence is in a position to appreciate the evidence led before him and the successor Judge or Magistrate cannot appreciate the evidence only on the basis of evidence recorded by his predecessor. The Court does not record the entire statement of witness. Therefore, the Judge or the Magistrate who has recorded such substance of evidence is in a position to appreciate the evidence led before him and the successor Judge or Magistrate cannot appreciate the evidence only on the basis of evidence recorded by his predecessor. Section 326 (3) of the Code does not permit the Magistrate to act upon the substance of the evidence recorded by his predecessor, the obvious reason being that if succeeding Judge is permitted to rely upon the substance of the evidence recorded by his predecessor, there will be a serious prejudice to the accused and indeed, it would be difficult for a succeeding Magistrate himself to decide the matter effectively and to do substantial justice.” Further, in para16, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe as below: “16. From the language of Section 326(3) of the Code, it is plain that the provisions of Section 326(1) and 326(2) of the new Code are not applicable to summary trial. Therefore, except in regard to those cases which fall within the ambit of Section 326 of the Code, the Magistrate cannot proceed with the trial placing reliance on the evidence recorded by his predecessor. He has got to try the case de novo. In this view of the matter, the High Court should have ordered de novo trial. Placing reliance on the above portion of the judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the instant case the trial of the present case since was required to be summary trial, the Presiding Officer who relied upon the evidence recorded by his predecessor has erred, as such, the petition deserves to be allowed. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant, in his argument, relied upon two judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court. In the first judgment in Mehsana Nagrik Sahkari Bank Ltd. vs. Shreeji Cab Co. and Others reported in 2013 (4) Crimes 351 (SC) in a similar circumstance of the case involving prosecution for dishonour of cheque, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while appreciating section 326 of Cr.P.C. was pleased to observe that where evidence during the trial was recorded in full and not in a summary manner, it was not required for successor Magistrate to record evidence de novo. It was held that Magistrate could proceed with the trial from the stage he took over from the predecessor Magistrate. In the second judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent which was in J.V. Baharuni and another vs. State of Gujarat and another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 494 once again while appreciating section 326 (3) of Cr.P.C. in a criminal prosecution for the offence punishable under section 138 of N.I. Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe that where in a case that can be tried summarily, if the court records evidence elaborately and in verbatim and gives defence full scope to crossexamine witnesses, such procedure adopted is indicative that it is not summary procedure. It also held that before arriving at any conclusion with regard to nature of trial, there should be proper application of judicial mind and evidence on record must be thoroughly perused. Thus, when case in substance is not tried in summary way, though triable summarily, and is tried as regular summons case, successor Magistrate need not hear the case de novo and can act on evidence recorded by his predecessor to decide the case. In the instant case, a perusal of the lower court record would clearly go to show that the Magistrate who conducted the trial and recorded the evidence in the matter did not try the case as a summary trial. A detailed evidence that was led before the Court was recorded. The only evidence that was led before the Court was that of PW1 which has been recorded in verbatim and the accused was also given a full opportunity to cross-examine the said witness to his fullest satisfaction. The said cross-examination portion of the evidence is also recorded in verbatim and in its entirety. Thus, the case in substance was not tried in a summary way though triable summarily, but was tried as a regular summons case. Therefore, no fault can be found in the successor Magistrate relying upon the said evidence recorded by his predecessor to decide the case. As such, the last point of argument of learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the acceptability of the evidence recorded by the predecessor Magistrate is also not acceptable. Resultantly as observed above, the complainant has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed an offence punishable under section 138 of N.I. Act. As such, the last point of argument of learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the acceptability of the evidence recorded by the predecessor Magistrate is also not acceptable. Resultantly as observed above, the complainant has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed an offence punishable under section 138 of N.I. Act. As such, the judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court, which was further confirmed by the Sessions Court does not warrant any interference in it. 11. So far as proportionality of sentence is concerned, the cheque amount was for a sum of Rs. 1,06,710/. The accused was sentenced to pay a fine amount of Rs. 1,54,955.04/and in default to pay the fine amount, to undergo simple imprisonment for four months. Considering the gravity of the offence to the proven guilt, the sentence ordered cannot be called as disproportionate in the circumstances of the case. As such, the sentence ordered above does not warrant any interference at the hands of this Court. Consequently, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER : The Revision Petition is dismissed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.07.2013 passed by the Civil Judge and JMFC, Manvi in C.C.No.111/2010, which is further confirmed by the Principal Sessions Judge at Raichur by its judgment in Criminal Appeal No.27/2013 dated 25.02.2015 is confirmed. The bail bond of the accused and the surety stands cancelled. Registry to transmit a copy of this judgment along with lower Court records to the Courts below immediately.